[Albert]

It doesn't matter as natural laws are not phenomena.

Sure if you through an apple into the air it is bound to land on Newtons head? Is that not phenomena?

Albert, Saeko is correct.

Natural laws are mere tentative descriptions of phenomenal events, not an account of the phenomena themselves regarding their metaphysical nature, which is really what this debate has been about.

The question is whether the chair you are sitting on can exist independent of any mind perceiving it. Physicalism (materialism) and Idealism (immaterialism) answer this question differently. Natural laws are not capable of dealing with this question.

However, I do think I know what you were trying to do, you were trying to give an example of something immaterial (or that must be presupposed as immaterial); let me just say that there are better things you can point to if attempting to make that argument.

I would love to read it. Please post it.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Sure if you through an apple into the air it is bound to land on Newtons head? Is that not phenomena?

The law is just a description of an event as observed. Laws in this sense are not absolute. There is no "binding law" of gravitation that compels downward movement. The law is only describing what we tend to observe. If anyone was claiming that natural laws were like the laws of logic, that would be different because those laws are universal necessarily and thus must be metaphysically explained. Natural laws cannot be proven to be universal as they only explain what "we have seen thus far based on what we have recorded."

Indeed, natural laws shouldn't be called laws at all, they should be called regular-event-descriptions.

I would love to read it. Please post it.

Look up the Transcendental Argument for God's Existence and The Stein-Bahnsen debate and listen to how the nature of logic was handled.

That is the best place to start. My journey into philosophy and apologetics began with Dr. Greg L Bahnsen.

Actually, i'll link the debate. Obviously, this is not the argument I use anymore, though it was definitely an inspiration and contains exactly what you are requesting.

[ingliz]

Ex Nihil[o], Nihil Fit

A zero-energy universe could come from nothing, a zero-energy universe already is nothing.

c 2 - M u G / R u = 0

Our universe is thought to be a zero-energy universe.

Since all things (minds and mental content) owe their existence to the Supreme Mind ...

God may owe his existence to the mind of man.

There is no evidence for causality being ontologically ordered, nor is there any possibility of defining a proper ontological ordering.

This is applying set-theoretic rules not to objects within the sets but to the sets themselves as objects in the theory, looking for (quite literally) the set of all causes that are not in the set of things that are caused.

... this makes the conclusion to this sort of reasoning null even aside from the conditional nature of his premises - it isn't just possibly correct or possibly incorrect, it is the class of reasoning that can lead to undefined or null conclusions - wrong at the level of a Gödellian knot.

It is Bullshit.

All questions about God that one attempts to answer via any sort of ontological condition are intrinsically self-referential as they require comparisons of a class that is, by definition, incomparable.

My argument, or rather Plantinga's turned on it's head.

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and

2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

3. It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness.

4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist.

5. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist

6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

[Victoribus Spolia]

If nothing comes from nothing, then God cannot exist, because God is not nothing. If that premise is true that “nothing comes from nothing,” and if God is something, then you have just shot yourself in the foot.

I do not think you understand ex nihil nihil fit, God is the answer to that ontological problem. Your remarks here don't make any sense.

God may owe his existence to the mind of man.

There is no evidence for causality being ontologically ordered, nor is there any possibility of defining a proper ontological ordering.

Actually I have demonstrated such an ontological ordering of causality, in reverse, from the axiom of human mentality.

My argument, or rather Plantinga's turned on it's head.

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and

2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

3. It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness.

4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist.

5. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist

6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

Terrible argument, almost as bad as Platinga's original argument.

besides being gibberish, this part is contradictory in premise 4, possibly and necessarily are not compatible, they are opposites actually:

Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily

Likewise my argument refutes this premise (#3):

. 3. It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness.

It is not possible that such a being does not exist based on actual necessity.

I don't see how 5 follows from your previous premises anyway.

All questions about God that one attempts to answer via any sort of ontological condition are intrinsically self-referential as they require comparisons of a class that is, by definition, incomparable.

This is simply untrue, where in my original debate post did I do this? Please provide evidence for this claim.

[ingliz]

Ex Nihil[o], Nihil Fit

A zero-energy universe could come from nothing, a zero-energy universe already is nothing.

c 2 - M u G / R u = 0

Our universe is thought to be a zero-energy universe.

gibberish

The argument is logically valid.

Is your argument logically valid gibberish?

possible

Epistemic possibility

1. It is possible that a maximally great being (God) does not exist.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then there is some possible world where a maximally great being does not exist.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. A maximally great being does not exist in every possible world (from 2).
5. Therefore, a maximally great being (God) does not exist.

[Sivad]

Epistemic possibility

1. It is possible that a maximally great being (God) does not exist.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then there is some possible world where a maximally great being does not exist.
3. If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.
4. A maximally great being does not exist in every possible world (from 2).
5. Therefore, a maximally great being (God) does not exist.

I'm not an expert in modal logic but I'm pretty sure that on S5 logic if we admit the possibility of a broadly logically necessary being then that being exists in all possible worlds. In other words, if it's possible that a maximally great being exists then a maximally great being does exist, and it exists in all possible worlds.

S5 is useful because it avoids superfluous iteration of qualifiers of different kinds. For example, under S5, if X is necessarily, possibly, necessarily, possibly true, then X is possibly true. Unbolded qualifiers before the final "possibly" are pruned in S5. While this is useful for keeping propositions reasonably short, it also might appear counter-intuitive in that, under S5, if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary.

Alvin Plantinga has argued that this feature of S5 is not, in fact, counter-intuitive. To justify, he reasons that if X is possibly necessary, it is necessary in at least one possible world; hence it is necessary in all possible worlds and thus is true in all possible worlds. Such reasoning underpins 'modal' formulations of the ontological argument.

[Victoribus Spolia]

A zero-energy universe could come from nothing, a zero-energy universe already is nothing.

c 2 - M u G / R u = 0

Our universe is thought to be a zero-energy universe.

Would this universe have a defining characteristic or attributes distinct from the nothing it originated from? If so, what are those characteristics and where did they come from?

If there is no difference, you have confirmed the point, not contradicted it, or you have a tautology.

Besides, this whole claim of yours seems to assume physical causation (i'd imagine your definition of energy would require this).

I challenge all such claims in my argument. If you want to challenge my argument for God's existence, you'll need to challenge my argument for Phenomenal Idealism. I don't think you can.

The argument is logically valid.

Is your argument logically valid gibberish?

Your argument is not logically valid because it contains contradictions and the conclusions do not follow from the premises.

1. It is possible that a maximally great being (God) does not exist.
2. If it is possible that a maximally great being does not exist, then there is some possible world where a maximally great being does not exist.

This is my point, there is no possible world where such a Being does not exist. This is because my proof demonstrates that God exists necessarily and in modal logic that means that "there is no possible world where God could not exist." Necessity and possibility are not compatible definitions.

Furthermore, you must be equivocating because your definition for a maximally great being in #3 and #1 are not compatible.

If a maximally great Being must exist in every possible world to be a maximally great Being (your definition in #3), than you cannot say its possible He might not exist in some possible world (contra #1).

So which is it?

[Sivad]

A zero-energy universe could come from nothing, a zero-energy universe already is nothing.

Did Lawrence Krauss tell you that? Internet atheists are just too much.

[ingliz]

possibility

1. To X it seems that P is possible on a priori grounds.

2. Q is necessary and knowable only a posteriori.

3. Q implies that P is necessarily false.

A question:

If there are a posteriori necessities, how can one have a priori knowledge of modality?

modal logic

That is why Plantinga used 'possibly necessary' and I kept 'possibly necessary' when I turned Plantinga's argument on its head.

Krauss

The zero-energy universe theory originated in 1973, when Edward Tryon proposed in the journal Nature that the universe emerged from a large-scale quantum fluctuation of vacuum energy, resulting in its positive mass-energy being exactly balanced by its negative gravitational potential energy.

[Sivad]

1. To X it seems that P is possible on a priori grounds.

2. Q is necessary and knowable only a posteriori.

3. Q implies that P is necessarily false.

A question:

If there are a posteriori necessities, how can one have a priori knowledge of modality?

I don't understand what you're asking? You seem to be confusing metaphysics with epistemology. If God is Taken as an MGB then his existence is either necessary or impossible. If you admit God's existence is possible then by the logic of your argument you are committed to a belief in God.

That is why Plantinga used 'possibly necessary' and I kept 'possibly necessary'

On S5 possibly necessary is necessary.
if X is possibly necessary, it is necessary in at least one possible world; hence it is necessary in all possible worlds and thus is true in all possible worlds. Such reasoning underpins 'modal' formulations of the ontological argument.

when I turned Plantinga's argument on its head.

The zero-energy universe theory originated in 1973, when Edward Tryon proposed in the journal Nature that the universe emerged from a large-scale quantum fluctuation of vacuum energy, resulting in its positive mass-energy being exactly balanced by its negative gravitational potential energy.

But the laws have no bearing whatsoever on questions of where the elementary stuff came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular elementary stuff it does, as opposed to something else, or to nothing at all.

The fundamental physical laws that Krauss is talking about in A Universe From Nothing--the laws of relativistic quantum field theories--are no exception to this. The particular, eternally persisting, elementary physical stuff of the world, according to the standard presentations of relativistic quantum field theories, consists (unsurprisingly) of relativistic quantum fields. And the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on--and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place. Period. Case closed. End of story.

[ingliz]

if X is possibly necessary, it is necessary in at least one possible world; hence it is necessary in all possible worlds and thus is true in all possible worlds. Such reasoning underpins 'modal' formulations of the ontological argument.

Correct.

My argument, or rather Plantinga's turned on it's head.

1. A being has maximal excellence in a given possible world W if and only if it is omnipotent, omniscient and wholly good in W; and

2. A being has maximal greatness if it has maximal excellence in every possible world.

3. It is possible that there isn’t a being that has maximal greatness.

4. Therefore, possibly, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good being does not exist.

5. Therefore, it is necessarily true that an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist

6. Therefore, an omniscient, omnipotent and perfectly good being does not exist.

If God ...

If God is real, one a can make an epistemic argument for God's non-existence.

[Sivad]

besides being gibberish, this part is contradictory in premise 4, possibly and necessarily are not compatible

They're compatible, they're just not compatible the way he's using them. He's equivocating between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility.

[Sivad]

If God is real, one a can make an epistemic argument for God's non-existence.

Do you know what epistemic means? You can make an epistemic argument for skepticism about God's existence, you can make an epistemic argument that belief in God is unwarranted, but epistemology has no bearing on whether something exists or not.

[ingliz]

Do you know what epistemic means?

epistemic: relating to knowledge or the conditions for acquiring it.

epistemology has no bearing on whether something exists or not.

Professor J. R. Wojtysiak, John Paul II Catholic University Lublin, disagrees.

Two Epistemological Arguments for the Existence of God

If God is immanent, in the world, why not?

If you admit God's existence is possible then by the logic of your argument you are committed to a belief in God.

No. I am committed to a position of 'What is epistemically possible may be true, for all we know; it may not'. As to God's existence, I choose to think not (I may be wrong).

Reason for edit: To correct quote attribution

[Sivad]

Professor J. R. Wojtysiak, John Paul II Catholic University Lublin, disagrees.

No he doesn't. In the first one he's arguing that God is the best explanation for reliable cognitive faculties, that's not a metaphysical argument. The second one is a metaphysical argument, he's claiming things can't exist unless they're known by a cogniser, that's not an epistemic argument.

If God is immanent, in the world, why not?

Because things either exist or they don't regardless of their status in our epistemology. Epistemology is the study of what we can know and how we can come to know, not what exists.

No. I am committed to a position of 'What is epistemically possible may be true, for all we know; it may not'. As to God's existence, I choose to think not (I may be wrong).

You choose to think not after stating for all you know it might be true? That's not thinking, it's just mindless dogmatism. If you don't know then you don't know, you can't just think not.

[ingliz]

it's just mindless dogmatism. If you don't know then you don't know

I am an epistemic relativist. I expect that on being exposed to essentially the same data people will sometimes end up with very different sets of beliefs. From my perspective I am making an educated guess. To expect more than this seems unreasonable.

That said.

Justification can reduce doubt.

If God is immanent and theologians have provided you with a list telling you what a God thing "is", surely, one can look at the world and judge how God-like He is.

If you conclude He is not God-like, it may be reasonable to assume a God thing does not exist.

If He isn't in the world, God is unknowable, and it won't matter anyway.

C: All Supreme Mind (God) is Trinitarian (Trinity-Necessitating).

The doctrine of the Trinity states that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. One of the basic logical properties of equality is transitivity. The transitive property states that for any A, B, and C, if A=B and B=C, then A=C. Ascribing values to these variables, A = Jesus, B = God, and C = the Father. Plugging these values into a statement of the transitive property as a conditional statement in modus ponens we get:

If Jesus is God and God is the Father, then Jesus is the Father.
Jesus is God and God is the Father.
Therefore, Jesus is the Father.

However, the conclusion of the argument is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity, for Jesus *is not* the Father. Perhaps we should not read the “is” as an “is of identity” (=), but as an “is” of predication. In that case we are not stating identity or equivalence between Jesus and God, or God and the Father, but rather we are positing that just as you are human and Sivad is a human, but you and Sivad are two different humans, so also Jesus is God and the Father is God, but Jesus and the Father are two different Gods. Obviously, positing an “is” of predication leads to tri-theism rather than expressing Trinitarianism.


p.s.

Why do you believe a metaphysical argument, an abstract theory with no basis in reality, is superior to an epistemological one?

[Sivad]

I am an epistemic relativist.

So you don't believe there are objective standards of justification, warrant, or knowledge? You think people can just make up their own standards and still be rational?

Justification can reduce doubt.

If God is immanent and theologians have provided you with a list telling you what a God thing "is", surely, one can look at the world and judge how God-like He is.

If you conclude He is not God-like, it may be reasonable to assume a God thing does not exist.

If He isn't in the world, God is unknowable, and it won't matter anyway.

I agree with you on that. Divine hiddenness and the POE are why I'm not a theist. The better versions of the argument from contingency make a convincing case for transtheism(an impersonal absolute ground of being) but despite all the natural theology and apologetics I can only view theism as a non-rational commitment of faith seeking understanding.

[Victoribus Spolia]

They're compatible, they're just not compatible the way he's using them. He's equivocating between epistemic possibility and metaphysical possibility.

I don't see how they are compatible.

For instance, if God "possibly exists" there are conditions by which his non-Existence would obtain (as a possibility); likewise, under modal reasoning this would be expressed as "a possible world exists in which God does not, even if not in all possible worlds).

Necessity is opposite, if God "necessarily exists" that means their is no condition by which He could not exist given the demands of reason. That is, under modal logic, there is no possible world where God could not exist.

Like I said, they are not compatible.

You said he is equivocating, and perhaps you are right and I don't want to interfere in your battle with him, but I tend to see little distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility (perhaps this is because I am a phenomenal idealist), but basically, we cannot claim something to be real (metaphysics) without some knowledge of it (epistemology); nor can we claim to know of something (epistemology) without making a metaphysical claim.

Its seem there is a definite interdependence between the two.

The doctrine of the Trinity states that the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. One of the basic logical properties of equality is transitivity. The transitive property states that for any A, B, and C, if A=B and B=C, then A=C. Ascribing values to these variables, A = Jesus, B = God, and C = the Father. Plugging these values into a statement of the transitive property as a conditional statement in modus ponens we get:

If Jesus is God and God is the Father, then Jesus is the Father.
Jesus is God and God is the Father.
Therefore, Jesus is the Father.

However, the conclusion of the argument is inconsistent with the doctrine of the Trinity, for Jesus *is not* the Father. Perhaps we should not read the “is” as an “is of identity” (=), but as an “is” of predication. In that case we are not stating identity or equivalence between Jesus and God, or God and the Father, but rather we are positing that just as you are human and Sivad is a human, but you and Sivad are two different humans, so also Jesus is God and the Father is God, but Jesus and the Father are two different Gods. Obviously, positing an “is” of predication leads to tri-theism rather than expressing Trinitarianism.

If you only quote my conclusion without showing how the conclusion did not follow from my premises, then I don't know how to interact with your meandering claims.

I have demonstrated identity and distinction consistent with Nicene formula as understood and restated by the Latin Fathers.

Likewise, you discussing in bold above utilizes a social analogy of the Trinity which is fundamentally flawed. That is categorical relation (class and member-of-the-class), not unity and diversity in Being. My argument is clearly psychological and claims to be.

[ingliz]

I have demonstrated identity and distinction consistent with Nicene formula as understood and restated by the Latin Fathers.

Where?

All I see is an obfuscating tangle of pseudo-theological babble.

[Sivad]

I don't see how they are compatible.

For instance, if God "possibly exists" there are conditions by which his non-Existence would obtain (as a possibility); likewise, under modal reasoning this would be expressed as "a possible world exists in which God does not, even if not in all possible worlds).

Necessity is opposite, if God "necessarily exists" that means their is no condition by which He could not exist given the demands of reason. That is, under modal logic, there is no possible world where God could not exist.

Like I said, they are not compatible.

It just means a necessary being is metaphysically possible and on S5 if it's metaphysically possible then it exists. If you deny that it's metaphysically possible then you deny its existence. A theist can't deny the metaphysical possibility of God and still be a theist, that would be a contradiction. To say God is metaphysically possible shouldn't be taken as a metaphysical principle over and above God which makes his existence possible, God would still exist by the necessity of His own nature, it just means that there is no metaphysical principle which can prevent or preclude God's existence.

You said he is equivocating, and perhaps you are right and I don't want to interfere in your battle with him, but I tend to see little distinction between epistemic and metaphysical possibility (perhaps this is because I am a phenomenal idealist), but basically, we cannot claim something to be real (metaphysics) without some knowledge of it (epistemology); nor can we claim to know of something (epistemology) without making a metaphysical claim.

Its seem there is a definite interdependence between the two.

I see what you're saying and I agree that metaphysics and epistemology do, to certain extent, implicate each other, but still, it's possible for something to exist that we can't have direct knowledge of, that we can only know of by inference, and for us to have and idea of something that doesn't in fact exist.