[LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX]

So to give a little background on me and the positions I have held, I am a former atheist that was raised in an atheist household never really having any type of religious backing. Both of my parents are great people, and so are my brothers and sisters. My parents never forced any of their beliefs on me, I became atheist as I discovered positions in the world and believed it to be the most logical position.

As I grow older, I have come to understand the position of people that believe in God. I believe that there is a God, She (they) created the universe and everything in it, but does not actively interfere in anybody's life except until they die. I acknowledge that I hold this mostly on faith and not really on any type of hard evidence. The biggest reason for my change of heart is morality. I do not think that a universal reality is possible without God, and as I believe that murder, rape, and physical abuse is morally incorrect in an objective and not just a social sense, this leads me to the belief in God.

So where does this belief come from? Well most people would assume the existence of God first, but I assume that there is an objective morality. From this morality, without having to define what it is that makes up this morality (only that it is there), it must be concluded that if it were to be objective, there would have to be someone that created it. This is where God comes in. Without God, our morality is entirely relative, legality-based, and essentially subjective. As I grow older, I do not think that this position is tenable.

Now, I'm not arguing for any religion. I think religions are entirely man-made, and this is borne out by the fact that so many religious sects contradict each other. I do think that morality itself, the process that governs human action, is not man-made. I'm interested in hearing what everyone's views on morality is, especially where it comes from and whether or not you believe it is subjective or objective.

[Paradigm]

From this morality, without having to define what it is that makes up this morality (only that it is there), it must be concluded that if it were to be objective, there would have to be someone that created it.

I'm not sure how this follows. Objectivity does not imply creation. If it were, we'd be in quite a bind by saying that God objectively exists. Most formulations of divine command theory are difficult to maintain rationally. However, one alternative formulation that I think works is to take the Neoplatonic route of saying that God is the Good.

[Godstud]

When humans create a society, where people need to live together, they need to make up rules so that society can function. Those rules are our morality.

It's why all societies are, in general, again theft, murder, lying, infidelity, etc., regardless of where they might be, and what contact they have had with each other.

Morality is Man-made.

[Besoeker]

When humans create a society, where people need to live together, they need to make up rules so that society can function. Those rules are our morality.

It's why all societies are, in general, again theft, murder, lying, infidelity, etc., regardless of where they might be, and what contact they have had with each other.

Morality is Man-made.

And predates religions.

[LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX]

I'm not sure how this follows. Objectivity does not imply creation. If it were, we'd be in quite a bind by saying that God objectively exists. Most formulations of divine command theory are difficult to maintain rationally. However, one alternative formulation that I think works is to take the Neoplatonic route of saying that God is the Good.

Does objectivity or subjectivity even apply to God? I could see someone saying that God is the Good, but I think She encompasses more than that. Or it begs the question as to what is evil. The absence of God?

[Saeko]

The biggest reason for my change of heart is morality. I do not think that a universal reality is possible without God, and as I believe that murder, rape, and physical abuse is morally incorrect in an objective and not just a social sense, this leads me to the belief in God.

Why?

So where does this belief come from? Well most people would assume the existence of God first, but I assume that there is an objective morality. From this morality, without having to define what it is that makes up this morality (only that it is there), it must be concluded that if it were to be objective, there would have to be someone that created it.

This does not follow. It is possible for something to be objective without having been created.

This is where God comes in. Without God, our morality is entirely relative, legality-based, and essentially subjective.

This is something you need to prove.

Now, I'm not arguing for any religion. I think religions are entirely man-made, and this is borne out by the fact that so many religious sects contradict each other. I do think that morality itself, the process that governs human action, is not man-made. I'm interested in hearing what everyone's views on morality is, especially where it comes from and whether or not you believe it is subjective or objective.

I'm an ethical nihilist. I believe in error theory.

4. Error Theory

Understanding the nature of an error theory is best done initially by example: It is the attitude that sensible people take toward phlogiston, that levelheaded people take toward astrology, that reasonable people take toward the Loch Ness monster, and that atheists take toward the existence of gods. An error theorist doesn't believe in such things; she takes talk of such things to be a load of bunk. The moral error theorist doesn't believe in such things as moral obligation, moral value, moral desert, moral virtue, and moral permission; she takes talk of such things to be bunk. This much allows one to get a fairly good intuitive grasp on the error theoretic position, though the details of how the stance should best be made precise are unresolved.

One might be tempted to express the error theory in negative existential terms: as the view that X doesn't exist. Some qualifications may be necessary depending on whether X is taken to be an object or a property. If it is an object, the error theorist simply denies its existence; but if it is a property it is somewhat less clear how to articulate the error theorist's denial. Does she deny that the property exists, or deny that it is instantiated at the actual world? It is a task for metaphysicians to decide the best way that we should speak of the status of the property of being phlogiston, say. One might allow that the property exists—even that it exists at the actual world—but deny that it is instantiated.

The problem with characterizing the error theory in negative existential terms is that it doesn't distinguish the position from noncognitivism, for the noncognitivist also denies that moral qualities exist (discounting the linguistic permissions that may be achieved via the quasi-realist program—see the supplementary document Projectivism and Quasi-realism. The difference between the noncognitivist and the error theorist is that the latter takes moral judgment as a mental phenomenon to be a matter of belief, and moral judgment as a linguistic phenomenon to be assertoric. Nobody thinks that when a 17th-century chemist said “Phlogiston resides in combustible materials” he was doing anything other than making an assertion; i.e., nobody is a noncognitivist about 17th-century phlogiston discourse. But we think that such assertions were systematically untrue, since there is no phlogiston. Similarly, the moral error theorist thinks that moral utterances are typically assertions (i.e., the error theorist is a cognitivist) but they are systematically untrue, since there are no moral properties to make them true. Strictly speaking, then, the object of an error theoretic stance is a discourse: We are error theorists about phlogiston discourse, not about phlogiston. In practice, however, philosophers often describe the error theory in the latter ontological manner, and this causes no obvious confusion. The common phrase “an error theory about morality” fudges this distinction.

Just as we obviously don't think that every sentence containing the word “phlogiston” is untrue (consider “Phlogiston doesn't exist” and “17th-century chemists believed in phlogiston”), nor does the moral error theorist hold that every sentence containing a moral term is untrue; indeed, the use of such terms is surely essential to articulating and advocating the error theory. Rather, the error theorist focuses on a proper subset of sentences containing the problematic terms: those that imply or presuppose the instantiation of a moral property. “Stealing pears is morally wrong” will be such a sentence; “Augustine believed that stealing pears is wrong” will not be. Let us call such sentences “atomic moral sentences.” The error theorist is typically characterized as holding that all atomic moral sentences are false. (See Pigden 2010.) As a quick characterization this is probably adequate, but speaking more carefully there may be grounds for revision. Consider, say, discourse about Babylonian gods, and consider in particular those sentences that imply or presuppose the existence of these gods (e.g., “Ishtar traveled to the underworld” but not “The Babylonians believed that Ishtar traveled to the underworld”). We rightly do not believe in Ishtar and all the rest of the Babylonian pantheon, and this should make us error theorists about this discourse. However, it is not obvious that a sentence like “Ishtar traveled to the underworld” comes out as false. As mentioned earlier, Strawson (1956) argued that such a sentence—where the subject term suffers from referential failure—is best considered neither true nor false. Were we to adopt this Strawsonian view, we should not be forced to accept noncognitivism about this erroneous discourse, for we saw in section 3 several reasons for rejecting the popular characterization of noncognitivism as the claim that moral judgments are neither true nor false. We can both maintain the distinction between the error theoretic position and noncognitivism, and accommodate the Strawsonian complication, if the error theoretic position is defined as the view that the relevant sentences of the discourse in question are, though typically asserted, untrue.

Not only is endorsing a moral error theory consistent with the continued use of moral terms (as in “Nothing is morally wrong”), it is even consistent with the continued use of atomic moral claims (such as “Stealing pears is wrong”). It is typically assumed that the moral error theorist must be a moral eliminativist: advocating the abolition of all atomic moral sentences. But in fact what the error theorist decides to do with the erroneous moral language is a matter logically independent of the truth of the moral error theory. Perhaps the moral error theorist will carry on asserting moral judgments although she believes none of them—in which case she will be lying to her audience (assuming her audience consists of moral believers). If lying is a fault only in a moral sense, the error theorist may remain unperturbed by this accusation. Or perhaps the moral error theorist carries on uttering moral sentences but finds some way of removing assertoric force from these utterances, in which case she is not lying, and need not be committing a moral or epistemological sin any more than does an actor reciting the lines of a play. (The error theorist who advocates maintaining moral language in this way is a kind of fictionalist. See Joyce 2001; Kalderon 2005; West 2010. See the entry on fictionalism.) Such possibilities suffice to show that the moral error theorist need not be an eliminativist about moral language, and counter the popular assumption that if we catch a professed moral error theorist employing moral talk then we can triumphantly cry “Aha!” Furthermore, even if it were true that by employing moral language the moral error theorist opens herself to accusations of hypocrisy, disingenuousness, bad faith, or vacillating between belief and disbelief, all such charges amount to criticisms of her—and to suppose that this somehow undermines the possibility of the moral error theory being true is to commit an ad hominem fallacy.

Although one could be a moral error theorist by implication—either because one endorses a radical global error theory (thus being skeptical of morality along with modality, colors, other minds, cats and dogs, etc.), or because one endorses an error theory about all normative phenomena—typically the moral error theorist thinks that there is something especially problematic about morality, and does not harbor the same doubts about normativity in general. The moral error theorist usually allows that we can still deliberate about how to act, she thinks that we can still make sense of actions harming or advancing our own welfare (and others' welfare), and thus she thinks that we can continue to make sense of various kinds of non-moral “ought”s, such as prudential ones (see Joyce 2007). Thus the moral error theorist can without embarrassment assert a claim like “One ought not harm others,” so long as it is clear that it is not a moral “ought” that is being employed. (In the same way, an atheist can assert that one ought not covet one's neighbor's wife, so long as it clear that this isn't an “…according to God” prescription.)

Holding a moral error theoretic position does not imply any degree of tolerance for those actions we generally abhor on moral grounds. Although the moral error theorist will deny (when pressed in all seriousness) that the Nazis' actions were morally wrong, she also denies that they were morally right or morally permissible; she denies that they were morally anything. This does not prevent her from despising and opposing the Nazis' actions as vehemently as anyone else. (See Joyce 2001, 2007; Garner 2010.) Thinking that the moral error theorist must be “soft on crime” is like thinking that the atheist must be.

Mackie, who coined the term “error theory” and advocated the view most clearly (1977), described it as a form of “moral skepticism.” Whether this label is acceptable depends on how broad or specific a definition of “skepticism” is being employed. If one thinks of skepticism as the state of being unsure, then Mackie is no skeptic: his position is not one of epistemic agnosticism with respect to moral claims, but rather of positive disbelief. (He is an “atheist” about morality, not an “agnostic.”) However, if one thinks of skepticism as the claim that there is no moral knowledge, and, moreover, thinks that a proposition must be true to be known, then Mackie's denial of moral truth can properly be called “skepticism.” (See the entry on skepticism.) Even so, the moral error theorist may still dislike the term “skeptic” for the connotations it brings that her position is somehow to be defined in opposition to a mainstream, and that she thus starts off shouldering a burden of proof. (Even the term “anti-realist” may be disliked for these reasons.) After all, if being “skeptical” is used in one of its vernacular modes to denote being in a state of disbelief, then the moral error theorist is no more deserving of the label than the moral realist, for the realist is a skeptic regarding the non-existence of moral properties. (Cf. definition of “theist”: “One who denies that God does not exist.”)

There are many possible routes to a moral error theory, and one mustn't assume that the metaethical position is refuted if one argumentative strategy in its favor falters. Perhaps the error theorist thinks that for something to be morally bad (for example) would imply or presuppose that human actions enjoy a kind of unrestricted autonomy, while thinking that in fact the universe supplies no such autonomy (see Caruso 2013; Blackmore 2013). Perhaps she thinks that for something to be morally bad would imply or presuppose a kind of inescapable, authoritative imperative against pursuing that thing, while thinking that in fact the universe supplies no such imperatives (Mackie 1977; Joyce 2001; Olson 2011, 2014). Perhaps she thinks that for something to be morally bad would imply or presuppose that human moral attitudes manifest a kind of uniformity, while thinking that in fact attitudes do not converge (Burgess [1978] 2007; see also Smith 1994a: 187–189, 2006, 2010). Perhaps she thinks that there exists no phenomenon whose explanation requires that the property of moral badness be instantiated, while thinking that explanatory redundancy is good ground for disbelief (Hinckfuss 1987). Perhaps she thinks that tracing the history of the concept moral badness back to its origins reveals a basis in supernatural and magical forces and bonds—a defective metaphysical framework outside which the concept makes no sense (Anscombe 1958; Hägerström 1953; see Petersson 2011). Perhaps she is both a Divine Command Theorist and an atheist. Perhaps she thinks all these things and more besides. Perhaps she is impressed by a number of little or medium-sized considerations against morality—none of which by itself would ground an error theory, but all of which together constitute sufficient grounds for skepticism.

Most opposition to the moral error theoretic position targets particular arguments in its favor, and since the range of such arguments is open-ended, so too is the opposition. Discussion has focused heavily on Mackie's 1977 presentation, and in particular on his two arguments in favor of the error theory: the Argument from Relativity and the Argument from Queerness.

Supplement: Mackie's Arguments for the Moral Error Theory

For discussion of Mackie's position, see papers in Honderich 1985 and in Joyce & Kirchin 2010. See also Brink 1984; Garner 1990; Daly & Liggins 2010; Miller 2013, ch.6; Olson 2011, 2014. It is important to remember, however, that Mackie's are not the only, nor necessarily the strongest, considerations in favor of the moral error theory.

The typical argument for the error theory has two steps: the conceptual and the ontological. First the error theorist tries to establish that moral discourse is centrally committed to some thesis X. The phrase “centrally committed” is supposed to indicate that to deny X would be to cease to participate competently in that discourse. Imagine a phlogiston theorist who, upon hearing of the success of oxygen theory, claims that his theory has been vindicated; he asserts that he has been talking about oxygen all along but just by a different name. When the important differences between the two substances are pointed out to him (that phlogiston is stored in flammable materials and released during combustion, while oxygen combines from the atmosphere with flammable materials and is destroyed during combustion), he admits that he's had some false beliefs about the nature of the substance, but remains adamant that he was still talking about oxygen all along. This seems unacceptable, roughly because the thesis about being stored and released is a “central commitment” of phlogiston talk; to deny this thesis with respect to some substance is to cease to talk about phlogiston.

The ontological step of the error theorist's argument is to establish that thesis X (whatever it may be) is false. This may be achieved either through a priori means (demonstrating X to be incoherent, say) or through a posteriori methods (investigating the world and coming to the conclusion that nothing satisfies X). Which method is appropriate depends on the nature of the error that has been attributed to moral discourse. Sometimes the moral error theorist will hold that there is something impossible or incoherent about moral properties, such that the error theory is necessarily true. But it suffices for being an error theorist to hold that the non-instantiation of moral properties is a merely contingent affair. (Mackie, for example, though often interpreted in the former way, seems to prefer the latter. He concedes that if theism were true, then “a kind of objective ethical prescriptivity could be introduced” (1977, p. 48), and, though an avowed atheist, Mackie did not, apparently, maintain that theism is necessarily false. Thus on the basis of this passage we must conclude that he took the moral error theory to be only contingently true.)

The error theorist pressing this form of argument thus faces two kinds of opponent. The challenger may acknowledge that the putatively problematic attribute that the error theorist assigns to morality really is problematic, but deny that this attribute is an essential component of morality; a normative framework stripped of the troublesome element will still count as a morality. Alternatively, the opponent may accept that the putatively problematic attribute is a non-negotiable component of anything deserving the name “morality,” but deny that it really is problematic. So, for example, if the error theorist claims that moral properties require a kind of pure autonomy which the universe does not supply, then one type of opponent will insist that morality requires nothing of the sort, while another will insist that the universe does indeed contain such autonomy.

The error theorist must be prepared to defend herself on both fronts. This job is made difficult by the fact that it may be hard to articulate precisely what it is that is so troubling about morality. This failure need not be due to a lack of clear thinking or imagination on the error theorist's part, for the thing that is troubling her may be that there is something deeply mysterious about morality. The moral error theorist may, for example, perceive that moral imperatives are imbued with a kind of mystical practical authority—a quality that, being mysterious, of course cannot be articulated in terms satisfactory to an analytic philosopher. Such an error theorist is forced to fall back on vague metaphors in presenting her case: Moral properties have a “to-be-pursuedness” to them (Mackie 1977: 40), moral facts would require that “the universe takes sides” (Burgess [1978] 2007), moral believers are committed to “demands as real as trees and as authoritative as orders from headquarters” (Garner 1994: 61), and so on. Indeed, it may be the vague, equivocal, quasi-mystical, and/or ineliminably metaphorical imponderabilia of moral discourse that so troubles the error theorist. (See Hussain 2004.)

Even if the error theorist can articulate a clear and determinate (putatively) problematic feature of morality, the dispute over whether this quality should count as a “non-negotiable component” of morality has a tendency to lead quickly to impasse, for there is no accepted methodology for deciding when a discourse is “centrally committed” to a given thesis. What is needed is a workable model of the identity criteria for concepts (allowing us confidently to either affirm or deny such claims as “The concept of moral obligation is the concept of an institution-transcendent requirement”)—but we have no such model, and there is no consensus even on what approximate shape such a model would take. It is also possible that the most reasonable account of conceptual content will leave many concepts with significantly indistinct borders. There may simply be no fact of the matter about whether the concept of moral obligation is, or is not, the concept of an institution-transcendent requirement (for example). Thinking along these lines, David Lewis makes use of the distinction between speaking strictly and speaking loosely: “Strictly speaking, Mackie is right: genuine values would have to meet an impossible condition, so it is an error to think there are any. Loosely speaking, the name may go to a claimant that deserves it imperfectly … What to make of the situation is mainly a matter of temperament” (Lewis [1989] 2000: 93).

Lewis's own temperament leads him to want to vindicate moral discourse, and he thinks that this can be done by supporting a kind of dispositional theory of value. He argues that certain dispositional properties, properly understood, are adequate contenders for being identified with values, and he applies this account to the moral realm (Lewis 2005: 320), thus defending the existence of moral facts (though not mind-independent moral facts). But he admits that this works only if one is willing to “speak loosely” about morality. If, on the other hand, one insists on speaking strictly, then (Lewis admits) one is forced to acknowledge that there are desiderata of moral values (such as the authoritative practical oomph that Mackie goes to such efforts to articulate) that these dispositions do not satisfy. And what is wrong with insisting on speaking strictly, or wrong with antecedently preferring to support theories that disrupt and challenge rather than vindicate ordinary belief systems? Nothing, according to Lewis. If this is correct, then the dispute between the moral error theorist and her many detractors may in fact be fundamentally undecidable—there may simply be no fact of the matter about who is correct. (See Joyce 2012.)

[LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX]

Why?

I am making the assumption. That's where I start my assumption, that rape, murder, physical/sexual abuse is wrong.

This does not follow. It is possible for something to be objective without having been created.

Maybe. But we are talking about morality. Without morality having been created or decreed, it is not objective.

This is something you need to prove.

So you disagree that without God, there is no objective morality? Then where does that morality derive the objectivity? You can say that morality is subjective, and I would have a harder time disagreeing with that assertion than disagreeing with the assertion that an objective morality can exist without God.

I'm an ethical nihilist. I believe in error theory.

Well, if you don't believe that certain actions are immoral then this thread becomes harder to apply to you. I start with the assumption that there are simply certain actions that are wrong. I am not trying to pinpoint all of these actions; rather I assume there to be at least one, and if we can suppose that there is at least one immoral action then it stands to reason that God is the One that made that action immoral.

[Saeko]

I am making the assumption. That's where I start my assumption, that rape, murder, physical/sexual abuse is wrong.

Maybe. But we are talking about morality. Without morality having been created or decreed, it is not objective.

So you disagree that without God, there is no objective morality? Then where does that morality derive the objectivity? You can say that morality is subjective, and I would have a harder time disagreeing with that assertion than disagreeing with the assertion that an objective morality can exist without God.

Well, if you don't believe that certain actions are immoral then this thread becomes harder to apply to you. I start with the assumption that there are simply certain actions that are wrong. I am not trying to pinpoint all of these actions; rather I assume there to be at least one, and if we can suppose that there is at least one immoral action then it stands to reason that God is the One that made that action immoral.

Yes, I understand that you are making those assumptions, but assumptions need to be examined. The question is why did you make those assumptions and not some others?

The trouble with your reasoning is that if you make the assumption that certain statements about morality are true, then there is no need to invoke a "source" of objectivity. If something is true, then it is necessarily objectively true.

Not only does a thing not need to have been created or decreed in order to be objective, having been created or decreed is no guarantee of objectivity. For example, I could simply make up some bizarre set of moral statements, but I doubt you would consider that set of statements to be objective.

[Besoeker]

I start with the assumption that there are simply certain actions that are wrong. I am not trying to pinpoint all of these actions; rather I assume there to be at least one, and if we can suppose that there is at least one immoral action then it stands to reason that God is the One that made that action immoral.

I disagree.
Humans to living together as a society, and they have done so for millenia, there has to be an acceptable set of rules to live by. Here is how the Cambridge English defines immoral:

"immoral
morally wrong, or outside society's standards of acceptable, honest, and moral behaviour:"

No mention of divine intervention. So no, I don't think it stands to reason that any deity was involved.

[Atlantis]

I do think that morality itself, the process that governs human action, is not man-made. I'm interested in hearing what everyone's views on morality is, especially where it comes from and whether or not you believe it is subjective or objective.

I grew up as a Christian but left the Church at age 16 (the minimum legal age for leaving the Church) because I was appalled by the hypocrisy of the Church and its violent history. I never saw myself as an atheist because it doesn't make sense. God is beyond human characterization and cannot be characterized as either existing or non-existing.

Even though I don't belong to any religious organisation, I have since become reconciled with religion and can see its many positive contributions to civilization. I may be best described as an agnostic Buddhist because, of all religious systems, Mahayana Buddhism makes most sense to me. It is also completely compatible with being an agnostic. It does not require the belief in a god or in anything else for that matter.

As to morality, God is also beyond human values of good and evil. Thus god cannot be the basis for morality, except in that if we are one with god we cannot do wrong. However, since we cannot always maintain this union with god in our daily life, society needs a system of morality. While Buddhism is in essence agnostic, it does however, require compassion for all living beings and the desire for enlightenment. Consequently, even though god as the ultimate reality is beyond good and evil, existence and non-existence, etc., the source of morality can be found in the compassion for all living beings and the desire for enlightenment, which I consider to be the natural driving forces of life.

I think religions are entirely man-made, and this is borne out by the fact that so many religious sects contradict each other.

The outer shells of religion in the form of tradition are man-made; however, all system of religions need an initial divine inspiration, which is the result of a deep insight in the divine. That divine inspiration cannot be accurately transmitted by human concepts or speech; therefore, different religions develop differently according to how they are conditioned by their respective cultural environment. Thus, while the literal interpretation of the different religious traditions seem to be different, the original divine inspiration is identical. The apparent contradiction between the man-made nature of religion and the divine is resolved if we consider humans to be part of the divine.

[Besoeker]

I never saw myself as an atheist because it doesn't make sense. God is beyond human characterization and cannot be characterized as either existing or non-existing.

That's opinion. Wheter it's right or wrong is another matter.

As to morality, God is also beyond human values of good and evil.

See above comment.

[Mosaic]

I think one of the mistakes (especially religious) people make is to attribute their good behavior to a morality, without realizing that they have an inner, what might be called, "default morality" that is a result of their natural constitution, and their life experiences. To put this in overly simplistic terms, there are people who are just shy, reserved, don't have a naturally high sex drive, and might not be terribly attractive so they're not exactly "in demand." Surprise, surprise - this person isn't "painting the town red." Then there are people who are out-going, risk-taking, devil-may care, have a very high sex drive, and may be very attractive, presenting this person with many tempting opportunities. The first type might pat himself on the back and think, "Golly gee whiz - I sure am moral! And that girl over there (the second type) - she's a slut!" This principle applies to many aspects of "moral" life.

Then there are things we might do if we didn't know we'd get in some kind of trouble (social, familial, or legal) but don't even consider doing out of fear. Not that we sit there consciously thinking, "If I do X I'll be in deep shit!" It's mostly autopilot. Again, we can pat ourselves on the back and say, to paraphrase Little Jack Horner, "what a moral boy am I," but we're giving ourselves too much credit where it is not due.

Those are only two examples of "non-moral" influences on our behavior. I don't think there really are too many things we do, or don't do because of some "cosmic moral code." I don't believe in objective morality of any kind - yet I don't beat my wife, I've never been arrested, etc. Then, we recently had a preacher at a local very conservative church get busted in a federal kiddy-porn sweep. The worlds a complicated place.

[Besoeker]

Those are only two examples of "non-moral" influences on our behavior. I don't think there really are too many things we do, or don't do because of some "cosmic moral code." I don't believe in objective morality of any kind - yet I don't beat my wife, I've never been arrested, etc. Then, we recently had a preacher at a local very conservative church get busted in a federal kiddy-porn sweep. The worlds a complicated place.

Yes, there was a bit of a fuss in Ireland about a number of Catholic Priests being kiddy fidlers. Some of didn't come out until decades after the events.
Complicated? Yes. But don't think morality is a product of religion or religious beliefs.

[QatzelOk]

When humans create a society, where people need to live together, they need to make up rules so that society can function. Those rules are our morality.

It's why all societies are, in general, again theft, murder, lying, infidelity, etc., regardless of where they might be, and what contact they have had with each other.

Morality is Man-made.

Our current "morality" is god-based and manmade. Exactly.

We haven't eliminated murder or theft at all. What we have done with our manmade God-based morality is ensure that all our murder and theft produces "offerings" for the highest-class members of our manmade, God-based moral order. The High Priests get to have nicer stuff than other people no matter how many people us good "moral" god-worshippers have to kill.

And predates religions.

The kind of morality that pre-dates religion is not God-based but survival/nature-based. This is the only natural morality. The manmade, God-based morality is contrived and acts like steroids - at first, it increased productivity and social hygiene tremendously, but over time, you get disastrous wars, major inequality, and horrible constraints on normal human life.

[Scheherazade]

So to give a little background on me and the positions I have held, I am a former atheist that was raised in an atheist household never really having any type of religious backing. Both of my parents are great people, and so are my brothers and sisters. My parents never forced any of their beliefs on me, I became atheist as I discovered positions in the world and believed it to be the most logical position.

As I grow older, I have come to understand the position of people that believe in God. I believe that there is a God, She (they) created the universe and everything in it, but does not actively interfere in anybody's life except until they die. I acknowledge that I hold this mostly on faith and not really on any type of hard evidence. The biggest reason for my change of heart is morality. I do not think that a universal reality is possible without God, and as I believe that murder, rape, and physical abuse is morally incorrect in an objective and not just a social sense, this leads me to the belief in God.

So where does this belief come from? Well most people would assume the existence of God first, but I assume that there is an objective morality. From this morality, without having to define what it is that makes up this morality (only that it is there), it must be concluded that if it were to be objective, there would have to be someone that created it. This is where God comes in. Without God, our morality is entirely relative, legality-based, and essentially subjective. As I grow older, I do not think that this position is tenable.

Now, I'm not arguing for any religion. I think religions are entirely man-made, and this is borne out by the fact that so many religious sects contradict each other. I do think that morality itself, the process that governs human action, is not man-made. I'm interested in hearing what everyone's views on morality is, especially where it comes from and whether or not you believe it is subjective or objective.

I'd personally say whether one believes in a God or not, or simply universal principles, the notion of 'subjective morality' is anti-intellectual and may contradict the physical laws of relativity as well.

Relativity stays in summary, that regardless of the perspective of the observer, the laws of physics are always the same (e.x whether one measures the speed of a moving train from behind or in front, the speed is the same).

So likewise, whatever law or principle governs morality, whether purely physical or ethereal, there's no reason to assume it's any more subjective than the laws of physics.

That to me would be like saying the belief that the earth is flat is "just as valid" as the scientific view that it's wrong, since it may "look" flat to the perspective of a layman, and who's to say their view is any less "valid" than that of an astronaut viewing it from space? lol

[LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX]

@Scheherazade But how can there be objective morality without a God/higher power that endowed the universe with it? I agree that there is an objective morality, but I think that if you also believe in one, you have to believe in at least a higher power.

[QatzelOk]

[usermention=42589]But how can there be objective morality without a God/higher power that endowed the universe with it? I agree that there is an objective morality, but I think that if you also believe in one, you have to believe in at least a higher power.

No. You don't have to "believe in" anything to be moral and objective.

"God" is just a text. Like Batman and Robin.

The only truly objective morality is living to maximize survival of our species and others, while permitting the best quality of life for the greatest number of creatures.

Our use of technology is vandalism. It shows how fake our "objective" morality really is.

[LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX]

Utilitarianism is an interesting take on morality, but it's not at all objective. For one, it does not have objective application. The idea sounds nice, but it can be twisted to mean so many things as to become useless except as a general guiding principle.

Secondly, there is nothing objectively moral about "permitting the best quality of life for the greatest number of creatures". It's actually a choice you have made to believe that there is an objective morality there. Philosophically it is an arbitrary choice because creatures have no inherent value without it being imbued on them by some higher power. Otherwise, nature doesn't care about killing creatures or creatures suffering in the least. Suffering only exist (physically) because those creatures that feel it are more likely to survive and pass on their genes.

Lastly, you don't have to believe in anything to be subjectively moral, but in order for your moral beliefs to be objective they have to be backed by the weight of an objective morality. That may sound like a tautology but I am just making a distinction. What prevents a morality without a god/higher power from being objective is that your ideas of morality without a higher power are based either on social conditioning or arbitrary preference. Even ideas such as "do no harm that you do not have to" are just subjective morals if you are an atheist, because there is nothing that prevents you from doing harm except society's punishments, and even then there is a lot of legal harm that you can cause others if you would like. The choice is yours. You may choose to act in accordance to a set of standards that most would consider moral, but it is still just a choice that you make.

[QatzelOk]

Utilitarianism is an interesting take on morality, but it's not at all objective. For one, it does not have objective application. The idea sounds nice, but it can be twisted to mean so many things as to become useless except as a general guiding principle.

All words can be twisted to mean a lot of divergent things. Isn't that what you are doing in your thinking-out-loud post above?

Look: "objectivity" means that it's not all about you and the texts you have read.

Reading a bunch of texts on "the exact meaning of objectivity" is not the same thing as actually "being objective."

A wise prof of mine once said that suicide bombers are the most objective people around. They apply morality without any concern for their own well-being and they believe that their actions will create the best quality of life for the greatest number.

[LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX]

Absolutely, which is why I don't find logic and objective morality to be compatible. Many horrible things have been justified by a nice-sounding string of words. And I don't think that if a person can't explain why you shouldn't kill or rape someone that means that killing or raping someone isn't objectively wrong, or that the reasons for not doing it are based on community standards.