- 02 Mar 2004 06:01
#115954
Ixabert, I am not going to delete this thread as it has already genereated discussion with other users. I am inserting the post you made on another thread that I deleted. If you don't think this is appropriate, please feel free to delete it and replace it with something relevant to the thread.
Just as locking people in cells controls the behaviour which
they are otherwise likely to emit, so giving someone a reward
for doing a desirable deed controls his behaviour by
increasing the probability that he will do it again. To change in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the probability that a
certain behaviour will be emitted in a person is to exercise a
degree of control over him. If a person, therefore, has
received in life a good deal of positive reinforcers for doing
objectionable things, should he not for that reason be free
from blame because he is being controlled? Or at any rate
should the degree to which he is blamed increase or decrease
in proportion as he is being controlled?* We do not punish a
person when conspicuous controls are at work, for example, if
a child is forced with a gun to his head to say naughty things.
The fact that he is being controlled is most apparent, and the
child is therefore exonerated. Yet when inconspicuous controls
are at work when someone does something objectionable, he
is likely to be punished. In spite of the inconspicuousness of
the controls, the person is nevertheless being controlled. Just
because the control is not "obvious" - like a gun to the head
- does not mean that it is not there. His reinforcement history
determines the probability that he will do this or that, that he
will steal or not steal, that he will kill or not kill, and so on.
Perhaps there is an element of "choice" involved in the end,
but the probability that he will "choose" this as opposed to
that is nevertheless predetermined by his reinforcement
history (but can that really be called choice?). Assuming the
veracity of the doctrine of the liberty of the will, the child with
the gun to his head is still capable of "choosing" to disobey:
yet he is still free from blame, and is therefore not punished,
because conspicuous controls are at work. Should it be any
different when the controls are inconspicuous, but assert
themselves all the more surely?
*However, I contend that the degree to which a person is
controlled is such that there is no room for any sort of "free
will". This, however, is not essential to my argument.
Just as locking people in cells controls the behaviour which
they are otherwise likely to emit, so giving someone a reward
for doing a desirable deed controls his behaviour by
increasing the probability that he will do it again. To change in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, the probability that a
certain behaviour will be emitted in a person is to exercise a
degree of control over him. If a person, therefore, has
received in life a good deal of positive reinforcers for doing
objectionable things, should he not for that reason be free
from blame because he is being controlled? Or at any rate
should the degree to which he is blamed increase or decrease
in proportion as he is being controlled?* We do not punish a
person when conspicuous controls are at work, for example, if
a child is forced with a gun to his head to say naughty things.
The fact that he is being controlled is most apparent, and the
child is therefore exonerated. Yet when inconspicuous controls
are at work when someone does something objectionable, he
is likely to be punished. In spite of the inconspicuousness of
the controls, the person is nevertheless being controlled. Just
because the control is not "obvious" - like a gun to the head
- does not mean that it is not there. His reinforcement history
determines the probability that he will do this or that, that he
will steal or not steal, that he will kill or not kill, and so on.
Perhaps there is an element of "choice" involved in the end,
but the probability that he will "choose" this as opposed to
that is nevertheless predetermined by his reinforcement
history (but can that really be called choice?). Assuming the
veracity of the doctrine of the liberty of the will, the child with
the gun to his head is still capable of "choosing" to disobey:
yet he is still free from blame, and is therefore not punished,
because conspicuous controls are at work. Should it be any
different when the controls are inconspicuous, but assert
themselves all the more surely?
*However, I contend that the degree to which a person is
controlled is such that there is no room for any sort of "free
will". This, however, is not essential to my argument.
Last edited by Ixa on 06 Mar 2004 23:27, edited 2 times in total.