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Hamas attacked Israel in the hopes of derailiIng normalization between Israel and Saudia Arabia since it would force Israel to respond. That would force Arabs to still consider Palestinian interests instead of being forgotten and pushed aside.
Statistics: Posted by Potemkin — 29 Oct 2023 15:44
Neo wrote:
@Wellsy @Potemkin
Well if terrorists cannot be deterred, then you have to either destroy them or severely weaken them to the point where they are not much of a threat such as was done with ISIS and Al-Queda.
But I think terrorist organizations can be deterred. It's just that with Hamas, when they saw that Israel and Saudia Arabia were coming close to normalized relations they felt that severely threatened their interests given that their interests were being forgotten about. Hence why they struck.
They were hoping to derail Saudi and Israeli normalization of relations. But this brings us back to the point of the original post that deterrence is about interests too.
Greek has a few words for fear, of which phobos (φόβος; the root of our word ‘phobia’) is the most familiar to English speakers; but Thucydides here uses deos (δέος). Where phobos is an unreasoning terrified panic (the fear of the sudden onset of battle, for instance), deos is a more general word – more a dread of or a desire to avoid a thing to come in the future. It has a greater sense of reality and reason – deos can be a reasoning, well-informed fear about future events, even quite distant ones. Thucydides is thus not asserting a ‘right to panic’ but a right to look forward to future dangers and act in advance to preempt them. In this sense, the motive of fear means that states will try to – and have a right to – proactively avert negative future outcomes for themselves. In particular, fear comes first because the primary concern of all states is survival. We might sum up fear by then saying that Thucydides contends states will fight to exist.
The word here translated as interest, ophelia (ὠφέλεια) has a number of meanings, such as ‘help’ or ‘aid’ (which is why it is sometimes used as a given name, as in Hamlet), but also ‘profit, advantage, gain’ or even ‘loot’ or ‘spoils’ (as in, stuff seized in war). Ophelia is a thing you get – by any means – which renders you better off. Thus interest, in this context, means that states will pursue their own gain or profit – or that of their citizens – at the expense of other states. Naturally, the ophelia of one state must often interfere with the deos of another – my greedy eyes looking over your resources may cause you to fear me.
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Conclusion
This chapter offered a critique of rational choice and routine activities theories by giving examples of the problematic nature of methodological individualism and instrumentalism. In particular, the lack of attention paid to the role of motivation within both theories was explicated. I demonstrated that deterrence does not enable us to analyze structural motivation or its relationship to individual actors; a connection that is necessary given the global context of terrorism. Finally, alternative theories of terrorism offer ways to move beyond the confines of the rational actor model of understanding terrorism. The following chapter addresses the consequences of our continued use of deterrence as a counterterrorism strategy.
The individual cost benefit rationale that deterrence theory assumes terrorists operate under eliminates the political context of terrorism. Therefore, within rational choice theory, terrorist acts are not part of a larger political project. In fact, rational choice theory places an emphasis on economic and material goals. As Moghaddam (2006:24) suggests, it is certainly possible that terrorists are rationally motivated to gain geographic territories or even material or natural resources. However, in the process of committing terrorist acts, terrorists often destroy material resources and sometimes destroy themselves. He suggests that acts such as suicidal terrorism are inconsistent with materialist motivation. Therefore, the deterrence paradigm removes terrorist acts out of the political realm. By rethinking terrorist explanations, we change how we interpret terrorist acts i.e. politically. For instance, a deterrence approach to terrorism does not facilitate the inclusion of political and structural inequalities into the terrorism discourse; thereby making terrorism apolitical. Conversely, when terrorism is understood within a global context, not only are the structural inequalities revealed, but the political context of terrorism, by definition becomes apparent.
How is it that people go, willing to sacrifice their lives, to a conflict apparently so far from their everyday concerns? Scott Atran (2014) conducted face-to-face surveys in a community in Morocco which had provided many foreign fighters, and in Lebanon amongst Shia, Sunni and Christians. He tested subjects’ attitudes including their willingness to sacrifice themselves in war and their attitude towards others who do so. His research has the merit that he spoke to people who might or might not become foreign fighters and who were acquainted with the practice at first hand.
Atran’s hypothesis is that the coincidence of two factors make for the readiness to become a foreign fighter and/or approve of others in the community who do so. These two factors are (1) “identity fusion” with a larger group whose welfare may be threatened, and (2) holding a “sacred value.”
A sacred value is something that motivates a person’s actions but which transcends any material interest, such as King and Country or Socialism. A sacred value is something abstract and remote from the close personal ties which commonly motivate sacrifice of individual material interest. Identity fusion refers to a person whose identity is wholly subsumed by a collectivity, whether a nation or religious community or a family or group of close comrades. A subject’s identity is fused with a group if the subject cannot see themselves apart from the relevant bonded identity group. The combination of these two factors is entailed when the group to which a person’s identity is fused is united by a sacred value, when we-all are fighting for the same thing. In the event that there is a threat to the sacred value uniting the social group to which the person’s identity is fused, then that person would be prepared to die defending the interests of that group, even if they are the last one standing.
A person may have a strong personal belief, but so long as that that belief is just personal, and not an ideal shared by and constituting a community of others, it cannot motivate extreme sacrifice.
Statistics: Posted by Wellsy — 29 Oct 2023 13:22
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Michael Rühle of NATO Review wrote:
Deterrence is making a comeback. Perceived by many as a mere relic of the Cold War, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has hastened its resurrection. However, the debate over the past months as to how best to deter Russia reveals that 20 years of neglect have taken their toll. Much of what was once considered basic knowledge on deterrence appears to have evaporated. What, then, is deterrence? What can it achieve – and what can it not?
Deterrence is the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action. This can be achieved through the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) or by denying the opponent’s war aims (deterrence by denial). This simple definition often leads to the conclusion that all it takes to deter is to put enough force on display. As long as both sides act “rationally”, i.e. according to a cost-benefit calculus, and if none of them is suicidal, their military potentials will keep each other in check.
If only it were so easy. History abounds with examples of deterrence failing despite a balance of forces, and even cases in which the weaker side attacked the stronger. In some cases, the weaker side banked on the element of surprise. The military leadership of Imperial Japan, for example, was fully aware of US military superiority. But if a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base would destroy a major part of the US Pacific Fleet while paralysing Washington politically, Japan might stand a chance of prevailing. In 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked the militarily superior Israel – not because they hoped to win, but because they wanted to re-establish the political clout they had lost after Israel had defeated them in the 1967 Six-Day-War. Israel had not seen the attack coming: why would two militarily inferior countries even think of attacking an opponent that was certain to emerge victorious? This self-assuredness led Israel to ignore the many warning signals about a pending attack. As a result, the rapidly advancing armies of Egypt and Syria were initially much more successful than expected. Military superiority had not ensured deterrence.
Another important example for the pitfalls of deterrence is provided by the 1982 Falklands War. Argentina, which contests the United Kingdom’s authority over the islands in the South Atlantic, knew only too well about the superiority of the British armed forces. However, over the course of several decades the UK had gradually been reducing its military protection for the islands. Thus, while London kept emphasising that the Falklands were British, the military Junta in Buenos Aires became convinced that such statements were mere lip service. When the Junta faced a domestic crisis that threatened its rule, it tried to generate support by stirring patriotic feelings and occupied the islands. Deterrence had failed because the United Kingdom had ignored an important factor. Striking a tough pose while at the same time reducing the means to make good on it undermines one of deterrence’s most important ingredients: credibility. The story did not end there, however. Much to Argentina’s surprise, the British Navy sailed to the South Atlantic and re-conquered the islands. General Galtieri, the Chief of Argentina’s military Junta, later admitted that he never believed that a European country would be ready to pay such a high price for a few insignificant islands so far away. Argentina, too, had miscalculated.
But could Galtieri and his fellow countrymen not have guessed that a proud nation like the United Kingdom would not stand idly by as part of her overseas territory was being occupied by another power? Should one not have known that remaining passive would have spelled the end for any British government? The answer: yes, in normal times Argentina may well have pondered such scenarios. However, in a crisis humans tend to think along a different kind of logic. Indeed, many studies about human behaviour demonstrate that people who fear to lose something valuable are ready to take greater risks than those who hope to make a gain. In the context of the Falklands War, this means that for the Junta, which was under siege politically, occupying the “Malvinas” was not about a gain, but rather about avoiding losing power. This made them take risks they otherwise would not have dared to take. Rationality – a precondition for a stable deterrence system – had evaporated.
Looking at Russian domestic politics today, the lessons of 1982 are worth reconsidering: stirring nationalism in order to generate political support may lead one to military adventurism which can be self-defeating.
All these cases demonstrate that deterrence is not just about military balances, but also about interests. If the opponent’s interest in achieving a certain objective is higher than one’s own, deterrence may fail. A classic example is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. When it became clear that Washington was ready to defend its core security interests, the Soviet Union withdrew the missiles it had started to deploy in Cuba. Another example is the Vietnam War. Although the United States was militarily far superior, it ultimately had to withdraw because the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were willing to make much greater sacrifices to achieve their goals than the US was willing to make in support of South Vietnam. This asymmetric set of interests not only makes deterrence fail, it also makes big powers lose small wars.
But what about nuclear deterrence? Should the fear of the enormous destructive power of such weapons not be enough to virtually guarantee deterrence? The answer to this question is the same as to the “conventional” examples cited above: even in the nuclear domain, deterrence depends on the interests that one seeks to protect. If a nation’s existence is at stake, the use of nuclear weapons is credible. Accordingly, deterrence between nuclear weapons states is considered to be relatively “stable”. By contrast, extending one’s national nuclear deterrence to allies is much more complicated. As British Defence Minister Denis Healey put it in the 1960s, one only needed five per cent credibility to deter the Russians, but 95 per cent to reassure the Europeans. Despite this “Healey Theorem”, however, extended nuclear deterrence has become a central pillar of international order. This is not only the case for NATO, but also for the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan, South Korea and Australia are under the US “nuclear umbrella”.
It is moot to speculate whether the United States would indeed be willing to risk nuclear escalation in order to protect an Ally. What counts is the political signal that Washington views the security of its Allies as a fundamental national security interest. However, such a message will only be convincing if the US is militarily present in those regions that is claims to defend. This ensures that in a conflict Washington will be involved from the start. Without such a presence, neither Allies nor opponents would perceive such a nuclear commitment as credible.
Statistics: Posted by Politics_Observer — 29 Oct 2023 01:31
Statistics: Posted by late — 18 Mar 2023 10:41
Sébastien Roblin of CNN wrote:
For 30 to 40 minutes in international airspace over the Black Sea on Tuesday morning local time, two Russian fighter jets harried a slow-moving American surveillance drone by flying dangerously close to it and dumping fuel over it, according to the US military.
Things came to an end only when one of Russia’s Su-27 ‘Flanker’ planes reportedly collided with the propeller on the drone’s tail, causing the MQ-9 Reaper drone to crash into the sea. It was the first time the countries’ military aircraft made direct physical contact since the start of the Ukraine war last year.
A video released by the US military Thursday shows the aggressive fuel dumping maneuver, as well as the approach of an Su-27 jet that seems likely to have clipped the drone. Subsequent footage shows impact damage to the propeller. The video further eroded the credibility of Moscow’s denial that any collision took place.
The Russian jets’ activities were bullying, pure and simple — at best an attempt to muscle aircraft out of airspace that’s open to all, if not outright destroy it. Some are tempted to advocate a response in kind to punish Russia for this episode, including Sen. Lindsay Graham (R-SC), who recently said on Fox News the US should threaten that any future Russian aircraft approaching those of the US military would be “shot down.”
But Washington shouldn’t stoop to Moscow’s level. The best reaction to schoolyard bullying is to show you aren’t rattled by provocations, and this arena is no different.
That doesn’t mean the US should stop its surveillance flights, both manned and unmanned, over this (and other) international airspace. In fact, it’s essential that the US continue its missions unabated. But an excessively dramatic American reaction could destabilize the current norms surrounding such flights and lead to a tit-for-tat spiral with the Kremlin that could escalate unpredictably.
That’s something to be avoided unless absolutely essential — particularly because at present these surveillance flights are giving the US valuable intelligence. Russia’s military has already been paying a price pretty much daily thanks to the intelligence collection activities of MQ-9 drones and other systems.
It would be counterproductive to jeopardize that with a heated response to Russia’s bad behavior, something that remains true even though this incident is far from isolated and encounters such as these are likely to increase.
In October, the UK said that a Russian Su-27 tailing a British RC-135W plane over the Black Sea fired a missile nearby (Russia said it was an accident). Fortunately no damage was done. In 2016, Russian bombers buzzed dangerously low over the US destroyer Donald Cook while it was on patrol in the Black Sea. And there was even a 2019 incident where a Russian warship intentionally came within 50 feet of colliding with the USS Chancellorsville, per the US military. Overall, since Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent Western backlash, such encounters have multiplied in frequency.
It’s worth unpacking which surveillance encounters violate common norms and which don’t. Rival militaries that are not at war routinely shadow each other’s activities and intercept each other’s aircraft and ships — in other words, send fast planes and vessels to come within close visual range of their adversaries’ craft to show they’re being watched and kept at bay. It’s legal under international law and generally perceived as acceptable over international waters so long as neither side performs maneuvers dangerously close to the other.
Russian pilots often practice safe intercepts in more routine encounters, as do American pilots. But a 2022 study by the Rand Corporation found that Russian pilots were apparently ordered to conduct unsafe intercepts to try to drive away foreign forces near areas they consider sensitive.
Undoubtedly at the heart of Russia’s aggressive intercept Tuesday was the drone’s gathering of intelligence that could be used to assist Ukraine’s military. But galling as that may be for Moscow, the US and Russia haven’t declared war against each other, and physical attacks on the other’s military in international waters and airspace remain illegal except in self-defense against direct, imminent attack.
What most likely happened on Tuesday is that the Russian pilots were instructed to seriously harass the drone, and pilot error then resulted in an unplanned collision. As for Russia’s complaints that the drone turned off its transponders (which makes it possible to identify the aircraft at a distance), the fighters interacted with the drone for more than a half hour; it’s hardly believable that they didn’t know it was American — and if they thought it was Ukrainian, they would have almost certainly shot it down.
Russia would like to pretend the Black Sea is its personal pond, but these are international waters bordered by Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania and Turkey as well — all but one are NATO members. The rules surrounding international waters and airspace are clear: National sovereignty extends no further than 12 nautical miles from the nearest coastline or border. If Russia wants to dispatch nuclear-capable bombers just farther than 12 nautical miles off the coast of Alaska, it can and has done so without major incident.
In the current case, Russia is insisting the drone was in an exclusion zone it asserted around Ukraine for its “special military operation” (i.e. a full-fledged war of conquest). While countries claim all kinds of additional jurisdictions like exclusive economic zones and air defense identification zones, the 12 nautical mile rule is the only one that has indisputable weight internationally.
In the current case, the US has responded so far by dressing down the Russian ambassador over the incident. The Pentagon might also decide to send manned fighters to escort drones to dissuade harassment. But this is something that couldn’t be sustained indefinitely; the point of drones is they’re generally much less costly per hour to operate than fighters and put personnel at less risk. Alternatively, the drones could be armed with their own air-to-air missiles.
Either way, the impact would be mostly psychological because US aircraft are unlikely to be authorized to shoot at Russian warplanes merely for performing dangerous maneuvers. The ethics of attacks on drones constitute a Wild West since the expansion of their technology has been so rapid. But since their destruction rightly lacks the moral weight of an attack on a manned craft, it makes sense not to treat the downing of an individual drone as a casus belli — which is what the Trump administration assessed in 2019 when it cancelled a retaliatory strike after Iran downed a US drone.
A sustained, deliberate pattern of destructive Russian attacks on drones would merit a response, but that’s not the case with the Black Sea collision — yet. For now, the US can and should confidently continue to occupy the high ground from a position of strength, defending a mutual norm which gives the United States, its allies and even its enemies transparency regarding each other’s military actions.
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Godstud wrote:
You can tell the American war-mongers here by who is shouting for war. One man had someone attack him. That is not justification for the deaths of tens of thousands, or more. You guys are fucking delusional if that's what you think!
I doubt Salman Rushdie would support fucktards asking for a war in his name, simply because yet another extremist made an attempt to kill him.
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But I don't think you really believe that, so please, keep trolling around.
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