[Truth To Power]

Fundamentally, all ethics is non-rational.

No, but almost all thinking about ethics is non-rational. A big part of the problem is that philosophy didn't -- largely still doesn't -- understand that millennia of ethical thought and philosophical speculation were all swept away more than 150 years ago, scientifically refuted by Darwin. To this day, the only rational thinking about ethics is in evolutionary psychology. All the rest is of no more significance or interest to the rational than the medieval scholastics' interminable disputes over how many angels could dance on the head of a pin.

[Lightman]

How could a mere descriptive claim about evolutionary processes yield a normative claim? In what sense could a scientific claim abolish all ethical claims? A material fact cannot prove the truth of metaphysical materialism.

[Truth To Power]

How could a mere descriptive claim about evolutionary processes yield a normative claim?

By showing what normative claims are: just another product of evolution, not descriptions of some metaphysical quality of the universe or divine ordinance.

In what sense could a scientific claim abolish all ethical claims?

By showing that ethical claims have no basis in anything but differential reproductive success.

A material fact cannot prove the truth of metaphysical materialism.

What does that have to do with ethical claims? It's up to those who posit a non-material basis for ethical claims to prove it exists. And of course, they can't.

[Lightman]

Kant offered a pretty good account of the mechanical nature/free ethical being divide before evolution was even a thing...

[Truth To Power]

Kant offered a pretty good account of the mechanical nature/free ethical being divide before evolution was even a thing...

Kant's account was rendered obsolete by Darwin. Kant simply and literally did not know what he was talking about.

[Lightman]

I don't see how Kant is remotely defeated by Darwin (he might have a harder time accounting for quantum physics, which complicated the traditional notion of causality). Kant didn't posit anything about the actual historical genesis of the human race,* and the Darwinian science has very little if anything to do with the major points Kant was making. To oversimplify a very complex subject: Kant posited that our commonsense notions of the world are wrong - that the world as we see it - the appearance of the world - could not be the world truly as it is. Rather, the things-in-themselves exist independently, freely, and unknowably, unbound by the laws of natural causality. But the world as it appears to us - that is, the way we combine the Categories into perception**- is indeed bound by natural causality. In fact, it operates under the laws of causality necessarily. (So, basically, Newtonian mechanics do in fact govern the world.)*** So how is it that humans are both natural beings, bound necessarily by causality, and yet at the same time ethical actors? The answer is that human action really is determined by mechanical causality, but that human action is free insofar as it is still free insofar as it determined by the things-in-themselves, which operate beyond the bounds of human causality (and are in fact responsible for human causality).

It would be difficult for a natural fact alone to defeat Kant's things-in-themselves idea. Kant is not making a natural position; he is taking a stance on natural positions.

*Actually, he might have in his Anthropology, but none of that is relevant to his major philosophical works, the Critique of Pure Reason and the Metaphysics of Morals.
** What the Categories are and how Kant derives them is esoteric and requires more room than I'm willing to spend here.
*** Kant's project here is to salvage causality after its Humean degradation.

[Truth To Power]

I don't see how Kant is remotely defeated by Darwin (he might have a harder time accounting for quantum physics, which complicated the traditional notion of causality). Kant didn't posit anything about the actual historical genesis of the human race,*

Of course not. He assumed it was created by God about 6000 years ago.

and the Darwinian science has very little if anything to do with the major points Kant was making.

Wrong. Darwin overturns all previous ideas related to human nature, and Kant was nothing if not a hypothesizer about human nature.

To oversimplify a very complex subject: Kant posited that our commonsense notions of the world are wrong - that the world as we see it - the appearance of the world - could not be the world truly as it is. Rather, the things-in-themselves exist independently, freely, and unknowably, unbound by the laws of natural causality.

But Darwin shows we can't have evolved to be deluded as a species. We have to see reality, because if we couldn't, our ancestors could not have survived competition with those who did.

But the world as it appears to us - that is, the way we combine the Categories into perception**- is indeed bound by natural causality. In fact, it operates under the laws of causality necessarily. (So, basically, Newtonian mechanics do in fact govern the world.)*** So how is it that humans are both natural beings, bound necessarily by causality, and yet at the same time ethical actors? The answer is that human action really is determined by mechanical causality, but that human action is free insofar as it is still free insofar as it determined by the things-in-themselves, which operate beyond the bounds of human causality (and are in fact responsible for human causality).

Again, this descends into incoherence in light of Darwin.

It would be difficult for a natural fact alone to defeat Kant's things-in-themselves idea. Kant is not making a natural position; he is taking a stance on natural positions.

A stance that happens to be incorrect.

** What the Categories are and how Kant derives them is esoteric and requires more room than I'm willing to spend here.

I.e., it's metaphysical BS of the exact sort that Darwin swept away.

*** Kant's project here is to salvage causality after its Humean degradation.

Actually, Kant was quite clear on the nature of his project: "I had to renounce knowledge in order to make room for faith."

[Lightman]

You have clearly not read any of Kant's works (I also think you haven't read any of Darwin's), and are instead relying on a completely inaccurate gloss of what he said. I will not engage in an extended debate on these issues, but I will respond to the specific points of your post.

Of course not. He assumed it was created by God about 6000 years ago.

I've never read anything to indicate that Kant was a Young Earth Creationist. He certainly believed in God, but he actively attacked the idea that we could be certain of God's existence through mere logical argumentation. The most damning attack on the classic formulation of the Ontological Argument is of Kantian origin. He made a large point in showing that belief in God was merely belief. We believe in God because we believe in an ethical order; yet the fruits of the world do not seem to go to the most ethical people (i.e., good people suffer). Insofar as we believe in an ethical order, we must believe in a God who punishes the unjust and rewards the just. But nothing can prove it.

Besides, Darwinism as such doesn't actually say anything about the origin of the universe.

Bear in mind that Kant was a philosopher of the Enlightenment. The Enlightened vision of God was not very much like what fundamentalist Christians imagine today.

But Darwin shows we can't have evolved to be deluded as a species. We have to see reality, because if we couldn't, our ancestors could not have survived competition with those who did.

Take a tree. We perceive the tree. Kant is not saying that there are sensuous characteristics of the tree that we simply fail to perceive; he is saying that if the tree has objective existence, i.e. existence as something beyond our senses, then that existence is inherently ungraspable. What lies beyond the sensuous by definition cannot be understood by the senses.

Again, this descends into incoherence in light of Darwin.

How? You're free to merely assert that, but you haven't shown that Darwinian natural beings differ substantially from merely Newtonian natural beings. Note, again, that Kant does not have a particular commitment to a divine origin of the world; all he believes is that a divine being punishes or rewards ethical actors.

A stance that happens to be incorrect.

This may be; but if it's incorrect, Darwin isn't responsible for proving it incorrect (nor would Darwin have taken himself to be saying anything about Kantian moral philosophy).

I.e., it's metaphysical BS of the exact sort that Darwin swept away.

The funny thing is that a huge part of Kant's philosophy was to critique existing metaphysics and reduce metaphysical excess. But yeah, Kant's thinking on the Categories is somewhat suspect.

Actually, Kant was quite clear on the nature of his project: "I had to renounce knowledge in order to make room for faith."

Completely out of context. Kant's point here is about metaphysics. For the most part, he renounces efforts to prove absolutely the truth of certain common metaphysical ideas - God, free will. Rather, they become matters of faith - things we believe (and not without good reason) but which we cannot absolutely prove.

Read the Critique of Pure Reason (or at least a commentary on it - it's a difficult book to get through without an instructor's guidance). You shouldn't shit on a major philosopher without knowing anything about him.

[lucky]

Nozick postulated a creature who received 100 units of utility (pleasure, happiness) per unit of resource consumption, in a universe where everybody else received 1 unit of utility per unit of resource consumption. In this type of universe, Nozick argued, utilitarianism would require that all of the people who got lesser utility be sacrificed (give up any and all resources) to the utility monster. This moral demand for sacrifice, however, is absurd. Therefore, basic utilitarianism is defeated by means of a reduction to absurdity.

Cardinal utilitarianism suggests that we allocate goods and resources so that we maximize the total or average amount of pleasure - given the existence of a utility monster we would be obliged to neglect the needs of human beings in favour of satisfying the monster, perhaps even to the extent of annihilating the human race.

Can anyone think of an argument defending utilitarianism, that can defeat the utility monster thought experiment?

I don't see any absurdity here.

As far as a single person's decisions are concerned, utilities can be arbitrarily scaled. It makes no difference to me whether eating an apple gives me utility of 10 and an orange a utility of 20, or whether an apple gives me 1000 while an orange 2000. Both are saying the same thing: I like the orange twice as much as I like the apple. It's a change in units.

The scales only matter when we start assigning utilities to multiple people for the purpose of making collective decisions. The scales express our inter-personal preferences.

So now, when we assign the Monster's consumption a utility 100x higher than everybody else's, that means we have, for some reason, decided that we care about the Monster's consumption 100 times more than we care about everybody else's consumption. So no wonder that we'll all end up giving a lot of stuff to the Monster. That's the direct, rational effect of the assumed value judgement we are modelling with the utility function. We love the Monster so much we want to give him stuff to the detriment of everybody else, and that is the end result achieved.

I see no paradox, no absurdity, no defeat of utilitarianism. It's utilitarianism working as intended.

[Truth To Power]

You have clearly not read any of Kant's works (I also think you haven't read any of Darwin's), and are instead relying on a completely inaccurate gloss of what he said.

I was probably reading Kant before you were born. I hold a degree in philosophy, with honors, from an internationally respected university, and the department head was a renowned Kant scholar, so yeah, I have read Kant.

Of course not. He assumed it was created by God about 6000 years ago.

I've never read anything to indicate that Kant was a Young Earth Creationist.

Almost everyone was then.

He certainly believed in God, but he actively attacked the idea that we could be certain of God's existence through mere logical argumentation. The most damning attack on the classic formulation of the Ontological Argument is of Kantian origin. He made a large point in showing that belief in God was merely belief. We believe in God because we believe in an ethical order;

Which Darwin refuted (whether he was aware of the fact or not) by showing why we believe in an ethical order: it confers reproductive success.

yet the fruits of the world do not seem to go to the most ethical people (i.e., good people suffer).

Darwin showed why that is irrelevant.

Again, Insofar as we believe in an ethical order, we must believe in a God who punishes the unjust and rewards the just.

Again, disproved by Darwin. We actually believe in an ethical order because (somehow, it's not clear how) it helps us survive and reproduce. That's all.

But nothing can prove it.

Darwin DISproved it.

Besides, Darwinism as such doesn't actually say anything about the origin of the universe.

Irrelevant. It says everything about the origin of ethics.

Bear in mind that Kant was a philosopher of the Enlightenment. The Enlightened vision of God was not very much like what fundamentalist Christians imagine today.

He lived during the Enlightenment, but wasn't enlightened himself.

But Darwin shows we can't have evolved to be deluded as a species. We have to see reality, because if we couldn't, our ancestors could not have survived competition with those who did.

Take a tree. We perceive the tree. Kant is not saying that there are sensuous characteristics of the tree that we simply fail to perceive; he is saying that if the tree has objective existence, i.e. existence as something beyond our senses, then that existence is inherently ungraspable.

Which Darwin disproved.

What lies beyond the sensuous by definition cannot be understood by the senses.

The senses are not organs of understanding in any case. They are organs of sensation.

Again, this descends into incoherence in light of Darwin.

How? You're free to merely assert that, but you haven't shown that Darwinian natural beings differ substantially from merely Newtonian natural beings.

They differ fundamentally, in that we know (roughly, in principle) why the former are the way they are. That sweeps away all Kant's hypothesizing about the metaphysical implications of ethics.

Note, again, that Kant does not have a particular commitment to a divine origin of the world; all he believes is that a divine being punishes or rewards ethical actors.

And Darwin showed why there is no need for any such being. It's a figment of Kant's imagination.

A stance that happens to be incorrect.

This may be; but if it's incorrect, Darwin isn't responsible for proving it incorrect (nor would Darwin have taken himself to be saying anything about Kantian moral philosophy).

True. Darwin does not seem to have understood the full implications of his discovery.

Actually, Kant was quite clear on the nature of his project: "I had to renounce knowledge in order to make room for faith."

Completely out of context.

Kant's point here is about metaphysics. For the most part, he renounces efforts to prove absolutely the truth of certain common metaphysical ideas - God, free will. Rather, they become matters of faith - things we believe (and not without good reason) but which we cannot absolutely prove.

But Darwin showed how, given three billion years, Kant's imagined metaphysics arises from physics.

Read the Critique of Pure Reason (or at least a commentary on it - it's a difficult book to get through without an instructor's guidance). You shouldn't shit on a major philosopher without knowing anything about him.

Oh, I know about him, all right, having read Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason and Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, and passed an oral exam on them. Never again will I waste my time and brain energy trying to disrobe the level 3 obscurities he dressed up as level 9 profundities.

[Truth To Power]

The scales only matter when we start assigning utilities to multiple people for the purpose of making collective decisions. The scales express our inter-personal preferences.

Different people's utilities are not commensurable.

So now, when we assign the Monster's consumption a utility 100x higher than everybody else's, that means we have, for some reason, decided that we care about the Monster's consumption 100 times more than we care about everybody else's consumption. So no wonder that we'll all end up giving a lot of stuff to the Monster. That's the direct, rational effect of the assumed value judgement we are modelling with the utility function. We love the Monster so much we want to give him stuff to the detriment of everybody else, and that is the end result achieved.

I see no paradox, no absurdity, no defeat of utilitarianism. It's utilitarianism working as intended.

No absurdity in North Korea-style subservience to the monster? It may be utilitarianism working as intended, but supererogation is a pretty well established condition of defeat.

[Potemkin]

But Darwin shows we can't have evolved to be deluded as a species. We have to see reality, because if we couldn't, our ancestors could not have survived competition with those who did.

This does not actually logically follow. The human race has not evolved to perceive the truth about the world (ie, to perceive the Kantian things-in-themselves) but to survive the Darwinian struggle for survival and reproduction. This means that our perceptions and conceptions of the world have no necessary connection with the truth about the world, but are merely makeshifts thrown up by the evolutionary process to further the reproductive success of our species. Given that fact, it is actually to be expected that most of our perception of the world and ideas about the world will be profoundly deluded in many ways.

[Truth To Power]

But Darwin shows we can't have evolved to be deluded as a species. We have to see reality, because if we couldn't, our ancestors could not have survived competition with those who did.

This does not actually logically follow.

Sure it does.

The human race has not evolved to perceive the truth about the world (ie, to perceive the Kantian things-in-themselves) but to survive the Darwinian struggle for survival and reproduction.

How can perception serve reproductive success unless it corresponds to reality? It is only fidelity of one's perceptions to reality that can enable the success of one's attempts to survive in it. We learn to perceive reality -- and understand causality -- accurately in infancy, or we don't survive infancy.

This means that our perceptions and conceptions of the world have no necessary connection with the truth about the world, but are merely makeshifts thrown up by the evolutionary process to further the reproductive success of our species.

Gibberish. How can perceptions serve reproductive success without being accurate models of the world? Real reality -- which is even more real than Kant's things-in-themselves -- inevitably impinges on us in its true physical form. That is what material reality is.

Given that fact, it is actually to be expected that most of our perception of the world and ideas about the world will be profoundly deluded in many ways.

Well, yours and Kant's, anyway...

[Unthinking Majority]

Can anyone think of an argument defending utilitarianism, that can defeat the utility monster thought experiment?

Here's the thing: utilitarianism was designed as an ethics system for humans. A utility monster 1) doesn't exist, and 2) wouldn't be human. So the "utility monster" argument kind of falls flat to begin with. If such a creature did exist, and it was human or human-like, only then would the theory need to be reevaluated.

Utilitarianism is a good concept as long as it can be balanced with fundamental human rights, like right to life, security, food etc. But I guess that wouldn't be straight utilitarianism anymore.

[KPres]

Here's my question about utilitarianism, is total utility a sum or per capita? Because if it's a sum, the thing to do is have as many children as possible. A planet with 100 billion people has more sum utils than one with 7 billion, even if the majority of people aren't very happy. Now, if it's per capita, the thing to do might be to kill off all but a handful of the happiest individuals. Then you'd achieve maximum per capita utility.

[Truth To Power]

Here's the thing: utilitarianism was designed as an ethics system for humans. A utility monster 1) doesn't exist, and 2) wouldn't be human.

You have no way of knowing that. Which is kinda the point. Maybe such a person has actually existed. We can't know.

So the "utility monster" argument kind of falls flat to begin with. If such a creature did exist, and it was human or human-like, only then would the theory need to be reevaluated.

No, it can be rejected on that hypothetical basis.

Utilitarianism is a good concept as long as it can be balanced with fundamental human rights, like right to life, security, food etc. But I guess that wouldn't be straight utilitarianism anymore.

Utilitarianism is incoherent because utility can't be measured except for an individual.

[Saeko]

Utilitarianism is incoherent because utility can't be measured except for an individual.

Utilitarianism is incoherent because utility can't be measured even for an individual.

[lucky]

Here's my question about utilitarianism, is total utility a sum or per capita?

Sum. It's slightly more complicated than that, people generally have higher weights for their own friends and relatives, but a sum is a good first approximation.

Because if it's a sum, the thing to do is have as many children as possible.

Yes. If having a child had no cost, that is.

That's why we want to colonize other planets, as well.

[Truth To Power]

Here's my question about utilitarianism, is total utility a sum or per capita?

Sum. It's slightly more complicated than that, people generally have higher weights for their own friends and relatives, but a sum is a good first approximation.

It is impossible to sum quantities that are not commensurable.

[MeMe]

@ all
This thread has been revived two times, and I think that it deserves a third time.

Can anyone think of an argument defending utilitarianism, that can defeat the utility monster thought experiment?

I suppose that this has already been done by philosophers. Apparently the utility monster idea is an example of the summing-principle, that welfare requires the optimization of the total utility.

There's a better solution to the 'problem' of the utility monster that crude/'act' utilitarianism neglects. Simply that as a rule, individuals within a society follow the postulates of rule utilitarianism to meet their own self-interested needs,

you could be talking about decreasing the happiness of rapists by outlawing rape but all such laws aim to increase happiness for most individuals

Right. It is essential that the people believe that their society is just. Therefore the maximization of utility must be restricted by a moral system, which protects for instance the natural human rights. Incidentally, this can be embedded within the utility theory, by providing all individuals with a strong preference for the moral system. For instance, it is well known that people appreciate reciprocity and a certain degree of equality. This may be interpreted as an instinctive urge, or as a conscious need for justice.

Note also that the utility monster may have perverse preferences, which are perhaps even destructive for society. It is rational that the people will hinder the monster in realizing its goals. Of course, this is simply another way of introducing the rule utilitarism.

Here's my question about utilitarianism, is total utility a sum or per capita? Because if it's a sum, the thing to do is have as many children as possible. A planet with 100 billion people has more sum utils than one with 7 billion, even if the majority of people aren't very happy. Now, if it's per capita, the thing to do might be to kill off all but a handful of the happiest individuals. Then you'd achieve maximum per capita utility.

This is an excellent remark. Surprisingly, it is only made during the second revival.

why would you say the industrial revolution was a good thing if it immiserated the majority of the population? Do you count the happiness of generations that come after the industrial revolution, if so, you still care about the majority (you just increased the sample size)

Although to be fair Poulmo here in the initial discussion already mentions that the size of the community is relevant for the total utility. Systems of central planning always employ a target function, which fixes the goals of the plan. The most fundamental form of the target function is the utility function. They include the planning horizon, that is to say, the period that is covered by the plan. For instance, a choice must be made between immediate consumption and investments for future consumption. Furthermore, note that planning is often based on the gross national product. This does not take into account the distribution of wealth, and so accepts the utility monster.

Why is it rational to demand that people work equally hard towards their own well-being, and towards that of strangers (as utilitarianism inherently demands)?

It may be completely rational for society as a whole to sacrifice your happiness as an individual for the 'greater good'. In other words, what is a rational outcome for society as a whole may be an irrational outcome from the point of view of the individual concerned. Bentham merely assumed that the rational outcome for society as a whole automatically trumps any possible rational outcome for the individual. This is merely another aspect of Bentham's lack of respect for the sacredness of individual subjectivity. He tended to value only collective, social outcomes and placed no intrinsic value on individual human life.

We love the Monster so much we want to give him stuff to the detriment of everybody else, and that is the end result achieved.

That is a philosophical question. At least a benevolent dictator could decide that it is rational to have some people work hard, so that other people gain additional happiness. Or a democracy could decide that this is a reasonable demand. In the democracy the harmed people could migrate to a better state, at least if they find their fate unbearable. Obviously, the majority would dislike this, and she would try te seduce them to stay. Apparently the summing-principle and the utility monster model suppose that all individuals acknowledge the total utility as a common good.