- 15 Feb 2011 13:52
#13629691
This is exactly the problem that comes with practicing Utilitarianism. Obversity mentioned dictators like Stalin who thought they were doing the right thing. Furthermore under Utilitarianism we can't even say he was wrong, since it's possible a world without Stalin has lower utility than a world with Stalin.
We both agree that practicing idealized Utilitarianism is logically impossible. If the former is the idealized version of Utilitarianism, the latter is its applied version. It will be impossible for people to prove X produces good consequences, therefore people will only be able to think X is good, and conclude that it is good.
Forgive me if I misunderstand, but isn't that directly opposed to the concept of Utilitarianism? My moral in this instance I mean morally good, doesn't Utilitarianism say happiness is morally good and therefore unhappiness is morally wrong?
It's because practicing Utilitarianism imperfectly is immoral under other systems of morality if they are true, and ironically it may be wrong even if Utilitarianism is right because it could result in lower Utility. We've gone through several examples of problems with the application, even if Utilitarianism is correct it may be right to practice a different ethical system because the latter would result in higher Utility. This is something it has in common with other systems of consequentialism.
As for using the aforementioned examples the thing I'm trying to avoid is the Reification fallacy. In creating an idealized circumstance you have to work within the axioms assumed by the scenario-if John has 5 apples and gives 3 to Jim your answer for how many he has left can't be he buys 5 more and has 7.
Your refutation of the island example, for instance, despite being very well stated begs the question-in the beginning you assume people have a positive utility and conclude they have a positive utility. Without making the initial assumption that people are more happy than unhappy, can you show why people would be more happy then unhappy in real life/a scarcity scenario?
I wasn't going to bring this up because it's of side relevance but since you do seem to be knowledgeable and we are having a god discussion I figure I might as well. Increasing Utility from 0 to 1 is +1, while increasing it from -1 to +1 is +2. Therefore under Utilitarianism the later is more more moral than the former, correct? I submit to you that people have a much greater capacity for pain than for pleasure, and therefore the relief caused from removing pain is greater than feeling pleasure. This is why the cure for a broken arm isn't to have sex, the pain is much greater than the pleasure. Therefore it would cause a greater increase in Utility to torture everyone until they die than to make them happy. This becomes a paradox because the most immoral thing to do is also the most moral thing to do.
I am glad you appreciate the discussion, I'm also enjoying talking to you. I have a new book on world philosophy, when I get to Utilitarianism I'll have to see what points it makes.
Eran posted before I did and points out another problem with the application and I believe verification of Utilitarianism. It's exactly what I said earlier-instead of assuming everyone's happiness is comparable, can you show that any two people's happiness is comparable?
El Gilroy wrote:I just want to clarify: I am in no way opposed to utilitarian methods; but I distrust contemporary societies and very much doubt that good would come of trusting politicians, judges, officials or just plain people to use utilitarianism towards desirable ends.
This is exactly the problem that comes with practicing Utilitarianism. Obversity mentioned dictators like Stalin who thought they were doing the right thing. Furthermore under Utilitarianism we can't even say he was wrong, since it's possible a world without Stalin has lower utility than a world with Stalin.
Obversity wrote:If you can somehow turn the statement "X action produces good consequences, thus X action is good" into "I think X is good to do, therefore X is good", then by all means do so. I'm having trouble, though.
We both agree that practicing idealized Utilitarianism is logically impossible. If the former is the idealized version of Utilitarianism, the latter is its applied version. It will be impossible for people to prove X produces good consequences, therefore people will only be able to think X is good, and conclude that it is good.
Obversity wrote:This could be an equivocation over the term 'moral', depending on how you meant it. If I am sad, I am not immoral, and similarly if I am happy, I am not necessarily moral.
Forgive me if I misunderstand, but isn't that directly opposed to the concept of Utilitarianism? My moral in this instance I mean morally good, doesn't Utilitarianism say happiness is morally good and therefore unhappiness is morally wrong?
Obversity wrote:Utilitarianism may be impossible to practice perfectly, but I fail to see what's wrong with that.
It's because practicing Utilitarianism imperfectly is immoral under other systems of morality if they are true, and ironically it may be wrong even if Utilitarianism is right because it could result in lower Utility. We've gone through several examples of problems with the application, even if Utilitarianism is correct it may be right to practice a different ethical system because the latter would result in higher Utility. This is something it has in common with other systems of consequentialism.
As for using the aforementioned examples the thing I'm trying to avoid is the Reification fallacy. In creating an idealized circumstance you have to work within the axioms assumed by the scenario-if John has 5 apples and gives 3 to Jim your answer for how many he has left can't be he buys 5 more and has 7.
Your refutation of the island example, for instance, despite being very well stated begs the question-in the beginning you assume people have a positive utility and conclude they have a positive utility. Without making the initial assumption that people are more happy than unhappy, can you show why people would be more happy then unhappy in real life/a scarcity scenario?
I wasn't going to bring this up because it's of side relevance but since you do seem to be knowledgeable and we are having a god discussion I figure I might as well. Increasing Utility from 0 to 1 is +1, while increasing it from -1 to +1 is +2. Therefore under Utilitarianism the later is more more moral than the former, correct? I submit to you that people have a much greater capacity for pain than for pleasure, and therefore the relief caused from removing pain is greater than feeling pleasure. This is why the cure for a broken arm isn't to have sex, the pain is much greater than the pleasure. Therefore it would cause a greater increase in Utility to torture everyone until they die than to make them happy. This becomes a paradox because the most immoral thing to do is also the most moral thing to do.
I am glad you appreciate the discussion, I'm also enjoying talking to you. I have a new book on world philosophy, when I get to Utilitarianism I'll have to see what points it makes.
Eran posted before I did and points out another problem with the application and I believe verification of Utilitarianism. It's exactly what I said earlier-instead of assuming everyone's happiness is comparable, can you show that any two people's happiness is comparable?
"As a retired soldier I can second completely what Cartertonian said about military people. War is not glorious. No one who sees it up close and personal as they say, survives unchanged." - DrLee