[SCoopsdk]

So this thread isn't about Time then?

Should I change the title to "The Calculus Thread"?

[noemon]

Time does not exist, no shit Sherlock, well done for telling us what we already know, and shout that we dont.

Well done for negating the method born from this context, and then well done for shouting that the method is incorrect, which is the method of this context that you preach. Well done for negating this method and offering no alternative, well done for using our conclusions that are apeira to tell us that since the conclusions are apeiro and hence never end, that our Hypothesis is incorrect and then go on redefine our Hypothesis, name it yours and play smart, well done for achieving nothing, and the beers are on me.

Well done for capturing some idiots minds to think that you say some different Hypothesis, when the Hypothesis, the universal truth of the axiom, is exactly that universal not yours, not mine and nobodies.

Well done for chasing around your tail instead of lifting your head up....and realize that the particle is everywhere, can be everywhere, but we assign a target and hence define the where and from there we count and measure, well done for saying the same thing over and over and over and over again, well done....

[SCoopsdk]

Wow. Thanks noemon

[noemon]

I apologize for coming out hard, but this discussion must end at some point(particle, dot, axiom, circle, torah, stigma, moment)

[Wellsy]

This is exactly the thread I needed to find to realize that I ain't figuring this shit out any time soon XD
It even played out the same discussion I had with someone else when trying to consider change and identity and the inadequacy of snapshots in time as being a real conception of time.

If I had some knowledge of maths and physics it would help see where my thought is going.
But I did stumble onto an interesting point that hopefully does legitimately relate well to Hegel of a non-reductionist view of motion in which contradictions are overcome to develop a richer conception in the same way that we don't explain social phenomenon through quantum mechanics as there's increasing complexity. Where mechanical motion is but a lower point of comprehending motion.

Spoiler: show

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1873/letters/73_05_30.htm

The subject of natural science — moving matter, bodies. Bodies cannot be separated from motion, their forms and kinds can only be known through motion, of bodies apart from motion, apart from any relation to other bodies, nothing can be asserted. Only in motion does a body reveal what it is. Natural science therefore knows bodies by considering them in their relation to one another, in motion. The knowledge of the different forms of motion is the knowledge of bodies. The investigation of these different forms of motion is therefore the chief subject of natural science.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/ch07d.htm

Hegel’s division (the original one) into mechanics, chemics, and organics,[203] fully adequate for the time. Mechanics: the movement of masses. Chemics: molecular (for physics is also included in this and, indeed, both – physics as well as chemistry – belong to the same order) motion and atomic motion. Organics: the motion of bodies in which the two are inseparable. For the organism is certainly the higher unity which within itself unites mechanics, physics, and chemistry into a whole where the trinity can no longer be separated. In the organism, mechanical motion is effected directly by physical and chemical change, in the form of nutrition, respiration, secretion, etc., just as much as pure muscular movement.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/ch07d.htm

All motion includes mechanical motion, change of place of the largest or smallest portions of matter, and the first task of science, but only the first, is to obtain knowledge of this motion. But this mechanical motion does not exhaust motion as a whole. Motion is not merely change of place, in fields higher than mechanics it is also change of quality.

http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/norman-sayers.html

Norman argues that Engels tries to establish a non-mechanistic, non-reductionist, and non-dualist materialism.

The connection of the conceptual and empirical-temporal dialectic is to be established by seeing them united in the general dialectical world-picture. There are empirical facts of nature, e.g. biological evolution, or the levels of organization of matter, out of which all kinds of bad philosophical conclusions can be drawn, but Engels' general world-picture, a monist but non-reductionist view of motion, matter, its forms and transformations, and his treatment of the categories of quality, quantity, identity, and difference, guide us toward a proper interpretation of the empirical facts (p. 157). Norman backs up Engels 100% and opposes the dualism of the idealist Marxists who accept a mechanical materialist picture of nature while reserving dialectics for the mind and end up making a mystery of both and of their relation to one another (p. 158)!

And I wonder if Engel's presentation of the quantitative change resulting in qualitative change is part of this sense of things being of increasing complexity as following Hegel's sublimation of opposites. Where a thing doesn't destroy itself but develops into something else, something more, different while preserving parts of the lower opposites.
Though the contradiction in trying to consider both time and motion leading to statements like a thing is both here and not here one moves from a static being and nothing into the richer concept of becoming.
https://broodsphilosophy.wordpress.com/2007/11/09/hegel-and-the-law-of-noncontradiction/

On that we need to point to the notion of time, and where does it come from. For Hegel (and for me), the time is an abstraction from change (and more here, in my comment about SEP article on change). That is, what we have in world are changing things, or changing states of affairs, and ‘time’ is only one way to talk about the relation between two abstract states of the changing states of affairs. that is, we talk for example, which abstract state of affairs came before which other one, or how many times some change taken as a unit repeated while some (measured) change happened.

What Hegel says, then, is this: If you try to describe change through being, the best you can do is say about something that changes that both it “is X”, and that it “isn’t X”. But, this is contradiction, and that doesn’t show that change is impossible, but that simply change can’t be described through being (and non-being). As pointed you can’t use “at time t” to make the distinction between two predicates and avoid the contradiction, because the phenomenon of time is grounded (abstracted from) phenomenon of change.

So, we can point to the how the Law of Noncontradiction isn’t true for Hegel, because when relating richer notion (like that of change), to a poorer one (like that of being), and when thinking on level of the richer one, we can say that both “is X”, and “isn’t X” (or both predicates are contained in change as moments, as Hegel would say). But also, on the level of the phenomenon of being alone, the Law of Noncontradiction, is seen as valid, and producing contradiction, which points that when thinking of change the notion of being (and non-being) is not enough.

What we can say, I guess, is then that, The Law of Noncontradiction is removed in Hegel’s system as some kind of absolute logical axiom, and is changed with somewhat richer dialectical relations among notions.

Though we have to be careful to what extent the a dialectics of concepts applies to that of reality.
http://www.autodidactproject.org/my/norman-sayers.html

Norman insists that dialectical concepts have not only users but applications. Norman is especially keen on the interpenetration of opposites and the quality-quantity relation. For Norman, contradiction means the unity of opposed concepts, and means essentially the interpenetration of opposites. Contradiction is a relation between concepts, but the concepts have empirical applications (p. 160).

And in saying that the term 'contradiction' describes the relation between concepts applicable to natural processes, we are not thereby committed to saying that the term also describes a relation between natural processes themselves." (p. 161)

Engels is often guilty of this confusion of nature and concepts. Even more so Norman criticizes Engels' spurious examples of negation in nature (grain-barley, etc.) (p. 162). However, there are processes of organic life which subsume yet transcend lower-order physical and chemical processes which are authentic applications of the notion 'negation of the negation' (p. 162). But this is not to say that natural processes negate one another. This is the defensible core in Engels: we need concepts of contradiction and negation "to describe the relations between dialectical concepts applicable to nature."

Norman then defends the notion of dialectics from the charge of idealism, by showing that Hegel, though idealist and aprioristic, is not irredeemably so much so that his ideas cannot be altered and used productively in a materialist form . . . as Engels does, and Lenin. Norman then blasts Colletti! (pp. 164-165)

Thouugh I don't see in what extent one is to clearly delineate these things if following Hegel the world itself is rational and thus reflected in thought. But then, Marx is said to have avoided the mystification of his idealism when applying the method in a material format.

And I see the OP's emphasis on change itself being the real ontology, to which time is a concept that becomes associated with that change, but it may treat time as some external intervening force and not treat the process of change of things as part of them.

Spoiler: show

http://muse.jhu.edu.sci-hub.cc/article/213612/pdf

In order to examine Dharmakı¯rti’s account of change in light of Priest’s inconsistent theory, we need to revisit Dharmakı¯rti’s notion of momentariness. Here I follow Georges Dreyfus’ authoritative reconstruction of Dharmakı¯rti’s philosophy from a Tibetan point of view.20

Dharmakı¯rti follows Vasubandhu’s view of momentariness as well as most of Vasubandhu’s metaphysics and ontology, in his Abhidharmakos´a.21 According to Vasubandhu,

Destruction of things is spontaneous. Things perish by themselves, because it is their nature to perish. Since they perish by themselves, they perish as they are produced. Since they perish by themselves, they are momentary.22

According to Dreyfus, Dharmakı¯rti elaborates on this ‘‘process view’’ of ontology in two ways: the argument from disintegration and the inference from existence.23 Dharmakı¯rti presents the argument from disintegration as a refutation of Nya¯ya ontology, according to which the term ‘‘disintegration’’ describes ‘‘the state of an already disintegrated thing.’’24 This Nya¯ya view of disintegration posits substances that undergo disintegration in dependence on causes of destruction (vina¯s´ahetu). Against this view, Dharmakı¯rti proposes a dilemma: is the disintegration of a substance an event that the substance undergoes or is it of the substance itself? If the former, it is difficult to see how all qualities disintegrate as soon as they are produced. If the latter, the substance itself must bring about its own disintegration. This means that one can infer the effect, that is, disintegration, from the cause, that is, substance. But for Dharmakı¯rti an inference from cause to effect is a fallacy. Hence, one cannot posit substances separate from their disintegration. Instead, we must think of the term ‘‘disintegration’’ as referring to the process of disintegration. What this means, by using Mortensen’s terminology, is that each spatiotemporal point is not occupied by a substance undergoing disintegration but by a process of disintegration itself.25

Dharmakı¯rti’s inference from existence goes as follows:

[T]hings truly exist insofar as they are able to perform a function. To function is to be capable of producing an effect, a faculty possible only if the object is constantly [ceasing to exist].26 A static object is not acting on anything else nor is it being acted upon. Therefore, that something exists shows that it is momentary.27

What this means is that if something exists, then it exists only momentarily. Hence, Mortensen is correct in saying that for Dharmakı¯rti every existing thing occupies only a spatiotemporal point

Nonetheless, Mortensen seems to underestimate the importance of Dharmakı¯rti’s process view of reality. For Dharmakı¯rti, if something exists, it occupies only a spatiotemporal point. But what exists is not really a substance that undergoes change. Rather, it is the process, or the change, itself that is at a spatiotemporal point. Once we understand Dharmakı¯rti’s view of momentariness in its full extent, it becomes unclear whether or not Dharmakı¯rti has enough resources to reject Priest’s argument for the inconsistent theory of change. This is what I will show below.

Dharmakı¯rti versus Priest

As we saw above, for Dharmakı¯rti there is no distinction between the object and the state in which the object is: the object is said to occupy a spatiotemporal point only to the extent that it is in the process of disintegration or cessation. Now, this view of reality rings a bell. It is a very similar view to Priest’s, if not the same, that a changing object must be in a state of flux at each spatiotemporal point. I examine in this section whether or not Dharmakı¯rti can resist the temptation of Priest and reject an inconsistent theory of change.

And this is where history or time isn't seperate, but something that is derived from the process of things disintergrating not in the sense of being a substance but as a process existence of always in a state of flux or becoming.
https://www.nyu.edu/projects/ollman/docs/dd_ch05a_content.php

In contrast to this approach, Marx set out to abstract things, in his words, "as they really are and happen," making how they happen part of what they are (Marx and Engels, 1964, 57). Hence, capital (or labor, money, etc.) is not only how capital appears and functions, but also how it develops; or rather, how it develops, its real history, is also part of what it is. It is also in this sense that Marx could deny that nature and history "are two separate things" (Marx and Engels, 1964, 57). In the view which currently dominates the social sciences, things exist and undergo change. The two are logically distinct. History is something that happens to things; it is not part of their nature. Hence, the difficulty of examining change in subjects from which it has been removed at the start. Whereas Marx, as he tells us, abstracts "every historical social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence" (My emphasis) (Marx, 1958, 20).

But the strange part of time being that it 'moves' forward and never backward.
But this might be comparable to thinking about change and unscrambling an egg.
Eh, I don't get entropy, this is confuzzling stuff.