- 30 Aug 2018 16:39
#14943453
Non-Sequitur. You receive percepts as they are and as they are received. Your argument here assumes a Kantian notion of mental categories creating perceptual reality out of bare sensory mush. Which is not only unnecessary, but silly and improvable.
If anything, sensations are abstractions from the percepts as they represent the component parts of such.
I doubt Berkeley was going to get into a long diatribe on the qualifiers of that statement in his work on Tar-Water.
He already explained in the Dialogues (as did I in this thread) how God can have the sensation of pain in His mind without it being an imperfection in Him, for we receive pain as a perceptual experience from without and are therefore subject to it; whereas, it originates in God and He is therefore not subject to it. The imperfection being in our minds in contrast to His, not in the sensation in-and-of-itself.
So when he speaks generally of sensations in Siris, he has no need to make such a qualification as he does in the Dialogues due to the audience and his context.....which is Tar-Water.
Struck a nerve did I?
Good.
Moore?
As yes the famous and cynical quip of the eminent professor of rhetoric, Samuel Johnson.
As if Berkeley were denying solidity......
You claimed you weren't a simpleton, but if you think to use the example that is used by historical philosophers in their "how not to argue against Berkeley" sections, I am beginning to wonder if my initial charge was not accurate.
[Note In Bold]
The conceptual "difference" is unjustified and is ad hoc.
I assume the given, the conceptual "difference" is not a given, its a claim without proof or evidence.
If you are only quoting the idiotic G.E. Moore to argue your solidarity with his critiques of Idealism which all amount to bold assumption of realism as if that were somehow an argument against Idealism, I can assure you that you have advanced nothing against my position.
So where is your proof again?
I see none.
"It is when a people forget God that tyrants forge their chains. A vitiated state of morals... is incompatible with freedom."
- Patrick Henry
ingliz wrote:No.
If it did, you and me both would be drowning in a sensory sea of irrelevant noise.
Non-Sequitur. You receive percepts as they are and as they are received. Your argument here assumes a Kantian notion of mental categories creating perceptual reality out of bare sensory mush. Which is not only unnecessary, but silly and improvable.
If anything, sensations are abstractions from the percepts as they represent the component parts of such.
ingliz wrote:God's mind?
sense is a passion; and passions imply imperfection
I doubt Berkeley was going to get into a long diatribe on the qualifiers of that statement in his work on Tar-Water.
He already explained in the Dialogues (as did I in this thread) how God can have the sensation of pain in His mind without it being an imperfection in Him, for we receive pain as a perceptual experience from without and are therefore subject to it; whereas, it originates in God and He is therefore not subject to it. The imperfection being in our minds in contrast to His, not in the sensation in-and-of-itself.
So when he speaks generally of sensations in Siris, he has no need to make such a qualification as he does in the Dialogues due to the audience and his context.....which is Tar-Water.
ingliz wrote:I am not the simpleton here.
Struck a nerve did I?
Good.
ingliz wrote:Wittgenstein, Brassier, and Moore is proof enough.
If they are too cerebral for you, here's a more muscular response.
Moore?
ingliz wrote:Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it thus.'
As yes the famous and cynical quip of the eminent professor of rhetoric, Samuel Johnson.
As if Berkeley were denying solidity......
You claimed you weren't a simpleton, but if you think to use the example that is used by historical philosophers in their "how not to argue against Berkeley" sections, I am beginning to wonder if my initial charge was not accurate.
ingliz wrote:The belief that everything is really just an object of experience in some mind must be necessarily true in order to have its intended consequences for the idealist scheme. Yet it seems clear that the belief is not analytic, since there is at least a conceptual difference between being on the one hand and being perceived on the other.
Thus idealists simply assume without evidence the truth of their most important principle.
[Note In Bold]
The conceptual "difference" is unjustified and is ad hoc.
I assume the given, the conceptual "difference" is not a given, its a claim without proof or evidence.
If you are only quoting the idiotic G.E. Moore to argue your solidarity with his critiques of Idealism which all amount to bold assumption of realism as if that were somehow an argument against Idealism, I can assure you that you have advanced nothing against my position.
So where is your proof again?
I see none.
"It is when a people forget God that tyrants forge their chains. A vitiated state of morals... is incompatible with freedom."
- Patrick Henry