[ThomasNewton]

I just want to clarify: I am in no way opposed to utilitarian methods; but I distrust contemporary societies and very much doubt that good would come of trusting politicians, judges, officials or just plain people to use utilitarianism towards desirable ends.

This is exactly the problem that comes with practicing Utilitarianism. Obversity mentioned dictators like Stalin who thought they were doing the right thing. Furthermore under Utilitarianism we can't even say he was wrong, since it's possible a world without Stalin has lower utility than a world with Stalin.

If you can somehow turn the statement "X action produces good consequences, thus X action is good" into "I think X is good to do, therefore X is good", then by all means do so. I'm having trouble, though.

We both agree that practicing idealized Utilitarianism is logically impossible. If the former is the idealized version of Utilitarianism, the latter is its applied version. It will be impossible for people to prove X produces good consequences, therefore people will only be able to think X is good, and conclude that it is good.

This could be an equivocation over the term 'moral', depending on how you meant it. If I am sad, I am not immoral, and similarly if I am happy, I am not necessarily moral.

Forgive me if I misunderstand, but isn't that directly opposed to the concept of Utilitarianism? My moral in this instance I mean morally good, doesn't Utilitarianism say happiness is morally good and therefore unhappiness is morally wrong?

Utilitarianism may be impossible to practice perfectly, but I fail to see what's wrong with that.

It's because practicing Utilitarianism imperfectly is immoral under other systems of morality if they are true, and ironically it may be wrong even if Utilitarianism is right because it could result in lower Utility. We've gone through several examples of problems with the application, even if Utilitarianism is correct it may be right to practice a different ethical system because the latter would result in higher Utility. This is something it has in common with other systems of consequentialism.

As for using the aforementioned examples the thing I'm trying to avoid is the Reification fallacy. In creating an idealized circumstance you have to work within the axioms assumed by the scenario-if John has 5 apples and gives 3 to Jim your answer for how many he has left can't be he buys 5 more and has 7.

Your refutation of the island example, for instance, despite being very well stated begs the question-in the beginning you assume people have a positive utility and conclude they have a positive utility. Without making the initial assumption that people are more happy than unhappy, can you show why people would be more happy then unhappy in real life/a scarcity scenario?

I wasn't going to bring this up because it's of side relevance but since you do seem to be knowledgeable and we are having a god discussion I figure I might as well. Increasing Utility from 0 to 1 is +1, while increasing it from -1 to +1 is +2. Therefore under Utilitarianism the later is more more moral than the former, correct? I submit to you that people have a much greater capacity for pain than for pleasure, and therefore the relief caused from removing pain is greater than feeling pleasure. This is why the cure for a broken arm isn't to have sex, the pain is much greater than the pleasure. Therefore it would cause a greater increase in Utility to torture everyone until they die than to make them happy. This becomes a paradox because the most immoral thing to do is also the most moral thing to do.

I am glad you appreciate the discussion, I'm also enjoying talking to you. I have a new book on world philosophy, when I get to Utilitarianism I'll have to see what points it makes.

Eran posted before I did and points out another problem with the application and I believe verification of Utilitarianism. It's exactly what I said earlier-instead of assuming everyone's happiness is comparable, can you show that any two people's happiness is comparable?

[eugenekop]

Unless I missed it, nobody seems to have mentioned one of the biggest problems with Utilitarianism - the impossibility of inter-personal comparisons of happiness.

It is not impossible, it is just somewhat subjective and inaccurate. I am a libertarian not because I believe in some natural rights. There is nothing inherently natural about property. I believe in libertarianism because I believe it makes the population wealthy, healthy, happy, and technologically advanced. That's utilitarianism.

[grassroots1]

Unless I missed it, nobody seems to have mentioned one of the biggest problems with Utilitarianism - the impossibility of inter-personal comparisons of happiness.

Utilitarianism is aimed at some variation of "maximizing happiness", implicitly assumes that happiness, at least in principle, can be summed up over multiple people. Worst yet, that the an increase in happiness of one person can be compared with a decrease of happiness of another person.

This is not just difficult. It is totally impossible, and with it the entire Utilitarian project.

Yes, some people are perfectly happy without food or water.

This is exactly the problem that comes with practicing Utilitarianism. Obversity mentioned dictators like Stalin who thought they were doing the right thing. Furthermore under Utilitarianism we can't even say he was wrong, since it's possible a world without Stalin has lower utility than a world with Stalin.

The whole question is silly. Everyone uses utilitarianism and rights-based ethics based on the circumstances that are presented to them. Would you fight a revolutionary movement to secure independence for your nation? Americans at one point in history found it justified to kill to secure that right. They used a means (killing) to achieve an end (independence). If they had all rolled over and said, "thou shalt not kill," maybe we'd still be living under the British yoke.

Some resign themselves to doing things that they find morally reprehensible in order to secure their own family's safety, like maybe a member of police or security forces in, say, Egypt? They are using a means to achieve an end which they feel is justified, and whether or not we feel that it is justified is a different discussion.

Any absolute morality that a person claims to live their lives by can be challenged by circumstances, and the person has a good chance of breaking their code, especially if there are extenuating circumstances that make the breaking of that code appear morally right, and not just necessary. "Thou shalt not kill" is a perfect example. "Thou shalt not steal." What if my mother is starving? I'll steal and steal and steal and never give it a second thought, in that case, and I'm not a person who steals. But then again I'm not poor.

It's easy to dictate morality from an ivory tower, rich people have been doing it for centuries if not millenia.

[ThomasNewton]

Grassroots, you should read this page. It explains the logically fallacy inherent in your argument.

I hope Obversity hasn't abandoned this thread, I suppose I should just be patient and what for a response from him.

[grassroots1]

I'm not sure how the is-ought fallacy is inherent in my argument. I'm not making any judgment of what should be, just saying what is and always will be. You can say I'm incorrect in my assessment of what is and will be, but since I'm not making any "ought" argument at all, the fallacy doesn't really apply.

[ThomasNewton]

I'm not sure how the is-ought fallacy is inherent in my argument. I'm not making any judgment of what should be, just saying what is and always will be. You can say I'm incorrect in my assessment of what is and will be, but since I'm not making any "ought" argument at all, the fallacy doesn't really apply.

Oh! Well we're talking about how things ought to be, so it's just irrelevant to the discussion at hand. Thanks for clearing that up, though-it's always good to have more opinions!

[grassroots1]

My whole point is that this discussion is divorced from reality. It doesn't matter what you believe people ought to live by, rights-based or utilitarian ethics, because people will live by them both, regardless. That's why I find the libertarian absolutist morality ridiculous, because they say that taxation is theft, and theft is wrong, and therefore taxation is wrong. I would challenge the very basis of that argument, ignoring the argument of whether taxation is actually theft. Is theft always wrong?

Everyone, under certain circumstances, would find it necessary, and even morally right, to steal. That is the plain fact.

[Melodramatic]

^

I agree.

In general I find these attempts to transform ethics and morality to a political argument is plainly ridiculous, and causes a vulgarization of both. Fact is that law will never be totally synchronized with what I define right or wrong, even if people will follow my every word. Such things exist for the individual, and for him alone.

Its easy to say that society should do everything you define as right, after all what else would you have them do? but the trick to understand society, rather than preach morals at them.

[KPres]

Deontology is all well and good, but the way I see it, if your foundational principles don't lead to positive outcomes, you might want to re-examine those principles. There needs to be some back-and-forth between deontology and consequentialism.

But what's a positive outcome?

I've known people who think humanity is a virus that should be eradicated from the planet. Not an idea most people consider a "positive outcome", but there you have it.

[Paradigm]

But what's a positive outcome?

I've known people who think humanity is a virus that should be eradicated from the planet. Not an idea most people consider a "positive outcome", but there you have it.

Well here's where a bit of utilitarianism can come in handy, isn't it? Clearly eradicating people from the planet would not create the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, now would it? Of course, the problem with pure utilitarianism is that it doesn't respect the individual, so that's where deontology comes into play. Combine them, and you get something like rule utilitarianism. Or you could start from deontology and get something like Rawls' original position.

[ThomasNewton]

Well here's where a bit of utilitarianism can come in handy, isn't it? Clearly eradicating people from the planet would not create the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, now would it?

Well...actually Paradigm...

1) Under Utilitarianism death has a utility of 0 since a dead person does not feel happiness but does not feel sadness either. The only way death is bad is if it causes other people to be sad.

2) We live in a universe of scarcity. Since there exists only a limited amount of resources the opportunity cost of one individual using a resource affects everyone else in existence by denying them that resource. Therefore existence has an overall negative Utility.

Conclusion: Under Utilitarianism the morally justified thing to do is to wipe out humanity. If everyone is dead no one is left to be sad, and an overall utility of 0 is higher than a negative utility.

Also as a side note, there are certain theories of deontology that claim if moral actions are followed moral consequences will result.

[El Gilroy]

Actually, the highest reasonable utility is accomplished when enough people are dead for the rest to live on happily using regenerating resources.

[SecretSquirrel]

no the highest utilitarian outcome is when a sadist psychopath dictator like pol pot gets to massacre his population and derive incredible utility from their suffering.

It's called a "Utility Monster"

[Obversity]

You're not by any chance a Randian, eh Squirrel?

If the former is the idealized version of Utilitarianism, the latter is its applied version. It will be impossible for people to prove X produces good consequences, therefore people will only be able to think X is good, and conclude that it is good.

This is a bit of a false dichotomy, don't you think, Newton? There are many shades of grey between 'to prove' and 'to think', whatever you take the latter to mean. I objected to your claim originally because it was a mischaracterisation of utilitarianism which could be used -- and had been used -- to ridicule it. Since you're so fond of fallacies, I'll be explicit: this is a straw man, and a bad one at that.

Forgive me if I misunderstand, but isn't that directly opposed to the concept of Utilitarianism? My moral in this instance I mean morally good, doesn't Utilitarianism say happiness is morally good and therefore unhappiness is morally wrong?

You are forgiven. A person, if he is happy, can still be 'morally wrong', where morally wrong under utilitarianism means that he has caused great unhappiness. An active sadist exemplifies this. Similarly, a person who is unhappy can have acted morally his whole life, and thus be a 'moral' person.

"Are they [depressed individuals] therefore less moral than other people as well?"

If you use 'less moral' to mean 'more immoral than someone who can be happier', then I stick by my original accusation: this is an equivocation. "Moral" as an adjective applied to people refers to their actions and intentions. Probability of attaining, or capacity to attain, happiness, does not make someone '(morally) good' or '(morally) bad'.

even if Utilitarianism is correct it may be right to practice a different ethical system because the latter would result in higher Utility.

I agree completely, which is why I emphasised the use of historical, political and social analysis in determining what tends to produce happiness. Act or action utilitarianism may be too difficult for us to use in many situations, and for these situations, another system, such as one using rules, might win out.

A stronger argument against act utilitarianism would be to contest the world's determinism and thus theoretically undermine it, rather than attack its applicability. But that delves into metaphysics, and probably isn't appropriate for this forum.

Your refutation of the island example, for instance, despite being very well stated begs the question-in the beginning you assume people have a positive utility and conclude they have a positive utility. Without making the initial assumption that people are more happy than unhappy, can you show why people would be more happy then unhappy in real life/a scarcity scenario?

I didn't assume anything, I merely gave an example of a possibility. To conclude that the island must have negative utility, you must rigorously discount the possibility of them being happy, which you can't do, because it's a matter of individual psychology, and a matter of how the group culture evolves and the previous cultural determining factors.

I bet if you put a bunch of Buddhist monks on the island, they wouldn't' be unhappy. Maybe we should convert to Buddhism? =P

I submit to you that people have a much greater capacity for pain than for pleasure

Of this you are correct. People do indeed feel pain much more than they feel pleasure. However, the conclusion that you draw from this is quite frankly moronic.

and therefore the relief caused from removing pain is greater than feeling pleasure.

The relief felt is never going to outweigh the negative utility of the pain. Relief isn't really pleasure; it's just pain stopping, which might be appreciated emotionally in the form of happiness, but will not outweigh the experience of the pain.

For you to agree with your own argument, you would also have to agree that you would like to be tortured for a period of time, then not tortured. Only if you think that this would make you happy, can you say that it's congruent with utilitarianism -- and even then, it's only congruent with utilitarianism for you, personally; others may not agree that it would make them happy.

About measuring happiness:

This is certainly a problem for classical utilitarianism. However, I don't believe it's an insurmountable one for utilitarianism, requiring that we scrap the whole idea.

Those to whom morality concerns are usually able to express themselves and their happiness or unhappiness, and this allows for a type of measure: a measure of quality, rather than quantity. This type of data has far greater potential than does scaling data, though it may be difficult to use and obtain on a large scale, which again has implications for applying utilitarianism.

This problem of measuring is one of the reasons I hold liberal, or 'preference' utilitarian views. Rather than trying to make people happy, you let them make themselves happy, and give them a hand where and when they need and / or request it.

[Arie]

Utility means usefulness. One question is, "useful to who?" Who or what counts in evaluating utility?
Another is assigning a value or measure of utility to different actions or options and/or their consequences: The purpose of assigning such values is to resolve conflicts, to make a decision regarding which option to choose, when faced with mutually exclusive options.
To that end, we also need some calculus for comparing the utilities of different options, and combining the utilities for different agents. It doesn't necessarily mean just summing the utilities. There are different options. The main alternative I can think of is maximizing minimal utility -- minimal over the set of agents. That is to say that we choose the option for which the lowest benefit or utility for an agent is maximized.

In fact, it seems to be a standard optimization problem, with utilities as weights. However, we can apply such optimization using weights based on values, which might also be based on cultural and religious beliefs rather than just on utilities. And the various views of how moral decisions are to be made can be translated into the calculus we choose to use in this optimization. For example, if we believe murder is absolutely wrong, it would have an "infinite negative value", or a special value with that effect. It can even be considered a utility value, since dying can be considered the lowest utility for the one dying.

In other words, I don't see a reason to abandon all mechanics of optimization. Rather, it seems to me that the core issue regarding utilitarianism can be expressed as whether the weights assigned should be based on utility. I'm not sure it matters, since we are free to call any weights "utilities", or argue that they are -- it doesn't make a difference to the calculation. The rest of the contentions can be expressed as different methods of making the calculation, different "calculi", and different optimization criteria -- i.e. how we define what we wish to optimize, regardless of what we call it -- whether we maximize "total value", or "minimal value", or something else, they all represent maximizing value (e.g. utility), but define that maximum differently. It's called the "optimization criteria".

Finally, from my personal experience with using optimization in some engineering class, I found it reasonable to use gut feelings and intuition to first make a decision, and then work backwards to find the weights that would justify that decision. If a decision is really bad, you could not find reasonable weights that would justify it. In other words, it might be better to use these mechanics as a way of verifying the reasonableness of a decision, rather than to actually make the decision, as a practical matter.

[SecretSquirrel]

You're not by any chance a Randian, eh Squirrel?

I'm a true anarchist, a classical liberal or libertarian to the logical extreme. I'm sure I would agree with a significant amount of what Rand said, though I've never cared much for her work because her epistemology is retarded to the extreme.

[Obversity]

Classical liberalism does not imply anarchism -- at least not the classical liberalism I'm familiar with, i.e. Locke and Mills. Incidentally, these two characters' foundations, while completely different, are quite relevant here: Locke was a natural rights proponent, and Mills a utilitarian. Say what you like about his ideas regarding the State, Locke's foundation for these 'natural rights' was shoddy at best. Mills arguments, however, I quite like and respect -- not just because they were utilitarian in principle, but because his principles are secular, and not requiring 'God' to be, uh, valid.

[Eran]

The two (Locke and Mills) also lived in quite different periods. Locke's ideas of natural rights have since been promoted by many secular libertarians, including, recently, Rothbard and Hoppe.

Mills's utilitarianism, on the other hand, is a deeply flawed theory. It can be partially rescued by (1) broadening the concept of the good from happiness maximization, and thus going from utilitarianism to consequentionalism, and (2) substituting act-utilitarianism with rule-utilitarianism (or, better yet, combining both into rule-consequentionailsm).

Randy Barnett and David Friedman are examples of rule-consequentionalists who arrive at free-market anarchist ideas not much different from those of Rothbard or Hoppe.

[Obversity]

The phrase "classical liberal" invoked those two historical names in my mind -- I didn't even consider other thinkers with similar liberal conclusions.

A consequentialist must be committed to act-consequentialism in theory; rule-consequentialism is difficult to extrapolate as a theory, as it meets a problem of demarcation: at what, presumably arbitrary point do we stop making rules? What if a new unforeseen scenario pops up? Do we create a new rule? If if so, why not just do that for every scenario? After all, no scenario is exactly the same. But isn't this just act utilitarianism?

I agree, however, that formulating rules that generally produce good consequences is a far more practical method -- that is to say, it is a more efficient, effective and easy method -- for deciding most moral action, and that consequentialism in political practice should take the form of rule utilitarianism, making good use of precedent, and so that the authority remains ostensibly consistent in its policies and rulings.

For example, you could create a general rule saying that "discrimination against minorities is bad", and apply that to all policies, but still give a consequentialist reason for the rule, rather than a rights based one.

I may look into some of the names you've mentioned, so thanks, Eran; I'm on this forum to learn, after all.

[Daktoria]

Utility is subjective, but rights are only pursued when afforded.

If anyone knows a word to replace, "only pursued when afforded" that'd be awesome.

All and all it depends on whether importance or existence deserves/contains priority.

If it's existence, utilitarianism succeeds. If it's importance, rights succeed.

These words can be reduced/deconstructed forever though. Ugh........ maybe success itself is an illusion.