Why were the Nazis Not More Socialist? - Page 4 - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

Wandering the information superhighway, he came upon the last refuge of civilization, PoFo, the only forum on the internet ...

The non-democratic state: Platonism, Fascism, Theocracy, Monarchy etc.
Forum rules: No one line posts please.
#14347154
Terror and Reprisals. The Nazi WERE fairly willing to maintain a fair amount of terror and acts of reprisals. It didnt work. It did niot eliminate the resistance and over time it polarizes more and more of the population against you.

North Africa , there were quite a few Italian division in North Africa, it's more than just 3 divisions. The British also suffered logistically the further they operated from Suez. While having a massive support base there almost everything had be trucked forward just like the Germans from Tripoli (the British had a small railway, better Naval transport but the vast majority still had be truck). Both sides had very large advantage when much closer to their logisctical base and the other side much further.

Invading the Near East via Turkey. The Railways of the Region are really really really really bad. Supporting half the forces involved in Barbarossa through Turkey is not possible. The Railways through the Balkans are pretty bad. So only a much smaller force could be supported and at a much greater cost. Coming through Turkey the forces at the sharp end in Iraq are still going to quite small due to the bad logistical support.

Even if successful there is no way to get the oil back. The railways are really really really bad. It would take massive upgrading of the railway lines to make it work. unfortunately every thing required has to come over the same really really bad rail lines and roads. The Germans simply didnt have the engines or rolling stock, it would have been a massive investment of resources. 3700 km over some really bad railways.


Why weren't the Nazi's more socialist? Because they were not socialists, and social policies were not priority. It was preparing ot making war, looting stuff, maintaining control, and killing people the didnt like. These were Nazi high priority activities. Social programs were always window dressing and just not that important.
#14347209
Rich wrote:The rulers united will never be defeated!

Really as long as you're willing to use a reasonable level of terror its not that hard to maintain an occupation. Now this is one area where I agree with the Libertarians, you don't need big government you just get the locals to police themselves. Someone shoots at you from a village, you take hundred hostages, if the perpetrators aren't handed over promptly you shoot them. most people's appetite for resistance rapidly crumbles when faced with the execution and torture of their children and other loved ones. Overall the resistance movements were chronically ineffective. They often spent more time fighting each other or preparing for the show down after the allied and soviets had liberated them. Even Tito was incapable of liberating his country without Soviet support even with the Germans in head long retreat. Soviet partisans were the most effect, but they would not have lasted long if the Soviets ceased hostilities. The Germans can hardly have been said to have lacked fanaticism but he Werewolves proved to be a completely damp squid once the Nazi regime had been eliminated.


What makes you think the Soviets would ever cease hostilities? Beria and Ustinov organized the evacuation of huge numbers of factories behind the Urals, allowing the USSR to continue armament productions even if all of European Russia was taken by Hitler.
#14347293
Andropov wrote:What makes you think the Soviets would ever cease hostilities?
They ceased hostilities in 1918. They made deals such as the Nazi Soviet pact. Treaties with Finland, Poland etc. You make peace with your enemies not your friends. It was Hitler who was incapable of making peace not Stalin or the Soviet leadership.
#14347315
pugsville wrote:Invading the Near East via Turkey. The Railways of the Region are really really really really bad. Supporting half the forces involved in Barbarossa through Turkey is not possible. The Railways through the Balkans are pretty bad. So only a much smaller force could be supported and at a much greater cost. Coming through Turkey the forces at the sharp end in Iraq are still going to quite small due to the bad logistical support.


I don't think conditions in Russia or North Africa were stellar either. The nazis at one point--c spring '41, had at least a half million troops in the Balkans. They localized enough troops to overrun Greece quickly. Even if they couldn't gulf ship oil back to the reich just taking it might've caused churchill to fold. He and others would've taken the loss very hard.

It was Hitler who was incapable of making peace..


In fact after stalingrad there were secret German-Soviet negotiations but the Germans asked too much--a border based on the dneiper--so the issue "was referred back to the field of battle" as one writer put it.
#14347498
Taking Middle Eastern Oil would not have hurt Britain at all. Britain was sourcing ALL it's oil from the Americas.

NorthAfrica - Yes the Axis had problems maintaining their troops in North Africa due to logistical constraints,
Russia - is quite different, there are is very large rail net, many road, (though the Russian rail net wasn't as dense or as strong as European rail network) The Forces were sustained by a very large network with many routes and parallel routes. And the First part of the route is pretty good to eastern poland.

Balkans - serviced by many roads and rail, the distance from large friendly logistical networks was not great.

rough logistical guide 500kms is a distance over which supplies can be trucked pretty well from major railheads. As the distance stretches to 1000 ms the amount of trucks , time and fuel consumed rises till is very hard. at 100km the trucks are consuming most of their load in fuel to make the trip, very little of the load is actually used to deliver resources at the end of the trip. 50% load used in fuel at distance x double the distance and 100% is being used as fuel, ie it's just unviable to use trucks over the greater distance,




Berlin to Basra is twice the distance from Berlin to Moscow.
#14347635
pugsville wrote:Taking Middle Eastern Oil would not have hurt Britain at all.


The blow to prestige alone probably would've broken the churchill government.

NorthAfrica - Yes the Axis had problems maintaining their troops in North Africa due to logistical constraints,


The combined axis force was still substantial--several divisions, which had the initiative at times.

Berlin to Basra is twice the distance from Berlin to Moscow.


At least the resistance was nowhere near as great.
#14347662
In June 1940 Hitler had won. Stalin was a very cautious expansionist. He showed not the slightest interest in getting into conflict with any major power. He tried to minimise conflict with Japanese and with Kuomintang. There was absolutely no way he was going to launch an attack on a triumphant Wehrmacht. Britain was impotent. America wasn't going to declare war. Hitler dominated Europe. He had a severe shortage of natural oil and rubber supplies but given his immensely powerful position that problem could be overcome.

Hitler was totally untrustworthy. That and his inability to make peace meant he ended up with a lot enemies. The one person he kept loyal to was Mussolini. This was particularly unfortunate choice for him. After the fall of France Hitler should have focused his military force and his immense diplomatic leverage over Vichy, France and Spain to secure Suez and the straits of Gibraltar. If he had focussed on submarine and other anti shipping warfare, using bases in Morocco and the Red Sea, Britian would have been rapidly brought to heel. It was Churchill that needed the threat of an invasion not Hitler.

Churchill is seen as great leader. The reason he is not remembered as a fool is because Hitler was stupid enough to leave the Mediterranean and Southern Europe to Mussolini and declare war on the Soviet Union and the United States.
#14348119
Rich wrote: Britain was impotent.


Well, the RN wasn't bad.

After the fall of France Hitler should have focused his military force and his immense diplomatic leverage over Vichy, France and Spain to secure Suez and the straits of Gibraltar.


He tried to bring Spain in but Franco's price--the French African Empire--was too high. He even tried to enlist Stalin to help dismantle the British Empire but again the price was deemed too high. Still, I agree he should've tried to knock Britain out of the war by going after its empire--as much as he could reach.

If he had focussed on submarine and other anti shipping warfare, using bases in Morocco and the Red Sea, Britian would have been rapidly brought to heel.


Sure, there should've been more emphasis on U-boat warfare. But the u-boat force just wasn't big enough in 1939-40, regardless of its bases (and its Biscay bases would've been absolutely enviable to the reichsmarine in WWI). If the Germans had used the steel etc wasted on the Tirpitz and Bismarck on u-boat construction, they might've won.
#14348126
FRS, how do you reconcile the ideology of lebensraum with the notion that all nations should have self determination? Because the extermination of an entire race and the settlement of its territory is the total opposite of self determination.

I think Stalin said it best :

[youtube]uTBbEpu7a94[/youtube]
#14348141
To clarify, Hitler should have gone to the Vichy French and said to them:

"will you be my ally, if you won't be my ally, I'll ask Franco and I'll be offering your empire as part of the deal."

If Vichy turned him down he should have gone to the Spanish and asked them to be an ally, offering them Morocco empire as an incentive. Tunis would be given to the Italians. He should have said if you don't want to cooperate and be my ally that's fine, you'll get the same treatment as Poland.

The British Navy was good. It could deny Germany access to the world market. The British fighter force was good. Attacking and focusing on the British homeland after the fall of France, was a really bad move. It played to Britain's strengths. The British air to ground attack was not particularly good and its strategic bombers were useful but no where near justified their cost. The British army could beat the Italians but were consistently outclassed by the Germans and the Japanese. It was one humiliating debacle after another. In fact arguably if we hadn't had the Italians to fight British morale would have collapsed completely. Hitler should have been able to turn the Mediterranean into an Axis lake. Looking back Britain's persistence may seem like it was inevitable. It wasn't. With the right focus and will, which Hitler liked to whine on about endlessly, bringing Britain to the negotiating table should have been easily achievable and with that access to the world market for oil, rubber and other raw materials.

If Hitler did want to Attack the Soviet Union he should have been able to settle the conflict with Britain in a couple of months. He could then have focussed all his forces on the soviet Union for the summer of 1941 and would have had plenty of oil for his panzers.
#14348304
Not everyone can be bullied all the time. Franco wanted a high price, arms and resources up front for his participation. Spain was heavily dependent on imported resources,one occupied Europe was extremely short of like oil. The Allies kept Franco on tight lease, running down his reserves and giving him just enough to keep going.

But What does Spain give the Axis? Gibraltar and very little else, and Gibraltar isnt a magical instant change in the war fortunes. British convoys went around Africa already. It would not really reduce the Allied resources defending North Africa.

What does Vichy give the Axis? the British conquered Vichy Syria. Everything else is up the End of North Africa too far to be any use against Egypt.

What does the Mediterranean becoming an axis 'lake' actually achieve? DO the acis gain access to strategic resources? NO. Does it change the balance of forces in North Africa? NO.

The Axis were unable to devote more resources to North Africa because of logistical constraints (shipping, ports, trucks) Nothing with Vichy or Spain is changing this.

North Africa you had the axis forces the closer they got to Egypt operating at the end of a very bad thin logistical pipe fighting against the British forces operating a short way from a massively large logistical pipe. The Axis could not logistically support large forces in North Africa, the British could always put in enough troops to be prevent conquest.
#14348487
Rich wrote: The British army could beat the Italians but were consistently outclassed by the Germans and the Japanese. It was one humiliating debacle after another. In fact arguably if we hadn't had the Italians to fight British morale would have collapsed completely.


Na, there was the battle of Britain, the sinking of Bismarck and the elimination of the top three u-boat aces in March 1941 (besides victory at Matapan around the same time and in North Africa late in 1940).
#14348639
starman2003 wrote:Na, there was the battle of Britain, the sinking of Bismarck and the elimination of the top three u-boat aces in March 1941 (besides victory at Matapan around the same time and in North Africa late in 1940).
I specifically said that the battle of Britain was a gross mistake by Hitler. He certainly should have threatened an invasion, to tie down British forces but he should have avoided heavy losses by air or naval forces in the British theatre. Matapan was against Italian forces. Hitler's alliance with Mussolini was a big mistake. It created hostilities with Greece and severely complicated his negotiations with Vichy France. What Hitler needed was the end of the British blockade and access to the world market, whether he planned to attack the Soviet Union or or not. He didn't need to retain occupation of Norway, Belgium, Holland or France. His occupation of these countries and France's turn to fascism, coupled with Spain and Greece's right wing governments agave him immense diplomatic and military leverage to force a very favourable settlement with Britain. Annexing Slovenia, Trieste, Egypt, along with possibly Libya and Tunis and annexing Gibraltar to Spain would have consolidated and secured his empire and positioned him nicely for future conflict and further expansion.
#14348954
How exactly force a settlement with Britain? He was unable to invade England, Defeat the RAF or cut the North Atlantic. Hitler didnt want to pay the steep price Franco wanted, and Gibraltar would do very very little to achieve any of these Ends. There was no effective way to attack Britian directly. Hitler was unable to defeat Britian.

How could he 'force' Britain to do anything? Hoping the British just give up is the sort of sloppy wishful thinking that made the Nazi's strategic deuces.

Vichy, Franco and Greece all said No to Germans demands. What are you saying the Germans could do differently to change those responses.
#14349008
pugsville wrote:How exactly force a settlement with Britain? He was unable to invade England, Defeat the RAF or cut the North Atlantic.


Yep, given his priorities in real life. But the reich might've sank enough shipping in 1940-41 had U-boat construction been emphasized over battleships and if the Luftwaffe had emphasized anti-shipping operations instead of the bombing of Britain. See e.g. the relevant chapter in Why Air Forces Fail.

Hitler was unable to defeat Britian.


Even had none of the above recommendations been followed, he still would've stood a chance in '41, had he not invaded Russia. That would've freed up enough resources to take Malta out once and for all, and stopped the losses of axis shipping in the Mediterranean before they became too serious. Besides of course, providing plenty of extra forces for Rommel. Under those circumstances the axis should've been able to take Egypt, and then advance to basra perhaps.
#14349301
U-Boats - the British would have responded to more U Boats and less battleships by building more destroyers. The British were well aware of what the Germans were building and woud have changed their mix.

Earlier success in the U boat campaign would have just sped up the responses from the British, the switch to convoys, the development of counter weapons, were all in the main a function of the resources devoted to the problem, bigger problem , more resources thrown at it, quicker results. If the Germans are making changes under a what if, well cop these simple changes the British could have quite easily made switching to convoys and building the cheap escort carriers (converted merchants still carrying goods, few swordfish, ready in weeks) diverting some Very Long Range Aircraft from bomber command (they had a lot and just did not give coastal command the very few needed)

Luftwaffe Anti Shipping - they just were not good at this early in the war, they really had not trained or prepared for it. Of course they could have if they were moved resources and training and perhaps performed worse at their other roles.

The Whole Suez-Drive to Middle Eastern Oil Gambit. Works fine in you ignore Logistics.

Malta was not the the biggest problem the Axis had in getting supplies to North Africa. The Ports in North Africa were few, with poor facilities, there was actually a bottleneck in unloading the ships in North Africa. Then they had to Truck everything to the front line. And when that Was in Egypt most of the load of the truck is fuel to drive it to the front (and back) The logistics of driving 1,000 km over bad roads to the front means less and less of the load is actually stuff delivered. You need more and more trucks driving up and done the same bad road. The British defending Egypt have a huge logistical base, and port and effectively can get as much supplies as they want. It's one of the big reasons Rommel failed logistics.

The Axis could not logistically support a larger force in North Africa. To do so the port infrastructure would need to be built up, and a railway constructed, all this would take a lot of time (and you would have to ship a lot stuff to north Africa heavily cutting into the stuff that was shipped, ) So it's incredibly hard for the Axis to support larger forces in North Africa, it was relatively easy for the British and they normally had reserves around the region which could have been sent in. In any playing out of a scenario, the British could quickly counter any increase of axis forces.

Malata caused some losses , made them used large convoys, but could be heavily suppressed from the air.

Even IF the axis take Egypt, you are still a vast distance from any oil. And Suez to Basra is another vast distance over bad roads, You would have to build a base at Suez and trucl everything with the same law of diminishing returns to the front towards Basra. And the British would have the same luxury and just shipping in vast amounts of stuff at the other end. the Logistics of massed shipping versus long lines of trucks on roads isn't a contest.

And Even if they get to Basra there is no way to get any Oil back in large quantities. Shipping is out, the Royal Navy has plenty of bases to pick off axis shipping, which does not have many tankers anyway and laughable amount of escorts. Trucking out , wouldn't work, the trucks would consume all the oil. The Railways dont go the right places and are really really bad and cannot substain the volume, and Germany is critically short of rolling stock and locos already. It would take years of massive effort to upgrade the railways and build the rolling stock and locos (all the time diverting resources from other areas giving you less for years)

Build up North African ports and railway - 1 year
Conquering Egypt - 6 months.
Drive to Basra - 1 year
Building up rail net to get oil back 2 years.

hmmm 4.5 years later the Germans are getting some return for all that investment.
#14349439
pugsville wrote:U-Boats - the British would have responded to more U Boats and less battleships by building more destroyers. The British were well aware of what the Germans were building and woud have changed their mix.

Earlier success in the U boat campaign would have just sped up the responses from the British, the switch to convoys, the development of counter weapons, were all in the main a function of the resources devoted to the problem, bigger problem , more resources thrown at it, quicker results. If the Germans are making changes under a what if, well cop these simple changes the British could have quite easily made switching to convoys and building the cheap escort carriers (converted merchants still carrying goods, few swordfish, ready in weeks) diverting some Very Long Range Aircraft from bomber command (they had a lot and just did not give coastal command the very few needed)


Even after three years of u-boat operations, and Allied countermeasures, the expanded u-boat fleet of late '42 was still able to inflict its highest toll ever, albeit mostly in less-guarded (but still important) peripheral areas. What if that fleet had been available two years earlier? Much higher shipping losses, before US aid amounted to much, might've decisively degraded the British economy and war effort.
Or, what if the Germans built about 100 extra Type IX U-boats instead of the Gneisnau, Bismarck and Tirpitz, and had 100 u-boats off the US east coast at the start of '42 instead of just 5? The result (the US remained unprepared despite British preparations) would've been an absolute massacre of US shipping--threatening the US ability to respond, since there would've been less tonnage to carry vital commodities, and less production capacity for other things besides replacement vessels.

Luftwaffe Anti Shipping - they just were not good at this early in the war, they really had not trained or prepared for it. Of course they could have if they were moved resources and training and perhaps performed worse at their other roles.


In fact, despite little emphasis, the early efforts in anti-shipping amounted to a "stunning performance."See the aforementioned ref.

The Axis could not logistically support a larger force in North Africa.


There were several divisions including the Italian ones. What if all the divisions were German? And Malta was a big problem. Monthly losses in '41 amounted to 60-75% IIRC. Despite that, Rommel was able to get deep into Egypt in mid '42. If (no russian campaign so) all his supplies had gotten through (with a lot more luftwaffe support and paratroops) and his German force was 2-3x bigger, that probably would've done it.


Even IF the axis take Egypt, you are still a vast distance from any oil.


Well, a better port like Alexandria would help. There might also have been serious political repercussions for the churchill government. The basic objective was just to get Britain to stop fighting not necessarily to capture oil for the reich's use.

And Suez to Basra is another vast distance over bad roads, You would have to build a base at Suez and trucl everything with the same law of diminishing returns to the front towards Basra. And the British would have the same luxury and just shipping in vast amounts of stuff at the other end. the Logistics of massed shipping versus long lines of trucks on roads isn't a contest.


From what I recall of Desmond Young's Rommel, he wrote the British had little available to hold the near east, especially after Japan entered the war.
#14349448
If Vichy turned him down he should have gone to the Spanish and asked them to be an ally, offering them Morocco empire as an incentive. Tunis would be given to the Italians. He should have said if you don't want to cooperate and be my ally that's fine, you'll get the same treatment as Poland.


The Spanish would have been even more useless than the Italians.
#14349449
Even after three years of u-boat operations, and Allied countermeasures, the expanded u-boat fleet of late '42 was still able to inflict its highest toll ever, albeit mostly in less-guarded (but still important) peripheral areas.


Mostly US shipping who were new to these kind of warfare and not experienced like British.

Or, what if the Germans built about 100 extra Type IX U-boats instead of the Gneisnau, Bismarck and Tirpitz, and had 100 u-boats off the US east coast at the start of '42 instead of just 5?


That will result in more investment by British on their anti submarine arm and most of these uber uboats at the bottom of Atlantic before being available in massive numbers to be deployed at US coast.

In fact, despite little emphasis, the early efforts in anti-shipping amounted to a "stunning performance."See the aforementioned ref.


Nope.

It is maintained by some historians[who?] that the U-boat Arm came close to winning the Battle of the Atlantic; the Allies were almost defeated, and Britain was brought to the brink of starvation. Others, including Blair[54] and Alan Levin, disagree; Levin states this is "a misperception", and that "it is doubtful they ever came close" to achieving this.[55]

The focus on U-boat successes, the "aces" and their scores, the convoys attacked, and the ships sunk, serves to camouflage the Kriegsmarine's manifold failures. In particular, this was because most of the ships sunk by U-boat were not in convoys, but sailing alone, or having become separated from convoys.

At no time during the campaign were supply lines to Britain interrupted; even during the Bismarck crisis, convoys sailed as usual (although with heavier escorts). In all, during the Atlantic Campaign only 10% of transatlantic convoys that sailed were attacked, and of those attacked only 10% on average of the ships were lost. Overall, more than 99% of all ships sailing to and from the British Isles during World War II did so successfully.

Despite their efforts, the Axis powers were unable to prevent the build-up of Allied invasion forces for the liberation of Europe. In November 1942, at the height of the Atlantic campaign, the US Navy escorted the Operation Torch invasion fleet 3,000 mi (4,800 km) across the Atlantic without hindrance, or even being detected. (This may be the ultimate example of the Allied practise of evasive routing.) In 1943 and 1944 the Allies transported some 3 million American and Allied servicemen across the Atlantic without significant loss. By 1945 the USN was able to wipe out in mid-Atlantic a wolf-pack suspected of carrying V-weapons with little real difficulty.

Third, and unlike the Allies, the Germans were never able to mount a comprehensive blockade of Britain. Nor were they able to focus their effort by targeting the most valuable cargoes, the eastbound traffic carrying war materiel. Instead they were reduced to the slow attrition of a tonnage war. To win this, the U-boat arm had to sink 300,000 GRT per month in order to overwhelm Britain's shipbuilding capacity and reduce her merchant marine strength.

In only four out of the first 27 months of the war did Germany achieve this target, while after December 1941, when Britain was joined by the U.S. merchant marine and ship yards the target effectively doubled. As a result the Axis needed to sink 700,000 grt per month; as the massive expansion of the U.S. shipbuilding industry took effect this target increased still further. The 700,000 ton target was achieved in only one month, November 1942, while after May 1943 average sinkings dropped to less than one tenth of that figure.

By the end of the war, although the U-boat arm had sunk 6,000 ships totalling 21 million grt, the Allies had built over 38 million tons of new shipping.

The reason for the misperception that the German blockade came close to success may be found in post-war writings by both German and British authors. Blair attributes the distortion to "propagandists" who "glorified and exaggerated the successes of German submariners", while he believes Allied writers "had their own reasons for exaggerating the peril".[56]

Dan van der Vat suggests that, unlike the U.S., or Canada and Britain's other dominions, which were protected by oceanic distances, Britain was at the end of the transatlantic supply route closest to German bases; for Britain it was a lifeline. It is this which led to Churchill's concerns.[7] Coupled with a series of major convoy battles in the space of a month, it undermined confidence in the convoy system in March 1943, to the point Britain considered abandoning it,[57] not realizing the U-boat had already effectively been defeated. These were "over-pessimistic threat assessments", Blair concludes: "At no time did the German U-boat force ever come close to winning the Battle of the Atlantic or bringing on the collapse of Great Britain".[54]


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Atlantic#Assessment

There were several divisions including the Italian ones. What if all the divisions were German?


Poorly equipped and non motorized.

Well, a better port like Alexandria would help. There might also have been serious political repercussions for the churchill government.


Why? What makes you think that British Populace (unlike Germans) were against the war and would had pounced at one opportunity to force same on Churchill?
#14349454
Expanding the U boat fleet before the war isnt just a matter of steel and man hours. The best U boat commanders and crews did most of the damage. Quality of officers and crews matter a lot. Just doubling the program would not necessarily mean you got as good material to work with.

Expanding the U-boat program before the war would mean the British would respond, more destroyers being built,and they could have put a lot more thought into anti submarine warfare. They could enter the war in much better shape tactically about submarine warfare if they worked at it and increased U-boats would signal a threat. It would also break the British-German Naval convention, which would increase British resistance to German moves before the war the effect is hard to estimate.

Replacing Italian troops in North Africa, would be a massive slap in the face for the Italians. It's highly unlikely the would agree. Nothing cap be done in North Africa without Italian help, their ports, their ships. To have to withdraw all Italian troops to be replaced by 'better' German ones would be a huge humiliation for Italy. Cannot see it.

If hoping that the British people get discouraged and replace Churchill and get all peace minded is the *best* German strategy, just hoping the enemy gives up rather than actually beat them. It a sign of weakness. After all is was the nub of the Japanese strategy and it was deeply flawed leading to their certain defeat.

Isn't oil and electricity bought and sold like ev[…]

@Potemkin I heard this song in the Plaza Grande […]

Russia-Ukraine War 2022

The "Russian empire" story line is inve[…]

I (still) have a dream

Even with those millions though. I will not be ab[…]