[Leninist]

Any good communist knows the stages of human existence according to Marx: Feudalism, Capitalism, Socialism. But, as any scholar of modern Chinese history will tell you, the Chinese, like the Russians, tried to skip the middle step to some extent. the communists took over a peasant nation, with good intentions, but due to Mao's misguided leadership, ultimately horrifying results. But since the time of Zheng and the gradual liberalizing of the economy, the Marxist order of history seems to be reasserting itself! The revolutions after the end of Feudalism have led to a generally capitalist and quite repressive state, although with some elements of communism still in the mix. My question is what is the next step for China. the neo-liberals insist it is further liberalizing eventually leading to bourgeois democracy. But is there not an argument to be made for the idea that much of the modern Chinese government is a sort of Bourgeois dictatorship? Much of the leadership is out of the new Chinese middle class. In my mind China will inevitably leave its current style of leadership, what is that next step most likely to be?

[The Immortal Goon]

What you're describing is unique, in that it's not "socialism in one country," or, "permanent revolution."

It's more akin to, "stagism," which is something we should watch out for. It can be useful, but only in the broadest possible way.

On the surface, it seems attractive to think that if we reach certain benchmarks we can chart a certain direction and from there go forward and chart a course. But this is to throw the dialectic out and leads to all the problems that Stalin had to face before the Second World War.

Lenin viewed stagism largely as Menshevik:

Mr. Plekhanov attempts to present the fundamental theoretical prohlem of the impending revolution in Russia. He quotes a passage from Marx to the effect that the 1789 Revolution in France followed an ascending line, whereas the 1848 Revolution followed a descending line. In the first instance, power passed gradually from the moderate party to the more radical—the Constitutionalists, the Girondists, the Jacobins. In the second instance, the reverse took place—the proletariat, the petty-bourgeois democrats, the bourgeois republicans, Napoleon III. “It is desirable,” our author infers, “that the Russian revolution should be directed along an ascending line”, i.e., that power should first pass to the Cadets and Octobrists, then to the Trudoviks, and then to the socialists. The conclusion to be drawn from this reasoning is, of course, that the Left wing in Russia is unwise in not wishing to support the Cadets and in prematurely discrediting them.

Mr. Plekhanov’s “theoretical” reasoning is another example of the substitution of liberalism for Marxism. Mr. Plekhanov reduces the matter to the question of whether the “strategic conceptions” of the advanced elements were “right” or wrong. Marx’s reasoning was different. He noted a fact: in each case the revolution proceeded in a different fashion; he did not however seek the explanation of this difference in “strategic conceptions”. From the Marxist point of view it is ridiculous to seek it in conceptions. It should be sought in the difference in the alignment of classes. Marx himself wrote that in 1789 the French bourgeoisie united with the peasantry and that in 1848 petty-bourgeois democracy betrayed the proletariat. Mr. Plekhanov knows Marx’s opinion on the matter, but he does not mention it, because he wants to depict Marx as looking like Struve. In the France of 1789, it was a question of overthrowing absolutism and the nobility. At the then prevalent level of economic and political development, the bourgeoisie believed in a harmony of interests; it had no fears about the stability of its rule and was prepared to enter into an alliance with the peasantry. That alliance secured the complete victory of the revolution. In 1848 it was a question of the proletariat overthrowing the bourgeoisie. The proletariat was unable to win over the petty bourgeoisie, whose treachery led to the defeat of the revolution. The ascending line of 1789 was a form of revolution in which the mass of the people defeated absolutism. The descending line of 1848 was a form of revolution in which the betrayal of the proletariat by the mass of the petty bourgeoisie led to the defeat of the revolution.

Mr. Plekhanov is substituting vulgar idealism for Marxism when he reduces the question to one of “strategic conceptions”, not of the alignment of classes.

---

I would suggest that Socialism in One Country would not fit with China; though, like Marx, Engels, and Lenin, I would argue it's an oxymoron in the first place.

This leaves us with Permanent Revolution, which I think describes China best:

The rule of capital and its rapid accumulation is to be further counteracted, partly by a curtailment of the right of inheritance, and partly by the transference of as much employment as possible to the state. As far as the workers are concerned one thing, above all, is definite: they are to remain wage labourers as before. However, the democratic petty bourgeois want better wages and security for the workers, and hope to achieve this by an extension of state employment and by welfare measures; in short, they hope to bribe the workers with a more or less disguised form of alms and to break their revolutionary strength by temporarily rendering their situation tolerable...But these demands can in no way satisfy the party of the proletariat. While the democratic petty bourgeois want to bring the revolution to an end as quickly as possible, achieving at most the aims already mentioned, it is our interest and our task to make the revolution permanent until all the more or less propertied classes have been driven from their ruling positions, until the proletariat has conquered state power and until the association of the proletarians has progressed sufficiently far – not only in one country but in all the leading countries of the world – that competition between the proletarians of these countries ceases and at least the decisive forces of production are concentrated in the hands of the workers.

This is, of course, slightly off in the case of China—which had a revolution not of the petty bourgeoisie, but of the proletariat and peasantry. Nonetheless, it is difficult to not see the parallels.

Trotsky adapts Marx to such a situation:

The conquest of power by the proletariat does not complete the revolution, but only opens it. Socialist construction is conceivable only on the foundation of the class struggle, on a national and international scale. This struggle, under the conditions of an overwhelming predominance of capitalist relationships on the world arena, must inevitably lead to explosions, that is, internally to civil wars and externally to revolutionary wars. Therein lies the permanent character of the socialist revolution as such, regardless of whether it is a backward country that is involved, which only yesterday accomplished its democratic revolution, or an old capitalist country which already has behind it a long epoch of democracy and parliamentarism.

The completion of the socialist revolution within national limits is unthinkable. One of the basic reasons for the crisis in bourgeois society is the fact that the productive forces created by it can no longer be reconciled with the framework of the national state. From this follows on the one hand, imperialist wars, on the other, the utopia of a bourgeois United States of Europe. The socialist revolution begins on the national arena, it unfolds on the international arena, and is completed on the world arena. Thus, the socialist revolution becomes a permanent revolution in a newer and broader sense of the word; it attains completion, only in the final victory of the new society on our entire planet.

...A backward colonial or semi-colonial country, the proletariat of which is insufficiently prepared to unite the peasantry and take power, is thereby incapable of bringing the democratic revolution to its conclusion. Contrariwise, in a country where the proletariat has power in its hands as the result of the democratic revolution, the subsequent fate of the dictatorship and socialism depends in the last analysis not only and not so much upon the national productive forces as upon the development of the international socialist revolution.

Draw conclusions as you see fit. This said, and I'm not accusing you of doing so, but be careful of following things in stages and benchmarks instead of dialectics.

[nnoommaaoo]

China's system now is more like crony capitalism.

[Social_Critic]

I have seen the process in China fairly closeup since 1979 (this happened when a very excited multinational VP called a meeting in our Houston office and reported he has met with the Chinese and they had revealed to him their plan to invite foreign investors into China, as you could imagine these guys were very excited. I happened to be there to stand behind the slide proyector and listen to the bosses talk because I had been pegged as a potential manager, so of course I never said a word). Ever since I have watched what went on.

And when you think of China, it's important to understand you are not Chinese. These guys are incredibly smart, have a really long term view of things, are very nationalistic and think they will eventually end on top.

Evidently the ruling elite has realized communism is garbage. It doesn't yield what they need to achieve their eventual goals, therefore they are tossing it away. I don't know their future moves. I have my own way of thinking which isn't exactly Chinese. But I'm sure they are focusing very hard into avoiding a return to communism.

So now try to think as if you were in their place. They realize communism isn't viable, have to morph yet gain some sort of legitimacy. They need popular support expressed in a tangible way. I suspect this takes them towards a form of fascism with a carefully calibrated form of democracy which gives them that popular support they crave so much. And to get popular support they do need a common external enemy, show economic growth, and that China will indeed end on top in the future. They are extremely focused on avoiding another rape of Nanking, an Opium War, or having their country dismembered. Given the lousy results they had with communism I sincerely doubt they'll ever return to that.

[nnoommaaoo]

I have seen the process in China fairly closeup since 1979 (this happened when a very excited multinational VP called a meeting in our Houston office and reported he has met with the Chinese and they had revealed to him their plan to invite foreign investors into China, as you could imagine these guys were very excited. I happened to be there to stand behind the slide proyector and listen to the bosses talk because I had been pegged as a potential manager, so of course I never said a word). Ever since I have watched what went on.

And when you think of China, it's important to understand you are not Chinese. These guys are incredibly smart, have a really long term view of things, are very nationalistic and think they will eventually end on top.

Evidently the ruling elite has realized communism is garbage. It doesn't yield what they need to achieve their eventual goals, therefore they are tossing it away. I don't know their future moves. I have my own way of thinking which isn't exactly Chinese. But I'm sure they are focusing very hard into avoiding a return to communism.

So now try to think as if you were in their place. They realize communism isn't viable, have to morph yet gain some sort of legitimacy. They need popular support expressed in a tangible way. I suspect this takes them towards a form of fascism with a carefully calibrated form of democracy which gives them that popular support they crave so much. And to get popular support they do need a common external enemy, show economic growth, and that China will indeed end on top in the future. They are extremely focused on avoiding another rape of Nanking, an Opium War, or having their country dismembered. Given the lousy results they had with communism I sincerely doubt they'll ever return to that.

What impedes China's further development now is vested interests more entrenched after so many years of elite-controlled economic reforms. Those bureaucrats are more interested in embezzling fortunes and becoming immigrants ( or at least letting their family do that first ) to Western countries than building their own.

[Social_Critic]

Mnoom, I fully agree. But the elite seems to be aware of this problem. This is why I suspect they will try to move under tight control towards more democracy. However they are greedy and will want to remain on top. And they will want to preserve privileges for the princeling class. It's a conflict they have to manage. But I have observed they ca be quite ruthless. This means they may create conditions for Darwinian competition within the party cadres. If they allow a purely hereditary and well connected ruling caste to emerge and eliminate meaningful social and political mobility the system will fail and they will lose power.

[Rei Murasame]

But since the time of Zheng and the gradual liberalizing of the economy, the Marxist order of history seems to be reasserting itself!

No, rather, Maoist nonsense has reasserted itself - or I should say come to maturation - and it is now apparent that they never truly opposed the thing that you all thought they were opposing. I've said this before and will say it again.

Let's start with this:



After drinking Coca-Cola from cups brought out by Richard Nixon in 1972, China decided - under no coercion and without even firing one bullet in protest - to deliberately assist the United States in selling out Bangladesh, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Laos, Cambodia, and so on. Why did that happen? What internal factors within China made that possible?

The policies of the Chinese Communist Party are merely liberal.... Even the most conservative American businessman can find nothing in our program to take exception to. China must industrialize. This can be done – in China – only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together, economically and politically.... The United States would find us more cooperative than the Kuomintang. We will not be afraid of democratic American influence - we will welcome it.

Now, they clearly titled that 'Lost Chance in China' because the US later became antagonistic toward China, but little did they know that Richard Nixon would repair that chance, and they would be sitting there drinking Coca-Cola and plotting to undermine the Soviet Union by the time 1972 came around.

And little did they know that we'd all be here now in 2013 watching as China is the United States preferred trading partner. Viewed with that kind of 'future sight', these opportunist quotes were like dormant ideas of heinous treason against the Asian peoples and against the working classes in the East, that were simply waiting for the appropriate moment to be pulled out of the closet.

More:

Large amounts of capital will be needed for the development of our industries. They will come chiefly from the accumulated wealth of the Chinese people, and at the same time from foreign assistance. We welcome foreign investments if such are beneficial to China's economy and are made in accordance with China's laws. Enterprises profitable to both the Chinese people and foreigners are swiftly expanding large-scale light and heavy industries and modernizing agriculture, which can become a reality when there is firm internal and international peace, and when political and agrarian reforms are thoroughly carried out. On this basis, we shall be able to absorb vast amounts of foreign investments. A politically retrogressive and economically impoverished China will be unprofitable not only to the Chinese people, but also to foreigners.

Is anyone surprised that opportunist nonsense inevitably gives birth to opportunist nonsense after a generation? Viewed through the prism of these sorts of ideas, every Chinese betrayal of the Asian peoples, every Chinese betrayal of the working classes in the East, was only the logical outgrowth of these ideas.

But it doesn't end there. People have many illusions about what Maoism stood for, which need to be corrected:

[...] The problem with Hassan’s argument is that it is based on a set of academic notions about what he would like Maoism to have stood for instead of what that trend actually did and said between the 1960s and the 1980s. Hassan says Maoism is to be credited with confronting an underlying “crisis of socialism” and for being at bottom a left-wing critique of Stalinism. Those would have been good things, but they have nothing whatsoever to do with Maoism’s actual role.

After Khrushchev made his criticism of Stalin and at least half-heartedly opened the door for a re-examination of the Stalin era, it was the Chinese Communist Party and Maoism that stepped forward to become the biggest defenders of Stalin in the world communist movement. Maoism was the main proponent of the proposition that any alleged “crisis of socialism” began with Khrushchev’s ”betrayal” and had nothing whatsoever to do with the basic structures of the one-party state or “command” economy that Stalin had put in place.

Hassan is likewise off base when he discusses the Maoist thesis that the Soviet Union had been socialist under Stalin and after his death restored capitalism mainly as if this was the basis for a probing theoretical debate. He distances himself from this thesis, saying it is must be taken as only “descriptive,” while completely evading the fact that this thesis was the central justification for both Chinese foreign policy of aligning with anyone – including U.S. imperialism – who opposed the USSR, and for the disastrous ideological crusades of the Cultural Revolution which alienated three generations in China from ideas of class struggle.

Further, it was the CCP and its followers who argued that embrace of the “capitalist restoration thesis” was an essential line of demarcation between genuine revolutionaries and opportunists. Hassan today ridicules the notion that the Soviet Union could ever have been socialist, since Western-style capitalism has been put in place there “without a civil war.” What does he have to say about the fact that every single Maoist group argued that precisely this had taken place in the USSR after Stalin’s death? Even PUL, arguably the most flexible U.S. Maoist group and a major predecessor of Freedom Road, insisted in its signature book “2, 3, Many Parties of a New Type” that:

The third position, shared by the CPC, the PLA [Albania], and a number of other Marxist-Leninist Parties, believes that the rise to power of revisionism means the rise to power of the bourgeoisie…. The restoration of capitalism in a country as powerful and centralized politically and economically as the Soviet Union means the emergence of imperialism or social-imperialism… the question of the USSR stands at the center of the world stage...Communist unification will require basic agreement around this analysis. (p. 218)

Given this framework, it’s not the Chinese party’s support for Pinochet or denunciation of Cuba which “almost defies explanation” as Hassan argues. Rather, it’s why Hassan thinks there is anything whatsoever mysterious about either these stances or Maoism’s alliance with apartheid South Africa against the MPLA in Angola or its backing for the genocidal Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea.

Maoism’s stance undermined national liberation struggles that had been waged for decades across the global south, and was of tremendous value to U.S. administrations from Nixon to Reagan. That’s why the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (among other liberation movements on the frontlines) concluded in 1981 that the “Chinese leadership’s position in the international class conflict is one of retrogression and cooperation with imperialism.”

Those who come out of the Maoist trend have a responsibility to more forthrightly face these realities. There may be certain ideas that come out of Maoism which can be useful for current efforts to find a 21st century revolutionary path. But they will not have much credibility with the vast majority of radicals who experienced the 1960s-1980s, or with those from a new generation who have studied those years, if those who advance them are unwilling to engage with the actual role Maoism played in the international class struggle.

More:

[...] In 1974 the Chinese unveiled their “Theory of the Three Worlds” as a justification for alliances with reactionary governments in the Third World, conservative European politicians and even the U.S. military against the Soviet Union, which the Chinese began to describe as the more dangerous of the “two superpowers.” Maoism’s initial attraction to 1960s activists was largely that it seemed more militantly anti-U.S. imperialist than the Soviet Union; now the Chinese Party was cozying up to Washington, calling for a stronger NATO, attacking Cuba as a Soviet puppet; and distancing itself from the most vibrant national liberation movements in Africa, the Middle East and Latin America because they received Soviet support.

Until the final end of the Vietnam War in spring 1975, the consequences of China’s new posture remained somewhat muted. But matters came to a head just a year later when conflict broke out in Angola following the successful conclusion of that country’s long battle against Portuguese colonial rule. China sided with South African and CIA-backed mercenary armies against the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola – which had led the anti-colonial struggle – because the MPLA was backed by Cuba and the USSR. U.S. Maoism was faced with a choice between following Beijing or sticking to its anti-imperialist roots, and the result was a bitter rupture: most of the largest organizations backed China, while the Guardian, the CLP, dozens of smaller circles and most of Maoism’s periphery supported the MPLA.

While this split was still raw, Chinese internal politics exploded. Mao died and the winners in Beijing’s subsequent power struggle arrested his closest allies (the “Gang of Four”). They quickly reversed the policies of the Cultural Revolution and embarked upon even greater cooperation with the U.S. Shortly thereafter, China’s closest ally, Albania, denounced Maoism; China’s protégés in southeast Asia, the Khmer Rouge, were exposed as genocidal killers and overthrown by a Cambodian faction backed by the Vietnamese (1979); China then launched an unsuccessful invasion of Vietnam.

All this left Maoism in shambles. [...]

So apparently China is always complaining about who did them wrong, but when given a free chance to do it their way without anyone interfering, the first thing they do is walk across and kiss the United States on the mouth.

And how did that kiss manifest in particular places in the third world? Like this:

[...] Although US President Richard Nixon claimed that he would not get involved in the situation, saying that it was an internal matter of Pakistan, his administration provided political and material support to Yahya Khan throughout the turmoil. Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, feared the expansion of Russian influence into South and Southeast Asia. Pakistan was a close ally of Maoist China, with whom Nixon had been negotiating a rapprochement and which he intended to visit in February 1972.

The US administration feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean the domination of the region by Stalinist Russia. That, in turn, would seriously undermine the global position of the US and the regional position of America’s new tacit ally, China. In order to demonstrate to China the reliability of the US as an ally, and in direct violation of the US Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan, routeing them through Jordan and Iran. China was encouraged to increase arms supplies to Pakistan.

The Nixon administration ignored the reports it received of the genocidal activities of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan, most notably in the infamous ‘Blood telegram’. This had been sent by US diplomat, Archer Blood, on 6 April 1971 and had highlighted atrocities during the liberation war.

Stalinist Russia supported the Indian army and Mukti Bahini during the war, recognising that the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its global and regional rivals. It gave assurances to India that, if a confrontation with the US or China developed, Russia would take countermeasures. This was enshrined in the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty signed in August 1971. [...]

This even filtered further down:

In 1971 Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) declared its independence from Pakistan. The Pakistani military tried to quell the uprising. India intervened militarily and gave active backing to the Bangladeshi resistance. Millions of Bangladeshi refugees sought shelter in India, especially in West Bengal.

At the time the radical sections of the Bangladeshi communist movement was divided into many factions. Whilst the pro-Soviet Communist Party of Bangladesh actively participated in the resistance struggle, the pro-China communist tendency found itself in a peculiar situation as China had sided with Pakistan in the war. In Calcutta, where many Bangladeshi leftists had sought refuge, CPI(M) worked to co-ordinate the efforts to create a new political organisation. In the fall of 1971 three small groups, which were all hosted by the CPI(M), came together to form the Bangladesh Communist Party (Leninist). The new party became the sister party of CPI(M) in Bangladesh.[22]

So CPI(M) and BCP(L) pretty much had to go it alone, because Maoist groups like the WPB were absolutely useless wastes of flesh, and China was supporting white American liberal-imperialism.

Another example, let's talk about China helping the USA to sabotage Vietnam's attempts to spread socialism to Laos and Cambodia. The Heritage Foundation in 1984 published a report called "Mandate for Leadership II", in which they called on the United States government to provide even more attention and funding to be directed toward, and I quote, "...employ[ing] paramilitary assets to weaken those communist and noncommunist regimes that may already be facing the early stages of insurgency within their borders and which threaten U.S. interests...", which actually gives you a good idea of what this was all about:

"I encouraged the Chinese to support Pol Pot," recalled Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, in 1981. "Pol Pot was an abomination. We could never support him. But China could." The U.S., he added, "winked semipublicly" as the Chinese funneled arms to the Khmer Rouge, using Thailand as a conduit.

Throughout the Reagan Administration, the Khmer Rouge have been part of a loose and unholy alliance of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla groups that the U.S. helped create. Pol Pot has lurked in the shadows of the Reagan Doctrine.

In the past year the U.S. has grown increasingly concerned that the Khmer Rouge might fill a vacuum left by a Vietnamese retreat from Kampuchea. As part of Mikhail Gorbachev's overall policy of defusing Third World conflicts, Moscow has been pressuring Viet Nam to end its occupation. Hanoi has agreed to pull out all its troops by September. In response, China seems willing to cut off support to the Khmer Rouge once the Vietnamese complete their withdrawal.

But defanging the Khmer Rouge will require more. As Pol Pot's mentor Mao Zedong once said, "Power comes from the barrel of a gun," and thanks to years of Chinese-Thai assistance, with tacit American blessing, the Khmer Rouge have more guns than the two non-Communist guerrilla groups that the U.S. has been aiding directly. The CIA estimates that the Khmer Rouge have enough materiel to fight on for an additional two years against their erstwhile allies.

Vietnam was meanwhile suffering sanctions for its previous efforts to remove the Khmer Rouge:

In 1978, when Vietnamese leaders launched their invasion of Kampuchea to remove the Khmer Rouge regime, they did not expect a negative reaction from the international community. However, the events that followed the invasion showed that Vietnamese leaders had severely miscalculated international sympathies towards their cause. Instead of backing Vietnam, most member countries of the United Nations denounced the Vietnamese use of force against Kampuchea, and even moved to revive the battered Khmer Rouge organisation that once governed the country with such brutality. [...]

The international community's political stance towards Kampuchea had a severe impact on the Vietnamese economy, already wrecked by decades of continuous conflicts. The United States, which already had sanctions in place against Vietnam, convinced other countries of the United Nations to deprive Vietnam and the People's Republic of Kampuchea of much-needed funds by denying them membership to major international organisations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

But that wasn't enough for them, they had to do more:

China's relations with Vietnam began to deteriorate seriously in the mid-1970s. After Vietnam joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon) and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978, China branded Vietnam the "Cuba of the East" and called the treaty a military alliance. Incidents along the Sino-Vietnamese border increased in frequency and violence. In December 1978 Vietnam invaded Cambodia, quickly ousted the pro-Beijing Pol Pot regime, and overran the country.

China's twenty-nine-day incursion into Vietnam in February 1979 was a response to what China considered to be a collection of provocative actions and policies on Hanoi's part. These included Vietnamese intimacy with the Soviet Union, mistreatment of ethnic Chinese living in Vietnam, hegemonistic "imperial dreams" in Southeast Asia, and spurning of Beijing's attempt to repatriate Chinese residents of Vietnam to China.

In February 1979 China attacked along virtually the entire Sino-Vietnamese border in a brief, limited campaign that involved ground forces only. The Chinese attack came at dawn on the morning of 17 February 1979, and employed infantry, armor, and artillery. Air power was not employed then or at any time during the war. Within a day, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) had advanced some eight kilometers into Vietnam along a broad front. It then slowed and nearly stalled because of heavy Vietnamese resistance and difficulties within the Chinese supply system. On February 21, the advance resumed against Cao Bang in the far north and against the all-important regional hub of Lang Son. Chinese troops entered Cao Bang on February 27, but the city was not secured completely until March 2. Lang Son fell two days later. On March 5, the Chinese, saying Vietnam had been sufficiently chastised, announced that the campaign was over. Beijing declared its "lesson" finished and the PLA withdrawal was completed on March 16.

[...]

After the war both China and Vietnam reorganized their border defenses. In 1986 China deployed twenty-five to twenty-eight divisions and Vietnam thirty-two divisions along their common border.

The 1979 attack confirmed Hanoi's perception of China as a threat. The PAVN high command henceforth had to assume, for planning purposes, that the Chinese might come again and might not halt in the foothills but might drive on to Hanoi. The border war strengthened Soviet-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam; moreover, Soviet ships enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. The Vietnamese responded to the Chinese campaign by turning the districts along the China border into "iron fortresses" manned by well-equipped and well-trained paramilitary troops. In all, an estimated 600,000 troops were assigned to counter Chinese operations and to stand ready for another Chinese invasion. The precise dimensions of the frontier operations were difficult to determine, but its monetary cost to Vietnam was considerable.

By 1987 China had stationed nine armies (approximately 400,000 troops) in the Sino-Vietnamese border region, including one along the coast. It had also increased its landing craft fleet and was periodically staging amphibious landing exercises off Hainan Island, across from Vietnam, thereby demonstrating that a future attack might come from the sea.

Low-level conflict continued along the Sino-Vietnamese border as each side conducted artillery shelling and probed to gain high spots in the mountainous border terrain. Border incidents increased in intensity during the rainy season, when Beijing attempted to ease Vietnamese pressure against Cambodian resistance fighters.

Since the early 1980s, China pursued what some observers described as a semi-secret campaign against Vietnam that was more than a series of border incidents and less than a limited small-scale war. The Vietnamese called it a "multifaceted war of sabotage." Hanoi officials have described the assaults as comprising steady harassment by artillery fire, intrusions on land by infantry patrols, naval intrusions, and mine planting both at sea and in the riverways. Chinese clandestine activity (the "sabotage" aspect) for the most part was directed against the ethnic minorities of the border region. According to the Hanoi press, teams of Chinese agents systematically sabotaged mountain agricultural production centers as well as lowland port, transportation, and communication facilities. Psychological warfare operations were an integral part of the campaign, as was what the Vietnamese called "economic warfare"--encouragement of Vietnamese villagers along the border to engage in smuggling, currency speculation, and hoarding of goods in short supply.

If you are not disgusted enough yet, let's move on and look at Africa.

Here's another glimpse of China using vulgar Thirdworldism in that fashion:

Huang Hua, China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited Zaire recently to meet with President Mobutu and discuss the possibilities of Chinese military aid for this African country. Shortly afterwards, two delegations of Chinese military advisors arrived in Zaire to train some of the country’s 800 sailors, artillerymen and tank drivers.

The visits of the Chinese leaders are linked to the current situation in that part of the world. For the second time in 14 months, Zaire has had to appeal for foreign military aid to fight off invasion of its territory by Katangan mercenaries trained and oufitted by Soviet imperialists and their Cuban agents in Africa. To counter these attacks, Morocco intervened in March 1977 in support of Zaire by sending an expeditionary force of 3,000 men airlifted into the area on planes provided by France. More recently, France, Belgium, Great Britain and the United States have had to bail out Zaire by providing soldiers, technicians and military equipment to throw back the invaders.

The current leaders of the Communist Party of China (CPC) consider this an important victory. They commented on events in 1977 by saying:

During the Zaire event last year, Moscow’s plot was smashed, thanks to the persistent struggle of the international united: front against hegemony. (Peking Review, April 21, 1978)

During his recent visit to Zaire, Huang Hua added:

...the Zairian people under the leadership of President Mobutu are capable of defending the independence, national sovereignty and unity of the country and repulsing all aggression from outside. (Peking Review, June 9, 1978, our emphasis).

So the current leaders of the CPC consider that the intervention of the “united front” of French, Belgian and US imperialists was a good thing. Furthermore, Mobutu’s regime should be cause for rejoicing for his leadership has apparently helped safeguard his country’s independence and sovereignty and thwart the hegemonic designs of the superpowers, particularly those of Soviet social imperialism, the “main enemy of and the major threat” facing “African countries and people”, according to Peking Review, June 3, 1977. In short, supporting Mobutu and his allies amounts to working in the interests of the peoples of the world.

But what is really happening? First, who is Mobutu? Whose interests does he really represent?

Does Mobutu defend the interests of the Zairian People?

Mobutu, a former parachutist trained in Israel, was an officer in the Belgian colonial army before Zaire’s formal independence. This already suggests that the interests he defends aren’t automatically compatible with the liberation of the people of Zaire. Furthermore, the lot of the labouring masses in Zaire today is enough to make us suspect what kind of “leadership” Mobutu is giving.

Indeed, how can Zairian workers have confidence in a regime that keeps them in misery, a regime that doesn’t even bother covering up its corruption, it regime that has presided over the collapse of their standard of living (taking 100 as an index for 1960, it fell to 26 in 1976 and 15 in 1977)? How can they leave their fate up to a president who undoubtedly learned how to rule by terror while serving in the colonial army? His bloody repression of peasant revolts in the Idiofa region, and the activities of the “national documentation centre”, a kind of secret police charged with detecting and crushing all opposition to the regime, testify to this.

In fact, Mobutu is far form being a great defender of the people’s interests. He is instead a worthy representative of that class of parasites who grow rich on the sweat and misery of the Zairian masses, and who make the Zairians pay for the disastrous state of the economy, the decline in production, the public debt of $4 billion, etc.

Doesn’t advising the Zairian people to submit to such “leadership” amount to advising slaves to grovel at the feet of the overseer?

A puppet of imperialism

When the leaders of the CPC declare that under the leadership of Mobutu the Zairian people are capable of defending the independence and sovereignty of the country, are they really unaware of how closely linked Mobutu is to imperialism, including US imperialism, one of the two superpowers? That France, Belgium and even the United States have intervened militarily twice in Zaire is neither a coincidence nor a demonstration of their desire for “dialogue”. Although Zaire has been formally independent since 1960, the colonialists of yesteryear have not abandoned their interests. They still dominate the Zairian people today, thanks to the agents they have trained. One of these is Mobutu, a leader clearly on the payroll of the Western imperialist bloc. Since 1975, he has offered to reimburse the imperialists 40% and then 60% and even, in certain cases, 100% of the capital confiscated in the 1973 nationalizations. The result is that today, nearly all the key sectors of the Zairian economy are controlled by foreign interests. In 1976, Mobutu went so far as to grant Otrang, a German company, rights to the “complete and integral usage” of more than 100,000 square kilometers of Zairian territory near the Tanzanian border. To top it all off, in June he confided the administration of the country’s economy to the international Monetary Fund, an economic organization controlled by the American superpower.

It is, for the least, a strange way to “defend the independence and national sovereignty” of the country. Similarly, when the CPC leaders applaud the intervention of the united front of imperialist countries like France, Belgium and Great Britain in Zaire, are they not erroneously hushing up the aggressive interventions of these imperialist States against the people of Zaire? Like the superpowers, these States defend the interests of their respective bourgeoisies first and foremost in their dealings with countries like Zaire, and it so happens that these interests are served by the plundering of Zaire’s natural resources and the savage exploltation of its workers. Belgians haven’t invested $800 million in Zaire to guarantee the sovereignty of its people; rather, their investments mean intensified exploitation of this people so as to extract superprofits and ensure the Belgian investors a better position in their rivalry with other imperialist States on international markets.

An application of the three worlds theory

The positions adopted by the CPC leadership in the question of Zaire are not unrelated to its defence of the three worlds theory as the strategic guideline for the struggle of the international proletariat at the present time. This theory divides the world into three groups of countries (the developing countries of the “Third World”; the superpowers, the USA and the USSR; and the developed countries of the “second world”), and declares that the way to respond to the hegemonic designs and threats of aggression of the two superpowers and in particular those of the USSR, the more dangerous – is to work at uniting all the other countries and peoples in a broad anti-hegemonic front. According to the leaders of the CPC, Mobutu and countries like France, Belgium and Great Britain are included in this united front.

But, as the example of Zaire emphasizes, how can one hope to strengthen Mobutu and French or Belgian imperialists, all of them enemies of the Zairian people, and at the same time support the revolutionary struggle of the people, who have the task of weakening and overthrowing these same enemies? How can one hope to fight Soviet social imperialism by relying on other, equally imperialist, States that are also competing for a larger and larger share of international markets?

Calling on the peoples to submit to reactionary leaders like Mobutu and collude with the imperialism that oppresses them – is that not abandoning a truly revolutionary line?

Obviously! But that's Maoists. That's their true disgusting face!

The more you read into Maoist-Thirdworldist theory, the more you realise that the theory is designed to produce exactly the sickening and surreal outcome which has manifested.

The particular semantic contortion which Maoists use to justify their economic policies of crushing the entire working class under their boot and selling them on the global market through the creation of FTZs (Free Trade Zones) and OCWs (Overseas Contract Workers), is through the use of a peculiar ideological mandala called 'semi-feudalism'. Maoists - with a straight face - argue that certain cultural markers in the superstructure are somehow indicative of a 'semi-feudal' status in the countries of Asia and Africa. Having established that beachhead of nonsense, they then proceed to claim that the Maoist party has a special responsibility to subject those people to the liberal-capitalist reorganisation of society so that the alleged 'peasants' can all be transformed into proletarians and through being subjected to abuse, will be groomed for their historic role.

As soon as you think about this for five seconds, you realise that Maoists are essentially ignoring the existing proletariat in these countries, so that they can claim that a state of 'semi-feudalism' existing (it does not exist, but they just say it does), justifies either a re-imposition of liberal-capitalism or an increase in the intensity of liberal-capitalist exploitation, which must of course be benevolently watched over by the bland and impassive ever-bloating faces of the Chinese communist party's so-called leadership.

The damage that this idea would do was inevitably going to be immense, and the damage has indeed been immense. Maoists have almost singlehandedly destroyed the hopes of millions - perhaps even billions - of people by delivering them up into the hands of the United States to be crushed, and then glossing it over by using a perverse misapplication of Marxian terminology.

What kind of anti-imperialist 'third-worldist' could support Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire? Only a Maoist so-called 'third-worldist' could do something like that, by talking some rubbish about how Zaire was allegedly 'semi-feudal' and therefore needed to be subjected directly to imperialist exploitation by the United States so that it could more adequately fight against... the United States? It is impossible.

But let me show you just how bankrupt even the basic premise of Maosim-Thirdworldism is. Read this:

Not until the 1960s did the urban population surpass the rural population. [...] Until the middle of the twentieth century, agriculture was dominated by small holdings and family farms. Two factors have affected rural land holdings since World War II. There has been an acceleration of the rural exodus leading to a strong migration toward cities, along with a consolidation of farm lands that had been scattered through inheritance patterns. [...] There are many small businesses and shops on city streets, and street markets thrive in the major cities. [...] Husband and wife generally worked together, sometimes participating in different tasks related to agricultural labor. The degree to which gender segregation in daily life was upheld varied by region. In general, women carried out domestic tasks of housekeeping, food preparation, and child care; however, they also were involved in farm labor, such as harvesting and tending young animals.

Now, imagine that this is the 1970s and you are reading these quotes. A Maoist-Thirdworldist would jump at this and immediately declare that it looks just like a country in Asia, Africa, or Latin America, which needs to have liberal-capitalism re-imposed on it under the tutelage of Chinese-American masters, so that it can transition out of a 'semi-feudal' status, to capitalism, and then 'eventually' (read: actually never) to socialism.

The problem with this is that the above quote is actually snippets of a description of France. Yes, France. Check the source: [Link]

France was obviously not semi-feudal, but Maoist-Thirdworldists would swear up and down that it is, up until the flag is unfurled and it becomes apparent that a country in western Europe is being described. And then they don't even care. Their analysis is self-evidently garbage. That's what happens when a whole movement begins to look for artefacts in the superstructure as a way to ignore the base and as a way to infinitely postpone the systemic changes which ought to be on the agenda. Maoism reduces itself to bourgeoisie liberal waffling.

Maoism is intellectually bankrupt, and the Communist Party of China is intellectually bankrupt.

Have you ever wondered why China and its fanatical supporters often trumpet how China's investment into countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America is done with 'no strings attached'? Why would they trumpet that? Why would they pride themselves on that 'accomplishment'? The 'accomplishment' of not altering one single thing about the societies that they are trading with in African or Latin American countries, much less in Asia? Their pride in that 'accomplishment', perhaps unbeknownst to themselves, reveals their anti-revolutionary bearing, they are taking pride in the fact that they could support revolutionary parties in these places, but instead they have 'sensibly' chosen not to. They have instead 'sensibly' and 'pragmatically' decided to enter with a placid smile, deepen capitalist exploitation in collaboration with the United States, and pat themselves on the back about how they are better at doing liberal-capitalism than America is, because they are beating America at being America, while helping America.

The false usage of the word 'pragmatism' and 'realpolitik' as a cloak to cover up actual pro-American imperialist opportunism, is the last refuge of insidious scoundrels, and you should expect that when pro-Chinese people talk about these things, they are going to use those words like a bandage to wrap up Maoism and Chinese foreign policy like it's some kind of Egyptian mummy.

Here's the takeaway. Remember this quote: "The Chinese leadership's position in the international class conflict is one of retrogression and cooperation with imperialism."

Never forget that. Never forget it.

[Conscript]

Something weird about even a brown realizing how troubled maoism is.

Just a few things:

1. Maoists don't 'ignore' the proletariat so much as they want it and the peasantry to ally with the national bourgeoisie (as unlike other marxists, maoists believe it is revolutionary or progressive) in an anti-imperialist coalition to liberate/modernize the nation in what's essentially a bourgeois revolution in an era where the bourgeoisie are too weak to challenge international finance and imperialism. Not too different from menshevism, both are pretty stagist (as was Stalin).

2. I'm not sure maoists deserve being called pro-americans that facilitate liberal-imperialism's exploitation. Not all maoists agree with considering the USSR a greater imperialist, and regardless of Mao's actions maoism can still be revolutionary and anti-imperialist. It really could do without Mao's later days after the cultural revolution.

3. All isolated revolutions in a underdeveloped country end up selling out their workers to foreign investment as from Lenin onwards marxists recognize such conditions require a phase of accumulation. It's not really 'selling out' as these revolutions depend on the worker in the advanced country one way or another (either through the capital of his exploiter, or as part of socialist internationalism). Unlike Lenin though, the maoists were never waiting for revolution in advanced countries to receive them, or any revolution at all really. They provided no new comintern or indicted us into a genuine revolutionary period like 1917-23. They didn't, because Maoism is very much a national phenomenon, the 'left wing of capital' particular to the third world. It's legacy in china can be summed up as a bourgeois revolution, imo.

4. Why the use of maoist third worldist? They aren't the same.

[Social_Critic]

So I guess these communists are all fascists but they lie about their true colours?

[Leninist]

I have to say I don't thin much of Maoism, even as a communist. It is far to nationalistic, and, as we have seen, the Chinese leadership, even Mao himself, was always more worried about China than communism. That is largely due to china's history, the century of shame especially, but it has always been nationalistic and paranoid to outsiders. As my political science teacher once said, the party may have been called communist, but it was always nationalist.

[nnoommaaoo]

I have to say I don't thin much of Maoism, even as a communist. It is far to nationalistic, and, as we have seen, the Chinese leadership, even Mao himself, was always more worried about China than communism. That is largely due to china's history, the century of shame especially, but it has always been nationalistic and paranoid to outsiders. As my political science teacher once said, the party may have been called communist, but it was always nationalist.

Maoism mostly derived from the thoughts of Chinese feudal emperors. Mao once said, I am a combination of Marx and Qin Shi Huang ( the First Emperor and literally the first emperor of China) . But the truth is Mao did not know much about Marxism. He read little on Marxism. He was more of a leader of Chinese feudal peasant's uprising than of a so-called modern revolution leader. Stalin properly called him China's Pugachev.

[fuser]

Mao once said, I am a combination of Marx and Qin Shi Huang ( the First Emperor and literally the first emperor of China)

Source? Also its not exactly surprising, Stalin admired Ivan the Terrible, it didn't mean he was fan of Russian monarchy.
Also, Qin was first emperor of Unified China (semantics but still ). The name China derives from Qin only.

But the truth is Mao did not know much about Marxism

Bold Claim.

Stalin properly called him China's Pugachev.

Again source?


Then, what's wrong with trying to preserve progressive socialist state when the whole world is hostile to you? Self preservation doesn't necessary mean betrayal of world revolution.

That being said, yes I am not a fan of maoism, from Indian experience even though there is a large proletarian class in India, maoists still tend to pin their hope on peasants as revolutionary group and yes I agree with Rei's analysis in that it (This maoist tendency) can result in very dangerous outcome. As lack of revolutionary proletarian and their upward pressure to the revolutionary party will mean maoist party getting virtually free hand to build capitalism first (not socialism) with peasants being at the receiving end and unable to resist because they are being rapidly uprooted from their traditional economical relation.

[nnoommaaoo]

["nnoommaaoo"]Mao once said, I am a combination of Marx and Qin Shi Huang ( the First Emperor and literally the first emperor of China)

Source? Also its not exactly surprising, Stalin admired Ivan the Terrible, it didn't mean he was fan of Russian monarchy.
Also, Qin was first emperor of Unified China (semantics but still ). The name China derives from Qin only.

But the truth is Mao did not know much about Marxism

Bold Claim.

Stalin properly called him China's Pugachev.

Again source?


Then, what's wrong with trying to preserve progressive socialist state when the whole world is hostile to you? Self preservation doesn't necessary mean betrayal of world revolution.

That being said, yes I am not a fan of maoism, from Indian experience even though there is a large proletarian class in India, maoists still tend to pin their hope on peasants as revolutionary group and yes I agree with Rei's analysis in that it (This maoist tendency) can result in very dangerous outcome. As lack of revolutionary proletarian and their upward pressure to the revolutionary party will mean maoist party getting virtually free hand to build capitalism first (not socialism) with peasants being at the receiving end and unable to resist because they are being rapidly uprooted from their traditional economical relation.

Sorry, my sources are mostly in Chinese. Mao was almost ignorant of Marxism. Few of Mao's comrades were very well educated. Even fewer of them(almost none is a safe bet) ever read Das Kapital , not to mention understood it." I am a combination of Marx and Qin Shi Huang " are Mao's very words and well known in China.

[fuser]

You are Chinese, living in China?

[Rei Murasame]

Since a lot of things have already been answered by other people, I'll just come back and address what has not been done yet:

Not all maoists agree with considering the USSR a greater imperialist, and regardless of Mao's actions maoism can still be revolutionary and anti-imperialist. It really could do without Mao's later days after the cultural revolution.

No, I have to disagree because you are not properly seeing what I'm saying. The theory of Maoism contains things which inherently lead to the actions that have happened. Furthermore, the cleft between 'early Mao' and 'late Mao', is not a cleft at all, because as you can see above, Mao was saying the same things in 1944, that manifested in 1971.

So what this means is that Maoism has an inbuilt tendency to do these things.

4. Why the use of maoist third worldist? They aren't the same.

The reason I've used the hyphenate "Maoist-Thirdworldist", is because Maoists put forward 'the theory of three worlds', and that is a specific type of Thirdworldism unique to Maoism. Which is to say, it is the Maoist conception of Thirdworldism, which I am calling 'vulgar' and 'flawed' (understatement).

I'm saying that the Maoist implementation of Thirdworldism inherently leads to regressive results and collaboration with liberal-imperialism, and that this manifested result flows from the Maoist theory proper, and from the Maoist theory of three worlds.

As my political science teacher once said, the party may have been called communist, but it was always nationalist.

That's one way to look at it, it's almost like the narrowest form of nationalism as well, since those countries that receive 'assistance' from China, almost feel as though China is not interested in bringing a revolution of any sort to them.

He was more of a leader of Chinese feudal peasant's uprising than of a so-called modern revolution leader. Stalin properly called him China's Pugachev.

That I didn't know. However, I don't know who Pugachev is, so one of you will have to explain that to me.

That being said, yes I am not a fan of maoism, from Indian experience even though there is a large proletarian class in India, maoists still tend to pin their hope on peasants as revolutionary group and yes I agree with Rei's analysis in that it (This maoist tendency) can result in very dangerous outcome. As lack of revolutionary proletarian and their upward pressure to the revolutionary party will mean maoist party getting virtually free hand to build capitalism first (not socialism) with peasants being at the receiving end and unable to resist because they are being rapidly uprooted from their traditional economical relation.

Yes. It was only quite recently as well that these subtle things started to really seem important and not just bits of trivia or 'different roads'.

For example, there is a real serious difference as well, between:

• 1. Peasants, and
• 2. Proletarians employed in agriculture who set up stalls in cities to sell their produce.

In the third world, that is a difference that is so important. Classifying #2 as being #1, whether it be done accidentally or on purpose, can lead to a ripple effect down the line which can mean the difference between justifying improvement of the people, or justifying exploitation by liberal-imperialists.

There is also a real serious difference between:

• 1. Revolution starting in the town and spreading to the countryside, and
• 2. Revolt starting in the countryside and spreading to the city.

If someone were to carry out #2, while saying that 'the countryside' is 'peasants' (regardless of whether they are or not), the result would at first be a total disaster of disorganisation and institutional breakdown because of peasant incompetence, followed later by the re-imposition of liberal-capitalism justified by the excuse that 'peasants must be made into proletarians', regardless of whether these people were already proletarians at the time that the revolt started.

This might sound completely obvious, but it's something I think hasn't been talked about enough.

Something weird about even a brown realizing how troubled maoism is.

I can't help it. Many national-syndicalists, right-socialists, and so on, all unfortunately find these things to be seriously boring, but for me it's like a necessity since I have a third world outlook as well. It's not only a red issue, if the brown team ignores it, it is at our own peril.

Let me choose another example, let's take a situation like the conditions in the West Indies, particular in the Lesser Antilles and parts of South America like Guyana and Suriname, and so on. They have a lot of people there who live next to or on agricultural lands and are involved in that kind of business. So if someone comes along and says, "they are peasants, and need to have capitalism imposed on them from the United States, in order that they can become proletarians", that is actually a severe mistake.

Because in that example, those people are not even peasants. They already are proletarians working for local agribusiness.

And so the Maoist theory, if applied to that example, would result in the re-imposition of even harder American capitalism onto people who are already under capitalism locally. Which is undesirable at best and horrific at worst.

There's also an element of complete insanity in it as well, because all it would do is enhance the regional and global hegemony of the United States (and I assume that everyone in this this thread, including myself, dislikes the United States), the very same American hegemony which Maoists claim with their mouths in public press statements, to 'not want'.

[The Immortal Goon]

I would be lying if I said I were that well versed in Mao. So this has been pretty interesting. My issue has been the peasant issue which I tended to crudely tell my classes was something like:

The Russians demanded that the peasants do what the proletarians said; the Chinese that the peasants and the proletarians were partners; the Cambodians that the proletarians had to be turned into peasants.

Which, as I mentioned, is crude and simplistic.

Regardless, I might venture that Maoism may have the slant it does because it is a modernist tendency. In China, as I understand it, there was always a tension with the west inso far as China was one of history's great civilizations and then these bug-eyes hairy brutes come in and start running trade and opium rackets through it. You had the Boxer Rebellion which tried to get the old Chinese ways to overpower the West, and since the bullets didn't turn to water upon hitting the Boxers (incidentally, the Maji Maji Rebellion and portions of the Ghost Dance - all within a few years of each other - all tried to use native mysticism to defeat bullets), the old Chinese system was done. So the end result was that China had to be abandoned and the West had to be used as a foundation for the new society if China was to last.

Marxism is, after all, Western. It would not surprise me if the tendency to go back to the Chinese well were still there to change things around, especially since a generally "Socialism in One Country," model was taken which validated some of the old Chinese things to some extent. This would seem to generally match up with Mao's conflict with Chen Duxiu. Regardless, Mao—at least from my understanding in light of this thread—seems to have taken the westernization for technological and other advancement pretty damned seriously.

[Technology]

This is interesting. I've long heard arguments that the revolution in China (and Russia) was flawed because it was done in a semi-feudal country filled with peasants, but here the argument (as I understand it) is that the leaders of the revolution thinking that was the case was the problem.

[Leninist]

This is interesting. I've long heard arguments that the revolution in China (and Russia) was flawed because it was done in a semi-feudal country filled with peasants, but here the argument (as I understand it) is that the leaders of the revolution thinking that was the case was the problem.

You could say that. Under Lenin the political power of the average person was limited because the Bolsheviks felt the people simply were not ready for political power. They were generally uneducated peasants, and the communists wanted to try and just stabilize the country until the people could be made ready for power. Then Stalin took advantage of the situation caused by Lenin's death to take power and create a dictatorship. Probably if Lenin had not died or Stalin not risen, it would have been different.

Similarly, if Mao had not been impatient and egotistical than the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution would not have happened and China would still actually be communist. Mao felt that he needed to initiate a sort of second revolution in China, even though there were growth rates of around ten percent in much of the fifties.

Its really quite funny, if you actually consider communist history, our biggest problem has been horrendous luck, mainly with a few leaders. I mean, the odds of Lenin dying, someone like Stalin being in the right place at the wrong time, and Mao living a bit too long. And bloody term limits. First thing we do next time is term limits.

[Rei Murasame]

Regardless, Mao—at least from my understanding in light of this thread—seems to have taken the westernization for technological and other advancement pretty damned seriously.

Pretty much, that's the net outcome of it. 'Taking it seriously' is the charitable way to put it, but basically it becomes a total capitulation.

the revolution in China (and Russia)

No, no, no. China and USSR are two different things entirely. In this thread, the USSR is basically the opposite of China on all the points raised here.

I mean, the odds of Lenin dying, someone like Stalin being in the right place at the wrong time

No. I have to get in with this before it goes off course. The USSR disagreed in thought and action with the things that went on with China. The revolution in the USSR actually did rely on the proletariat to take it forward. They did not present a narrative of having to bring peasants in to 'take the towns'. It simply did not go that that way. Instead, the USSR manifested in the towns and went to 'take the countryside'. Its a very big difference.

Furthermore, Marxism-Leninism - as far as I'm aware - only became a codified ideology under the rule of Joseph Stalin. So for all intents and purposes, Marxism-Leninism is not orthogonal to the moniker 'Stalinism', it's actually synonymous with 'Stalinism'.

Naturally, in any case, if you have to choose one, Stalinism seemed to export much better results to the third world than Maoism did.

[Social_Critic]

15. Do not deliberately take conversations off-topic. Avoid bringing irrelevant issues into a conversation that will take conversation away from the topic addressed by the opening post.