- 19 Sep 2016 14:05
#14719545
@ Potemkin, Truth To Power, Sceptic
These remarks have not been debated in the thread. Nevertheless, they merit some reflections. The economists Edgeworth and Jevons do believe that utility can simply be measured. However, it is clear that this is a gargantuan task, because utility (or happiness, or satisfaction, or well-being) is a subjective variable. Moreover, the neoclassical economists were desparately trying to develop an exact science, and therefore they wanted to keep out the psychology. Thus they managed to develop a formalism, which does not depend on utility. For convenience, many introductory textbooks state that utility can not be quantified (called cardinal utility, as opposed to ordinal utility, which is qualitative). But this statement is controversial, and imhb it is false.
In fact utility (or satisfaction) has always been used, even within the economic science. Immediately after WWII Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed a popular theory about expected utility, which supposes that utility can be quantified. Measurements of satisfaction have been done since the sixties of the last century. This domain of economy uses techniques from sociology, in particular opinion polls. The interrogated person values his satisfaction by means of a number. In this way the satisfactions of two individuals can be compared. Evidently, the answers are not necessarily reasonable or rational.
Moreover, it turns out that this approach yields meaningful results. For instance, it can be shown that on average the satisfaction depends on the personal income. And since that connection can be quantified, it is even possible to attach a money value to satisfaction. Of course the relations hold for the representative (average) person, and not for particular persons. But still this makes them a good measure for the development of policies. The representative person does not have peculiarities, and therefore it behaves in a rational manner, at least as far as the human nature and urges allow for rationality.
In principle the measurement of satisfaction can also be employed in the valuation of human life under certain circumstances. For instance, the happiness as a result of life-saving operations can be calculated. And this can be compared with happiness as a result of other investments. In case that someone objects to this approach: in reality politicians do it all the time.
Evidently it can be argued that morals yield happiness of a higher order, which can not be compared with the happiness due to money. Then one has a pluralistic utility. There is some merit in this standpoint, since it can be used to defend for instance the absolute validity of the natural human rights. However, morals are cumbersome in cases where a practical policy must be developed. For the material resources are scarce, and therefore costs do matter and policies must be efficient. I like to believe that efficiency herself is a virtue. So politicians must always weigh the various policy options, and in general all options are negotiable, even the moral choices, even efficiency. I think that is is more fruitful to suppose that the utility is monistic, and to value certain morals with an extremely high price.
Finally, it must be admitted that the measurement of satisfaction (or utility) is still in its infancy. A huge problem is the dynamics in the human preferences. Individual preferences depend on the personal situation, and may change when the situation alters. And it is a difficult task to identify all relevant variables, which are dominant in the influence on the satisfaction. If this is done in a flawed manner, then hidden variables may disturb the correlations of the included variables. Anecdote: the short-term level of satisfaction is influenced by the results of the national soccer team. But these are practical problems, which can in principle be overcome.
Potemkin wrote:it violates the sense we have of the incommensurability of individual human life.
Truth To Power wrote:Different people's utilities are not commensurable. ... It is impossible to sum quantities that are not commensurable. ... Utilitarianism is incoherent because utility can't be measured except for an individual.
Sceptic wrote:Who the hell divides happiness into units and then makes out like it's a measurable phenomenon
These remarks have not been debated in the thread. Nevertheless, they merit some reflections. The economists Edgeworth and Jevons do believe that utility can simply be measured. However, it is clear that this is a gargantuan task, because utility (or happiness, or satisfaction, or well-being) is a subjective variable. Moreover, the neoclassical economists were desparately trying to develop an exact science, and therefore they wanted to keep out the psychology. Thus they managed to develop a formalism, which does not depend on utility. For convenience, many introductory textbooks state that utility can not be quantified (called cardinal utility, as opposed to ordinal utility, which is qualitative). But this statement is controversial, and imhb it is false.
In fact utility (or satisfaction) has always been used, even within the economic science. Immediately after WWII Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed a popular theory about expected utility, which supposes that utility can be quantified. Measurements of satisfaction have been done since the sixties of the last century. This domain of economy uses techniques from sociology, in particular opinion polls. The interrogated person values his satisfaction by means of a number. In this way the satisfactions of two individuals can be compared. Evidently, the answers are not necessarily reasonable or rational.
Moreover, it turns out that this approach yields meaningful results. For instance, it can be shown that on average the satisfaction depends on the personal income. And since that connection can be quantified, it is even possible to attach a money value to satisfaction. Of course the relations hold for the representative (average) person, and not for particular persons. But still this makes them a good measure for the development of policies. The representative person does not have peculiarities, and therefore it behaves in a rational manner, at least as far as the human nature and urges allow for rationality.
In principle the measurement of satisfaction can also be employed in the valuation of human life under certain circumstances. For instance, the happiness as a result of life-saving operations can be calculated. And this can be compared with happiness as a result of other investments. In case that someone objects to this approach: in reality politicians do it all the time.
Evidently it can be argued that morals yield happiness of a higher order, which can not be compared with the happiness due to money. Then one has a pluralistic utility. There is some merit in this standpoint, since it can be used to defend for instance the absolute validity of the natural human rights. However, morals are cumbersome in cases where a practical policy must be developed. For the material resources are scarce, and therefore costs do matter and policies must be efficient. I like to believe that efficiency herself is a virtue. So politicians must always weigh the various policy options, and in general all options are negotiable, even the moral choices, even efficiency. I think that is is more fruitful to suppose that the utility is monistic, and to value certain morals with an extremely high price.
Finally, it must be admitted that the measurement of satisfaction (or utility) is still in its infancy. A huge problem is the dynamics in the human preferences. Individual preferences depend on the personal situation, and may change when the situation alters. And it is a difficult task to identify all relevant variables, which are dominant in the influence on the satisfaction. If this is done in a flawed manner, then hidden variables may disturb the correlations of the included variables. Anecdote: the short-term level of satisfaction is influenced by the results of the national soccer team. But these are practical problems, which can in principle be overcome.