[Victoribus Spolia]

No.

This where your silly semantic argument fails.

'attribute' and 'property' are synonyms.

That was not the basis of my argument, I didn't critique that post on the basis of a difference between property and attribute, but on the notion that a predicate of table like redness, hardness, etc. (which is part of its created essence) applies to the predication of God's essence.

The issue here is that the author is arguing that because the exemplified essence is caused in regards to the table's predicate of redness, then likewise God's predicate of His essence (omnipotence) would thereby have to be caused, thus causal circularity.

The argument is flawed because it assumes without proof that all predicates must be contingent (which is obviously false, especially under modal reasoning, as there are both necessary and accidental qualities)

Likewise it oddly assumes that Theists claim God's omnipotence to be caused by God in the first place. Which I've never heard before.

Perhaps our idea of God's omnipotence is caused by God, but that is an altogether different matter.

[ingliz]

Likewise it oddly assumes that Theists claim...

No. It does not.

It assumes a proposition to be true, that theists believe God to be omnipotent, in order to prove another.

attribute... modal reasoning

By claiming that it is part of an object's nature that it exist necessarily, we are saying something like it is necessarily the case that the haecceity of the object is exemplified.

But who causes God's haecceity to be instantiated; who 'thinks' being God into existence?

There are only two sets of minds, God's and ours.

If not God (causal circularity), then us.

And God owes his existence to the mind of man.

God's haecceity

A paradox - self-exemplification.

If every predicative expression corresponds to a property, then the expressions ‘is a property that does not instantiate itself’ should do so. This raises the question: does this property instantiate itself? Suppose that it does. Then it is a property that does not instantiate itself; so if it does instantiate itself, it doesn’t instantiate itself. Now suppose that it does not instantiate itself. Then it is one of those properties that do not instantiate themselves; so it does instantiate itself. Such a property, which instantiates itself if and only if it does not instantiate itself, appears to defy the laws of logic, at least classical logic. (Swoyer 1999)

[Victoribus Spolia]

No.

It does not.

It assumes a proposition to be true, that theists believe God to be omnipotent, in order to prove another.

The portion you quoted clearly states that:

Similar to the manner with which God causes being red to be exemplified by the table in exemplifying the table's essence, God causes being omnipotent to be exemplified by himself. But, surely God can't cause the property being omnipotent to be exemplified by himself: How can God make himself omnipotent? Furthermore, one might think that God's omnipotence should be causally prior to his causing properties to exist. However, on this occasion it is not. Then, if one does think that God's omnipotence should be causally prior to his causing properties to exist, this would be an instance of causal circularity. This sort of argument will work for other properties like being omniscient or having divine cognitive activity.

[NOTE: underlined and italics sections specifically, the part in bold is only the author's conclusion]

So yes, the author assumes that all predicates are caused and that the theist confesses God's omnipotence to likewise be caused. You are wrong as usual. Quoting retards isn't going to advance your argument. You would be better grabbing Atheist Arguments for Dummies.


His whole argument rests of false assumptions regarding causality and false characterizations regarding the theist position. This is a garbage argument.

Please try harder.

By claiming that it is part of an object's nature that it exist necessarily, we are saying something like it is necessarily the case ( ) that the haecceity of the object is exemplified.

This jumbled bit of word salad is a bit indiscernible (note in italics). Please clarify.

Otherwise, it still assumes the same problem, that God needs to cause his attributes in some way. That is absurd.

Otherwise, if by 'exemplify' you only mean that God makes Himself known, that is called revelation, which is an adequate descriptor of Berkeley's doctrine of direct perception as it relates to God anyway and ultimately has nothing to do with the problem of causal circularity. That God is necessarily inferrable from the nature of our own experiencing may be called a general revelation of God's existence.

If every predicative expression corresponds to a property, then the expressions ‘is a property that does not instantiate itself’ should do so. This raises the question: does this property instantiate itself? Suppose that it does. Then it is a property that does not instantiate itself; so if it does instantiate itself, it doesn’t instantiate itself. Now suppose that it does not instantiate itself. Then it is one of those properties that do not instantiate themselves; so it does instantiate itself. Such a property, which instantiates itself if and only if it does not instantiate itself, appears to defy the laws of logic, at least classical logic.

This is a complaint, not an argument.

If logic can require the existence of God, that is sufficient; whether or not the nature of God can be comprehensively discerned by reason is a separate, and quite frankly, irrelevant matter.

ALSO: what does the author mean by "instantiate itself" ? That is important to his argument.

But who causes God's haecceity to be instantiated; who 'thinks' being God into existence?

There are only two sets of minds, God's and ours.

If not God (causal circularity), then us.

And God owes his existence to the mind of man.

Isn't this just asking whether or not God is self-existing?

You already know the Christian answer to this question unless I am missing something, but this not argued as self-causation, this is simply being Eternally uncaused. The grounds of all causation itself.

My argument requires the existence of God, it ends with Him. It advances and cannot advance further and that is fine. The chain of causality begins and ends with Him depending on which source material you begin with; Scripture or plain reason.

[ingliz]

God is necessarily inferrable from the nature of our own experiencing

Are you arguing, existence is not a property that objects possess or lack, but a correspondence between a concept and the world?

In that case, God existing is a matter of the concept of God being exemplified, and God not existing is a matter of the concept of God not being exemplified. In both cases, the concept of a God that either is or is not exemplified is exactly the same.

As these two concepts of God are identical, and my "experiencing" cannot be yours, your claim falls.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Are you arguing, existence is not a property that objects possess or lack, but a correspondence between a concept and the world?

No and to be frank I don't even understand how you could get that from my point. The section you quoted only argued that God's existence can be concluded via argumentation as a necessary inference. His existence is necessary including any properties which are likewise necessary and not accidental to His definition all of which are inferred by us in relation to Him (in this case, we reason backward from ourselves to God who created us). The chain of inference regarding natural revelation is directly inverse of the ontology (chain of causation); special revelation attempts to put this right via a direct communication from God to man, thus bypassing the need to start with axiom of human mentality and reasoning to God as my argument does.

However, in none of this can it be said that God ontologically originates in the mind of man, nor can it be argued that God is self-causing, or that his necessary attributes such as omnipotence are caused and therefore subject to the critique you presented which was based on a false-analogy.

Hence, your argument has failed on all points. Which is typical.

Its presumptuous and confused when its not blatantly fallacious.

You Lose.

[ingliz]

I don't even understand how you could get that from my point.

You said, "God is inferrable from the nature of our own experiencing".

Are you now saying there is no correspondence between what we experience, a bundle of concepts, and the 'objects' in your ideal world?

(in this case, we reason backward from ourselves to God who created us)

Why do you think God created us?

[Victoribus Spolia]

Are you now saying there is no correspondence between what we experience, a bundle of concepts, and the 'objects' in your ideal world?

How would that follow?

That God is necessarily inferred means that God-as-inferred (concept) correspond to God-as-He-exists (actuality).

Perception is a bit different, but basically the idea is the same, the table I perceive is what it is and corresponds directly to the idea as it exists in the mind of God either because its the exact same percept [Hard-correspondence/identity], or because what I have is a direct copy (revelation) [Soft-correspondence]. I am undecided as to which as its an in-house debate among Phenomenal Idealists.

Why do you think God created us?

Because any knowledge of my existence depends on my awareness which is likewise dependent on the contents of awareness which likewise are necessarily originating from the Supreme Mind.

Hence, the fact that I am not omniscient and had a time of which I have no memory, means that God created me. Human mentality is dependent on Him as the originator (creator) of it.

[ingliz]

Eternally uncaused

The cosmological argument presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument. But since the ontological argument is defective, the cosmological argument that depends on it likewise must be defective.

How would that follow?

So there is a correspondence between a concept and the world?

revelation... God is inferrable from the nature of our own experiencing

In that case, God existing is a matter of the concept of God being exemplified, and God not existing is a matter of the concept of God not being exemplified. In both cases, the concept of a God that either is or is not exemplified is exactly the same.

As these two concepts of God are identical and my "experiences" cannot be yours (Example: I have not experienced revelation), my argument stands and your claim falls.

Because any knowledge of my existence depends on my awareness which is likewise dependent on the contents of awareness which likewise are necessarily originating from the Supreme Mind

Prove it.

Hence, the fact that I am not omniscient and had a time of which I have no memory, means that God created me.

An assumption.

Human mentality is dependent on Him as the originator (creator) of it.

Prove it.

[Victoribus Spolia]

he cosmological argument presupposes the cogency of the ontological argument. But since the ontological argument is defective, the cosmological argument that depends on it likewise must be defective.

I don't use the cosmological argument, and I have never heard this claim before either.

That God is uncaused by definition is definitional irrespective of that proof.

So there is a correspondence between a concept and the world?

What do you mean by "world"?

God existing is a matter of the concept of God being exemplified, and God not existing is a matter of the concept of God not being exemplified.

How do you mean by "exemplified" here? Are you using it as a synonym for revelation? Yes or No?

As these two concepts of God are identical and my "experiences" cannot be yours, I have not experienced 'revelation', my argument stands and your claim falls.

I don't see how that is the case, as logic is universal and not relative. Thus, if natural revelation of God is merely a matter of inference, then His actual existence ought to believed irrespective of your independent discovery or lack thereof regarding God's existence.

If you are only saying that God can't exist because you are not convinced of the Scriptures, or because He has not directly revealed Himself to all (including the compulsion to believe), then your conclusion simply doesn't follow.

Prove it.

I already did. See my original debate post # 1 in this thread. That is the same proof I would use for man being created.

An assumption.

No, an inference necessitated by the impossibility of the contrary. Any claim of a created state of which by definition is unknowable to me and unprovable to anyone would require some sort of extraordinary contrary proof, the inference (or presumption at worst) I am making is based on what can known and proven and therefore the conclusion is perfectly reasonable.

Prove it.

Already did, Original Debate Post #1 in this thread.

IF you are ready to start debating my argument, I will welcome such with open arms and its about fucking time.

via Imgflip Meme Generator

[ingliz]

by definition

The move from the contingency of the components of the universe to the contingency of the universe commits the Fallacy of Composition, which mistakenly concludes that since the parts have a certain property, the whole likewise has that property. Hence, whereas we legitimately can ask for the cause of particular things, to require a cause of the universe or the set of all contingent beings based on the contingency of its parts is mistaken. (Russel 1912)

I am making is based on what can known and proven and therefore the conclusion is perfectly reasonable.

Bollocks!

You are just stacking one assumption upon another.

[Victoribus Spolia]

The move from the contingency of the components of the universe to the contingency of the universe commits the Fallacy of Composition, which mistakenly concludes that since the parts have a certain property, the whole likewise has that property. Hence, whereas we legitimately can ask for the cause of particular things, to require a cause of the universe or the set of all contingent beings based on the contingency of its parts is mistaken. (Russel 1912)

Agreed. Good thing I don't use the cosmological argument huh?

Bollocks!

You are just stacking one assumption upon another.

Bollocks!!!

No i'm not.

[ingliz]

Good thing I don't use the cosmological argument ...God is uncaused by definition

Don't be silly. Of course you do, by definition.

"exemplified"

Instantiated.

what can [be] known and proven

There is sufficient evidence at present to justify the belief that the universe began to exist without being caused to do so.

[Victoribus Spolia]

There is sufficient evidence at present to justify the belief that the universe began to exist without being caused to do so.

The fallacies in that article could fill a library. Hell, the whole theory of relativity is ad hoc and this whole thing assumes physical causation which is by definition fallacious (cum hoc/post hoc).

So no. No good reasons at all whatsoever.

Don't be silly. Of course you do, by definition.

Nope. Wrong again.

[ingliz]

that God needs to cause his attributes in some way. That is absurd.

Plain reason:

If God is identical to his properties, then he is a property, and they are a single property, in which case God is a single property. Given that properties are abstract entities, and abstracta are causally inert, then God is abstract and causally inert — which is of course inconsistent with the core tenet of classical theism according to which God is the personal creator and sustainer of every contingent being. No abstract object is a person or a causal agent. No abstract object can be omniscient, or indeed know anything at all. More fundamentally, no abstract object can be identical to any concrete object. Abstracta and concreta are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. (Gale 1991)

[Victoribus Spolia]

Given that properties are abstract entities, and abstracta are causally inert, then God is abstract and causally inert

Properties are not causally inert. Especially in God. Where does the author get this ridiculous idea without demonstration?

Technically "efficacy" is a property and is by definition the opposite of being inert.

No abstract object is a person or a causal agent. No abstract object can be omniscient, or indeed know anything at all. More fundamentally, no abstract object can be identical to any concrete object. Abstracta and concreta are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.

How does the author define abstract and concrete?

If by non-material the author means abstract, then minds are abstract; therefore abstract objects have knowledge, thus the being having omniscience would have to be abstract and not concrete as a mind(contra the author's claim).

What are you doing by quoting this garbage?

Are you rummaging through your library to find something that will stick?

Good luck, this is mad fun, you keep throwing the balls and i'll keep hitting them out of the park.

[B0ycey]

Good luck, this is mad fun, you keep throwing the balls and i'll keep hitting them out of the park.

According to who?

I read no reasons why the quotes are fallacious, only opinions that they are. Stating they are fallacious without analysing is a poor argument at best. But Ingliz is correct. All you are doing is stacking assumptions on top of each other and hoping they stick. And they aren't - except in your own mind. But perhaps you should just publish and let peer review dictate opinion for you.

[ingliz]

"efficacy"

Platonism (with a small 'p').

An abstract object does not exist in space-time and is therefore entirely non-physical and mind-independent.

Causal efficacy:

Abstract objects are generally supposed to be causally inert in every sense.

Even Berkeley who refused to recognise abstraction on principle (only God exists necessarily) says much the same thing.

[An] object of thought... can’t do anything or be the cause (strictly speaking) of anything. (PHK 25)

Properties

Properties are plausibly construed as abstract objects.

As abstract objects are acausal, properties cannot be the cause of anything. (DeWeese 2011)

God

God does not exist in space-time (John 8:48) and is therefore entirely non-physical (John 4:24) and mind-independent (Romans 11:34).

without demonstration

A general theory of abstract objects is developed axiomatically in Zalta. (2016)

[Victoribus Spolia]

According to who?

I read no reasons why the quotes are fallacious, only opinions that they are. Stating they are fallacious without analysing is a poor argument at best. But Ingliz is correct. All you are doing is stacking assumptions on top of each other and hoping they stick. And they aren't - except in your own mind. But perhaps you should just publish and let peer review dictate opinion for you.

Don't you think you've embarrassed yourself enough already?

Causal efficacy:

Platonism with a small 'p'.

Not an argument.

"Efficacy" itself is a predicate, something is or is not efficacious, for anything to be efficacious, whether abstract or not, is to have efficacy as a property.

efficacy is by definition NOT causally inert.

Therefore your argument here:

Given that properties are abstract entities, and abstracta are causally inert,

is FALSE.

You Lose.

An abstract object

I asked how you were defining this term in relation to concrete (or else the person you were quoting). You have failed to supply these definitions.

I cannot respond to your position if I don't know how you are using your terms.

For instance, are abstract entities merely immaterial? If so, I reject the notion that they must be causally inert, in fact, I would argue that only such entities could be causally efficacious.

If you mean merely transcendent (and therefore non-immanent) and non-particular, well God is not truly abstract either, as God is both transcendent and immanent, both unity (One) and particularity (Many).

God does not exist in space-time (John 8:48)

Define space-time? Do you regard it as a thing?

Berkeley argued time was merely the succession of ideas, space is perceptual; thus, space-time exists in a mind, so it doesn't make sense to say that God exists outside of space-time in an unqualified sense.

is therefore entirely non-physical

Do you mean merely non-extended, or do you mean non-perceptual? I would say both, He is not an object of perception, but mind-independent is a bit trickier, He is not Himself empirically perceived, but the idea of God, the concept can be known to a Mind and He has been perceived physically though His Son (In Whom dwells the fullness of the Godhead Bodily; Colossians 2:9).

mind-independent

He is not dependent on any Mind outside of Himself for His existence, true. He is not perceptual outside of the Incarnation, True.

However, He is a Mind, and is thus not inconsistent with the metaphysical position of Immaterialism: "All that exists is either a mind or mental-content."

Abstract objects are generally supposed to be causally inert in every sense.

That depends on how you define abstract and causality.

I have always regarded causation as the necessary condition, source, or basis of an event.

God is not an abstract entity in the sense that the concept "humanity" is an abstract category and is not itself particular. (which is how Berkeley is defining the terms, He argue that no concepts (abstractions) or percepts (objects of thought) are causually efficacious, but He would not define God merely as an object of thought either.... That is not seriously how you are trying to define God is it? Berkeley argued quite clearly that a mind can be causal, God is a mind, therefore God can be causal. God is not merely an abstraction or object of thought, for such cannot be the source of mental content. God's existence was demonstrated because He was the necessary condition of such.

Thus, until you define that terms I don't know how to address whatever you are getting at.

However, if God is shown as the necessary condition, source, or basis for an event; then He sufficiently fulfills the requirement to be considered causally efficacious. I have already established how this is so in my proof. Thus, if "people" or certain "meta-physicians" regard abstract entities as causally inert, then under the definitions they are using, either God is not an abstract entity (at least not completely) or they are wrong regarding the efficacy (or lack thereof) of abstract entities.

Properties are plausibly construed as abstract objects

Plausibly construed is not good enough. This is a concession of a bad theory that is based on "construel" not proof.

Easily dismissed.

As abstract objects are acausal

"Plausibly construed" is not strong enough for you to infer this strong of a premise.

It would be better for you to say:

"As abstract objects are plausibly construed (by some) as acausal"

Properties (as plausibly construed (by some)) may not be the cause of anything.

Do try harder.

You and @B0ycey are becoming my routine objects of refutation, accompanied by my morning dump and cup of coffee.

[B0ycey]

I will just wait until you publish VS and reserve judgement until then. But the prequel isn't up to scratch I'm afraid.

[Victoribus Spolia]

I will just wait until you publish VS and reserve judgement until then.

You may not see it as it will be published under my actual name once I finish my Ph.D.

It will likely be a in small academic book written under the name Dr._________Ph.D., Th.M., B.A.

Plus, I plan on combining it with my moral argument in the other thread into one single argument. I was actually inspired by something said by Ingliz (I think) that showed me that I can actually start from a single axiom to infer both my moral and metaphysical position at the same time. I can't wait to get started on it. Its going to be epic.

But the prequel isn't up to scratch I'm afraid.

Your highly-advanced professional opinion means so much to me, I just don't know how I can go on without your approval.