[galactus]

Is that so?

Yes, it might be weird if you are a non-physicalist, but as you mentioned Block is a physicalist(in some sense) and thinks that the term consciousness is a term that refers to something* that the brain does(and the brain being entierly physical). He thought that people often confused the use of consciousness to mean 'awareness' with meaning 'phenomenality'. That is, the difference between prossessing information without phenomenal properties and getting information from experience, as I understand it. I might mention that he is also a 'friend of qualia', but believes that it is a physical aspect of the brain(at least I think he does, non-reductive physicalism and all that).

Solving the problem with identity with the whole causal-chain description of identity is a bit so-so. I guess it is possible but then there wouldn't be any difference between the two selves in the original example(given a functional identification of consciousness), which seems a bit counter-intuitive(but not impossible). I am more optimistic at a solution through linguistical critique.

* two things actually

[Theodore]

Yes. Yes it is.

The whole non-reductivist trend in physicalism is a bit strange, if you ask me. If you accept the 'minimal copy' account of physicalism, you eventually end up with epiphenomenalism, and if you claim (as Block seems to), that qualia are physical, you are contradicting physics. At least no physical theory I'm aware of considers qualia as physical properties (I think Penrose had a few ideas about that, though).

[galactus]

You don't need to end up with epiphenomenalism, for example Dennett's theory of 'the intentional stance' offers a good non-reductivist, non-epiphenomenal position. When it comes to qualia the debate is about if it can be physical, seems like a odd point to just claim that it can't because no physical theory yet explains it. No physical theory took into account gravity before Newton either.

It's all a bit OT. Hmm, I should really move parts of this thread to the Agora. You know, if I feel like replying(or if anybody else replies) to you next post I will(move it).

[Theodore]

It seems that almost every thread I post in these days ends up in the Agora...

Denett doesn't seem like much of a nonreductionist... if anything, he seems to emphasise that more abstract levels of explanation are also less accurate. In any case, it is possible to imagine a non-epiphenomenalist nonreductive physicalism, but only as long as qualia are denied.

(Or one could, I guess, view qualia as special properties of our neurons, but this would not only mean that our neurons would be literally red, painful and so on, but it couldn't account for the distinct spatial organisation our experience has.)

And as for qualia being physical, that is describable in terms of physical laws and whatnot, they don't seem to obey any law at all, physical or otherwise. Even if we conceived them as such, we would end up with two structures (the brain and the qualia) which would do the exact same thing, which creates more problems than are solved with such a conception.

But, like I've said, Penrose had some ideas on the subject, and I plan to look them up. From what I've seen his ideas are rather unconventional, but I really wouldn't expect baseless speculation of a scientist of his calibre.

[galactus]

Oh, hello.

Maybe you are like me, and have a tendency of turning discussions onto the subject that you are interested in at the moment? It isn't exactly a coincident that I wrote a paper about Ned Block and Syndey Shoemaker and that all my discussions in The Agora has been about roughly the same subject. I ever borrowed some arguments from Shoemaker last time we had this discussion, even though I knew they had some flaws!

I might have wrongly characterized Dennett as a non-reductionist, but his theory about 'higher order patterns' is non-reductionistic. You will not see these patterns in a reductionist view, or at least there is no point in seeing them. Dennet does deny qualia, but only because he thinks the term is vague and often refers to several rather incoherent ideas, according to him. What is important to point out is that he does not deny the existence of qualia if we take this to mean "what if feels like to be in a certain state", however he claims that this is not what most people intend when they use qualia in an argument against physicalism.

I can agree though that ones view of qualia has to be a bit deflationistic, something like: "Oh, but what we actually mean with "qualia" is the function X, Y, Z, etc". For example the ability to discern between colours with a system of visual markings, could be one of the functions. Contrast this with the view on personal identity I had in our previous debate, "Oh, but what we actually mean with "I" is our memories, attitudes, rational capabilities, etc". A cheap linguistical deflation well within the analytical tradition.

Scepticism towards this is natural and advisable. Physicalism or qualia sceptics have few in my opinion good arguments why we should accept this portrayal of qualia, but I think the arguments they have why we can dismiss qualia as epiphenomenal are good though. One being that following a causal theory of knowledge we are unable to have any knowledge about qualia*, another being that a strict interpretation of the meaning of 'being caused but not causing anything' as saying 'being caused by physical systems but being non-physical or physically impotent themselves' breaks some well-known laws of physics. For example I don't think thermodynamics would be so happy with a system doing work that either costs no energy or results in the destruction of energy(renders energy causally impotent).

* this is Shoemakers argument in an old article called "Functionalism and Qualia", Philosophical Studies 27 (5) (1975): 291–315.

edit: I looked up Penrose claim, and didn't really like them even though I agree with his conclusions a bit but for other reasons. I should read up on him though, seems worthwhile.

[Theodore]

I guess it's related to my general interest in ontology... after all, philosophy of mind is more or less the analytic version of what we on the dark side would call ontology or metaphysics.

I wouldn't say that the theory of higher-level patterns is non-reductionist, especially since (if I've understood Dennett correctly) he views them as providing only approximate explanations. Like how we could say that a billiard ball moves because it is hit; this is a simplistic explanation with a lot of hidden premises and definitions, some of which aren't even correct, but it serves its purpose.

Now, concerning the knowledge argument against qualia (which is the only proper argument against qualia I've heard), it is pretty obvious that qualia have a physical correlate in the brain, an idea of sorts associated with them. We have learned to differentiate between qualia and brain states because this idea is markedly different from the idea we form of our brain states.

That probably wasn't as clear as it should be, so I'll provide an example. When Mary sees red, her brain has a certain state, which it can manipulate as an object when thinking and so on. But Mary is not only a colour scientist, she also dabbles in neurology. She has, therefore, formed an idea (which is equivalent to a brain state) about the states of neurons, and this brain state is markedly different from the one associated with her perception of colour. A few brain operations later, she infers qualia from her experience.

Also, if qualia are non-physical the laws of physics don't really apply. But I'm not really comfortable with this kind of dualism; I still think qualia will eventually be physicalised. They are a problem, but it is by no means apparent that they're an insolvable problem; I mean, the origin of life also posed some interesting questions regarding information and thermodynamics.

[galactus]

Higher-level patterns aren't reducible, and intentional propositions(mental propositions) are higher-level patterns, hence the theory is non-reductionistic when it comes to them. I muddied it up a bit since it is obviously only non-reductionistic when it comes to some applied mental properties, it isn't a theory about neurological causes of sensations and it is anti-realist when it comes to these properties. I dunno why I mentioned it as a theory of non-reductive physicalism, it isn't about that at all only about how we talk about or ascribe mental properties. Non-reductionistic physicalist views on sensation are prima facie prone to epiphenomenalism.

About the knowledge argument, I didn't really get what conclusion you wanted to draw from you example. It sounds like what you are portraying is a strict physicalist view of qualia, and if we applied a causal theory of knowledge to it we come to the conclusion that epiphenomenalism is false(because Mary seems to have knowledge about qualia).

You are of course correct that the laws of physics do not apply to qualia if qualia is non-physical, however the laws of physics still apply to the brain, and we are often reluctant to break them to save other theories(like those about qualia). I agree that qualia will eventually be 'physicalised', it is just that we currently have no conception of how to do this. I think this is what leads people(like Dennett) to be sceptical towards the concept of qualia, it might as well be that some of the things we ascribe as being qualia might actually be something else.

[Torwan]

Ever heard of incoherent concepts?

When did I say that the concepts I mentioned and the possibilities I suggested were coherent or complete?

(This is also a reply to you, Barish)

Try to understand what I'm saying by giving you an example very similar to "life": Death.

Before modern medicine was invented, a person was "dead" when the heart stopped beating.

When modern medicine stepped in and cardiac arrest was treatable by cardiac massage and defibs, "death" had to be re-defined. "Death" was defined by a certain period of time a person was without heartbeat and had to be "heart massaged". And that time has been increasing over and over again, so it isn't a complete coherent definition.

Another definition of "death" is "brain death" - when the brain doesn't show any activities and the body "lives" somehow through machine control. But even then - people have woken up after "brain death", so this concept isn't complete or coherent either.

"Death" has been challenged and beaten back a little by one technological family: Medicine. Many other technological families are also working on pushing back "death" a little more.

"Life", on the other hand, has been extended by several techological families, "Medicine" again as a key technology here.

So - if we have to re-define "death" at some points in human existence - isn't it possible that we will one day reach an Omega point at which "death" becomes obsolete? I don't say that I have the answer here or worked everything out, but I claim that nobody can proove me wrong when I say: You can't rule that out. You can say it's very unlikely, but you can't rule it out completely.

[galactus]

Another definition of "death" is "brain death" - when the brain doesn't show any activities and the body "lives" somehow through machine control. But even then - people have woken up after "brain death", so this concept isn't complete or coherent either.

Actually brain death is defined as the permanent cessation of electrical activity in the brain. People do not 'wake up' after brain death by definition, so people who wake up from brain death have been misdiagnosed.

[Theodore]

galactus:

The point of the argument wasn't to prove epiphenomenalism (despite my choice of avatar, I really don't think it's a viable theory anymore, and the dualism involved is a tad annoying), but to prove qualia.

In fact, I've turned into something of a physicalist lately, even if I think that science isn't currently advanced enough to provide a satisfactory solution to the problem.

Torwan:

The problem is that you can't sustain an organism infinitely; even if you get lucky enough to live for a few millennia either heat death or the big crunch will get you in the end.

[Torwan]

@Theodore:

That is true. An organism has to die at some point.

But there are ways to bypass that problem. You can augment an organism with replaceable technology (nanotechnology perhaps). Or you can find a way to transfer yourself from one body to another. Or you can find a way to change your body from matter-basis to energy-basis.

The question then is: Is that still "life"? And is that still "you"? But it's definitely something and possibly a way to eternal life. (But what is "eternal"? (...) Did I mention I don't like philosophical discussions?! )

[Theodore]

Energy doesn't exhibit structures necessary to sustain life; in any case, whatever you do, you're still susceptible to the two deaths I've mentioned.

[Torwan]

Energy doesn't exhibit structures necessary to sustain life

This is unknown, I wouldn't rule it out. Just because we haven't verified any form of energy that can sustain life doesn't mean that there is no form of energy that can.

[Theodore]

There you go again with massless invisible elephants... we have no reason to believe energy could support life, and even if it did such life would still be doomed when the universe ends, whether by heat death or a big crunch.

[Torwan]

There you go again with massless invisible elephants... we have no reason to believe energy could support life, and even if it did such life would still be doomed when the universe ends, whether by heat death or a big crunch.

There was also a time when people had no reason to believe that there was any way to fly to the moon or that the Earth orbits the sun - but it happened to be possible/true anyway.

Just because we don't currently know something to be possible, it doesn't necessarily mean that it is generally impossible.

That's what I mean with "being open-minded". Based on our current knowledge and technology - you are, of course, right. But nobody knows what future science and technology will provide us with - so I'm staying open for the possibility.

[Theodore]

There is a logical possibility that our understanding of the fundamental concepts of physics will change so severely immortality will be possible. And there's a logical possibility I'm God and am going to make sure you don't achieve immortality because you dared argue with me in this thread. I'd say the odds are about the same. The point is, one can only argue on the basis of the knowledge he has. If someone proposed quantum electrodynamics in the 17th century, he would have been called a nutter - and rightly so.

[Torwan]

See, that's what I would call open-minded.

A man proposing quantum electrodynamics would have faced the same "weightless invisible elephants"-jokes like I'm now. He would have been right, though.

Come on, Leonardo proposed helicopters centuries before they were built. You've already said there is a small possibility that our understanding of physics might evolve so that immortality could be theoretically possible.

That's all I was asking for - being open for the theoretical possibility. You never know what will happen next.

[Theodore]

The jokes would have been quite legitimate; there is no way in hell he could have worked out QED in the 17th century. The only thing he could have done is devise a theory for which he has no evidence and try to justify it by speculating on the state of our future knowledge (a topic that doesn't exactly lend itself to speculation). Which is more or less what you're trying to do now.

(Da Vinci, by the way, was bloody luck he didn't try to test that 'helicopter' of his.)

The point is that a logical possibility doesn't amount to much, and can really be used to 'prove' anything.

[galactus]

There is a big problem with using "what we don't know" to indicate a logical possibility. Just because there are things that we don't know does not mean that we can establish logical possibility for a thing that might be proved possible given a revolutionary discovery. That would more or less mean the logical possibility of everything , making talk of possibility/impossibility meaningless.

You actually have to show why a thing is logically possible, references to imperfect knowledge won't do it.

[Kylie]

I guess my problem with this in general is the fact that I don't really want to be immortal. Even if I found a super secret way to gain immortality, I would be living forever with the same stench of humanity that premeates this world, only with cooler toys and possibly living on the moon or some shit. As much as things change, people remain the same, so why would I want to subject myself to such torture? Ugh!