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By Wellsy
#14724352
I certainly don't have the depth of knowledge to satisfy this topic but I suspect these could be useful pieces in regard to some of the subjects that have come up in the thread. Plus I'm being a shameless necro'er since I think this thread is quite interesting and think would be interesting for others.

In regards to morality and the issue of it being presctive and descriptive, I thought this might be useful.
http://sci-hub.cc/10.1007/BF01043575
Page 126
A. Servitude: Scientific Description or Moral Evaluation?
Words such as 'servitude' and 'exploitation', one could argue, have a role in our language analagous to that occupied by terms such as 'liar' and 'thief' insofar as each combines factual and evaluative elements. For Engels, as we saw earlier, exploitation was a technical term used to describe the relationship between capitalist and worker. But it could also be seen as expressing certain values. For there is no way in which exploitation may be explained without containing pejorative notions. To understand how to employ this concept in the context of Marx's theories of surplus value is to understand what is wrong with an economic and political system. Just as one acquires the appropriate values in learning the correct use of the word 'liar', so one can be said to acquire a certain attitude towards capitalism when one learns the usage of concepts such as 'servitude', 'pauperization', 'ruling class', 'alienation' and 'surplus value'. The difference is that whilst for Phillips and Mounce one learns how to employ terms such as 'thief', 'liar' and so on in the course of conforming to society, Marx held that terms such as 'servitude' are acquired in learning how to transform capitalist society. But both share the view that moral concepts are acquired in human activity rather than in the speculations of philosophy.
Marx often referred to servitude and alienation in describing capitalism and accepted that these were good reasons for attacking it. But he never advanced an additional philosophical argument to show why these factors would constitute good reasons for condemning it,just as Phillips and Mounce argue that we require no further argument to establish that lying is bad. No doubt Marx was fully aware that capitalism could not be adequately undermined with an appeal to its own moral criteria. Presumably he felt that the reasons contained in his theory were sufficient. Hence no further appeal to moral principles was necessary to demonstrate the iniquity of capitalism.
Given this, the question of whether Marxism is prescriptive or descriptive, moralistic or scientific, is misplaced. This point has been made by Wood in his article 'The Marxian Critique of Justice':

Marx's own reasons for condemning capitalism are contained in his comprehensive theory of the historical genesis, the organic functioning, and the prognosis of the capitalist mode of production. And this is not itself a moral theory, nor does it include any particular moral principles as such. But neither is it 'merely descriptive', in the tedious philosophical sense which is supposed to make it seem problematic how anything of that sort could ever be a reason for condemning what is so 'described'. There is nothing problematic about saying that disguised exploitation, unnecessary servitude, economic instability, and declining productivity are features of a productive system which constitute good reasons for condemning it.~9

No one has denied that capitalism, understood as Marx's theory understands it, is a system of unnecessary servitude, replete with irrationalities and ripe for destruction. Still less has anyone defended capitalism by claiming that a system of this sort might after all be good or desirable, and it is doubtful that any moral philosophy which could support such a claim would deserve serious consideration. 20

Page 129
Indeed to argue that every man has an unalienable right to appropriate the full value of his labour, and that a denial of this right constitutes an injustice, is anachronistic. For it presupposes a mode of production based on individual private property with each individual producing his own means of production, a mode of production very different from capitalism whose hallmark is the co-operation of men in the work process using the same means of production.
Insofar as the extraction of surplus value is the fundamental and defining feature of capitalism, there can be no moral objection to this practice within the framework of a capitalist mode of production. The extraction of surplus value, argues Wood, is just and to try to deprive the capitalist of surplus value is unjust. It would therefore be wrong "to suppose that Marx's critique of capitalism is necessarily rooted in any particular moral or social ideal or principle".
The extraction of surplus value is not an abuse of capitalist production or an unfair practice within capitalism that should be abolished. On the contrary, this appropriation is of the essence of capitalism. It cannot be removed by social and political reforms. Only a complete change in the mode of production can remove it and this would involve a transformation of capitalism itself.
But if the extraction of surplus value may be defended as just, why did Marx condemn capitalism? Wood responds to this question in the following way:

It would be extremely naive to suppose that there could be any single, simple answer to such a question. The only genuine answer to it is Marx's comprehensive theory of capitalism as a concrete historical mode of production; for it was as a whole that Marx condemned capitalism, and his condemnation was based on what he believed was a unified and essentially complete analysis of its inner workings and its position in human history. Capitalism, in Marx's view, had performed a valuable historical task in developing social forces of production. He even speaks of this development as the historical 'justification' of capital. But this development had taken place at enormous human cost. Not only had it impoverished the physical existence of the mass of workers whose labour had brought about the development of productive forces, but the intellectual and moral lives of men had been impoverished by it as well. The rapidity of social change under capitalism had created a permanent state of instability and disorder in social relationships which had taken away from human happiness perhaps more than was added by the increase in human productive capacities. But the capitalist era, itself, in Marx's view, was drawing to a close. Marx argued that the capacity of capitalism further to develop the forces of production was meeting with increasing obstacles, obstacles resulting from the organic workings of the capitalist system of production itself. At the same time, and partly as a result of these same obstacles, the human cost of capitalism was growing steadily greater. The interests and needs of fewer and fewer were being served by its continuation, and its preservation was being made more and more difficult by the cumulative effects of its own essential processes. 25

Marx's critique of capitalism is derived from his account of the workings of capitalism rather than from abstract moral principles. Society is always changing. As it changes so does its own standards of justice. The exploitation characteristic of relationships between men in capitalist society cannot therefore be construed as unjust. Nor can this exploitation be removed by the demand for and extension of human rights or an appeal to absolute moral principles. Indeed Marx was highly suspicious of the abstract ideals of the French Revolution which he thought would serve to divert the working class away from its historical role as the agent of social change. If each mode of production has its own standards of justice we cannot say that Communism is better or more just than capitalism, as Taylor, Allen and Kline, each in their own way, imply. If there is no external moral standard against which different societies may be measured, the Communist society described by Marx cannot be seen as a better alternative. Nor can Marx be seen as advancing a moral theory. On the contrary he argues that "Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and the cultural development conditioned by it". 26 What comes with Communism is a new mode of production with its own peculiar judicial and moral institutions and practices. It will not be more or less just than capitalism but simply appropriate to that particular way of life.

Page 132
From the foregoing discussion we can note that whilst Marx transcends the fact-value distinction he embraces neither a scientistic approach nor a moral theory. Rather he gives a sociological account of morality, illustrating that description and evaluation cannot be separated and that juridical conceptions need to be understood in relation to the mode of production in which they arise, s° In the absence of an absolute notion of justice it is mistaken to see Marx as offering a critique of capitalism based on moral principles. Of course Marx had reasons for attacking capitalism but these are contained within his account of the capitalist mode of production. Yet whilst this theory is not a moral theory it cannot be described as a descriptive theory either. In Marx's work description and evaluation cannot be meaningfully separated.

In portraying Communist society as the solution to problems generated within capitalist society Marx is not sketching out a picture of a morally superior society but rather considering the possibilities of an alternative way of life with its own moral and judicial standards. Indeed the fact that Marx did not provide blueprints for future Communist society is itself symptomatic of his awareness of the difficulties involved in the attempt to describe in detail a form of social life based upon principles different from our own.




all morality is simply what a particular social group prefers or takes to be preferred. This is subject to the standard criticisms against cultural relativism. Moreover, I see no reason to think that Marxism embraces cultural relativism. I forget the passage, but Engels, for one, thought that we could not achieve an appropriate moral discourse in a predicament where we find ourselves stratified along class lines. It seems that the suggestion is that we could achieve an appropriate discourse where moral reasoning is no longer hostage to class morality. There is, then, a sense in which the Marxist advocates for a universal morality.

Perhaps this passage is the one you refer to.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1877/anti-duhring/ch07.htm
We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and for ever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. We maintain on the contrary that all moral theories have been hitherto the product, in the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed. That in this process there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt. But we have not yet passed beyond class morality. A really human morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life. And now one can gauge Herr Dühring’s presumption in advancing his claim, from the midst of the old class society and on the eve of a social revolution, to impose on the future classless society an eternal morality independent of time and changes in reality. Even assuming — what we do not know up to now — that he understands the structure of the society of the future at least in its main outlines.


It would seem that some share this same line of thought and I would agree.
Now I do have some tentative thoughts on the subject and I think that our ideas may track on this. I do want to hear your thoughts. Here is how I think we can criticize certain ideological and moral systems. In any system of production we can always look at a particular objective, material fact: the productivity, per capita, of goods and services and their 'effective' distribution (i.e. the effectiveness of the goods produces to satisfy human actual human needs). Ideological systems, while they ultimately 'stem from' the mode of production and distribution also have a reciprocal effect on that system. In so far as that ideological system gives way to progress in those material relations, i.e. sustaining and or increasing productivity and the effectiveness of distribution, then we could say that it is rational to subscribe to that ideological system. In so far as that ideological system is a fetter on these productive processes and inhibit both the increase in the productive capacity of a society and the ability of that society to satisfy social and material needs, then we can say that subscribing to that ideological system is irrational. In this way, certain practices like child labor or stoning women can be discredited by a Marxist because they are practices that no longer have an efficient effect on the productive relations of that society. They become a fetter on our ability, as human beings, to produce and satisfy our needs. It would be irrational to subscribe to such practices given the state of development in Western societies. Similarly, many Bourgeois conceptions of justice and law receive a similar fate.

MARX AND MORALITY
p. 247
In evaluating specific moral questions, Marx evaluates a whole host of concrete historical factors to reach a conclusion about whether a particular action, principle, movement, etc., is such as to promote or inhibit the realization of human nature and the development of what he calls “rich individuals,” human beings for whom the exercise, development, and expansion of their own capacities is their greatest need, and for whom labor has been transformed from drudgery into “life's prime want.” And so morality, according to Marx, is not mere abstract moralizing, but a scientific analysis of which things are most likely to promote the development of human beings. The morality he develops is thoroughly historical, and so the specific fact of the matter about whether an action or a state of affairs is moral or immoral can be different in different historical situations. However, on Marx's view it is possible to say with a very reasonable degree of accuracy which things are actually likely to promote the development of the “rich individuality” of human beings, and which things are not. This allows Marx to claim an objectivity for the moral judgements that he makes.
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By Wellsy
#14762783
I wonder if some of the value judgments come in part from the possibility of something.
It's not clear to me to what extent the conditions of a society seriously limits one's ability for certain thoughts, as somethings are difficult to think of but we're also able to contradict ideological views, so think of things that aren't a substantive reality. But that might be because its reality for few but not all as ruling ideologies are defined by the ruling class experience. The the basis of immanent critique is that ideologies often have contradictions to the actual practice of the ideologues.
But it would seem that a lot of things are simply idealistic, that they don't make an effort to consider how to actualize their ideals. Something like Rawls conception of a just society for example seems to go to the logical conclusion of liberalism which sounds like a social democratic society, but doesn't make an attempt to discuss how to actualize it.
I think Marx and Engels work is more grounded in that it seems to make us not appeal simply to ideals but draw attention to what are the conditions of possibility, as ought implies can. And I imagine this is what TIG was getting at when discussing how one might not agree with slavery or child labor in sweat shops but a morality that doesn't ground itself in a a approximate understanding of reality is merely idealistic. That a good morality would perhaps not exist just in an abstract thought experiment but would truly consider the individual in real world moral dilemmas, that they would be considered on both an individual and collective ontology.
I make the assumption that what makes Marx compelling is that in first grasping the limits of say living under capitalism, that he allows us to understand what is sustainable under capitalism and what could be realized upon transcending it.
That capitalism itself created a change in the conditions of a society through things like industrialization which prompted change in possibilities for what people could actually do and think possible. I think a great example is the feminist project/woman question, which from my understanding largely arrives after industrialization. Where working class women advocate for themselves to form their own unions because they're excluded from male ones and upper class ones advocate for the vote as from their perspective it would be meaningful political step to achieve other political goals.
Many are able to see the possibility due to the material conditions, other things are simply not sustainable without a change in the material conditions which sets the limits on what is possible. That what is impossible is idealism, and that we have to resign ourselves to the reality that somethings are inevitable like death until we somehow make them possible.
But the expansion of the means of production changes conditions in a way that things that were impossible concretely and even conceptually suddenly become possible. To think of how we're conceptually limited it's useful to consider how difficult it is to not think in a dualist fashion, where one side of a dichotomy has to take primacy over the other. Then to consider how difficult it is to conceive of what life under communism might look like other than pointing out that it'd require certain differences to our present state, like not reducing all social relations to monetary ones.

And I'm not quite sure the exact relationship between the base and superstructure is, but it would seem that many people are unable to truly imagine what might be possible in the abstract without grasping the present reality. That Marx seem to have emphasize important variables which set the limits of what is possible and sustainable and then deduced how they might be resolved.

That if something like beating ones children to make them behave shows itself to be unnecessary, then suddenly it becomes a moral wrong. But to consider whether a person who in the past did such a thing was moral or immoral, we'd have to consider that they could have in fact conceived of it as a wrong to imply that they ought to have done otherwise. Which might require greater sensitivity to what extent the base translates to the superstructure and vice versa, how limited are peoples abstractions due to their conditions.
That one might argue how someone in the past couldn't have known any better. How were they to think or act otherwise? To which I suspect the individuals that seem progressive and ahead of their time are individuals that have been able to live more materially prosperous lives. That it's easier for well off person to get access to things that would expand their mind to consider certain things and not be pressed by other conditions that make it difficult for them to enact it. But this is a very vague thing, that I don't know how we'd estimate to what extent someone would've had the probability to have access to the means to think and act differently. Since social sciences are only approximate estimations and not accurate like classical physics. That I think if we had a clearer picture of to what extent one's worldview is restricted by ones living conditions then we might be able to better articulate that someone should've known better and based on their material conditions, should've acted better.
But I'm not sure I know enough about moral and ethical philosophy to articulate how we get a normative sense from Marx and Engel's work. I have only an intuitive impression that we can rationally argue that somethings make more sense than others and thus can value them differently. That some peoples morality becomes obsolete because the conditions make them stuck in archaic ideologies because the material conditions have already superseded the necessity of the social relations they find morally justifiable.

I'm not familiar enough with Marx and Engels work to lay claim to what they might've thought. But something I found interesting was a discussion about something Zizek said about form and essence. That it seemed to be from the discussion that Zizek was expressing the equal importance of form and essence in order to understand something. That the form was the sensory experience of an object, and that the essence was the meaning that we projected onto it. Not a 'thing-in-itself', like an abstract object that existed objectively in reality, but that there was no concrete essence as it is 'that which is thought'. So abstractions that we project onto the item, which I imagine relates to earlier points of how our social relations organize the meaning prescribed upon empirical objects. That there is no fixed meaning, but that we collectively designate meanings to certain objects, in the same way that we give a specific meaning to money which empirically is just metal, plastic or paper. And that even if this is the case, that all meaning is 'subjective' projections, they are still incredibly compelling because of the social organization of society.
Zizek makes a good point that how we can even be aware of our disbelief in things yet still function according to ideological lines.
This is because our selves are so social, that it's kind of difficult to imagine our view of reality being separated from society without being some sort of feral child. Because even our thoughts are thoroughly ingrained from our experience of the world which is thoroughly social. That my thoughts may be possible to keep to myself, but my thinking didn't develop in a vacuum, no part of my mind that is outside from the influence of society.
That we can internalize it so thoroughly, that even the threat of social,legal or violent consequences need not exist objectively or be implied, though they are part of what helps make it feel real. Because we embody the things done to us, whether it be sexual guilt from the Church, social pressures to act like a wo/man, how to dress and so on. There is no part of the self that is untouched by such relations if one has existed within such relations. So I assume that this position lacks normative strength, beyond perhaps trying to appeal to reason based on axioms that are thought to stem from class positions because its from such positions that we thus internalize such social relations.

EDIT: Recently found a very basic summary of someone's interpretation of Marx's ontology. Which might give some hints for those more philosophically inclined of how things might fit.
Against Dualism: Marxism and the Necessity of Dialectical Monism
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