A Defense of Immaterialism: The Debate - Page 20 - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

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#14944715
ingliz wrote:Example:

Your argument/Berkeley's 'master argument'.

If you can conceive it possible for … any sensible object whatsover to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so... (DHP 200)

P1) If it is possible to conceive of a sensible object without a mind, then it is possible that those things exist without minds.

P2) It is not possible to conceive of a sensible object without a mind.

C) It is not possible that there are sensible objects without minds.

Logical Form:

P1) If P, then M

P2) not-P

C) not-M

Denying the antecedent is a fallacy in formal logic where in a standard if/then premise, the antecedent (what comes after the "if") is made not true, then it is concluded that the consequent (what comes after the "then") is not true.

You committed this formal fallacy in the 'master argument'. The argument is invalid because the truth of the premises does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.


If Claim-Of-Reality-Proven (P), then Knowledge-of-Reality-Demonstrated (Q).

Non Q (No Knowedge-of-Reality Demonstrated); therefore Non P (No Claim of Reality Proven).

Modus Tollens.

My argument is valid.

If you claim a certain reality (mind-independent substance); then knowledge of such must be demonstrated, since it cannot be done so without contradiction, then the claim is invalid.

Thus my argument is established.

ingliz wrote:More language games.


More Wittgensteinian nonsense.

Its amusing your only refuge is verbal relativism after the likes of ol' Wittgenstein, the analytic tradition's discount version of post-structuralism and literary deconstruction. :lol:

Wellsy wrote:In regards to VS, I wonder if his position is perhaps hostile to/suspect of natural philosophy/science and has gone back to a scholasticism where it's confined within limits that harmonize logical forms with God/scripture.
Better if religion was left to being a matter of faith and not try to rationalize it and be indifferent to content and only interest in the form of arguments apparently independent of the phenomenal world.


My critique of natural science is that it is fallacious and therefore ought to be rejected.

Wellsy wrote:So in the end I think we might not be solving the relation/correlation between mind and matter in terms of mapping the nature of the brain in a way that would satisfy us.


Fallacious reasoning should never satisfy us unless we enjoy presuming the erroneous as if it were truth. Which may be the case with many.

Wellsy wrote: I do find VS intriguing in that he exemplifies an aspect of America that I don't really understand as I'm so alien to it. How does one come to be a person such as he? What is the nature of the world he has experienced to result in all this so far?
Well I don't think I'm the one to draw him away from where he is exactly, all I could suggest is that if he follows the path of criticism, he should presumably end up a Marxist


:lol:

Just ask and I will tell you why I am what I am and Why I believe what I believe.

Wellsy wrote:As in have I come across the peculiar musings in which he and his wife publicly express a want of men's authority over women? I've seen bits and pieces. But I haven't inquired so far as to see how 'faith' based they are. Though I do believe he is missing some crucial elements in his justification for it.
But that is a difference of me finding sympathy in Marx and he in others.


Indulge me.

Wellsy wrote:I do imagine he'd whirl my head.


Why is that? You seem more than capable.

Wellsy wrote:Really I haven't followed this thread in too much detail and I'd draw VS to certain points of my own interest as I haven't the ability nor motivation for an immanent critique of his views.


Give it a shot. I can link the actual argument if you'd like.

ingliz wrote:"To be real is to have causal powers."


A ridiculous definition, not based in proof or axiom.
#14944716
Victoribus Spolia wrote:If Claim-Of-Reality-Proven (P), then Knowledge-of-Reality-Demonstrated (Q).

Non Q (No Knowedge-of-Reality Demonstrated); therefore Non P (No Claim of Reality Proven).

Knowledge-of-Reality has been demonstrated (See Szabó 2005)

Hylas can meet Philonous’ challenge. He can conceive a tree to exist which is not conceived, without absurdity.

It's amusing...

Die Ideen exis­tie­ren nicht ge­trennt von der Spra­che. (Marx, Notebook I)

Ideas do not exist separately from language.


:)
Last edited by ingliz on 06 Sep 2018 21:31, edited 5 times in total.
#14944718
ingliz wrote:Knowledge-of-Reality has been demonstrated (See Szabó 2005)

Hylas can meet Philonous’ challenge. He can conceive a tree to exist which is not conceived, without absurdity.


I already addressed this is horseshit.

The conceived unconceived is a contradiction or else assumes what has yet to be proven, i.e. naive realism.

ingliz wrote:Die Ideen exis­tie­ren nicht ge­trennt von der Spra­che. (Marx, Notebook I)

Ideas do not exist separately from language.


:)


Sure, but if language is made relative and meaningless, then the ideas represented become so as well.

Which is my point.
#14944808
Victoribus Spolia wrote:If...

If Claim-Of-Reality-Proven (P), then Knowledge-of-Reality-Demonstrated (Q).

Q (Knowedge-of-Reality Demonstrated); therefore P (Claim of Reality Proven).

Modus Ponens.

My argument is valid.

If you claim...

Since knowledge of a reality independent of finite minds can be demonstrated without contradiction (Berkeley 1710*; Moore 1903; Wittgenstein 1967; Tipton 1994; Marsonet 1995; Szabó 2005; Brassier 2011; Victoribus Spolia 2018*), the claim is valid.

Thus my argument is established.


* neither I nor Berkeley deny that objects can exist apart from our own individual minds

we only deny that they can exist apart from ANY mind (contra realism).

The explanatory virtue of naturalism:

a) Theism has no explanatory advantage over naturalism, since both appeal to infinite regress, but naturalism is more parsimonious than theism, hence it is preferable.

b) An initial supernatural state is no better, from an explanatory perspective, than an initial natural state (regardless of whether we take the initial state to be necessary or contingent). So, from an explanatory perspective, the hypotheses are again equal, but from a simplicity perspective naturalism wins again. (Oppy 2009)

I already addressed this is horseshit.

No.

You called it 'Wittgensteinian nonsense' and ignored it.

When words describe reality, talking about what reality is requires that you understand how language works - This seems undeniable.

A ridiculous definition, not based in proof or axiom.

Whatever has a native power, whether of affecting anything else, or of being affected in ever so slight a degree by the most insignificant agents, even on one solitary occasion, is a real being. In short, I offer it as the definition of be-ings that they are potency - and nothing else.

Plato, Sophist 247d–e


:)
#14944930
Victoribus Spolia wrote:My critique of natural science is that it is fallacious and therefore ought to be rejected.

Is this based in what seems to be your return to Berkeley and his idealist monism in regards to reality, destroying the subject object relation based on the lacking of both empiricism and of contemplative materialism of the day?
Fallacious reasoning should never satisfy us unless we enjoy presuming the erroneous as if it were truth. Which may be the case with many.

Indeed formal logic protects us from fallacious reasoning and helping us keep away from error.



:lol:

Just ask and I will tell you why I am what I am and Why I believe what I believe.

If I'm curious about anything specifically I'll ask, but it's more than you as an individual but elements of the US and the circumstances that historically lead to certain characteristics in it's population.

Indulge me.

I haven't fleshed out the view but it relates to human nature taken historically and the nature of universals not as abstract sameness but more terms of Goethe's Urphänomen. Where one identifies an empirically existing thing which is the simplest unit of a complex whole and is the genus of all particulars.
Where I wonder whether you end up with emphasizing inessential features based in an arbitrariness of identifying the sameness across time rather than see how human nature develops in conjunction with society such that what I imagine to be your beliefs about the nature of women posit a false human nature in regards to women that have already shown themselves obsolete in certain circumstances. Where there is an attachment to certain ideas irrespective of the world that once gave them some rational foundation.

But if we pursue it, it'd perhaps be better in an older thread of yours.

Why is that? You seem more than capable.

I haven't engaged with some subjects and schools of thought to have ready made views that I could deploy consciously. Though I guess discussion is the place to develop as much.

Give it a shot. I can link the actual argument if you'd like.

I was quite serious in regards to an inability to do an immanent critique. It requires an extensive understanding of a subject in order to see the relation between different ideas in order to know the limits where the relative truth of something becomes erroneous and to then synthesize the truths of different positions of understanding.
Plus I would need to have already studied Hegel and have a conscious grasp of his asserted dialectics, but I'm far off from studying him directly.
#14944997
Victoribus Spolia wrote:Your argument here assumes a Kantian notion of mental categories creating perceptual reality out of bare sensory mush. Which is not only unnecessary, but silly and unprovable.

Silly and unprovable?

No.

We perceive what we know. (Locher et al. 1993; Willis and Todorov 2006; Carbon 2011b)

It is the connection between sensory inputs and our semantic networks that enables us to recognise objects.

Example: The man-rat-illusion where an ambiguous sketch drawing is presented whose content is not clearly decipherable, but switches from showing a man to showing a rat - A demonstration of the highly constructive qualities of our perceptual system.

What we will perceive at first glance is mainly guided through the specific activation of our semantic network. If we have been exposed to a picture of a man before, or if we think of a man or have heard the word “man”, the chance is strongly increased that our perceptual system interprets the ambiguous pattern towards a depiction of a man—if the prior experiences were more associated with a rat, a mouse or another animal of such a kind, we will, in contrast, tend to interpret the ambiguous pattern more as a rat. (Carbon 2014)

Image


:)
#14946786
B0ycey wrote:But RT, nonetheless perhaps you can answer the very question which is being debated on this thread. What to you creates the percepts you witness? God, light or something else? What does philosophy teach you when answering this question?
I plead the 5th (US constitution) and advise you to turn off the computer and go outside.


@Wellsy Yo bro, there's more to life than Western-Germanic ideas. Your perspective is very limited, but it isn't your fault. Human thought is fragmented. :lol:

ingliz wrote:We perceive what we know.
Oh so that's why you guys are arguing like children. You're both an amalgamation of consciousness and its properties.

It is the connection between sensory inputs and our semantic networks that enables us to recognise objects.
Sure, the medium is the message. You can reword it however you like. I'd like to point out that plants do not have a neuronal network, yet they adapt and recognize 'objects' through signal response. Likewise, many unconscious activities occur in your body, conscious awareness is not needed. Photomorphogenesis and thigmomorphogenesis will take place, and the plant doesn't need to cognitively recognize the stimuli. Human perception or noogenesis will take place, and it doesn't need your feedback. The flesh is enfolded in a cloud of stimuli, which contains layers and layers of unrecognized processes unfolding right now. It's impossible for you to perceive everything simultaneously. We need one another to make sense of sense. There's a crack in the mirror, but you don't have to fight yourself.

Example: The man-rat-illusion where an ambiguous sketch drawing is presented whose content is not clearly decipherable, but switches from showing a man to showing a rat - A demonstration of the highly constructive qualities of our perceptual system.

What we will perceive at first glance is mainly guided through the specific activation of our semantic network. If we have been exposed to a picture of a man before, or if we think of a man or have heard the word “man”, the chance is strongly increased that our perceptual system interprets the ambiguous pattern towards a depiction of a man—if the prior experiences were more associated with a rat, a mouse or another animal of such a kind, we will, in contrast, tend to interpret the ambiguous pattern more as a rat
Poor example. The treachery of images doesn't define what's real. Be it man or rat, such 'things' in reality do not shapeshift in reality. This is just a thought experiment, and while it illustrates cognitive association, it doesn't magically negate the fact that a man and a rat have definable qualities and characteristics in reality. :lol:

Furthermore, like I said on page 19:

There must, in the nature of human things be a mental language common to all nations, which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life, and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these same things may have diverse aspects. A proof of this is afforded by proverbs or maxims of vulgar wisdom, in which substantially the same meanings find as many diverse expressions as there are nations ancient and modern.

This common mental language is proper to our science, by whose light linguistic scholars will be enabled to construct a mental vocabulary common to all the various articulate languages living and dead... As far as our small erudition will permit, we shall make use of this vocabulary in all the matters we discuss.

-Vico


Etymological archetypes support and reflect a common perception.

Consciousness is an intangible & inalienable prerequisite for experience. Here it unfolds, creation is proof.
#14946833
RhetoricThug wrote:@Wellsy Yo bro, there's more to life than Western-Germanic ideas. Your perspective is very limited, but it isn't your fault. Human thought is fragmented. :lol:

Indeed there's a lot to life and I don't consider my life wholly encapsulated with German philosophy. Though I think it plays a important part in the development of human understanding and is useful when it comes to the repetition of Berkeley's monist idealism.
#14946952
Wellsy wrote:Indeed there's a lot to life and I don't consider my life wholly encapsulated with German philosophy. Though I think it plays a important part in the development of human understanding and is useful when it comes to the repetition of Berkeley's monist idealism.
We wouldn't fault you for trying, Wellsy. Come, walk with me... I must ask, what's available to other philosophers that's not available to you? Why do you wish to emulate or emulsify mediated experiences, when such experiences can be gained directly? After-all, what is German philosophy, monist idealism, etc; if not chapters in a book? Who writes the chapters in this book, and who is responsible for this book of knowledge?

What can you gain from this book that cannot be gleaned or shaken from the living tree of nature? See, learning is remembering, you must remember who you are! You must remember the SOURCE... Only then will you bear fruit and become a resource. But you see, it's not your fruit... You didn't plant yourself here, you didn't fertilize the roots (but you will). You're somewhere else in the cosmic cycle. Your body and mind buds and blooms and the soul of the world reaps the harvest.


I want you to remember so you can teach us something new. The flow of existence is a paradox. The ebb & flow of the whole repeats itself, but its parts arise anew. Tis the season of the soul, found within this inescapable moment.

Sincerely,

-The Universe
#14947739
RhetoricThug wrote:We wouldn't fault you for trying, Wellsy. Come, walk with me... I must ask, what's available to other philosophers that's not available to you? Why do you wish to emulate or emulsify mediated experiences, when such experiences can be gained directly? After-all, what is German philosophy, monist idealism, etc; if not chapters in a book? Who writes the chapters in this book, and who is responsible for this book of knowledge?

What can you gain from this book that cannot be gleaned or shaken from the living tree of nature? See, learning is remembering, you must remember who you are! You must remember the SOURCE... Only then will you bear fruit and become a resource. But you see, it's not your fruit... You didn't plant yourself here, you didn't fertilize the roots (but you will). You're somewhere else in the cosmic cycle. Your body and mind buds and blooms and the soul of the world reaps the harvest.


I want you to remember so you can teach us something new. The flow of existence is a paradox. The ebb & flow of the whole repeats itself, but its parts arise anew. Tis the season of the soul, found within this inescapable moment.

Sincerely,

-The Universe

What is available in the work of others that isn't given to me is that they have already worked over some problems so that I can go over their work to see the problem and their solutions so I don't have to try and retrace the path of the entire history of human knowledge in isolation.
The concepts/language I use has been developed through the effort of other and I am not so bold as to think I would discover all the answers others have already achieved.
Better that I learn than attempt to recreate the 'wheel'.

Gained directly? I don't know how you consider knowledge is acquired and developed.
The knowledge of things isn't immediately in me as much as it's part of the human culture I'm born into and am part of. If I were born isolated from society, I would likely be as primitive as an animal.

But I wonder if you're possibly giving some emphasis to the present moment to which I would express that such immediacy is but a moment in consciousness and I don't think it should be made an absolute.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/mean02.htm
Pure Being is the world an instant before you see it, it is the world through the eyes of a new born baby. Like the Zen teaching that demands of the devotee absolute awareness, absolute "thoughtlessness", it is, for consciousness, an unattainable moment - even though it is equally the beginning of all consciousness!
...
Being is the immediate, that is, un-mediated, given in itself and not by means of something else, in a round about way. But right from the outset, Hegel makes it clear that "neither in Heaven nor on Earth" is there anything that is not equally mediated as immediate. "Being is immediate" is not an absolute, but a relative truth. To elevate it into an absolute (like the ancients and like the gurus of "awareness") is one relative moment or stage of the Absolute Idea.


The truth of things is to be found in reality, but the essence of things doesn't reveal itself directly in the appearance of things otherwise there would be no need for science as the truth of everything would be plain to see. But the truth of things aren't given in the present moment although such immediacy is important.
#14949447
Wellsy wrote:What is available in the work of others that isn't given to me is that they have already worked over some problems so that I can go over their work to see the problem and their solutions so I don't have to try and retrace the path of the entire history of human knowledge in isolation.
Yes, but you're prone to repeat their mistakes too. Furthermore, there's no such thing as 'isolation.' :lol:

Here is a relevant story:

Thompson imagined the Maya as an empire of peaceful people ruled by mystical priests, not unlike the Anglican Church. This view persisted until 1952, when a 30-year-old Russian ethnologist, Yuri Valentinovich Knorosov, working alone, published out of the blue an article that would lead to the cracking of the Maya script.

By the 1930s, British researcher Eric Thompson was the world's foremost expert in glyph studies. His achievements included deciphering signs related to the calendar and astronomy as well as identifying new words from the Maya lexicon. Thompson also developed a numerical cataloguing technique, the "T"-numbering system, for each glyph (left). This enabled experts to easily discuss symbols that had yet to be fully understood or identified. Nevertheless, glyph studies nearly came to a halt during this time, in large part because Thompson had most scholars convinced that each of the symbols in glyphs stood for entire words or ideas. For instance, the glyph for "west" included a well-known symbol for the sun and an as-yet unidentified symbol depicting a nearly closed hand. Thompson suggested that the hand meant "completion." And so "west," where the sun sets, was symbolized by "completion of the sun." It was a reasonable guess, but one that, along with Thompson's more general take on the glyphs, would be proven wrong.

While glyph studies languished in the West, a Russian linguist in Moscow was making his own groundbreaking discoveries. In 1952, Yuri Knorosov (left) postulated that the individual symbols in Maya glyphs stood for phonetic sounds, much like English letters do. Knorosov knew that Maya had too many glyphs to be a true alphabet but too few for each glyph to symbolize an entire word. (Maya's 800-plus glyphs compare to the several thousand characters of Chinese, for example.) He determined that written Maya, like Egyptian hieroglyphics, contained a combination of these elements. Because "west," in spoken Maya, is "chik'in," and "k'in" is the word for sun, the hand represents the syllable "chi," as Knorosov concluded. Fortunately, American scholars Michael and Sophie Coe began publishing Knorosov's papers in the U.S. in the late 1950s. Otherwise, his important (though incomplete) findings might have been inaccessible to Western scholars until the end of the Cold War.


The concepts/language I use has been developed through the effort of other and I am not so bold as to think I would discover all the answers others have already achieved.
Better that I learn than attempt to recreate the 'wheel'.
True progress requires bold theories. Most minds run subconscious programs and rarely challenge such programs consciously.

Gained directly? I don't know how you consider knowledge is acquired and developed.
The knowledge of things isn't immediately in me as much as it's part of the human culture I'm born into and am part of. If I were born isolated from society, I would likely be as primitive as an animal.
:lol: The story of a feral child and the critical period hypothesis [1] doesn't explain when or where human knowledge or society/culture began. Again, I ask, when did intuition become reason? But that's a different epistemological topic. We mimic nature, and nature is our first teacher. We adapt to the environment, because of the mind-matter interface and how we experience 'things' in the environment. We're engaged in an information feedback loop, your body is a bridge, and being present is an information bias.

To summarize this principle, of nature being our first teacher, I point to the airplane or the concept of flight. Humans had to first observe flight in nature before we could technologically replicate it. This is what I mean when I say what can you gain from this book that cannot be gleaned or shaken from the living tree of nature? Any form of knowledge in any book is comprised of compressed visual symbols we use to organize and communicate an experience. Formal education is indoctrination. In reality, life is a classroom, and it contains all the subjects.

Experience is filtered by media or environments. The potential energy that unfolds in nature is shaped by its interaction and experience with other forms of potential energy. When I drop a pebble in a pond, the water shows the rock and the rock ripples the water. Now if I want to tell you about the pebble in the pond, I'd use a medium called language (in some shape, form, or fashion) and tell you about my experience. But until you directly experience the pebble in the pond, my story is just an image in your head, and your imagination (be it self-referential) will fill in the blanks. The imagination is a double-edged sword. It's an Interpreter & interrupter, it can imagine things unseen or not experienced and it can distort reality as well.

[1] The critical period hypothesis is the subject of a long-standing debate in linguistics and language acquisition over the extent to which the ability to acquire language is biologically linked to age. The hypothesis claims that there is an ideal time window to acquire language in a linguistically rich environment, after which further language acquisition becomes much more difficult and effortful.

I simply ask you to re-imagine yourSELF from time to time and forget everything you think you know. :)



-RT
#14949556
RhetoricThug wrote:
Spoiler: show
Yes, but you're prone to repeat their mistakes too. Furthermore, there's no such thing as 'isolation.' :lol:

Here is a relevant story:

Thompson imagined the Maya as an empire of peaceful people ruled by mystical priests, not unlike the Anglican Church. This view persisted until 1952, when a 30-year-old Russian ethnologist, Yuri Valentinovich Knorosov, working alone, published out of the blue an article that would lead to the cracking of the Maya script.

By the 1930s, British researcher Eric Thompson was the world's foremost expert in glyph studies. His achievements included deciphering signs related to the calendar and astronomy as well as identifying new words from the Maya lexicon. Thompson also developed a numerical cataloguing technique, the "T"-numbering system, for each glyph (left). This enabled experts to easily discuss symbols that had yet to be fully understood or identified. Nevertheless, glyph studies nearly came to a halt during this time, in large part because Thompson had most scholars convinced that each of the symbols in glyphs stood for entire words or ideas. For instance, the glyph for "west" included a well-known symbol for the sun and an as-yet unidentified symbol depicting a nearly closed hand. Thompson suggested that the hand meant "completion." And so "west," where the sun sets, was symbolized by "completion of the sun." It was a reasonable guess, but one that, along with Thompson's more general take on the glyphs, would be proven wrong.

While glyph studies languished in the West, a Russian linguist in Moscow was making his own groundbreaking discoveries. In 1952, Yuri Knorosov (left) postulated that the individual symbols in Maya glyphs stood for phonetic sounds, much like English letters do. Knorosov knew that Maya had too many glyphs to be a true alphabet but too few for each glyph to symbolize an entire word. (Maya's 800-plus glyphs compare to the several thousand characters of Chinese, for example.) He determined that written Maya, like Egyptian hieroglyphics, contained a combination of these elements. Because "west," in spoken Maya, is "chik'in," and "k'in" is the word for sun, the hand represents the syllable "chi," as Knorosov concluded. Fortunately, American scholars Michael and Sophie Coe began publishing Knorosov's papers in the U.S. in the late 1950s. Otherwise, his important (though incomplete) findings might have been inaccessible to Western scholars until the end of the Cold War.


Mistakes are part of the process of learning and the development of understanding in going beyond the limits of a previous view, hence Hegel's emphasis on scepticism of a thing on it's own terms.
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/story-concept.htm
The question is not the correspondence of the subject to the object, but of the capacity of a mutually constituting subject/object, that is, a formation of consciousness, to withstand sceptical criticism. Under the impact of sceptical attack the subject and object will both change. The object changes because it is constituted by the subject, and vice versa. The Gestalt is a subject/object which understands its own activity and its own production according to its own thinking.

The dynamic in the “Phenomenology,” the driver which pushes it on from one Gestalt to another, is its vulnerability to sceptical attack from within, in its own terms. He demonstrates how every one of the Gestalten at a certain point fails to withstand self-criticism and collapses. Some new Gestalt which is proof against this line of reasoning and can withstand the type of attack which the previous Gestalt could not, is then able to develop. And so it goes on.

One inevitably ends up making mistakes unless one somehow has absolute knowledge for which there is no error.

I don't get what you mean that isolation doesn't exist.
When I said it I mean in isolation from the culture that has already overcome many limited perspectives.
Often people who don't look to such lines of thought do repeat the same mistakes in their own thinking and don't extend as far as the greatest thinkers, replaying same old problems already solved.

In the end I don't know what point you intend me to take from the summary of the ethnologist because it's unclear to me what isolation you're dismissing as non-existent.
True progress requires bold theories. Most minds run subconscious programs and rarely challenge such programs consciously.

Bold theories radically challenge what is known in going both beyond it yet retaining it.
For example Einstein's Theory of relativity displaced Newton's classical mechanics but it still held explanatory value for what was explained by classical mechanics.
Understanding doesn't appear from no where but in advancement of establish knowledge.
Spoiler: show
:lol: The story of a feral child and the critical period hypothesis [1] doesn't explain when or where human knowledge or society/culture began. Again, I ask, when did intuition become reason? But that's a different epistemological topic. We mimic nature, and nature is our first teacher. We adapt to the environment, because of the mind-matter interface and how we experience 'things' in the environment. We're engaged in an information feedback loop, your body is a bridge, and being present is an information bias.

To summarize this principle, of nature being our first teacher, I point to the airplane or the concept of flight. Humans had to first observe flight in nature before we could technologically replicate it. This is what I mean when I say what can you gain from this book that cannot be gleaned or shaken from the living tree of nature? Any form of knowledge in any book is comprised of compressed visual symbols we use to organize and communicate an experience. Formal education is indoctrination. In reality, life is a classroom, and it contains all the subjects.

Experience is filtered by media or environments. The potential energy that unfolds in nature is shaped by its interaction and experience with other forms of potential energy. When I drop a pebble in a pond, the water shows the rock and the rock ripples the water. Now if I want to tell you about the pebble in the pond, I'd use a medium called language (in some shape, form, or fashion) and tell you about my experience. But until you directly experience the pebble in the pond, my story is just an image in your head, and your imagination (be it self-referential) will fill in the blanks. The imagination is a double-edged sword. It's an Interpreter & interrupter, it can imagine things unseen or not experienced and it can distort reality as well.

[1] The critical period hypothesis is the subject of a long-standing debate in linguistics and language acquisition over the extent to which the ability to acquire language is biologically linked to age. The hypothesis claims that there is an ideal time window to acquire language in a linguistically rich environment, after which further language acquisition becomes much more difficult and effortful.

I simply ask you to re-imagine yourSELF from time to time and forget everything you think you know. :)

-RT

I wasn't attempting to explain the origins of society from a child isolated from society :hmm:
Rather that a person who existed outside of society would likely be near to the state of an animal than one raised in society.
The difference between one growing up isolated in nature and another being those of us who exist in humanized nature ie society.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/mikhailov/works/riddle/riddle3b.htm
In man, on the other hand, we encounter a diametrically opposite mode of inheritance. Man inherits part of the “species programme” of life-activity, but the greater part (and precisely the specifically human part) is geared into the “mechanisms” of his life by his mastering the objectified means of culture in intercourse with other people. He even develops his bodily needs and abilities in the process of mastering the historical ways and means of activity and intercourse, such as the need for communication, for prepared food, for “instruments” to consume it with, for objects that provide for the human functioning of his organs, creating the conditions for normal sleep, rest, labour, and so on. And, particularly important, the infinitely diverse and infinitely developing means of realising the inherited “programmes” of life-activity are acquired only in the form of the socially significant instruments of activity and intercourse created by the labour of previous generations.

Academician N. P. Dubinin writes: “The possibilities of human cultural growth are endless. This growth is not imprinted in the genes. It is quite obvious that if the children of contemporary parents were deprived from birth of the conditions of contemporary culture, they would remain at the level of our most remote ancestors who lived tens of thousands of years ago. Whereas the children of such “primitive people” placed in the conditions of contemporary culture would rise to the heights of contemporary man.” [2]

And I'm not going as far as to deny intuition/sensual reality as part of understanding, only that I would emphasize that it is a step in understanding, rather the task is to use reason in regards to intuition adequately.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/help/mean06.htm
In the next chapter, we shall look at the development of the Notion, from a simple abstract concept to a more and more concrete concept, but it must first be noted that we do not use the words "abstract" and "concrete" to contrast the ideal and mental versus the material and sensual. Rather, "abstract" refers to the simplicity of a single thing or aspect of a thing which is torn away from its connection with other things, other aspects, from historical development, while "concrete" on the other hand, refers to the combination of many aspects and interconnections, of many abstractions. Hegel remarks:

Sensuous consciousness is in ordinary estimation the most concrete and thus also the richest; but that is true only as regards materials, whereas, in reference to the thought it contains, it is really the poorest and most abstract.

We find truth in immediate perception because of the richness of its content, but the concepts that immediately arise from immediate perception are the most abstract and poorest (contrary to the obsession of bourgeois social science with statistics, surveys and so on). The dialectical notions which form the basis of rational analysis are abstract in their simplicity (such as the concept of the atom in the beginnings of the science of physical chemistry) but must be deemed concrete inasmuch as they contain within them the whole history leading up to their conception, negating all earlier concepts of the thing which have outgrown their limits and been negated and carried forward.


This part of your post emphasizing the pond makes me think you likely make an emphasis tied to the ancients.
Because reading it made me think of a post I once made
Wellsy wrote:As I'm reminded of a stone cutter who comments on some masters reading of an old text that he was wasting his time, when told he should explain why sufficiently or be punished, he explained how when cutting stone the act of doing so conditioned his body acting on it, one learns through practice. He could not teach his son by merely telling him what to do, and similarly because knowledge of practice can't be transferred but only replicated, the words of wise men in books couldn't imbue one with such knowledge either, one would have to come to it themselves.

To which I think it's a step further than empiricists who simply make the correct point of reality being the source of knowledge (although they are stuck being contemplative rather than engaged with reality).
So in this regard I agree with such an emphasis which is that knowledge isn't confined to book learning but outside of it.

To which I think we may find some agreement, but this doesn't mean that what one learns in a book is without any use except to the extent it is made entirely independent of activity.
#14950475
ingliz wrote:The man-rat-illusion where an ambiguous sketch drawing is presented whose content is not clearly decipherable, but switches from showing a man to showing a rat - A demonstration of the highly constructive qualities of our perceptual system.


This argument is irrelevant, as the idealist objection would be that how the idea is perceived and understood as it is disposed to a mind by the Source. This is neither an argument in favor of language-games or of realism.

Wellsy wrote:Is this based in what seems to be your return to Berkeley and his idealist monism in regards to reality(?)


No, it based on the fact that such is actually fallacious. :lol:

Wellsy wrote:Indeed formal logic protects us from fallacious reasoning and helping us keep away from error.


Agreed.

Wellsy wrote:but it's more than you as an individual but elements of the US and the circumstances that historically lead to certain characteristics in it's population.


What characteristics do you have in mind? You must have something in particular for you to muse as to why America produces people such as myself.

I would like you to share some of these musing with me further.

Wellsy wrote:Where I wonder whether you end up with emphasizing inessential features based in an arbitrariness of identifying the sameness across time rather than see how human nature develops in conjunction with society such that what I imagine to be your beliefs about the nature of women posit a false human nature in regards to women that have already shown themselves obsolete in certain circumstances. Where there is an attachment to certain ideas irrespective of the world that once gave them some rational foundation.


In essence, you see human nature as tied to societal development, and if social conditions arise that make lifestyles more directly tied to these "inessential" features obsolete (I am sure you are referring more to biological sex-distinctions in this instance) , then insisting on them (my position) is actually to insist on something contrary to our nature (which is ironically quite the opposite of what the patriarchalist claims to be advocating) because such a nature changes with society. In addition, you think this is possibly tied to how one relates universals (categories) to their particulars (instances). Thus, Goethe's "unfolding" view of the universal is juxtaposed to the more "static" view of categorization usually employed in scholastic thinking, with the later being indicative of my position.

Does this summarize your analysis accurately?

I would love to continue this discussion with you and have my rebuttal "locked and loaded," as it were.

Wellsy wrote:Though I guess discussion is the place to develop as much.


Lets do it, check out my proof and give me your critique. It won't hurt, I promise. ;)
#14950555
"Pick a flower on Earth and you move the farthest star." -Paul Dirac

Due to the nature of holographic cosmology, I will blur the existential spectrum (individual-collective-cosmic) with this post. Remember to keep your head in the clouds and feet on the ground :angel:
I don't get what you mean that isolation doesn't exist.
The primordial emanation contains ALL. Any form of knowledge or ignorance is an aspect of the All. Knowledge is organized ignorance and the material world is organized immateriality. There's nothing outside of the universe (everything) that can help the intellect define what is actually inside of the universe and therefore the primordial emanation contains ALL. We're piloting the wave somewhere in existence.

Isolation implies separation, to separate. To form an island of experience. The word we are looking for is insularity. Insularity is metaphysically impossible. There's no prerequisite for consciousness and thus there's no prerequisite for BEING present. There's no separation in the present moment. Everything is NOW.

Knowledge is created by the movement of this inescapable present moment. Knowledge is memory and memory is the past. Intuition is instinct and instinct is the present. Imagination is the marriage of the past and present. The past is an illusion, the future is an illusion. ALL of IT is happening right NOW.

How can one be isolated from knowledge when everything I think I can know exists everywhere all at once? Sure, an isolated person couldn't 'catch up' with the past (collective memories) we've created, but it can recreate our past by being present. Knowledge can start at anytime and anywhere. :up: Hence the name renaissance, it's a rebirth or reawakening of knowledge. A renaissance is the retrieval of eternal knowledge. Knowledge that's always with us, because it is an aspect of the ALL.

In the end I don't know what point you intend me to take from the summary of the ethnologist because it's unclear to me what isolation you're dismissing as non-existent.
Now that I've explained what I mean by isolation, I hope the example makes more sense. I thought it was a straight-forward example. I said we're prone to make the same mistakes, especially if we form a judgement out of the crowd of authorities. Chances are, had Yuri Knorosov mingled with Eric Thompson, the "foremost expert" on the subject, he wouldn't of made his ground-breaking discoveries. In short, Knorosov didn't need to study any of Thompson's work, because it was completely flawed, and this supports the notion that the truth can be found in isolation (or at least your definition of isolation, which, again, is metaphysically impossible)... Cultural insularity doesn't always limit ones access to truth.

In-fact, cultural involvement can limit ones access to truth. I highly recommend the book Culture Against Man by Jules Henry. Culture Against Man is a 1963 book-length ethnography by anthropologist Jules Henry of his native United States culture. With the book's title in mind- I must remind you that some people, like Giordano Bruno, learn the hard way.

KNIGHT OF THE SUN, OR PRINCE ADEPT.

Excerpt:

Infinite Being penetrated the brain, and became the Soul: and lo, MAN THE IMMORTAL! Thus, threefold, fruit of God's thought, is Man; that sees and hears and feels; that thinks and reasons; that loves and is in harmony with the Universe.

Before the world grew old, the primitive Truth faded out from men's Souls. Then man asked himself, "What am I? and how and whence am I? and whither do I go?" And the Soul, looking inward upon itself, strove to learn whether that "I" were mere matter; its thought and reason and its passions and affections mere results of material combination; or a material Being enveloping an immaterial Spirit: . . and further it strove, by self-examination, to learn whether that Spirit were an individual essence, with a separate immortal existence, or an infinitesimal portion of a Great First Principle, inter-penetrating the Universe and the infinitude of space, and undulating like light and heat: . . and so they wandered further amid the mazes of error; and imagined vain philosophies; wallowing in the sloughs of materialism and sensualism, of beating their wings vainly in the vacuum of abstractions and idealities.

While yet the first oaks still put forth their leaves, man lost the perfect knowledge of the One True God, the Ancient Absolute Existence, the Infinite Mind and Supreme Intelligence; and floated helplessly out upon the shoreless ocean of conjecture. Then the soul vexed itself with seeking to learn whether the material Universe was a mere chance combination of atoms, or the work of Infinite, Uncreated Wisdom: . . whether the Deity was a concentrated, and the Universe an extended immateriality; or whether He was a personal existence, an Omnipotent, Eternal, Supreme Essence, regulating matter at will; or subjecting it to unchangeable laws throughout eternity; and to Whom, Himself Infinite and Eternal, Space and Time are unknown. With their finite limited vision they sought to learn the source and explain the existence of Evil, and Pain, and Sorrow; and so they wandered ever deeper into the darkness, and were lost; and there was for them no longer any God; but only a great, dumb, soulless Universe, full of mere emblems and symbols.


@Wellsy

I hope you enjoy the following quote ;) :

“May Hegel's philosophy of absolute nonsense - three-fourths cash and one-fourth crazy fancies - continue to pass for unfathomable wisdom without anyone suggesting as an appropriate motto for his writings Shakespeare's words: "Such stuff as madmen tongue and brain not," or, as an emblematical vignette, the cuttle-fish with its ink-bag, creating a cloud of darkness around it to prevent people from seeing what it is, with the device: mea caligine tutus. - May each day bring us, as hitherto, new systems adapted for University purposes, entirely made up of words and phrases and in a learned jargon besides, which allows people to talk whole days without saying anything; and may these delights never be disturbed by the Arabian proverb: "I hear the clappering of the mill, but I see no flour." - For all this is in accordance with the age and must have its course.” -Arthur Schopenhauer

Lastly, I've been rather consistent with my message across this forum. If you actually read my posts, and consider my superpositions, you'd realize that I've been philosophically sincere. Despite detractors and half-wits, I've delivered my encomiums. Praise be to

Qauntum logic shall bride the binary gap! The Noogenesis begins with 0 and its exodus ends with 1. You can call this post spooky action at a distance... There's no isolation or separation. We must overcome our observation bias and realize that we're co-generating this moment.



-One Love
#14951453
Victoribus Spolia wrote:No, it based on the fact that such is actually fallacious. :lol:

This response makes me somewhat curious. Gives to me the impression that your perspective is one of fine tuning it then.

What characteristics do you have in mind? You must have something in particular for you to muse as to why America produces people such as myself.

I would like you to share some of these musing with me further.

You're a young chap who seems intently religious and seem enamored with the old patriarchal relations and systems of governance. But the religious aspect is something about America that particularly gets my confusion in part not having been raised all that religious myself. I now live in a place with a lot of religious people now, but many seem culturally religious more so than religious. It seems curious with America being in it's foundations exceptionally liberal and capitalist even with it being filled with a lot of religious immigrants.
I don't quite get it's continuity or the state of religion in the US which is different from it in Europe where liberal revolutions were strongly based on persecuting the church and it's power.

The patriarchal stuff isn't exceptional itself except to the extent it is a rather strong and explicit assertion of it.
It just seems peculiar but I guess somewhat characteristic of the times in which the struggle for women's labor to be of equal value to mens has garnered some mainstream basis even for those who don't care for feminism (whilst in their actions reflecting the change of women's average position in society uknowingly).
Even when I think of people who defend the old relations, I guess it has a connotation of a way of life from their time. More commonly for men's anti-feminism today doesn't express a conservative masculinity (paternalist carer of women) as much as a hostility to the burden of conservative masculinity. Feeling tension between expectations of masculinity they don't like and reject but ambivalently also professing the need for women to not be the way they are in the modern age.
A confused bunch they are, reminscient more of urban individualist men who seem to resent their own attraction towards women and the difficulty of relating to them like urban men of old who were anti-feminist but felt restricted by masculinity, wanting to do as they pleased with women (fuck 'em, dump 'em).
I'm rambling now, bit tired after long travel to Australia.
In essence, you see human nature as tied to societal development, and if social conditions arise that make lifestyles more directly tied to these "inessential" features obsolete (I am sure you are referring more to biological sex-distinctions in this instance) , then insisting on them (my position) is actually to insist on something contrary to our nature (which is ironically quite the opposite of what the patriarchalist claims to be advocating) because such a nature changes with society. In addition, you think this is possibly tied to how one relates universals (categories) to their particulars (instances). Thus, Goethe's "unfolding" view of the universal is juxtaposed to the more "static" view of categorization usually employed in scholastic thinking, with the later being indicative of my position.

Does this summarize your analysis accurately?

I would love to continue this discussion with you and have my rebuttal "locked and loaded," as it were.


That seems apt enough of a description, where I think the assumed essential nature is a result of abstracting in an ahistorical fashion which universalizes the appearance of things in the present state in order to naturalize such tendencies.
To which the point should be to find the concrete universal which underpins human nature (labor) in order to explain how demographics change.
It is the same with race, blacks are viewed in a particular way because of the relations which they have come from and exist within.
The idea of an internal essence in itself is mistaken, because the essence of things isn't behind appearance but through the relations of things. Which is why efforts to abstract the individual thing outside its real world relations renders a thing empty, and unknowable as it has no content but is simply form.

But I would be curious to see you detail your view beyond my slap of other concepts.
#14951475
Wellsy wrote:I would be curious to see you detail your view beyond my slap of other concepts.
We wish you would help us end the war on consciousness.


"Paradise only exists in the heart, love is the missing link from here to the stars."

Impregnate the stars
viewtopic.php?f=92&t=170622
We hide and make love in plain sight.
#14952218
RhetoricThug wrote:
Spoiler: show
"Pick a flower on Earth and you move the farthest star." -Paul Dirac

Due to the nature of holographic cosmology, I will blur the existential spectrum (individual-collective-cosmic) with this post. Remember to keep your head in the clouds and feet on the ground :angel:
The primordial emanation contains ALL. Any form of knowledge or ignorance is an aspect of the All. Knowledge is organized ignorance and the material world is organized immateriality. There's nothing outside of the universe (everything) that can help the intellect define what is actually inside of the universe and therefore the primordial emanation contains ALL. We're piloting the wave somewhere in existence.

Isolation implies separation, to separate. To form an island of experience. The word we are looking for is insularity. Insularity is metaphysically impossible. There's no prerequisite for consciousness and thus there's no prerequisite for BEING present. There's no separation in the present moment. Everything is NOW.

Knowledge is created by the movement of this inescapable present moment. Knowledge is memory and memory is the past. Intuition is instinct and instinct is the present. Imagination is the marriage of the past and present. The past is an illusion, the future is an illusion. ALL of IT is happening right NOW.

How can one be isolated from knowledge when everything I think I can know exists everywhere all at once? Sure, an isolated person couldn't 'catch up' with the past (collective memories) we've created, but it can recreate our past by being present. Knowledge can start at anytime and anywhere. :up: Hence the name renaissance, it's a rebirth or reawakening of knowledge. A renaissance is the retrieval of eternal knowledge. Knowledge that's always with us, because it is an aspect of the ALL.

Your summary here makes me think of the distinction between absolute and relative.
Absolute and Relative are philosophical terms concerning the mutual interdependence of things, processes and knowledge. ‘Absolute’ means independent, permanent and not subject to qualification. ‘Relative’ means partial or transient, dependent on circumstances or point-of-view. For dialectics, the Absolute is only the whole movement through various relative stages of understanding, but the progress of knowledge never comes to an end, so the absolute is relative. However, even a relative truth may nevertheless contain some grain of the whole absolute truth, so there is an absolute within the relative. Perception is relative to the observer, but the existence of an objective world is absolute.

Where reality as a whole is an absolute which we only get partial/relative understanding of. Abstracting pieces of the whole as we can't hold all of reality in our mind except in this emphasis of being in the present but this doesn't seem to allow a representation/rational explanation and confined to experience.

But that the absolute is always there in the ever present reality doesn't accord with how knowledge develops, as reality isn't knowledge although it's what we get knowledge of. Otherwise what would be the point of trying to understand anything with the perfect representation of everything is already in front of us.
Except our knowledge of things isn't directly given in appearance and experience but requires much deliberation. The essence of things isn't behind appearances (noumenon) but doesn't simply coincide with appearance. Otherwise the truth of things would be self evident and there would be no need for people to strive to understand things, no distinction between appearance and essence.
Our understanding of nature/reality exists only to the extent it becomes socially significant based on human needs.
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/jordan2.htm
The world as known to man is a man-made world; it is the totality of ‘things for us’ and not of ‘things-in-themselves’. The only knowable is the world that appears in man’s experience, that is causally transformed by human action, divided into species and particulars, class members and classes, articulated into objects and their relations, into things with a definite form, arrangement, and structure, and cut out from the chaotic mass of the pre-existing world as it persists by itself. This humanized world is knowable because it is a world determined by man, the outcome, as Marx said in the first Thesis on Feuerbach, of ‘human sensuous activity’. As a natural being man shapes the environment according to his needs, and the needs determine the articulation of the world into separate things and their connections. External objects are, as it were, the objectified centres of resistance in the environment encountered by the human drives striving for the satisfaction of needs. If the needs were different, the world would look differently too, as it does to other animal species.

Although sensuous objects are different from thought objects, they do not exist in the form of objects unless they are made such by human activity. Cognition is not simply a matter of discovering or disclosing some entities which exist independently of us. The subject participates in the determination of the objective nature and order of things and, in a certain sense, creates it in the act of continuous world-objectification (Vergegenstandlichung). While according to Marx, man’s practical activity creates an objective world in the indicated sense, objectification should not be conceived as a spiritual but as a natural act and, therefore, as an act of production rather than that of creation in the proper sense, that is, of bringing something into being ex nihilo. Consequently, man’s capacity of objectifying what gratifies his needs and provides him with enjoyment presupposes the ‘sensuous external world’. This external world is the material on which man’s labour becomes manifest, from which and by means of which external objects are produced.[46]
...
The sensuous world ... is not a thing given direct from all eternity, ever the same, but the product of industry and the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is a historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social organization according to the changed needs.[52]

So I give a strong emphasis to one's existence in relation to society as it would indeed be nonsensical to think of any being isolated from reality.
But one can be isolated from society or part of it yet still have a poverty of it's development through one's own stunted opportunities within it (relatively isolated from cultural products).

Reality is absolute but our ability to know things isn't, somethings seem incomprehensible and impossible to conceive of until society develops to a point that it can face certain problems and come to understand things in solving them. Not only when our ability and division of labor has developed but the types of problems that face us based on new needs have also emerged.

Now that I've explained what I mean by isolation, I hope the example makes more sense. I thought it was a straight-forward example. I said we're prone to make the same mistakes, especially if we form a judgement out of the crowd of authorities. Chances are, had Yuri Knorosov mingled with Eric Thompson, the "foremost expert" on the subject, he wouldn't of made his ground-breaking discoveries. In short, Knorosov didn't need to study any of Thompson's work, because it was completely flawed, and this supports the notion that the truth can be found in isolation (or at least your definition of isolation, which, again, is metaphysically impossible)... Cultural insularity doesn't always limit ones access to truth.

In-fact, cultural involvement can limit ones access to truth. I highly recommend the book Culture Against Man by Jules Henry. Culture Against Man is a 1963 book-length ethnography by anthropologist Jules Henry of his native United States culture. With the book's title in mind- I must remind you that some people, like Giordano Bruno, learn the hard way.

Ah, so your point is that he wouldn't have necessarily gained much by simply following the mainstream path in the wake of Eric Thompson.
In which case it would be impossible to disagree with the point that Yuri was able to discover something in spite of a major expert in the field's misguided attempt. And I think you have done well in clarifying and making a distinction I can grab onto between being isolated from the world/reality being impossible as different from cultural isolation/insularity.
I would agree such cultural insularity doesn't limit one's ability to get to the truth of a thing, I would even emphasize that it can be the outsiders perspective of those who aren't so inoculated into a mainstream that are better able to evaluate the limits of the mainstream and go beyond it.

I don't expect myself to become an original thinker on the frontier of some field and thus don't expect to be an original thinker, which in part why I retrace the steps of original thinkers.
My life isn't going into studying some field in order to make some break through, although even then people like Yuri develop tools through their own study prior to their works and eventual discoveries.


KNIGHT OF THE SUN, OR PRINCE ADEPT.

Excerpt:

This does sound like what I thought earlier of the emphasis of the Ancients with Zen and all that.
It even seems to reflect the point about the truth of things being beyond language.
Which appeals to me but as earlier I would emphasize it as an important and necessary point but one I would have as a stage rather than absolute.

@Wellsy

I hope you enjoy the following quote ;) :

“May Hegel's philosophy of absolute nonsense - three-fourths cash and one-fourth crazy fancies - continue to pass for unfathomable wisdom without anyone suggesting as an appropriate motto for his writings Shakespeare's words: "Such stuff as madmen tongue and brain not," or, as an emblematical vignette, the cuttle-fish with its ink-bag, creating a cloud of darkness around it to prevent people from seeing what it is, with the device: mea caligine tutus. - May each day bring us, as hitherto, new systems adapted for University purposes, entirely made up of words and phrases and in a learned jargon besides, which allows people to talk whole days without saying anything; and may these delights never be disturbed by the Arabian proverb: "I hear the clappering of the mill, but I see no flour." - For all this is in accordance with the age and must have its course.” -Arthur Schopenhauer

Lastly, I've been rather consistent with my message across this forum. If you actually read my posts, and consider my superpositions, you'd realize that I've been philosophically sincere. Despite detractors and half-wits, I've delivered my encomiums. Praise be to

Qauntum logic shall bride the binary gap! The Noogenesis begins with 0 and its exodus ends with 1. You can call this post spooky action at a distance... There's no isolation or separation. We must overcome our observation bias and realize that we're co-generating this moment.

-One Love

Here's a funny for you
Image

To an extent he was right though, because Hegel's language is quite unnecessarily difficult and his subject highly abstracted which is what makes it so generalizable I suspect.
But just as some take their initial glance at your language to be too much to understand and thus take it to be nonsensical and thus missing the content of what you do share. Hegel is rich in content in spite of his dismissal by many. So I don't doubt that you're not just spewing things without sense.
#14953822
Wellsy wrote:Gives to me the impression that your perspective is one of fine tuning it then.


Well, if you know anything about the constructs upon which are scientific edifices are built, it should give you the impression of a wrecking ball.

Wellsy wrote:You're a young chap who seems intently religious and seem enamored with the old patriarchal relations and systems of governance. But the religious aspect is something about America that particularly gets my confusion in part not having been raised all that religious myself. I now live in a place with a lot of religious people now, but many seem culturally religious more so than religious. It seems curious with America being in it's foundations exceptionally liberal and capitalist even with it being filled with a lot of religious immigrants.
I don't quite get it's continuity or the state of religion in the US which is different from it in Europe where liberal revolutions were strongly based on persecuting the church and it's power.

The patriarchal stuff isn't exceptional itself except to the extent it is a rather strong and explicit assertion of it.
It just seems peculiar but I guess somewhat characteristic of the times in which the struggle for women's labor to be of equal value to mens has garnered some mainstream basis even for those who don't care for feminism (whilst in their actions reflecting the change of women's average position in society uknowingly).
Even when I think of people who defend the old relations, I guess it has a connotation of a way of life from their time. More commonly for men's anti-feminism today doesn't express a conservative masculinity (paternalist carer of women) as much as a hostility to the burden of conservative masculinity. Feeling tension between expectations of masculinity they don't like and reject but ambivalently also professing the need for women to not be the way they are in the modern age.
A confused bunch they are, reminscient more of urban individualist men who seem to resent their own attraction towards women and the difficulty of relating to them like urban men of old who were anti-feminist but felt restricted by masculinity, wanting to do as they pleased with women (fuck 'em, dump 'em).
I'm rambling now, bit tired after long travel to Australia.


To be honest, I think America fosters quite a bit ideological diversity that could explain all of this, of which having unusually religious populations among-st its masses is only a part of the whole in explaining your experience.

Americans have striven to make their way of life by carving it out of the wilderness and selling themselves by outdoing others or being more "original" than others. This sort of thinking causes non-conformity to be a marketable asset where in other cultures it could be a liability. I think this is starting to change, but bucking the system cuts both ways; left and right.

This isn't to say that such originality and views are insincere. Rather, its only to argue that people aren't afraid of seriously investigating views that would be almost impermissible to even discuss in other more homogeneous, smaller, and more centralized nations/cultures.

Wellsy wrote:That seems apt enough of a description, where I think the assumed essential nature is a result of abstracting in an ahistorical fashion which universalizes the appearance of things in the present state in order to naturalize such tendencies.
To which the point should be to find the concrete universal which underpins human nature (labor) in order to explain how demographics change.
It is the same with race, blacks are viewed in a particular way because of the relations which they have come from and exist within.
The idea of an internal essence in itself is mistaken, because the essence of things isn't behind appearance but through the relations of things. Which is why efforts to abstract the individual thing outside its real world relations renders a thing empty, and unknowable as it has no content but is simply form.

But I would be curious to see you detail your view beyond my slap of other concepts.


The idea of a concrete universal is not itself entirely misguided, but the very notion would not be opposed to essentialism, but would balance essentialism to more performative notions of human identity; that is, the concrete universal would be where the static (natural) essence and the transient performative (social) role find their mutual reduction.

However, if gender has an essential quality, I would only argue that it does inasmuch that circumstances compel it revelation, like in what might be called "the state of nature."

Rousseau once said that man was born free but everywhere is in chains; the reality of the phrase is testable. What man is in his essence is how he will be when the artificial societal conditions of his own creation are removed.

Is patriarchy or egalitarianism a social condition or construct or both? Remove any semblance of a state that would enforce or perpetuate either and see what people create out of necessity.

I would argue the structure that emerges out of this is the concrete universal, it represents the most essential aspect of the human psyche but is not so fixed that it cannot be entirely changed.

For instance, is the essence of a Tiger (from this more transient line of thought); how we observe the animal acting in captivity or in the wild? Your position would be that the natural tiger is how the tiger is now as it has developed given the social-circumstance (because you see the nature as in no way fixed, but changing). If this is the case, then the essence of the tiger is not some fixed nature; rather its nature is what is immediately known to us in the present; that is, sitting in captivity, generally inactive, somewhat trained into obedience, neurotic, and being fed by others is the Tiger's natural state.

I would agree that a "tiger" is what we observe empirically, but that whatever mental state it may or may-not have is unknowable to us (the problem of other minds) and that we can only gauge the true impulse of such a being by removing those artificial structures that would limit its free action. This is isn't to say that biological factors and external factors can ever be fully removed, but inasmuch as they have been imposed we should remove them if we wish to see real and authentic behavior of the beast.

If you want to know the essence of a Tiger, observe it in the wild. The same goes for man.

For this reason can I say that Patriarchy is natural state of humanity and just like a tiger in captivity such an animal is in a state of slavery, sickness, neurosis, etc., so is egalitarianism as perpetuated and protected by the state; its not natural, its artificial and degenerative. That this is confirmed empirically by observing the human body is quite secondary; anatomy and cultural anthropology is merely the lipstick and pearls of the queen, The queen is praxeology.

______________________________________________________________________________________


Also, what are your thoughts on immaterialism and my proof? ;)
#14954011
Victoribus Spolia wrote:To be honest, I think America fosters quite a bit ideological diversity that could explain all of this, of which having unusually religious populations among-st its masses is only a part of the whole in explaining your experience.

Americans have striven to make their way of life by carving it out of the wilderness and selling themselves by outdoing others or being more "original" than others. This sort of thinking causes non-conformity to be a marketable asset where in other cultures it could be a liability. I think this is starting to change, but bucking the system cuts both ways; left and right.

This isn't to say that such originality and views are insincere. Rather, its only to argue that people aren't afraid of seriously investigating views that would be almost impermissible to even discuss in other more homogeneous, smaller, and more centralized nations/cultures.

When I think of America I think of the pragmatism that was popular in the US which wasn't concerned with truth itself as much as what worked, a practical attitude rather than an intellectualizing/theoretical one.
The story being that the Americans needed to test out what from the old world/countries held up in the new world.
This seems amicable to your summary in that people test out new ideas/perspectives.


The idea of a concrete universal is not itself entirely misguided, but the very notion would not be opposed to essentialism, but would balance essentialism to more performative notions of human identity; that is, the concrete universal would be where the static (natural) essence and the transient performative (social) role find their mutual reduction.

However, if gender has an essential quality, I would only argue that it does inasmuch that circumstances compel it revelation, like in what might be called "the state of nature."

Rousseau once said that man was born free but everywhere is in chains; the reality of the phrase is testable. What man is in his essence is how he will be when the artificial societal conditions of his own creation are removed.

Is patriarchy or egalitarianism a social condition or construct or both? Remove any semblance of a state that would enforce or perpetuate either and see what people create out of necessity.

I would argue the structure that emerges out of this is the concrete universal, it represents the most essential aspect of the human psyche but is not so fixed that it cannot be entirely changed.

For instance, is the essence of a Tiger (from this more transient line of thought); how we observe the animal acting in captivity or in the wild? Your position would be that the natural tiger is how the tiger is now as it has developed given the social-circumstance (because you see the nature as in no way fixed, but changing). If this is the case, then the essence of the tiger is not some fixed nature; rather its nature is what is immediately known to us in the present; that is, sitting in captivity, generally inactive, somewhat trained into obedience, neurotic, and being fed by others is the Tiger's natural state.

I would agree that a "tiger" is what we observe empirically, but that whatever mental state it may or may-not have is unknowable to us (the problem of other minds) and that we can only gauge the true impulse of such a being by removing those artificial structures that would limit its free action. This is isn't to say that biological factors and external factors can ever be fully removed, but inasmuch as they have been imposed we should remove them if we wish to see real and authentic behavior of the beast.

If you want to know the essence of a Tiger, observe it in the wild. The same goes for man.

For this reason can I say that Patriarchy is natural state of humanity and just like a tiger in captivity such an animal is in a state of slavery, sickness, neurosis, etc., so is egalitarianism as perpetuated and protected by the state; its not natural, its artificial and degenerative. That this is confirmed empirically by observing the human body is quite secondary; anatomy and cultural anthropology is merely the lipstick and pearls of the queen, The queen is praxeology.

Rousseau's man in a state of nature is a fiction, a fairy tale which doesn't hold rationally to human history as he presumes something which couldn't have logically existed. He tries to think of individuals coming together to form society, when the idea of isolated individuals historically is incomprehensible. Mankind in its origins can be nothing but social in nature, the formation of language itself would be nonsensical due to it's presumption of multiple peoples having some necessity to try to communicate with one another. Which isn't that fictions can't be illustrative of something but that it's idealization is problematic. Hegel does a better job in considering subjects as a group who collaborate on a broader project/society as opposed to a methodological individualism.
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/state-of-nature.pdf
The concept of “state of nature” is taken in Hegel’s writings to mean individuals (or family groups) living from nature and relating to others of their own species just as they related to the rest of nature, to be feared or subdued. Hegel consistently regarded this meaning as a fiction, and the idea of human society emerging from primitive egoism is utterly absent from Hegel’s thinking. Nonetheless, this was the sense in which the term was used.
...
Hegel knew that before history there was a pre-history, but he also knew that what people knew of this prehistory was very little or nothing. 12 What Hobbes and Rousseau were doing with the supposed historical starting point of a “state of nature” was projecting onto an unknown prehistory what they claimed to find in the nature of human beings today.



And I find your insistance on the tiger in nature as deserving some sort of primacy over a tiger in captivity/zoo arbitrary and unpersuasive. A tiger in captivity is just as real as the one in nature and I would also emphasize that if one observed behaviours of many animals as they exist now, one may well make the very ahistorical error of generalizing from a particular point inconsiderate to different environmental conditions. At present, tigers in the wild are endangered and severely effected by the behaviour of humans on the environment. The ideal of a 'state of nature' seems more an ideological obscurity to project things into and give legitimacy as being 'natural'. Just like how Rousseau and others projected their present day conditions onto an unknown history.

Spoiler: show
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/en/jordan2.htm
In the opinion of Marx, it is an error to assume that the primary psychological constitution of the individual can be distinguished from his socially acquired characteristics and that the latter, being a product of social existence, are in a sense artificial and secondary, since they are derivable from the former. The differentiation between what man owes to society and to his primary, true, and unchanging nature, can be disregarded as a pseudo-problem or a mere figment of speculation. The ‘normal man’, ever the same in each historical epoch, who provided Jeremy Bentham with his yardstick of utility in the past, present, and future, existed only in Bentham’s own mind. With an incomparable naiveté, Bentham took the English shopkeeper for his model and regarded what was useful to this queer normal man and to his world as absolutely useful.[101] Engels may have praised Rousseau as a forerunner of dialectics, admiring his dialectical ingenuity which enabled him to show how man in the state of nature, free from any social bonds and inclinations, was constrained to enter into social life, and thus came to form society and to establish law and government. But Marx ignored Rousseau’s dialectics as spurious, firmly holding to the view that men have always lived in society and believing that the individual is ‘a social being’ or ‘an ensemble of the social relations’. Consequently, society is as real as the interacting individuals of which it is composed are real.[102] The social laws are not an artificial human product, established by convention or imposed by the will of a powerful lawgiver who can change or discard them as he thinks fit. ‘Marx considers social evolution to be a natural process governed by laws which do not depend upon the will, consciousness, or the intention of men,’ wrote the Russian reviewer of Capital, whom Marx praised for the accuracy of his evaluation in the preface to the second edition of this work. Marx’s own view on society is aptly reflected by Emile Durkheim’s observations made some fifty years later, that it is no easier to modify the type of society than the species of an animal. The more man emancipates himself from the original dependence on nature by social co-operation and becomes an individual by social action, the more he falls under the influence of his social environment and, more specifically, of the mode of existence of his society.[103]

It does not follow from the fact that ‘society is the product of men’s reciprocal action’ that society is governed by laws that are made arbitrarily or are deducible from unchangeable human nature and applicable to the behaviour of individual men, always and everywhere. Since social life results from, or is based upon, human interaction, the study of the behaviour of individual men taken separately of their motives and aspirations, hopes and expectations, is irrelevant to social investigations. Society is not an aggregate of individuals but a totality of interacting individuals. Therefore, society changes and develops according to its own laws which are not psychological but specifically social laws. They help towards understanding social phenomena and the social behaviour of individuals. As Marx put it, just as society is produced by men, so society itself produces man as man.[104]

Having included man within nature and recognized all human experience and activity as processes of interaction between different parts of nature and thus as natural events, Marx, like Hegel, considered all experiences and activities of man amenable to a single method. While for Hegel spirit was history’s only motive and formative power, Marx accepted the self-sufficiency of nature. Consequently, what Hegel regarded as manifestations of spirit, Marx recognized as natural processes and replaced Hegel’s spiritualization of man and of the world by their ‘naturalization’. Hegel’s method was either teleological or dialectical and described human activity in terms of final causes, of values, ends, and norms of conduct. Marx’s method, however, was to be scientific, in that its task was to discover what is the case and not what ought to be, to make exclusive use of observation and inference, and to reveal causal or functional relationships among the various objects and processes of nature. Apart from its formal advantages, the universality of scientific method reflected Marx’s assumption that neither the external world nor society nor man can be conceived of and explained separately but only in their interaction, as they determine each other and change through reciprocal impact and natural influences.
...
For the understanding of Marx a different point is, however, important. The Marxian conception of nature, of man, and man’s relation to nature disposes of many traditional epistemological problems. Marx neither needs to prove existence of the external world, nor disprove its existence. From his point of view both these endeavours are prompted by false assumptions concerning the relation of man to nature, by considering man as a detached observer, setting him against the world or placing him, as it were, on a totally different level. For man, who is part of nature, to doubt the existence of the external world or to consider it as in need of proof is to doubt his own existence, and even Descartes and Berkeley refused to go to such a length.

This conclusion is of considerable significance for the interpretation of Marxian philosophy. As Marx refused to dissociate nature from man and man from nature and conceived man not only as part of nature but also nature in a certain sense as a product of man’s activity and, thus, part of man, Marx’s naturalism has no need of metaphysical foundation. Moreover, since man knows only socially mediated nature, ‘man’, and not natural reality, ‘is the immediate object of natural science’.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/fromm/works/1961/man/ch04.htm
Of course, Marx was never tempted to assume that "human nature" was identical with that particular expression of human nature prevalent in his own society. In arguing against Bentham, Marx said: "To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch." [22] It must be noted that this concept of human nature is not, for Marx -- as it was not either for Hegel -an abstraction. It is the essence of man -- in contrast to the various forms of his historical existence -- and, as Marx said, "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual." [23] It must also be stated that this sentence from Capital, written by the "old Marx," shows the continuity of the concept of man's essence ( Wesen) which the young Marx wrote about in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. He no longer used the term "essence" later on, as being abstract and unhistorical, but he clearly retained the notion of this essence in a more historical version, in the differentiation between "human nature in general" and "human nature as modified" with each historical period.

In line with this distinction between a general human nature and the specific expression of human nature in each culture, Marx distinguishes, as we have already mentioned above, two types of human drives and appetites: the constant or fixed ones, such as hunger and the sexual urge, which are an integral part of human nature, and which can be changed only in their form and the direction they take in various cultures, and the "relative" appetites, which are not an integral part of human nature but which "owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication." [24] Marx gives as an example the needs produced by the capitalistic structure of society. "The need for money," he wrote in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, "is therefore the real need created by the modern economy, and the only need which it creates.... This is shown subjectively, partly in the fact that the expansion of production and of needs becomes an ingenious and always calculating subservience to inhuman, depraved, unnatural, and imaginary appetites." [25]

Man's potential, for Marx, is a given potential; man is, as it were, the human raw material which, as such, cannot be changed, just as the brain structure has remained the same since the dawn of history. Yet, man does change in the course of history; he develops himself; he transforms himself, he is the product of history; since he makes his history, he is his own product. History is the history of man's self-realization; it is nothing but the self-creation of man through the process of his work and his production: "the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labor, and the emergence of nature for man; he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins." [26]

It is important to consider man in relation to a humanized nature, there is nothing meaningful in trying to imagine a nature separate or unaffected by man because man if he is indeed a man uses his labor to change nature to satisfy his needs.
Even now, one of a contemplative materialism may look at nature and think it nature independent of man but there is no such things especially now with how profound and effect we've had on the world.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/german-ideology/ch01b.htm
Feuerbach’s conception of the sensuous world is confined on the one hand to mere contemplation of it, and on the other to mere feeling; he says “Man” instead of “real historical man.” “Man” is really “the German.” In the first case, the contemplation of the sensuous world, he necessarily lights on things which contradict his consciousness and feeling, which disturb the harmony he presupposes, the harmony of all parts of the sensuous world and especially of man and nature. To remove this disturbance, he must take refuge in a double perception, a profane one which only perceives the “flatly obvious” and a higher, philosophical, one which perceives the “true essence” of things. He does not see how the sensuous world around him is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the preceding one, developing its industry and its intercourse, modifying its social system according to the changed needs. Even the objects of the simplest “sensuous certainty” are only given him through social development, industry and commercial intercourse. The cherry-tree, like almost all fruit-trees, was, as is well known, only a few centuries ago transplanted by commerce into our zone, and therefore only by this action of a definite society in a definite age it has become “sensuous certainty” for Feuerbach.

Incidentally, when we conceive things thus, as they really are and happened, every profound philosophical problem is resolved, as will be seen even more clearly later, quite simply into an empirical fact. For instance, the important question of the relation of man to nature (Bruno [Bauer] goes so far as to speak of “the antitheses in nature and history” (p. 110), as though these were two separate “things” and man did not always have before him an historical nature and a natural history) out of which all the “unfathomably lofty works” on “substance” and “self-consciousness” were born, crumbles of itself when we understand that the celebrated “unity of man with nature” has always existed in industry and has existed in varying forms in every epoch according to the lesser or greater development of industry, just like the “struggle” of man with nature, right up to the development of his productive powers on a corresponding basis.

Which is why earlier I emphasize that even the wild in which the Asian Tiger lives now isn't as it was in the past and I speculative think it has changed its behaviour as we now see with Tigers so close to human populations can be 'man eaters'.
Though in this I would emphasize that animals unlike humans don't as significantly inherent things culturally as much as many of them do have an instinctive "program" as far as we can tell although they are just as likely to change in adapting to environmental pressures and thus can emerge progeny better suited and not quite like ancestors in some ways.


Man is to be considered in relation to real existing society/humanized nature. The world has not known man independent of it for a very long time now. Even if one considered tribal people as closer to nature, one would find the effects of human labor on it. The indigenous Australians for example burnt off of things for hunting and future growth and shaped the land of Australia before colonialists arrived.
https://theconversation.com/how-aboriginal-burning-changed-australias-climate-4454
One would've been in error to think it just a state of nature, as it had been a product of man's activity for thousands of years also, inseparable from that activity as man is from the natural.
And this remains true even in modern societies where we have a highly complex division of labor that has taken on a global scale.

Man living tribally or what ever is no more or less real than man in industrialized society. The idea of the state as artificial and unnatural is an unpersuasive rhetorical effort to naturalize the intended view of patriarchal as natural and egalitarian as unnatural.
Fine argue for patrirachial relations but should see that it itself isn't any more natural/real than changes in gendered relations in industrialized society where women's labor is given value as their forms of labor become commodified.
To me, even if we take a stance of one set of conditions being harmful to the nature of a thing and another more desirable with how it accords to a things nature, it is no less real.
As such, one should instead make an argument for certain nature of a thing to speak about what is best for it in realizing it's full potential to it's nature which isn't a static ahistorical thing in the case of humans as man has developed as mankind has developed society.

But it is the case that Marx holds to a sense of human nature based on biological and social needs, but that this isn't confined to an ahistorical or imagined sense of nature but is based in how man's labor generates changes in society and changes man himself.
http://critique-of-pure-interest.blogspot.com/2011/12/between-materialism-and-idealism-marx.html
That elusive middle is captured by Marx’s claim that the external object, on which humanity depends, is in turn dependent on the formative power of human activity. In other words: nature determines (causes, affects) man, who in turn determines (works upon) nature. Thus man is indirectly self-determining, mediated by nature. This reciprocal determination of man and nature is what Marx means by “praxis". In the first Thesis, therefore, Marx reproaches traditional materialism for not seeing this fundamental importance of praxis, since it (materialism) sees man one-sidedly as subjected to nature and thus it forgets man’s active intervention in nature – a point repeated by Marx in the third Thesis, where he focuses on the consequences of materialism for social theory: “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing [by which men are changed, PS] forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is essential to educate the educator himself.”

http://isj.org.uk/marxism-and-ethics/
Both modern and classical conceptions of ethics share one common theme. They tend to treat the very different social contexts in which they were formulated as unchanging features of nature.38 Hegel’s great contribution to moral theory started from a historical comparison of these two contexts: asking how and why we (or more precisely Germans at the turn of the 19th century) are different from ancient Greeks. By doing this he began a process, later completed by Marx, of synthesising and overcoming the limitations of both Kantian morality and Aristotelian ethics.

Just as Aristotle sought to base his ethics on a model of human essence, Hegel insisted that ethics must start from a model of “what human beings are”. It is only when they are so grounded that it is possible to say “that some modes of life are suited to our nature, whereas others are not”.39 He followed Aristotle in assuming that the goal of life is self-realisation, but he broke with him by arguing that it is only by way of freedom that this is possible. Whereas Aristotle insisted that happiness is the end of life, Hegel believed with Kant that the end of life was freedom.40 But unlike Kant, who counterposed freedom to necessity, he insisted that to act freely was to act in accordance with necessity.41 He thus criticised “Kant for seeing dichotomies in the self between freedom and nature…where he ought to have seen freedom as actualising nature”.42 Moreover, he believed that moral laws, far from being universal in some transhistoric sense, are in fact only intelligible “in the context of a particular community”, and can be universalised only to the extent that “communities grow and consolidate into an international community”.43

Hegel thus provided a social content to the concept of freedom by relating it to the movement of “a living social whole”.44 In so doing, he simultaneously worked a dramatic change on Aristotle’s concept of happiness. For if human nature evolves with the cultural evolution of communities then so too does the meaning of self-realisation. His ethics is therefore best understood as a form of “dialectical or historicised naturalism”.45 It was this historical understanding of human nature that provided Marx with the basis from which he went beyond existing materialist (Hobbesian) and idealist (Kantian) models of agency.


Mankind changes itself and develops with society, pushing back natural necessity and allows for a rich individuality where people can take on the greatest products of culture upon themselves and be much more than mere animals driven by desire and basic needs, but instead have more human/social needs. Where even what fulfills basic desires like food, sex and such take on a social/human character.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/zetkin/1920/lenin/zetkin1.htm
Of course, thirst must be satisfied. But will the normal person in normal circumstances lie down in the gutter and drink out of a puddle, or out of a glass with a rim greasy from many lips? But the social aspect is most important of all.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions. But taken abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal functions.


And I would distinguish that one can't readily identify the essence of an animal by considering it isolated to some ideal nature/wild nor in captivity.
How a tiger behaves in either context doesn't readily reveal the essence of a tiger, as the essence isn't what is common across tigers in each environment or in one environment over the other in themselves. One would have to thoroughly study them to see what underpins the appearance of their behaviours in each and any context.

And the idea of describing patriarchy of egalitarianism as social constructs seems silly as both are very real, and reflective of a division of labor and the ensuing values/meanings imbued to the sexes within those relations. Saying this is natural or unnatural is rhetoric, not reason and I would speculate there are stronger arguments than trying to argue that patriarchal relations are 'natural'. I see people try to speak to the functional necessities and strengths of them. So for example many women still do practice the traditional housewife position because its economically irrational to work and pay for daycare as capitalism has only given the possibility for women to struggle for better status through the exchange-value of their labor but isn't invested in human emancipation/liberation but only exploiting their labor.
https://aifs.gov.au/publications/family-matters/issue-86/persistent-work-family-strain-among-australian-mothers
In conclusion, Australian mothers in recent decades have greatly increased their participation in the labour market. Fathers, however, have not increased their participation in unpaid household work to a matching degree. But, without equal sharing of the dual roles of earner and carer between mothers and fathers, mothers will inevitably feel the work-family tension more keenly. Furthermore, institutional and structural changes supporting mothers' increased workforce participation are few and slow coming. Consequently, working mothers faced with the challenge of reconciling family and work commitments are often forced to find individual solutions. However, work and family life balance is not a problem specific to individual families. Rather, it is a universal problem shared by many families, and as such it requires institutional and structural changes supported by society as a whole.

The ideal of egaltarianism has gained value along the average status of women but isn't necessarily a reality for many people.
So in a way we retain much of the old, things are essentially new except for the breaking down of formal discriminations in law that made women more dependent on men out of an inability to support themselves. Which than valorized men's paternalistic protection of women even whilst it was sexism that made them vulnerable/dependent on men.
To which if we do end up valuing women as people like men in regards to having to develop their potential, then patriarchal control only retards/fetters the potential of women, what is best for humans is inclusive to realizing the potential of women.
http://www.socraticmethod.net/essays/gender_identity.htm
The fundamental gender binary breaking principle here is that members of both sexes must possess the same important qualities of mind needed to live well, even within the arbitrary context of their pre-defined social roles. These qualities are at the heart of their true human identity. Blending defined social roles, such as the role of statesmanship vs. a home oriented domestic role, into a society's definition of gender over-extends the concept of gender and makes it nothing more than a projection of society's need to create order at the expense of truth. In this Socratic perspective, basic qualities of the human body and mind such as strength, justice, virtue, temperance, courage, wisdom, etc. exist in both sexes enough to make their inclusion, or the inclusion of anything dependent upon them, in a gender identity distinction into a serious misconception of men and women

This means that the most important and valued attributes of the human heart and mind should never be included in the construction of gender difference. All that is courageous, tender, temperate, virtuous, compassionate, just and wise, all that stands at the heart of our attempts to live well, all that is the very lifeblood of the human spirit's striving for excellence is never masculine or feminine. It is human. When concepts of gender identity incorporate such qualities, or incorporate secondary attributes and functions that are derived from or dependent upon such qualities, they degenerate into simplistic projections that service society's need for order over the human need for excellence in understanding.


What makes the point of patriarchy of natural especially weak is that it can no longer be naturalized by an existing status quo but has given favor to new ideas.
https://www.marxists.org/subject/women/authors/beaton/2013/feminism.htm
The ideology of the women’s movement has conquered the dominant ideology so now it is generally accepted that women have the potential to develop capabilities with men in almost all areas of life. Those who still say that women are lesser beings than men or are unable to take on equal responsibilities, or aren’t entitled to equal shares of the wealth now speak outside of the dominant ideology. The impact of this ideological change lies underneath the massive changes to social organization that have been taking place ever since. In every workplace, in every home in the advanced capitalist world attitudes to women and their capabilities have changed. These changes in attitude have not been limited to the ideas of women, but to men as well, who have been dragged, often kicking and spluttering, along behind the women. The changes have not been confined to the developed capitalist world but have clearly impacted everywhere. It is also evident that those who want to maintain the old values of men’s superiority have to assert their ideas with ever increasing force and violence.

It was easy for people in the past to deny what hadn't yet been achieved and to speak of women's inability to do things, to speak of it as natural but to speak of an older society and it's standards as somehow more compelling than the modern seems unpersuasive.
Maybe it'd gain favor with the cynics who disavow the achievements of capitalist production and development entirely and want to blow us back to primitive groups.


Universals


And this is exactly where I'm going to have to explain somethings in regards to the difference between abstract universals and the concrete universal. Because what characterizes the abstract universal is trying to find that which is common to all things within class abstracted of it's inessential characteristics.
But this isn't really an understanding of anything, science would not be needed as the essence of things would be so readily apparent in the appearance of things and we wouldn't need to scientifically investigate things, the truth would be clear to the eyes.

So with an abstract universal, one can only identify things arbitrarily rather than finding that which holds out of logical necessity. An issue Hegel took with Kant over.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/pilling/works/capital/pilling4.htm#Pill5
Hegel rejected this Kantian view of the concept on the grounds that it was confined to what he called abstract identity or abstract universality. Some aspect common to a range of objects is isolated (abstracted) as that which is ‘general’ to them, to be set against a ‘particular’ which, on this view, can exist on its own. The necessity of the aspects chosen can never be demonstrated and, given that this necessity cannot be established, these ‘aspects’ out of which the general is constructed must remain ultimately arbitrary. In short, regularity in appearance is not sufficient to establish necessity. This Hegel points out when he notes the inadequacy of the consensus gentium as a proof for the existence of God. The fact that everybody agrees with the existence of God, is no necessary proof for God’s existence. Unless the nature of this individual consciousness is thoroughly explained and its inner necessity established, the proof is inadequate
...
For Hegel a concept was primarily a synonym for the real grasping of the essence of phenomena and was in no way limited simply to the expression of something general, of some abstract identity discernible by the senses in the objects concerned.
A concept (if it was to be adequate) had to disclose the real nature of a thing and this it must do not merely by revealing what it held in common with other objects, but also its special nature, in short its peculiarity.
The concept was a unity of universality and particularity.
Hegel insisted that it was necessary to distinguish between a universality which preserved all the richness of the particulars within it and an abstract ‘dumb’ generality which was confined to the sameness of all objects of a given kind.
Further, Hegel insisted, this truly universal concept was to be discovered by investigating the actual laws of the origin, development and disappearance of single things. (Even before we take the-discussion further, it should be clear that here lay the importance of Marx’s logical-historical investigation of the cell-form of bourgeois economy, the commodity.) Thought that was limited to registering or correlating empirically perceived common attributes was essentially sterile – it could never come anywhere near to grasping the law of development of phenomena. One crucial point followed from this which has direct and immediate importance for Capital. It was this: the real laws of phenomena do not and cannot appear directly on the surface of the phenomena under investigation in the form of simple identicalness.
If concepts could be grasped merely by finding a common element within the phenomena concerned then this would be equivalent to saying that appearance and essence coincided, that there was no need for science.

The concrete universal as inspired by Goethe's Urphänomen is about finding the simplest archetypal unit which when properly understood can explain the origins of all particulars and it itself is a particular but with universal significance as it explains all other particulars of it's class.
Dull sameness in biology was the classification is basically like Linnaeus' taxonomy where things are classified based on similarity of appearance.
But this was overtaken by Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection where he identified the development and origin of species. One was then able to consider through the development of animals how somethings were related even whilst they in appearance may look very unlike one another.

The best summary of this that I've read is Evald Ilyenkov's The Universal where he uses similar point against a simple essentialism that Wittgenstein put forth in regards to family resemblance. Where the actual ancestor from which all progeny originate from may share only partial likeness, where one couldn't identify the actual existing ancestor by compiling similar attributes and abstracting away dissimilar ones or by averaging the attributes.
And what he finds in his explanation is that when faced with a question like what is man? People who use the thinking of dull sameness, trying to see that which is common to all arbitrarily identify different features that don't by logical necessity really give satisfaction to the essence of what a human is.
So that in the end one ends up with a contentless tautology that man is man ( A = A), which in his example has real significance when it comes to a possible peoples the Tropi where a character kills one and it brings up questions of whether he was guilty of murder, whether the priests should save their souls, whether they would have rights of human citizens or were more exploitable for labor.

Spoiler: show
https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/abstract/abstra1e.htm
‘Each man is a man first and foremost, and only then is he a follower of Plato, Christ, or Marx,’ wrote Vercors in the afterward to the Russian edition of the book. ‘In my view it is much more important to show the way in which points of contact may be found between Marxism and Christianity proceeding from such a criterion, than to emphasise as such regardless of their differences.’ The essence of man the ideological differences, does not lie in adherence to some doctrine or other. But wherein does it lie? In the fact that ,man is first and foremost ... man’. That is the only answer that Vercors was able to oppose to the ‘one-sided’ view of dialectical materialism. But this kind of ‘answer’ takes us back to the starting point – to a simple name unendowed with any definite content. To move away from the tautology, one will have to take up the line of reasoning from the very beginning.

The position so vividly and wittily outlined by Vercors expresses very well the attitudes of those sections of Western intellectuals who struggle agonisingly with the burning issues of our times yet have not solved so far the problem for themselves – where lie the ways of redeeming the noble ideals of humanism? They see clearly that capitalism is innately hostile to these ideals. Yet they do not dare to take up communism for fear of losing in it ‘independence of thinking’, the sham ‘privileges of the thinking part of mankind’.

While this part of mankind agonises over the choice between these two real poles of the modern world, any uncomplicated theoretical question grows out of any proportion into a most intricate and completely insoluble problem, while attempts to solve it with the aid of the most sophisticated instruments of formal logic ultimately lead to a tautology: A = A, man is man.
Nothing else can result from a search for a definition of man through establishing the abstractly identical property which each individual representative of present-day mankind possesses. Logic based on this kind of axiom is absolutely powerless to do anything here. The essence of man to be expressed in the universal definition is by no means an abstraction inherent in each individual, it is not the identical feature which each individual representative of the human race taken separately possesses. A universal definition of man cannot be obtained on this path. here one needs a different kind of logic, a logic based on the dialectical materialist conception of the relationship between the universal and the individual. This essence is impossible to discover in a series of abstract features inherent in every individual. The universal cannot be found here however hard one might look for it.
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The essence of modern humanity, and thereby a universal definition of man, is of course a subject-matter worthy of the closest attention of a philosopher. A clear view of the world is the first and necessary premise for approaching this problem correctly. But one also needs a more developed logic than that which suggests that the solution lies in searching for the ‘general and essential property’ inherent in all the individual representatives of modern mankind taken separately and reducing the universal to the merely identical. Such logic cannot yield anything but empty tautologies. Besides, the abstract motto, ‘Look for the general, and thou shalt find the knowledge of the essence’, gives a free hand to arbitrariness and subjectivism in delimiting the range of facts from which the general is abstracted.
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An expression of the essence of a genus is not to be found in a series of ‘abstractions’, hard as one might try, for it is not contained in this series.
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The essence of human nature in general, and thereby the genuine human nature of each man, can only be revealed through quite a concrete study of the ‘ensemble of the social relations’, through a concrete analysis of those laws which govern the birth and development of human society as a whole and of each human individual.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/articles/universal.htm
However, there is one other important conclusion to be made from the Tropi story, which Vercors refuses to make for various reasons, namely, that nothing but tautology can result from the logic with which the novel’s characters seek to resolve the issue, i.e., to find the universal definition of “man” by way of abstraction from the “common,” a feature possessed by every individual representative of the human race, every individual as such. Obviously, a logic based on this conception of the “universal” would fail to lead thought out of its impasse, so as a result the notion of “man in general” remains somewhat elusive. The history of philosophical and sociological thinking proves the point with no less clarity than do the mishaps of Vercors’ characters, described above.

Clearly, any attempt to discover the abstract-common feature equally descriptive of Christ and Nero and Mozart and Goebbels and the Cro-Magnon hunter and Socrates and Xantippe and Aristotle, and so on and so forth, hides the cognitively valuable inside itself, and leads nowhere except to an extremely weak abstraction by no means expressive of the heart of the matter. The only way out of this deadlock, as far as we know, is to turn to Marx with his reliance on a more sound logic, on a more earnest and specific conception of the problem of the “universal”
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Distinctly pertinent here is not only the sociological, but also the logical principle underlying Marx’s line of reasoning. If translated into logical language, it would mean the following: universal definitions expressing the essence of a genus, whether human or any other, cannot be effectively searched for amidst abstract, common “features,” such as every particular specimen of the genus possesses.

The “essence” of human nature in general – and of the human nature of each particular human being – cannot be revealed, except through a science-based, critical analysis of the “entire totality,” the “entire ensemble” of the socio-historic relationships of man to man, through a case-study approach and apprehension of the regularities which have and are actually governing the process of origination and evolution of human society as a whole, and of a particular individual.
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Fully consistent with the data of cultural and physical anthropology and archeology, the materialistic conception of “the essence of man” envisions this “universal” form of human existence in labor, in the direct remaking of nature (both external and one’s own) as accom­plished by social man with the tools of his own creation.

Small wonder then, that K. Marx regarded with warm sympathy Franklin’s well-known definition of man as a being producing labor tools. Producing labor tools – and for this one reason a being who thinks, speaks, composes music, follows moral norms, etc. No better example illustrative of the Marxist conception of the universal as the concrete-universal, as well as the latter’s attitude to the “particular” and the “individual” can be given than the definition of “man in general” as the “being producing labor tools.”

From the standpoint of the canons of the old and traditional formal logic the above definition is too “concrete” to be “universal.” It cannot be stretched to cover directly, by means of a simple formal abstraction, such unchallenged representatives of the human race as Mozart or Leo Tolstoy or Raphael or Kant. Formally, the definition bears on a constricted circle of individuals, e.g., employees at manufacturing plants or workshops. Even the workers who are not the producers but the users of these machines will not formally qualify for it. As a result, old logic with its conception of the “universal” will be right in its judgment of the definition as strictly particular rather than “universal,” as a definition of a particular human occupation rather than of “man in general.”

Nevertheless, Franklin proves to be essentially right in his conflict with this logic since he is led by intuition and the bulk of facts and con­tentions bearing on the problem of the “human in man” to assume the viewpoint of a logic a great deal more earnest and profound; the very Logic which has been ripening for centuries on end in the lap of philosophy and in particular, in the logical discourses of Descartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz and Kant, Fichte and Hegel. In fact it has found its concrete scientific application in “Capital” and Marx’s theory of surplus value and the materialistic conception of history and modern times.

https://kapitalism101.wordpress.com/2014/07/21/abstraction-abstract-labor-and-ilyenkov/
Often, in common language, when we talk about abstraction we are identifying the general properties that all objects of a certain class have, setting aside (abstracting from) differences. For instance, when I say ‘piano’ I refer to the general features that all pianos have (strings hit by hammers activated by keys, etc.) but I abstract away from all differences between particular pianos (size, model, age, etc.). In this everyday, non-dialectical sense of abstraction (Ilyenkov calls it ‘Old Logic’) an abstraction is based on the general features of a class of objects. The abstraction itself, the abstract piano, does not exist in reality. Only particular pianos exist. Therefore the abstract piano only exists in the mind. For old logic abstractions are only in the mind while the opposite of abstract, concrete, refers to the objects of the real world, the particular pianos. For old logic an abstract idea is correct if it adequately captures the general features of a class of objects. It is wrong if there are concrete objects within this class that do not have the general features of the abstraction. Thus, if there is a piano with no hammers (like the Yamaha Avante-Grand) this would challenge our abstraction that a piano is something with strings hit by hammers activated by keys.
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If we are free to select one general feature over another we can radically change the concept of capital. If we choose only the ahistorical features we can make capital seem eternal. If abstraction is just seen as the identification of general features then we have no choice but to be arbitrary in our abstractions. But if abstraction is seen differently, as identifying the essential nature of an object, as identifying the “relation within which this thing is this thing” as Ilenkov puts it, then we can be scientific about our abstractions.

When we make an abstraction we want to select that aspect of the object which identifies its essence. Since the essence of things is in their relation to other things, we want to identify the essential relations which govern the object, abstracting away other non-essential aspects.
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A funny thing happens when we make abstractions of this kind: They often cease to be general features of the entire class.
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This way of abstracting gets us out of the arbitrary nature of old-logic where we chose whatever general features we wanted. Instead when we abstract we must identify the essential relation which defines an object, a relation that is generative of the class. This requires a very careful scientific approach to understanding how one form generates another, etc. This is the process of unfolding contradictions, etc…. but I will not get into that here.

This is how mankind's essence is based in his labor and creativity even though most people don't necessarily labor to satisfy our needs, that it isn't representative of every particular example of human kind but it is from that basis that any and every person in modern society has emerged from historically.
Where by logical necessity it becomes impossible to make sense of humanity and its development should one erase such a capacity as inessential.


Also, what are your thoughts on immaterialism and my proof? ;)

I'll have to get back to it at a later time though I think some of the things above may be interesting in regards to your epistemological position, particular the part where man and nature can not be ontologically separated and how man doesn't approach nature in a in a contemplative sensuous sort but to a humanized nature changed by generations of human activity.
As it does away with a lot of philosophical pseudo-problems that come from emphasizing some abstractions in a way that is negligent to the reality of how things work.
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A far better criteria would be if they had enough […]

:lol: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MdHtAzFNwjE[…]

No, I was talking about Gaza.

https://twitter.com/ajitxsingh/status/103297598683[…]