[Victoribus Spolia - Debate Post 3/8]I. On The Axiom of Human Mentality I find my opponent’s boast of having refuted the presentation of an axiom as uniquely amusing given the irony implicit in the fact that any attempt to refute an axiom is inherently,
self-refuting.That being said, my opponent has quoted a statement of mine in a vain attempt to support her case that I did in fact claim to prove the existence of consciousness (rather than simply assert it as axiomatic, which I did). Let us look at this statement she quoted, please notice the remarks in bold and remember that she is claiming this as evidence that I in fact proposed to prove human consciousness as existent in general and NOT merely posit it as an axiom or first principle.
Since my primary objective in this debate is to establish the existence of the mental as non-physical (not physically reducible), and since I cannot stop merely there, but also wish to establish the mental as the ONLY reality (contra physicalism), which likewise necessitates the existence of God, it is important in such a complex debate to lay down my first principle in the proof(s) that now follows.
My opponent then concludes from this statement the following remark:
“Which he then follows with a purported proof of the existence of consciousness.”
This of course being a statement which not only cannot be inferred from my actual remark, but likewise describes an event which never occurred.
Notice the emphasis from that bold portion,
“it is important to lay down my first principle in the proof(s) that now follows.” The first principle that is laid down is not the same as the proof (s) that now follow. The
“Proof(s)" is clearly referring to my bold claim to go further than my minimal task to also:
“establish the mental as the ONLY reality (contra physicalism), which likewise necessitates the existence of God” A complex debate indeed.
Thus,
The first principle is the axiom, the proof(s) is everything else mentioned above. “First principle,” as a term in philosophy, is a synonym with the term axiom. Thus, I laid down the first principle in the first part of the broader proof, but (as I have maintained) the axiom itself is unproven and only governed by certain rules of inference.
To emphasize this, perhaps my opponent would benefit from a review of what an axiom actually is and why it is unproven (notice especially, the portions in bold):
An axiom or postulate is a statement that is taken to be true, to serve as a premise or starting point for further reasoning and arguments. The word comes from the Greek axíōma (ἀξίωμα) 'that which is thought worthy or fit' or 'that which commends itself as evident.'[1][2]
The term has subtle differences in definition when used in the context of different fields of study. As defined in classic philosophy, an axiom is a statement that is so evident or well-established, that it is accepted without controversy or question.[3] As used in modern logic, an axiom is simply a premise or starting point for reasoning..... Logical axioms are usually statements that are taken to be true within the system of logic they define
The logico-deductive method whereby conclusions (new knowledge) follow from premises (old knowledge) through the application of sound arguments (syllogisms, rules of inference), was developed by the ancient Greeks, and has become the core principle of modern mathematics. Tautologies excluded, nothing can be deduced if nothing is assumed. Axioms and postulates are the basic assumptions underlying a given body of deductive knowledge. They are accepted without demonstration.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AxiomNow my opponent has also connected axiomatic reasoning with
modus tollens as evidence that axioms are in fact proven, but this disingenuous bit of argument is self-refuting for her. Indeed, the odd thing about my opponent bringing this up is, that even if I were to grant that I had used (subtly)
modus ponens or modus tollens,
those methods of inference are valid forms of axiomatic demonstration that are immune from either form of petito principii (my opponent’s critique) because they are neither regarded ad assuming the antecedent or consequent despite their surface similarities.
https://www.cs.ucsb.edu/~pconrad/cs40/l ... llens.htmlhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_tollensNo matter where my opponent turns, her original critique is invalid, there is no fallacy of
petito principii in my original positing of an axiom and this would still be the case even if I used a variation of either
modus tollens or
modus ponens.
Thus the axiom remains an axiom unless she shows otherwise, which for some unknown reason, my opponent seems content to evade rather than to attempt a critique. One can only speculate as to why this is the case.
I will now briefly consider one more portion from her last post as well as her claim that I committed an
Ad-Hominem:
“This is based on two unfounded assumptions. First, that consciousness exists. Second, that propositional reasoning can only occur in consciousness.”
The first part of her critique was addressed above, but the second is answered by the simple fact that propositional reasoning is undeniably reducible to human mentality, which is definitionally subsumed to the content of the stated axiom,
for how can their be reasoning without thought? If my opponent answers that, perhaps we might actually get somewhere (in fact, I think I’ll ask her below)….
The challenge for my opponent is to make an argument without being aware of the argument being made or to concede the axiom. This is also why my critique was
NOT ad-hominem. If my opponent denies she is aware, she is disqualified from being my opponent (and for the reasons I have given already), for if I have no agent (one having awareness) to oppose me and to be potentially convinced, then the debate is pointless and effectively over. This is not an
ad-hominem, this is just a fact.
Let me now ask some questions of my opponent; (numbered as per the terms of the debate).
1. Can you provide an example of how propositional reasoning can occur without any mentality or process of thought whatsoever?
2. Do you deny human mentality, including your own consciousness (awareness), per the definitions of the debate? II. On The Irreducibility of Human MentalityAfter being shown that her attempt to distinguish between
improvability and
truth-of-the-contrary, was in the context of the debate, to make a distinction without a difference, my opponent has now attempted (from the corner with which she made herself quite comfortable) to conjure up a brand-new dilemma.
Namely, she now attempts to distinguish
general improvability and
specific improvability as the "alleged" flaw in my argument.
She uses the following analogy regarding a crime to make this point:
" It is just like the difference between knowing that someone committed a crime and knowing who actually committed the crime. Just because one does not or even cannot know who the perpetrator is, does not mean that there is no perpetrator nor even that one cannot know that a crime has been committed. Similarly, just because we may not be able to know which physical reduction of consciousness is the correct one, it does not follow that there is no correct physical reduction of consciousness nor even that we cannot know that there is a correct physical reduction of consciousness."
Note that the tone of concession is still there (in bold) in spite of claim that no concession is made (which she makes later on, as she argues that she is merely assuming for sake-of-argument a concession). The "apparent" concession being that there
could be a correct physical cause for the mental in spite of the argument I made that all such are impossible.
Likewise, she continues to maintain that physical causation is not impossible
per se when she states the following:
“Nor do I concede that it is impossible to know the true physical reduction of consciousness…. Even if his argument that all attempts to prove that some particular reduction is the true one are fallacious, it still does not logicially follow that none exists… Physicalism only claims that some physical reduction of consciousness exists, but it does not say anything about what we can know about this reduction….”
Once again, faith is not the standard of this debate, nor is fancy. If my opponent is hiding some proof or counter-argument that would demonstrate the possibility of physical causation or origination of the mental, let her produce it. Talk is cheap after all.
There is no burden of proof in this debate beyond my claim that I could demonstrate the mental as being existent independent of physical. Both my opponent and myself are both monists, myself an Idealist, her a materialist.
I have given a demonstration that all reductions of the mental to the physical must proceed on either
cum hoc or
post hoc forms or violate the corollary of
ex nihil nihil fit given in section IV.
At this point, my opponent’s claim that a physical cause
might exist stands precluded as impossible and merely stating that
"well I don't believe that" is neither an argument nor a rebuttal. There must be a reason given as to why there still exists such a possibility and it is incumbant upon her to provide one. I have claimed, and supported with demonstration, that all forms of possible reductions stand erroneous and thus for that reason any physical reduction is impossible (as no non-erroneous attempt to do so consistent with materialism can ever be done). This contrary claim requires my opponent to actually challenge it, not merely claim that
"it could be challenged" without giving any reason as to why she ought to be believed.
Indeed, when she states that i must prove that no physical reduction exists, by demonstrating the impossibility of such a reduction
I have done just that, in point of fact.
I have shown, clearly, that any any proof of physical reduction would be inherently fallacious.
As my opponent herself stated, neither of us have the luxury of a presumption of truth, I have presented why any attempted proof would be erroneous,
let her show me why I am wrong. Note again the definition and the sections in bold:
" Physicalism (Materialism): negatively, the denial of any entity or cause that is not physically reducible as being existent. Positively, the assertion that the only things which exist are fundamentally physical or material in nature. "
If a demonstration was made that all physical reduction would require erroneous inferences (and are thereby impossible), it is incumbent upon my opponent to now show where my argument has erred via a counter-argument, or to save everyone time and just concede it.
However,
she cannot say that physicalism allows her the belief in physical reduction without proof, quite the contrary, the definition above actually requires her to renounce physicalism (especially note section in bold) if no proof can be given of such a reduction.
So I ask;
3. On what basis do you claim that it is NOT impossible to establish a physical reduction of the mental?
4. What proof or evidence do you currently have that would rationally justify your belief in a physical reduction of the mental?III. On The Establishment of Phenomenal IdealismThis section rests upon the same back-pedal method used in section two, but has an additional error of the fallacy of the false analogy.
The argument given by me is that it is impossible (and only due to this impossibility); that any attempt to demonstrate the existence of physical would be meaningless and unintelligible, my opponent then uses an example that works as a false analogy of this argument given an algebraic theorem:
" The inability to know something about something in no way implies its non-existence or meaninglessness. For example, I do not know what the exact solutions of the equation 5x^6 - 13x^5 + 4x^4 + 8x^3 - x^2 + 8x - 1 = 0 are. Indeed, we may never know. However, the fundamental theorem of algebra guarantees that six of them exist (counting multiplicities). Whatever the solutions are, they are guaranteed to be complex numbers which are perfectly intelligible."
However, this analogy does not mirror the argument being made, I am not arguing that my opponent does not have the specific answer to a particular problem and therefore no possible answer to it exists.
I am arguing that no answer to the problem is even possible at all because the framing of the answer itself can only ever be done in error.
I have argued that
NO argument can be given for a non-mental reality without it first being known to a mind (namely the one making the argument); which would be proof of a performative contradiction, and further that the attempt to describe such a reality with non-mental data is not only impossible, but the very attempt could only ever be meaningless and unintelligible to us.
This is an entirely different claim by me than my opponent would like it to be (hence the false analogy). It is actually quite stronger and it requires counter-argument to be dislodged.
It is now incumbent upon my opponent to rebut the claim, for its implications are obvious: that no non-mental reality can be either demonstrated or conceived without contradiction and that the attempt to even articulate the belief in such a reality would be meaningless (in the logical sense).
I don't need a specific substance to be proven, I require only that
ANY non-mental reality can be shown to be possible via argument.
ANY. If my opponent cannot provide
ANY arguments and for
ANY possible non-mental (material) reality, why should anyone believe her position
AT ALL?
The answer is obvious.
So let me ask her:
5. What evidence of a mind-independent substance do you have, if you believe such to exist?IV. On The Necessary Existence of The Trinitarian GodMy opponent's quote here seems oddly confused, and I re-post it for much needed analysis.
" My opponent defines “objective truth” as merely something independent of his own mind. If this is his meaning and not the one I provided, then his argument for a singular mind as the source of all objective truths no longer works. This is because every mind other than his own is independent of his own mind, and so each one of them qualifies as a source of “objective truth”."
To be honest, I don't know what my opponent is attempting to argue, so I can only repeat the claim I think she is trying to rebut.
As stated in my last post, if something is objectively true, it merely must exist independent of my own mind in the
non-solipsist sense (as I clearly stated in my last post). Meaning, that for something to be objective it must be known and binding for more minds than just my own (once again,
contra solipsism).
Likewise, she makes an odd inference from this (obviously a
non-sequitur) that states that other minds independent of my own have to be the source of their own truth, and hence it would not be objective truth, under my position.
This strange conclusion does not follow even from her own premises, but does not seem to follow the argument I gave at all earlier that NO finite mind can be the source of its mental content (thus precluding them as independent sources of truth).
I have proven, without rebuttal, that one's own mind cannot be the source of its own knowledge unless it be omniscient, for otherwise it would be
pre-aware of all thoughts, percepts etc., before they were even had. The only mind that can be the source of such knowledge for all others minds, is God (as demonstrated already).
That this knowledge is
objective is secured merely in that it neither exists in only my personal mind, nor does it originate from multiple disparate sources.
My opponent also states this tautological phrase, of which I have no idea what she means, nor was it anything stated by me (note in bold):
" My opponent further claims that all mental content has its source in mental content and yet maintains that minds cannot be the source of their own content."
However, the latter part is clear enough and may elucidate her meaning a bit, though its still a poor objection based on her own misunderstandings:
" This means that only other minds can be the source of one's own thoughts, but that's precisely what we do not mean by “our own thoughts”. If they originate in other minds, then our thoughts are not our own, and thus we cannot speak of our own mind. This is simply yet another contradiction."
In this statement, my opponent argues a whole new objection (by abandoning earlier ones, as she has been apt to do in this latest post of hers). She now argues that if my thoughts do not originate in my own mind then they cannot be "our thoughts;" this objection is trivial, for it has already been demonstrated without possibility of refutation that our own minds cannot be the source of our own mental content. So, this being the case, how would one deal with a
colloquial phrase like
"our own thoughts" if it is impossible for us to be the source of our own mental content?
Well, simply,
the having them in our own mind at any given time is entirely sufficient to call them "our own thoughts" and in that simple stroke the objection is wiped away quicker than it was likely written.
If my opponent insists that for our thoughts, perceptions, etc. to have originated outside of our own self implies that they cannot be our thoughts, I don't see how this objection would not equally apply to a materialist who claims that thoughts originate in physical causes, for in that case our thoughts would not be ours either,
but would belong to matter.
This is not an attempt at
tu qoque, only an attempt to point out that the issue under contention is not that our mental content has a cause or source,
but whether or not such is physically reducible, to which I have added that;
if it is not physically reducible, from whence did such originate? Lastly, my opponent argues against my Trinitarian proof again merely on the grounds that I still haven't provided a demonstration that all minds have satisfaction, only some minds.
I don't see how my opponent could infer this conclusion when I specifically argued that all minds have objects of pleasure and satisfaction and given that God is part of this class, the presumption of his having an object of satisfaction is entirely justified.
If my opponent believes this claim is wrong, let her provide her proof.
All-in-all, a disturbing pattern that looks eerily like evasion is appearing in my opponent’s posts.
So let me just say by way of conclusion to the post:A debate is not a one-way street, if my opponent is uncomfortable with my claim that the debate has basically been won already, then perhaps she should start providing real challenges to my claims and arguments. As of yet, these have not been given and, by all counts, her demands that I keep proving more than is needed seems more indicative of a mood of desperation rather than of disputational competence. My arguments carry the weight of my claims sufficiently for the task I bore upon myself. Let my opponent now demonstrate why this system of mine is wrong, let her show why the mind is in fact material in any sense whatsoever. Let my opponent show all as to why my claim that her position is impossible, is in fact false.
If she refuses to do so, let those observing infer what they will regarding the validity of her position, but as far as disputation is concerned we still have a "no show" situation regarding it with my challenges being proclaimed and argued with no substantial critique given thus far.