- 05 Oct 2016 13:43
#14724352
I certainly don't have the depth of knowledge to satisfy this topic but I suspect these could be useful pieces in regard to some of the subjects that have come up in the thread. Plus I'm being a shameless necro'er since I think this thread is quite interesting and think would be interesting for others.
In regards to morality and the issue of it being presctive and descriptive, I thought this might be useful.
http://sci-hub.cc/10.1007/BF01043575
Page 126
Page 129
Page 132
Perhaps this passage is the one you refer to.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch07.htm
It would seem that some share this same line of thought and I would agree.
MARX AND MORALITY
p. 247
In regards to morality and the issue of it being presctive and descriptive, I thought this might be useful.
http://sci-hub.cc/10.1007/BF01043575
Page 126
A. Servitude: Scientific Description or Moral Evaluation?
Words such as 'servitude' and 'exploitation', one could argue, have a role in our language analagous to that occupied by terms such as 'liar' and 'thief' insofar as each combines factual and evaluative elements. For Engels, as we saw earlier, exploitation was a technical term used to describe the relationship between capitalist and worker. But it could also be seen as expressing certain values. For there is no way in which exploitation may be explained without containing pejorative notions. To understand how to employ this concept in the context of Marx's theories of surplus value is to understand what is wrong with an economic and political system. Just as one acquires the appropriate values in learning the correct use of the word 'liar', so one can be said to acquire a certain attitude towards capitalism when one learns the usage of concepts such as 'servitude', 'pauperization', 'ruling class', 'alienation' and 'surplus value'. The difference is that whilst for Phillips and Mounce one learns how to employ terms such as 'thief', 'liar' and so on in the course of conforming to society, Marx held that terms such as 'servitude' are acquired in learning how to transform capitalist society. But both share the view that moral concepts are acquired in human activity rather than in the speculations of philosophy.
Marx often referred to servitude and alienation in describing capitalism and accepted that these were good reasons for attacking it. But he never advanced an additional philosophical argument to show why these factors would constitute good reasons for condemning it,just as Phillips and Mounce argue that we require no further argument to establish that lying is bad. No doubt Marx was fully aware that capitalism could not be adequately undermined with an appeal to its own moral criteria. Presumably he felt that the reasons contained in his theory were sufficient. Hence no further appeal to moral principles was necessary to demonstrate the iniquity of capitalism.
Given this, the question of whether Marxism is prescriptive or descriptive, moralistic or scientific, is misplaced. This point has been made by Wood in his article 'The Marxian Critique of Justice':
Marx's own reasons for condemning capitalism are contained in his comprehensive theory of the historical genesis, the organic functioning, and the prognosis of the capitalist mode of production. And this is not itself a moral theory, nor does it include any particular moral principles as such. But neither is it 'merely descriptive', in the tedious philosophical sense which is supposed to make it seem problematic how anything of that sort could ever be a reason for condemning what is so 'described'. There is nothing problematic about saying that disguised exploitation, unnecessary servitude, economic instability, and declining productivity are features of a productive system which constitute good reasons for condemning it.~9
No one has denied that capitalism, understood as Marx's theory understands it, is a system of unnecessary servitude, replete with irrationalities and ripe for destruction. Still less has anyone defended capitalism by claiming that a system of this sort might after all be good or desirable, and it is doubtful that any moral philosophy which could support such a claim would deserve serious consideration. 20
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Indeed to argue that every man has an unalienable right to appropriate the full value of his labour, and that a denial of this right constitutes an injustice, is anachronistic. For it presupposes a mode of production based on individual private property with each individual producing his own means of production, a mode of production very different from capitalism whose hallmark is the co-operation of men in the work process using the same means of production.
Insofar as the extraction of surplus value is the fundamental and defining feature of capitalism, there can be no moral objection to this practice within the framework of a capitalist mode of production. The extraction of surplus value, argues Wood, is just and to try to deprive the capitalist of surplus value is unjust. It would therefore be wrong "to suppose that Marx's critique of capitalism is necessarily rooted in any particular moral or social ideal or principle".
The extraction of surplus value is not an abuse of capitalist production or an unfair practice within capitalism that should be abolished. On the contrary, this appropriation is of the essence of capitalism. It cannot be removed by social and political reforms. Only a complete change in the mode of production can remove it and this would involve a transformation of capitalism itself.
But if the extraction of surplus value may be defended as just, why did Marx condemn capitalism? Wood responds to this question in the following way:
It would be extremely naive to suppose that there could be any single, simple answer to such a question. The only genuine answer to it is Marx's comprehensive theory of capitalism as a concrete historical mode of production; for it was as a whole that Marx condemned capitalism, and his condemnation was based on what he believed was a unified and essentially complete analysis of its inner workings and its position in human history. Capitalism, in Marx's view, had performed a valuable historical task in developing social forces of production. He even speaks of this development as the historical 'justification' of capital. But this development had taken place at enormous human cost. Not only had it impoverished the physical existence of the mass of workers whose labour had brought about the development of productive forces, but the intellectual and moral lives of men had been impoverished by it as well. The rapidity of social change under capitalism had created a permanent state of instability and disorder in social relationships which had taken away from human happiness perhaps more than was added by the increase in human productive capacities. But the capitalist era, itself, in Marx's view, was drawing to a close. Marx argued that the capacity of capitalism further to develop the forces of production was meeting with increasing obstacles, obstacles resulting from the organic workings of the capitalist system of production itself. At the same time, and partly as a result of these same obstacles, the human cost of capitalism was growing steadily greater. The interests and needs of fewer and fewer were being served by its continuation, and its preservation was being made more and more difficult by the cumulative effects of its own essential processes. 25
Marx's critique of capitalism is derived from his account of the workings of capitalism rather than from abstract moral principles. Society is always changing. As it changes so does its own standards of justice. The exploitation characteristic of relationships between men in capitalist society cannot therefore be construed as unjust. Nor can this exploitation be removed by the demand for and extension of human rights or an appeal to absolute moral principles. Indeed Marx was highly suspicious of the abstract ideals of the French Revolution which he thought would serve to divert the working class away from its historical role as the agent of social change. If each mode of production has its own standards of justice we cannot say that Communism is better or more just than capitalism, as Taylor, Allen and Kline, each in their own way, imply. If there is no external moral standard against which different societies may be measured, the Communist society described by Marx cannot be seen as a better alternative. Nor can Marx be seen as advancing a moral theory. On the contrary he argues that "Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development conditioned by it". 26 What comes with Communism is a new mode of production with its own peculiar judicial and moral institutions and practices. It will not be more or less just than capitalism but simply appropriate to that particular way of life.
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From the foregoing discussion we can note that whilst Marx transcends the fact-value distinction he embraces neither a scientistic approach nor a moral theory. Rather he gives a sociological account of morality, illustrating that description and evaluation cannot be separated and that juridical conceptions need to be understood in relation to the mode of production in which they arise, s° In the absence of an absolute notion of justice it is mistaken to see Marx as offering a critique of capitalism based on moral principles. Of course Marx had reasons for attacking capitalism but these are contained within his account of the capitalist mode of production. Yet whilst this theory is not a moral theory it cannot be described as a descriptive theory either. In Marx's work description and evaluation cannot be meaningfully separated.
In portraying Communist society as the solution to problems generated within capitalist society Marx is not sketching out a picture of a morally superior society but rather considering the possibilities of an alternative way of life with its own moral and judicial standards. Indeed the fact that Marx did not provide blueprints for future Communist society is itself symptomatic of his awareness of the difficulties involved in the attempt to describe in detail a form of social life based upon principles different from our own.
all morality is simply what a particular social group prefers or takes to be preferred. This is subject to the standard criticisms against cultural relativism. Moreover, I see no reason to think that Marxism embraces cultural relativism. I forget the passage, but Engels, for one, thought that we could not achieve an appropriate moral discourse in a predicament where we find ourselves stratified along class lines. It seems that the suggestion is that we could achieve an appropriate discourse where moral reasoning is no longer hostage to class morality. There is, then, a sense in which the Marxist advocates for a universal morality.
Perhaps this passage is the one you refer to.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch07.htm
We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and for ever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. We maintain on the contrary that all moral theories have been hitherto the product, in the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed. That in this process there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt. But we have not yet passed beyond class morality. A really human morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life. And now one can gauge Herr Dühring’s presumption in advancing his claim, from the midst of the old class society and on the eve of a social revolution, to impose on the future classless society an eternal morality independent of time and changes in reality. Even assuming — what we do not know up to now — that he understands the structure of the society of the future at least in its main outlines.
It would seem that some share this same line of thought and I would agree.
Now I do have some tentative thoughts on the subject and I think that our ideas may track on this. I do want to hear your thoughts. Here is how I think we can criticize certain ideological and moral systems. In any system of production we can always look at a particular objective, material fact: the productivity, per capita, of goods and services and their 'effective' distribution (i.e. the effectiveness of the goods produces to satisfy human actual human needs). Ideological systems, while they ultimately 'stem from' the mode of production and distribution also have a reciprocal effect on that system. In so far as that ideological system gives way to progress in those material relations, i.e. sustaining and or increasing productivity and the effectiveness of distribution, then we could say that it is rational to subscribe to that ideological system. In so far as that ideological system is a fetter on these productive processes and inhibit both the increase in the productive capacity of a society and the ability of that society to satisfy social and material needs, then we can say that subscribing to that ideological system is irrational. In this way, certain practices like child labor or stoning women can be discredited by a Marxist because they are practices that no longer have an efficient effect on the productive relations of that society. They become a fetter on our ability, as human beings, to produce and satisfy our needs. It would be irrational to subscribe to such practices given the state of development in Western societies. Similarly, many Bourgeois conceptions of justice and law receive a similar fate.
MARX AND MORALITY
p. 247
In evaluating specific moral questions, Marx evaluates a whole host of concrete historical factors to reach a conclusion about whether a particular action, principle, movement, etc., is such as to promote or inhibit the realization of human nature and the development of what he calls “rich individuals,” human beings for whom the exercise, development, and expansion of their own capacities is their greatest need, and for whom labor has been transformed from drudgery into “life's prime want.” And so morality, according to Marx, is not mere abstract moralizing, but a scientific analysis of which things are most likely to promote the development of human beings. The morality he develops is thoroughly historical, and so the specific fact of the matter about whether an action or a state of affairs is moral or immoral can be different in different historical situations. However, on Marx's view it is possible to say with a very reasonable degree of accuracy which things are actually likely to promote the development of the “rich individuality” of human beings, and which things are not. This allows Marx to claim an objectivity for the moral judgements that he makes.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/For%20Ethical%20Politics.pdf#page90
-For Ethical Politics
-For Ethical Politics