[Paradigm]

The notion of cause and effect has been an important feature of philosophy since Aristotle. Aristotle, for his part, identified four different types of cause: material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, and final cause. Of these, the notion of final cause was latched onto by the medieval scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas. Then came the Renaissance, and thereafter the Enlightenment, bringing with them the scientific revolution. For reasons partly practical and partly ideological, the notion of final cause was stuffed away, and causality became virtually synonymous with efficient cause, which lay at the center of Isaac Newton's revolutionary physics. And so it was that efficient causation was canonized as an immutable law of nature. Everything in existence had a precise cause which preceded it, and every cause had a specific effect.

The first to famously challenge this orthodoxy was David Hume. He formulated the famous problem of induction, noting that no one had ever actually observed causality. They could only observe one event occurring subsequently to another. We assume we are observing causality as a result of seeing the same sequence repeatedly, and generalizing. Our interpretation of a cause-effect relationship is based on the assumption that the sequence must necessarily take place whenever the first event happens, and that they are inherently related. In other words, we passively assume that what has always happened in the pas will continue to happen in the future.

Hume's attack on causality may have been cause for skepticism and fallibilism, but most people weren't going to abandon causality based on the possibility that the glass breaking after being hit by a rock might just happen to be a coincidence.

But Hume was hardly the last to tackle causality. An even more devastating critique was made by John Stuart Mill. He pointed out that there is no strict distinction between what we might call "cause" and "conditions." Suppose there's some explosion in Derry/Londonderry. What is its cause? Is it the match that is lit? Is it the gunpowder that ignited? Is it the oxygen that feeds the flames? Is it the upbringing of the perpetrator? Is it the history of conflict between English Protestants and Irish Catholics? The answer is all of the above. No event has a single cause, but rather exists within a causal nexus. The factor we identify as "the" cause is a pragmatic matter dependent upon what our purpose of inquiry is. For a physics student, the process of combustion will be the most pertinent point of inquiry here. But when BBC reports it, it would be woefully inadequate to report that the reason for the explosion was the lighting of a match. It seems Aristotle was being quite conservative when he talked of only four causes. The actual number of causes for any given event are too numerous to list.

Bertrand Russell was outright contemptuous of causality. He called it "a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm," further noting that "it is not in any sameness of causes and effects that the constancy of laws consists, but in sameness of relations." (Problems of Philosophy, 1912) In his view, scientific laws could be described in purely relational terms, rather than with any appeal to causal force which inhere in any object. The past no more caused the future than the future caused the past.

One last interesting commentator on causality I'd like to bring up is Henri Bergson. He was quite fond of ridiculing people's tendency to predict the inevitability of events after the fact. Of course, one might say, the American Revolution was bound to happen, given the conditions of the colonies, the ideology of the Enlightenment, and the debt from the French and Indian War. Nonsense, Bergson would protest. The American Revolution was impossible until it happened. No one could have predicted it beforehand because it was a novel occurrence. That is how novelty works: people can always find a cause for it afterwards, but it always necessarily comes as a surprise when it happens.

In the world of science, quantum mechanics baffles most people. It doesn't seem to conform to the same notions of causality that we are used to in the Newtonian sphere. But as Bertrand Russell already pointed out, causality is not necessarily to explain scientific laws. Perhaps adapting to new scientific paradigms requires an epistemological shift whereby we radically reformulate our notion of causality.

[anticlimacus]

In the world of science

While often overlooked, I think this is also an issue in the world of practice--i.e. understanding the nature of practice. For instance, we can look at Heidegger, whose major philosophical task was to replace the notion of subject-object causal relation (either an individual subject acting on the "objective" world or an indivdual subject passive to the "objective" world) with the idea of being related. This has led to explaining human practice in terms of relations, a nexus of relations, rather than in mere causal terms between a subject (person) and and object (world). Thus there is not first an identity, a person or a subject, and then action. There are various relations all interacting and contributing, to which what we call the "subject" is a part. The context of relations tells us more about practice than does the nature of the subject and his/her single causal relation to the world taken in isolation.

[Potemkin]

Bertrand Russell was outright contemptuous of causality. He called it "a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm," further noting that "it is not in any sameness of causes and effects that the constancy of laws consists, but in sameness of relations." (Problems of Philosophy, 1912) In his view, scientific laws could be described in purely relational terms, rather than with any appeal to causal force which inhere in any object. The past no more caused the future than the future caused the past.

This. Scientific 'laws' are usually written as equations, which are essentially a (usually small) set of signifiers which are placed in a certain structural relation to each other. For example, Newton's second law of motion can be written as 'F=ma', a structural relation between the signifiers for force, mass and acceleration. It is meaningless to ask whether the force 'causes' the acceleration or the acceleration 'causes' the force - the equation simply states that they always appear together, and always in a certain fixed relation to each other.

[Arie]

Explanation. Intention. Determinism, Free Will. These concepts overlap with the concept of cause and effect. "Cause" might not be the slickest category in this listing. But if we dismiss it completely, what becomes of Explanation? is it simply reduced to "knowing" the relationships? knowing the equations? Why not simply "know" what happened and accept it, events being their own "explanation"? Is seeking explanation equivalent to simply seeking more related knowledge, and at what point does it become an "explanation"?

What's more problematic to me is what happens to the concept of intention? Even if it is retained, as an attitude of the subject, does it not become pointless? Isn't some version of cause and effect behind the idea of aquiring skill to attain one's goals, pursue one's intentions?

Finally, the equations of physics which convey relationships without a sense of "cause and effect", being symmetric with respect to time (moving forward or backward), left and right, perhaps even with respect to positive and negative charge, missing something precisely because they do not capture these concepts? Is there anything to capture here, to add to science, and if so, how?

[Vera Politica]

This. Scientific 'laws' are usually written as equations, which are essentially a (usually small) set of signifiers which are placed in a certain structural relation to each other. For example, Newton's second law of motion can be written as 'F=ma', a structural relation between the signifiers for force, mass and acceleration. It is meaningless to ask whether the force 'causes' the acceleration or the acceleration 'causes' the force - the equation simply states that they always appear together, and always in a certain fixed relation to each other

Would the definindium (force) and definiens (ma) each have a referent? Would it be the fact that they point to the same referent that makes the equation true?

I would guess the answer to this would be now, in line with your structural formalism.

So I'm just probing your mind a bit

[Potemkin]

Would the definindium (force) and definiens (ma) each have a referent? Would it be the fact that they point to the same referent that makes the equation true?

I would guess the answer to this would be now, in line with your structural formalism.

So I'm just probing your mind a bit

You've found me out, VP! I've never quite recovered from reading Levi-Strauss.

Anyhoo, the structural relation between F, m and a in the equation for Newton's second law of motion is such that F and ma do indeed have the same referent (otherwise the equation would not be valid, now would it? ); however F, m and a each have different referents (that is, they are distinct signifiers with distinct signifieds, to use Saussure's terminology). Furthermore, the validity of the equation F=ma cannot be known a priori merely from the definitions of the signifiers F, m and a. Enter a certain Isaac Newton, Esquire....

[Suska]

The Dalai Lama said that interdependence and causality are mutually exclusive. I think there's something to that, however I don't think his point was that one was truer than the other. It's more like we are a compromise between exclusive poles of every sort. We both sketch and paint, we walk with two legs, not one.

There is something to say here about confusing spacetime with space/time. Causality is a great model for engineering, and engineering projects have a relational quality regardless of how artless they are, so a relational (or compositional) perspective is basically taking an engineering project into a wider sphere, such as what an architect attempts to do.

We can always generalize or refine but we don't do so to eliminate one or the other, but to employ both to check each other, and the goal for us is always a median path through the human life scale, not to arrive at one end or the other. The problems come when we try to take all opposites for rivals.

[Vera Politica]

Anyhoo, the structural relation between F, m and a in the equation for Newton's second law of motion is such that F and ma do indeed have the same referent (otherwise the equation would not be valid, now would it? )

I understand your point - but there is a sense in which we need not talk about referent for something to be true (this can be done in mathematics - Hilbert's formalism is an example where axioms are true in so far as they are consistent even though there is no content to these axioms). In any case I don't see how this would be possible in physics, say, or any other natural science which clear is about physical objects or physical relations (rather than abstract ones) - so it seems consistency would not be enough.

Would I be correct in saying that the referent of 'F' is a physical relation that obtains between objects (or between other physical relations)?

[Potemkin]

I understand your point - but there is a sense in which we need not talk about referent for something to be true (this can be done in mathematics - Hilbert's formalism is an example where axioms are true in so far as they are consistent even though there is no content to these axioms). In any case I don't see how this would be possible in physics, say, or any other natural science which clear is about physical objects or physical relations (rather than abstract ones) - so it seems consistency would not be enough.

Indeed. Physics is always about something, if only about our observations (however those are defined - and defining what is or is not an 'observation' is already heavily theory-laden).

Would I be correct in saying that the referent of 'F' is a physical relation that obtains between objects (or between other physical relations)?

Hmmm, not quite, I would say. For example, the concept of 'force' (represented by the signifier 'F' in the equation of Newton's second law of motion) is an abstraction from our observations of the world. Before it is possible to write down the correct laws of motion, it is first necessary to define the correct abstract concepts which will serve as the referents for our signifiers. Concepts such as 'force' or 'energy' are "free creations of the human mind", to use Einstein's phrase. Newton's laws of motion are structural relations between signifiers which represent abstract concepts rather than real, solid objects 'out there'. These structural relations must, of course, be tested against our observations and be demonstrated not to be obviously inconsistent with them, but apart from that the 'laws' of physics relate almost entirely to things which are inside our heads rather than out there in the external, physical universe. I realise that the preceding statement begs all sorts of philosophical questions, but it will do as a first approximation to what I actually mean.

[Vera Politica]

Hmmm, not quite, I would say. For example, the concept of 'force' (represented by the signifier 'F' in the equation of Newton's second law of motion) is an abstraction from our observations of the world. Before it is possible to write down the correct laws of motion, it is first necessary to define the correct abstract concepts which will serve as the referents for our signifiers. Concepts such as 'force' or 'energy' are "free creations of the human mind", to use Einstein's phrase. Newton's laws of motion are structural relations between signifiers which represent abstract concepts rather than real, solid objects 'out there'. These structural relations must, of course, be tested against our observations and be demonstrated not to be obviously inconsistent with them, but apart from that the 'laws' of physics relate almost entirely to things which are inside our heads rather than out there in the external, physical universe. I realise that the preceding statement begs all sorts of philosophical questions, but it will do as a first approximation to what I actually mean

I think I understand. Experiential observations provide a model (or an interpretation) for what is, otherwise, simply an abstract, consistent system. Of course this would be too simple a view to take - as much in science does involve inductive reasoning from observation - but in the end to get a generalizable scientific theory, it is needs to be, in a sense, abstracted from particular content/observables and be treated schematically and filled in with whatever relevant observations.

I think the case would certainly be made for physics - which tends toward deductive reasoning and quasi-philosophical thought experiments (so it uses, I would say, both mathematical and philosophical deductive methods, at least much more so than any other natural science). Newton may have made a case for how his laws of motion were derived from Kepler's observations - but in the end I see Newtonian physics as a very typical case of axiomatization and deduction. I also think Einstein made quite a lot of use thought-experiments (which is typical of philosophy). But in any case, I am not qualified to really say any more about this.

Here is a bit I may be more qualified to say: as it concerns calling these a 'creation of the mind' - this may be subject to Frege's objection. If for any concept we take it as 'created' we must test for consistency by introducing a model (in this case a set of observables in the world) as a semantic interpretation for whatever system of concepts or 'theory' we've 'created' then, Frege would argue, you haven't created anything at all - what you thought was a creation was simply just a discover about an objective, external relation that exists independently of the human mind. (Frege really did want to do away with any psychological ideas concerning concept-formation).

[Potemkin]

I think I understand. Experiential observations provide a model (or an interpretation) for what is, otherwise, simply an abstract, consistent system. Of course this would be too simple a view to take - as much in science does involve inductive reasoning from observation - but in the end to get a generalizable scientific theory, it is needs to be, in a sense, abstracted from particular content/observables and be treated schematically and filled in with whatever relevant observations.

Precisely. This is why mathematics was so important to physics - the reasoning processes of physicists are essentially based on the reasoning processes of mathematicians. After all, F=ma is a mathematical equation; as well as being abstract concepts derived from empirical observations, the signifiers F, m and a are also mathematical variables - we can plug numbers into the equation and perform calculations. This is why what Aristotle did was not really physics; it was qualitative rather than quantitative. But yes, you are essentially correct, in my view - physics aims to create (but has not yet done so) a completely self-consistent and adequate model of the external world which can be manipulated independently of our observations of that external world. Einstein's 'thought experiments' were a demonstration of his faith in this project.

I think the case would certainly be made for physics - which tends toward deductive reasoning and quasi-philosophical thought experiments (so it uses, I would say, both mathematical and philosophical deductive methods, at least much more so than any other natural science). Newton may have made a case for how his laws of motion were derived from Kepler's observations - but in the end I see Newtonian physics as a very typical case of axiomatization and deduction. I also think Einstein made quite a lot of use thought-experiments (which is typical of philosophy). But in any case, I am not qualified to really say any more about this.

The point is that that there is more than one such abstract axiomatic system which physics could adopt as a model of the external physical world. This is why empirical observation is an essential element of any properly 'scientific' theory, since such observations allow us to eliminate a whole plethora of possible axiomatic systems. One common criticism of superstring theory, for example, is that it makes predictions about observations which can never be tested, sometimes not even in principle. Is it a theory of physics at all, in that case?

Here is a bit I may be more qualified to say: as it concerns calling these a 'creation of the mind' - this may be subject to Frege's objection. If for any concept we take it as 'created' we must test for consistency by introducing a model (in this case a set of observables in the world) as a semantic interpretation for whatever system of concepts or 'theory' we've 'created' then, Frege would argue, you haven't created anything at all - what you thought was a creation was simply just a discover about an objective, external relation that exists independently of the human mind. (Frege really did want to do away with any psychological ideas concerning concept-formation).

Which is precisely what most physicists wish to achieve (they aren't all Ernst Mach ). Physical theories are indeed a "free creation of the human mind", as Einstein said, but they also conform to the real world, in the sense that they are consistent with our observations of the external world and can even make predictions about what our future observations of the external world will and can be. If these predictions are contradicted by actual observations, then the theory is wrong and should (in principle) be discarded. Most physicists believe that the structural relations between our abstract concepts such as force, mass-energy, etc, do indeed correspond in some way with objectively real relations between elements of the external world in some sense. If they didn't believe that, they probably wouldn't bother to do what they do.

[Vera Politica]

The point is that that there is more than one such abstract axiomatic system which physics could adopt as a model of the external physical world. This is why empirical observation is an essential element of any properly 'scientific' theory, since such observations allow us to eliminate a whole plethora of possible axiomatic systems. One common criticism of superstring theory, for example, is that it makes predictions about observations which can never be tested, sometimes not even in principle. Is it a theory of physics at all, in that case?

This may in fact be what motivated or at least substantiated Carnap's principle of tolerance - we can present any logical systems we please and the only constraint (as it as generally understood) is that these systems be consistent (internally consistent, not necessarily consistent with one another) and fruitful.

Concerning superstring theory - I've always seen it as metaphysics and almost essentially pure philosophy. However, I do not understand the technical matter near enough to hold onto this conviction with any certainty. Consider it a 'first blush' impression.

Physical theories are indeed a "free creation of the human mind", as Einstein said, but they also conform to the real world, in the sense that they are consistent with our observations of the external world and can even make predictions about what our future observations of the external world will and can be.

Indeed, but Frege would argue that they were not a creation after all - his argument does have a lot of intuitive force. If any concept or system of concepts need to test their consistency by providing a model which consists of observables from external reality then the concept cannot be a creation of the mind - although it may seem like it was, for Frege it would simply be a discovery since it is an objective relation or concept that holds of the external world and, thus, exists in the external world and independent from the human mind.

You may have thought up a horse, but reality gave it its legs.

It is a different story for mathematics. Hilbert showed this or tried to show this by providing a direct, formal understanding of consistency itself by saying the content of logic is not determined by logic (and by avoiding any existential claims like the axiom of infinity), rather the content we are concerned with is simply signs (which are, indeed, a creation) - so arithmetical consistency is reduced, in a sense, to the consistency of thought - the consistency of recognizing similar and dissimilar signs. (I am quite new to Hilbert's foundational programme, so this may be way off!) (note: Frege would even object to this - he was a realist about abstract objects, in particular numbers and logical objects like sets).

[Paradigm]

I must say that as a cognitive externalist, all this talk about "internal" and "external" reality is like nails on a Cartesian chalkboard for me.

[JRS1]

Say what you like, I prefer Holby City.

[Potemkin]

Indeed, but Frege would argue that they were not a creation after all - his argument does have a lot of intuitive force. If any concept or system of concepts need to test their consistency by providing a model which consists of observables from external reality then the concept cannot be a creation of the mind - although it may seem like it was, for Frege it would simply be a discovery since it is an objective relation or concept that holds of the external world and, thus, exists in the external world and independent from the human mind.

I would say that it is a creation, since even if it is 'verified' by observations of the external world, the physical model is still merely a model; there might be 'hidden variables' in nature itself which our model does not incorporate. The fact that the model gives an adequate and predictive description of nature does not necessarily mean that the relations between the elements of our model are the same as the relations between the elements of reality itself. The 'hidden variables' interpretation of quantum mechanics developed by Bohm and Deutsch is one example of precisely this idea.

You may have thought up a horse, but reality gave it its legs.

I'm not sure what you mean, VP. Could you unpack that idea?

It is a different story for mathematics. Hilbert showed this or tried to show this by providing a direct, formal understanding of consistency itself by saying the content of logic is not determined by logic (and by avoiding any existential claims like the axiom of infinity), rather the content we are concerned with is simply signs (which are, indeed, a creation) - so arithmetical consistency is reduced, in a sense, to the consistency of thought - the consistency of recognizing similar and dissimilar signs. (I am quite new to Hilbert's foundational programme, so this may be way off!) (note: Frege would even object to this - he was a realist about abstract objects, in particular numbers and logical objects like sets).

I cannot go along with Frege's realism here - an abstract object is not (intuitively speaking) as 'real' as an apple, for example. I can imagine a unicorn, and that thought may be 'real' as an abstract concept, but there is probably nothing in reality which could act as a referent for that abstract concept.

[Vera Politica]

I'm not sure what you mean, VP. Could you unpack that idea?

I don't necessarily agree with Frege, so I'm simply trying to elucidate the objection as best I can.

What I mean, then, is something like this: you can think up a concept as you like but what makes it true is whether it is consistent with a set of physical observables. So the concept is never created in the mind, only - in a sense, thought up in the mind. Its truth and, thus, its reality is external to the cognizer and, in this sense, can never be a creation of the mind. The mind can only point out what is already there so to speak. Concept formation, in this sense, cannot be free - it cannot be a mere stipulation of the mind. It can be thought up and be a true concept only in so far as it refers to a relation or thing that is already external to the mind. Since the concept is, say, a linguistic or formal expression of a certain relation - what Frege would say is that such relations cannot be created, they are already external.

I think, then, that what Frege is saying is something like this: if a concept is to mean anything, it cannot be a creation of the mind (meaning is granted to a concept if it has a determined reference). We can surely create a myriad of meaningless concepts that are internally consistent, but this doesn't help us at all (and is certainly not what we do in the sciences or logic).

I can imagine a unicorn, and that thought may be 'real' as an abstract concept, but there is probably nothing in reality which could act as a referent for that abstract concept.

He may be a realist about the concept 'unicorn', but no object would fall under it. Concepts like "not identical to itself' is also a perfectly good concept, even though nothing falls under it. The idea here is that it doesn't commit one to be a realist about 'unicorns' in the sense that one believes something falls under it. There is a difference between being a realist about unicorns and being a realist about the concept unicorn (one can form perfectly good concepts whose extensions are empty).

Frege is a realist about numbers because he thinks they do, indeed, have a reference. They are extensions of second-order concepts.

[Potemkin]

What I mean, then, is something like this: you can think up a concept as you like but what makes it true is whether it is consistent with a set of physical observables. So the concept is never created in the mind, only - in a sense, thought up in the mind. Its truth and, thus, its reality is external to the cognizer and, in this sense, can never be a creation of the mind. The mind can only point out what is already there so to speak. Concept formation, in this sense, cannot be free - it cannot be a mere stipulation of the mind. It can be thought up and be a true concept only in so far as it refers to a relation or thing that is already external to the mind. Since the concept is, say, a linguistic or formal expression of a certain relation - what Frege would say is that such relations cannot be created, they are already external.

Frege seems to be assuming the equivalence of truth-value and reality; that if something is true, then it must by definition be real. I remain unconvinced.

I think, then, that what Frege is saying is something like this: if a concept is to mean anything, it cannot be a creation of the mind (meaning is granted to a concept if it has a determined reference). We can surely create a myriad of meaningless concepts that are internally consistent, but this doesn't help us at all (and is certainly not what we do in the sciences or logic).

Yet a concept can be useful without necessarily being true - Newton's classical laws of motion are now known not to be true (Einstein's theories have superseded them), yet physicists still find Newton's laws to be extremely useful and have not discarded them.

He may be a realist about the concept 'unicorn', but no object would fall under it. Concepts like "not identical to itself' is also a perfectly good concept, even though nothing falls under it. The idea here is that it doesn't commit one to be a realist about 'unicorns' in the sense that one believes something falls under it. There is a difference between being a realist about unicorns and being a realist about the concept unicorn (one can form perfectly good concepts whose extensions are empty).

An abstract concept considered as a concept (and not, say, as a physical state of the human brain according to the principle of psycho-physical parallelism) is not 'real' in the way that, say, an apple is real. Frege seems to be simply asserting that abstract concepts are real (just as I am simply asserting that they are not real ).

Frege is a realist about numbers because he thinks they do, indeed, have a reference. They are extensions of second-order concepts.

What was his attitude towards complex numbers? They do not correspond to any quantity, yet mathematicians consider them to be just as much numbers as the set of integers.

[Vera Politica]

They do not correspond to any quantity

For Frege, neither do natural numbers or real numbers for that matter (he is no empiricist in this sense). He simply states that they are the extension of second-order concept "equinumerous to" and they are objects we assign to concepts. For example, the concept "not idential with itself" is assigned the object '0' where '0' is the extension of the concept "equinumerous to 'not identical with itself'" (which is a second-order concept).

Concerning complex numbers, Frege tries to give some notion of them by extending the definition of 'sum' and 'product'. He does this in section 100 of the foundation of arithmetic - but I haven't the faintest idea what he's getting at.

[Arie]

Quote:
He may be a realist about the concept 'unicorn', but no object would fall under it. Concepts like "not identical to itself' is also a perfectly good concept, even though nothing falls under it. The idea here is that it doesn't commit one to be a realist about 'unicorns' in the sense that one believes something falls under it. There is a difference between being a realist about unicorns and being a realist about the concept unicorn (one can form perfectly good concepts whose extensions are empty).

An abstract concept considered as a concept (and not, say, as a physical state of the human brain according to the principle of psycho-physical parallelism) is not 'real' in the way that, say, an apple is real. Frege seems to be simply asserting that abstract concepts are real (just as I am simply asserting that they are not real ).

A perception is a relation between a "real" object and a "real" sensor. I don't see how constructing a sensor (or concept) to detect something that is never detected, makes the sensor (or concept) less real. This is related to what VP was saying in the quoted paragraph, I think. Applying to the Unicorn example, it would be like constructing a sensor that responds only when both "horselike" and "having a single horn in the middle of its forehead" are detected together. I don't see why that is not "real", but I do see a distinction between the sensor (or concept) and the object triggering it.

[Wellsy]

Been thinking that causality is but a lesser moment in comprehending the nature of a thing as often I end up at a stage of seeing it as a reciprocal relation that can't be reduced to one simply causing the other except arbitrarily.
https://www.marxists.org/glossary/terms/r/e.htm

In Hegel's Logic, Reciprocity is the completion of the division of Actuality which proves to be the Notion. Reciprocity is the grasping of the thing at the point where cause and effect, action and reaction, possibility and necessity have completely merged with one another.

Reciprocity is sometimes called “interaction”, the conception of a complex system as a network of interacting causes and effects, but yet lacking a “notion” or concept of the underlying unifying system to “make sense” of these interactions.

https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/determinism.htm

Hegel showed that causality is extremely limited in its explanatory capacity, because the invocation of causation leads to an infinite regress. Efficient causes are always of interest, but a phenomenon is only understood when it is grasped as a cause of itself (a causa sui), that is, the relevant process is seen to create and recreate the conditions for its own existence. But even then, explanation often takes the form of Reciprocity of cause and effect. Hegel (1831) grants that “to make the manners of the Spartans the cause of their constitution and their constitution conversely the cause of their manners, may no doubt be in a way correct,” but still explains nothing. But Reciprocity is as far as Causality can go. The understanding of a process as a cause sui means grasping it as a concept and usually incorporates an investigation of its origins and development.

And it is indeed the case that to explain things in a rational way has no need to explain them causally.

What caused the beaks on Darwin’s finches to get longer over successive generations? Natural selection of random variations is not a causal explanation. The most fundamental explanatory scientific theory of biology is not causal. And what applies to natural evolution applies with redoubled force to social, cultural and personal development.

Why do I say that natural selection is not a causal explanation of evolution? Although nowadays, thanks to genetics and the Wave Function, it is possible to say that natural variation has something like a causal explanation (though not any particular variation), in Darwin’s time, when he first posited the idea of natural selection, natural variation had no causal explanation; Darwin merely empirically observed that offspring resemble their parents. The idea of natural selection certainly makes evolution intelligible, but it is not a cause. The theory of evolution by natural selection shows how a genotype will evolve in some direction precisely if there is no cause causing it to develop in that or any other direction – it is not directional. Very many processes in Nature are made intelligible in this way, by the absence of a cause.