- 01 Aug 2014 20:00
#14446632
This is my first post in quite some time, so I apologize if I am not coherent.
This post isn't, specifically, about the historical conflict between what is often called 'German Idealism' and 'Historical Materialism'. The point is to try and get even a superficial understanding of what this tension might actually consist in. From my experience, many Marxists seem to present both idealism and materialism in a simplistic way. This isn't, itself, a bad thing. As I said, I really just want to see whether we can get a simplistic understanding of this tension. But what I meant to say is that this simplistic way of framing the debate, I think, does severe injustice to both camps. Marxists (and I mean amateur Marxists here, like you and me. Well maybe not you, but certainly me) tend to present idealism in such a way that accepting the view seems childish or insane. As a result, what we mean by 'materialism' becomes a jumbled mess.
Because of many other things going on in my life, I am not in a position to seriously address this question; this will be something like a priori historical exegesis and is, consequently, false. I want to engage in a little philosophy. The tension is, indeed, a philosophical one.
Here is in a crude sense how we could dissociate realism and idealism. Suppose we are talking about some object X. A realist about object X is one who thinks that object X exists independent of anything about minds: that is, independent of human conventions, language, etc. An idealist about that object will say that part of what is means to be the object X is to be conceptualized, or named, or..etc. That is, object X is, in some sense, not independent of human beings.
Now consider how crazy idealism might look when we speak of every day objects. Consider the cup of coffee sitting next to my laptop. If I am an idealist about this cup, I am saying that this cup would cease to exist if there were no minds. The cup is not independent of the way it is conceived by minds. Let's be a little clearer: it is not independent of the way in which it could be conceived, perceived, named, etc., by rational creatures with a mind. "Whoah," you may protest, "that's just fucking bonkers!" Sure sounds so. But let me try to make the thesis more palatable. Consider just the portion of the cup that is 2.489 cm, or less, away from any portion of the table it is resting on. What about that object? Surely, one may say, that that object is, in an important sense, dependent on human conceptualization, thought, language, etc. Is there really such a thing as the portion of the cup of coffee that is 2.489cm away from any point of the table independently of any way in which such a thing is even conceived? What about that portion of the cup along with the portion of the table that is less than pi metres from the window? The more we do this, the more we see that we can arbitrarily conceive of and/or name certain portions of matter. Maybe the idealist is one who thinks that, in the end, the cup is just an arbitrarily named or perceived portion of matter -- even matter itself is just an arbitrarily perceived or named or conceptualized portion of... you get the idea.
What privileges my cup from arbitrarily conceived objects? My (very tentative) answer to this question would be that certain objects that we conceive, perceive, or name, play either distinct roles in our perceptive/cognitive/sensory apparatus or in our scientific theorizing. For example, perceiving a lion as a distinct object has a distinct evolutionary advantage: it signals certain other cognitive functions, or whatever, and induces us to fight or flight. The fact that this plays a distinct role in our survival is best explained by our taking these objects to be independent of ourselves: we are observing something true of (and independently true of) our capacity to perceive or conceptualize that object. Now take some other entities, like theoretical entities in science. In so far as they play the right sort of predictive role in our scientific theories (i.e. that we can accurately predict and/or explain phenomenon) is good reason to think that these entities exist independently of the way in which we actually conceive and theorize about them. In short, we provide an "inference to the best explanation". The utility of privileging certain objects is best explained by the fact that some of these objects are actually independent of human beings.
Ok I'm tired of writing, but I am trying to move from this to consider what Marxists are trying to say when they claim that they have a realist (and materialist) conception of history. My sense is that this thesis is informed by the fact that Marx thought that there could be such a thing as social science and that there could be certain entities, objects, whatever, that play the right sort of theoretical roles in that science. One negative side of this thesis is that there are many things, like concepts of "justice", "geist", whatever, that do not play the right sorts of theoretical roles in this science.
Alright, I will write some more after I hear what other people have to say. Please don't be shy to just call out my foolishness (not that this is really something I need to mention on PoFo).
This post isn't, specifically, about the historical conflict between what is often called 'German Idealism' and 'Historical Materialism'. The point is to try and get even a superficial understanding of what this tension might actually consist in. From my experience, many Marxists seem to present both idealism and materialism in a simplistic way. This isn't, itself, a bad thing. As I said, I really just want to see whether we can get a simplistic understanding of this tension. But what I meant to say is that this simplistic way of framing the debate, I think, does severe injustice to both camps. Marxists (and I mean amateur Marxists here, like you and me. Well maybe not you, but certainly me) tend to present idealism in such a way that accepting the view seems childish or insane. As a result, what we mean by 'materialism' becomes a jumbled mess.
Because of many other things going on in my life, I am not in a position to seriously address this question; this will be something like a priori historical exegesis and is, consequently, false. I want to engage in a little philosophy. The tension is, indeed, a philosophical one.
Here is in a crude sense how we could dissociate realism and idealism. Suppose we are talking about some object X. A realist about object X is one who thinks that object X exists independent of anything about minds: that is, independent of human conventions, language, etc. An idealist about that object will say that part of what is means to be the object X is to be conceptualized, or named, or..etc. That is, object X is, in some sense, not independent of human beings.
Now consider how crazy idealism might look when we speak of every day objects. Consider the cup of coffee sitting next to my laptop. If I am an idealist about this cup, I am saying that this cup would cease to exist if there were no minds. The cup is not independent of the way it is conceived by minds. Let's be a little clearer: it is not independent of the way in which it could be conceived, perceived, named, etc., by rational creatures with a mind. "Whoah," you may protest, "that's just fucking bonkers!" Sure sounds so. But let me try to make the thesis more palatable. Consider just the portion of the cup that is 2.489 cm, or less, away from any portion of the table it is resting on. What about that object? Surely, one may say, that that object is, in an important sense, dependent on human conceptualization, thought, language, etc. Is there really such a thing as the portion of the cup of coffee that is 2.489cm away from any point of the table independently of any way in which such a thing is even conceived? What about that portion of the cup along with the portion of the table that is less than pi metres from the window? The more we do this, the more we see that we can arbitrarily conceive of and/or name certain portions of matter. Maybe the idealist is one who thinks that, in the end, the cup is just an arbitrarily named or perceived portion of matter -- even matter itself is just an arbitrarily perceived or named or conceptualized portion of... you get the idea.
What privileges my cup from arbitrarily conceived objects? My (very tentative) answer to this question would be that certain objects that we conceive, perceive, or name, play either distinct roles in our perceptive/cognitive/sensory apparatus or in our scientific theorizing. For example, perceiving a lion as a distinct object has a distinct evolutionary advantage: it signals certain other cognitive functions, or whatever, and induces us to fight or flight. The fact that this plays a distinct role in our survival is best explained by our taking these objects to be independent of ourselves: we are observing something true of (and independently true of) our capacity to perceive or conceptualize that object. Now take some other entities, like theoretical entities in science. In so far as they play the right sort of predictive role in our scientific theories (i.e. that we can accurately predict and/or explain phenomenon) is good reason to think that these entities exist independently of the way in which we actually conceive and theorize about them. In short, we provide an "inference to the best explanation". The utility of privileging certain objects is best explained by the fact that some of these objects are actually independent of human beings.
Ok I'm tired of writing, but I am trying to move from this to consider what Marxists are trying to say when they claim that they have a realist (and materialist) conception of history. My sense is that this thesis is informed by the fact that Marx thought that there could be such a thing as social science and that there could be certain entities, objects, whatever, that play the right sort of theoretical roles in that science. One negative side of this thesis is that there are many things, like concepts of "justice", "geist", whatever, that do not play the right sorts of theoretical roles in this science.
Alright, I will write some more after I hear what other people have to say. Please don't be shy to just call out my foolishness (not that this is really something I need to mention on PoFo).