[ingliz]

Good luck.

You are confusing mind-independence with concept-independence.

It is true we cannot conceive of concept-independent things without conceiving of them; but it by no means follows from this we cannot conceive of things existing independently of concepts, since there is no logical transitivity from the mind-dependence of concepts to that of conceivable objects. The claim that the difference between what they are and that they are is not conceptual cannot be challenged by conflating the sense of a word with the referent of its concept.

The existence of the referent does not depend upon the conditions of reference. (Brassier 2011)

[Victoribus Spolia]

It is true we cannot conceive of concept-independent things without conceiving of them

Sure.

but it by no means follows from this we cannot conceive of things existing independently of concepts

Now you are confusing conceptualization with conceiving, to conceive is only to have something in one's mind as an idea or thought;

Your claim was very specific:

I can conceive of a mind-independent reality, as has been demonstrated in this thread.

a mind-independent reality is by definition, unconceived; hence, in order for your claim to be proven, you must show me how you can conceive of the unconceived (and unconceivable)

[Missus V. Spolia.]

I've really enjoyed reading this thread this morning.

Idealism was one of the most life changing things I can remember, with a couple of exceptions.

Learned a lot, greater refresher

[ingliz]

unconceivable

Once again, the sleight of hand consists in the equivocation between what should be two distinct functions of a word.

Let the word be 'Saturn' (I will use 'Saturn' when mentioning the word and Saturn when designating the concept for which the word stands). The word 'Saturn' must be understood to mean sense (or 'mode of presentation') of the concept Saturn. But in order to be interesting (as opposed to blandly tautological), the word 'Saturn' must be understood to mean the referent of the concept Saturn. Once this is understood, it become clear that the considerations that make it true to say that Saturn cannot be posited independently of the conditions of its positing (ie. the conditions for the proper use of the concept), do not make it true to say that Saturn cannot be posited as non-posited (ie. that Saturn cannot exist unless there are conditions for the proper use of Saturn).

When I say Saturn does not need to be posited in order to exist, I am not saying that the meaning of the concept Saturn does not need to be posited by us in order to exist - quite obviously, the concept Saturn means what it does because of us. But when I say Saturn exists un-posited I am not making a claim about a word or a concept; my claim is rather that the planet which is the referent of the word 'Saturn' existed before we named it and will probably still exist after the beings who named it have ceased to exist, since it is something quite distinct both from the word 'Saturn' and the concept Saturn. Thus the 'Saturn' that is synonymous with 'correlate of the act of positing' (ie. Saturn as the sense of the word 'Saturn') is not synonymous with the Saturn probed by Cassini-Huygens.

To say that Saturn exists un-posited is simply to say that Cassini-Huygens did not probe the sense of a word and is not in orbit around a concept.

a mind-independent reality is by definition, unconceived

No.

To claim that X exists independently of our minds is not to claim X exists beyond the reach of our minds.

Independence is not inaccessibility. (Brassier 2011)

[Victoribus Spolia]

Once again, the sleight of hand consists in the equivocation between what should be two distinct functions of a word.

Semantics is your only recourse now, but it cannot help you.

Let the word be 'Saturn' (We will use 'Saturn' when mentioning the word and Saturn when designating the concept for which the word stands). The word 'Saturn' must be understood to mean sense (or 'mode of presentation') of the concept Saturn. But in order to be interesting (as opposed to blandly tautological), the word 'Saturn' must be understood to mean the referent of the concept Saturn. Once this is understood, it become clear that the considerations that make it true to say that Saturn cannot be posited independently of the conditions of its positing (ie. the conditions for the proper use of the concept), do not make it true to say that Saturn cannot be posited as non-posited (ie. that Saturn cannot exist unless there are conditions for the proper use of Saturn).

You don't need to explain (again) the notion of objects "out there" (referents) and the conceptual instantiation (referens) in realist epistemology, but this distinction is irrelevant, because you still need to explain how you know that the referents exist "out there" independent of referens, which is still the claim. I understand the realist distinction, in fact that is what I am challenging.

You repeat the problematic issue again here:

But when I say Saturn exists un-posited I am not making a claim about a word or a concept; my claim is rather that the planet which is the referent of the word 'Saturn' existed before we named it and will probably still exist after the beings who named it have ceased to exist, since it is something quite distinct both from the word 'Saturn' and the concept Saturn.

[Note Section in Bold]

This is what you need to prove, if something exists independent of your conceiving of it, or of your referring to it, you need to prove so, but that is exactly the crux of the dilemma.

You cannot argue for a referent without a recourse to a referens; the argument is circular. I am asking you to prove the referents independent of the referens, because so long as you use a referens you are failing to meet the burden of proof to show that something independent of referens (our conceiving) exists.

The referent-Saturn must be proven to exist independent of referens-Saturn, that is, independent of any idea, instantiation, percept, or concept of saturn, the true saturn in-itelf is said to exist. You said you have and can prove this, do it.

If you cannot do so without recourse to conceiving, you have failed to show how such actually exists independent of a mind.

You can claim that mind-independent things exists, you are permitted to do so like a fideist is permitted to claim God exists, but this claim is not only improvable, its unintelligible. Its fideism and it has no place in debate.

Idealism is established.

I win.

No.

To claim that X exists independently of our minds is not to claim X exists beyond the reach of our minds.

Independence is not inaccessibility.

You can make the former claim, but its content is meaningless, improvable, and unintellgible.

You make a distinction without a difference, if X exists independent of our minds, knowledge of it sufficient for proof requires at least a basic apprehension (accessibility); hence, unless you can demonstrate a mind-independent object X (without recourse to conceiving, perceiving, etc) then X being mind-independent can only be taken to mean that X is also inaccessible, because its by definition unknowable.

You've stepped in it my friend. Take your toys and go home.

[ingliz]

the argument is circular.

Pot calling the kettle black.

You identify the act of thinking (the experiencing) with the object of thinking (the experienced). To identify physical objects with experiences is already to assume that they do not exist independently of experience.

what you need to prove

The claim that my thoughts cannot exist independently of my mind is trivially true; and distinct from the claim that what my thoughts are about cannot exist independent of my mind, which simply does not follow from such a trivial truth.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Pot calling the kettle black. (Your argument is circular, too).

To Quoque

You nailed this fallacy so hard it could be a text-book example!

And you are wrong too.

you identify the act of thinking (the experiencing) with theobject of thinking (the experienced).

Note true, perception is passive and can't be shown otherwise, likewise, I only assume what is given, which is human mentality (which is also axiomatic).

To identify objects with experiences is already to assume that they do not exist independently of experience.

Your very question assumes "objects-out-there" which have yet to be proven, the simple assumption is what is given and undeniable (human mentality); my rejection of anything beyond my own mentality (i.e. conceiving, perceiving, et al) is merely taking a passive default position. You claim something beyond this, you said you can prove it, so prove it.

You cannot switch the burden of proof now my friend.

Now present your proof for a mind-independent reality that you've claimed to have.

Go ahead, i'm still waiting.

The claim that my thoughts cannot exist independently of my mind is trivially true

We'll see how trivial it is once you deliver your proof for something outside of them, now won't we?

The claim that what my thoughts are about cannot exist independent of my mind.... simply does not follow from such a trivial truth

Thats not exactly the claim though, the claim is that there is no reason to believe in such at all, such would be unintelligible and is by definition improvable.

Atheism is sufficiently fulfilled as a position if it were to point out that there is no reason to believe in God because the notion is logically improvable and unintelligible. This is an uncontroversial point, but the same works here.

Idealism is sufficiently fulfilled if mind-independent objects are shown to be improvable and unintelligible. They are, thus Idealism is sufficiently established as the most reasonable position.

If something exists independent of your thoughts, that is itself neither a thought or a mind, please provide evidence for it without recourse to your own mentality. If you can't, there is no reason to believe in its existence unless you have some necessary inference to demonstrate why your thoughts require the existence of such an entity.

You cannot do this, but it will be amusing to see you try.

Please, proceed.

[ingliz]

burden of proof

The burden of proof is yours (You instigated the debate)


.

[Victoribus Spolia]

The burden of proof is yours (You instigated the debate)

Yes and I have shown that there is no reason to believe in objects beyond our own human mentality which is axiomatic and default. That was all I was required to do according to the terms of my debate.

You've made a bold claim to the contrary that there exists something beyond this and you have also claimed to have shown it in this thread.

My claims and my argument can only be refuted by their presentation because my proof, was a negative one:

Following the rules of classical disputation, I from the outset listed a series of outcomes which would qualify as a definitive victory, the one to which Saeko and I agreed was that I merely had to the establish the existence of the mental as non-physical or not physically reducible.

I established that the mental is not reducible to mind-independent substance, you have claimed that I am wrong because you have proven such....

Show me.

There cannot be a refutation of my proof, without a counter-argument or challenge. No one has given one and this is where Saeko merely stopped debating (which according to the terms of the debate was a folding of her hand.)

Feel free to take up the gauntlet for her.

[RhetoricThug]

^Enough squabbling!

Consciousness is an immaterial phenomenon
Space is a material experience.
Inside is outside.

Consciousness involves touch, consciousness and space entangle and create a mutually inclusive state of awareness. The observer and observed are one, the observer is the observed. The participants of this thread are being absorbed by this thread, and this thread is being absorbed by its participants. Such is LIFE! We share the same field of experience, and that's why you're able to influence the field of experience. We're finite expressions of ONE infinite field. The information is touching your mind, and your mind touches the information. There's no separation, consciousness and space occur simultaneously.

Consciousness is enfolded in space. The flow of existence appears before us as the present, but is a pattern of the past. The future is a reaction to the past, but can only exist in the present. Language, as an extension and compression of experience (direct and indirect) superficially divides the present up into three parts. These three parts, past-present-future, are tools we use to compartMENTALIZE a state of awareness which can only exist in the present. That's why the flow of existence is a paradox, it's relative and absolute simultaneously.

The probability of the future is a projection of the past, but our experience occurs in the present moment. Therefore, the past is the ground for the figure of the future and your mind and body exist as the resonant interval for communication between past and future states of awareness. Future figures become the past and the past will become the future. IT's the interplay of the mind/matter interface which generates NOW. If we consider everything I just said (please read it carefully), we can now say that the immaterial is the ground, or shall we say environment, from which material reality manifests. It's a strange loop, the event horizon of perception, with an inconceivable vanishing point at the core of its existential potential. That which contains this present moment, the immaterial and material, is the substantial FORCE ENERGY unknowable noumenon responsible for consciousness and space. Call it God, the Universe, etc. Whatever IT IS, it contains ALL... Consciousness and space.

This thread is evidence for what this moment really is. My post will appear before you as the past, and your post will appear before me as the future. We're generating this moment together.

Forum image @Victoribus Spolia and forum image @ingliz are sleepwalkers lost in reflection. And that's perfectly fine! The Universe will simply recycle them, they'll be refined and reproduced as more information for a present moment that has yet to unfold. We're souvenirs floating in a cosmic reservoir collecting star dust.

∞

[ingliz]

Semantics

Semantics, the "Wittgensteinian nonsense", has shown up the fallacious character of your arguments.

reality

No doubt our image of reality depends on the human mind, but I see no reason to believe that reality per se is dependent on the human mind at the ontological level.

[Victoribus Spolia]

No doubt our image of reality depends on the human mind,

Correct.

but I see no reason to believe that reality per se is dependent on the human mind at the ontological level

You are free to believe it, but it can neither be proven or even described.

You are simply left with reality as it exists in your mind and what can be inferred from it.

You Lose.

[RhetoricThug]

^Dear reader, this is what organized ignorance looks like. Self-referential interference patterns being pushed and pulled by finite expressions of an infinite field. Sleepwalkers lost in reflection, their thoughts whorl into existence. They use a language they didn't create and collect quotes from dead personalities. They're intelligent creatures of habit enfolded in something larger than life. Absolutely beautiful reflections of this present moment.

This mirror is evidence for what this moment really is. My post will appear before you as the past, and your post will appear before me as the future. We're generating this moment together. Repeat-less-ness fueled by human repetition. Forum image @Victoribus Spolia and forum image @ingliz are obsessed with the past, because it's the only thing their minds can grasp.

[ingliz]

reality

That I can perfectly understand a world with no human mind which intentions it offers ground that reality is ontologically prior to our intentioning it. And even if it were true that we can know the world only through categories put forward by our mind, this fact would not change this ontological priority. (Marsonet 1995)

[Victoribus Spolia]

That I can perfectly understand a world with no human mind which intentions it, offers ground that reality is ontologically prior to our intentioning it. And even if it were true that we can know the world only through categories put forward by our mind, this fact would not change this ontological priority.

Ok, so basically you are giving up the argument then?

Because now you are just arguing that it seems sensible to you to believe that the world predates you even if a world without any mind is improvable and unknowable.



I'll take this as the concession and border-line red-herring that it is. So Thanks.

Also note: Idealism does not deny the ontological priority you mention, it just gives a necessary inference to prove the "metaphysical-prior" behind our mentality.

Yours has no proof or inference, only faith in the unintelligible and improvable world that is said to exist independent of yourself. Its a fantasy in your system, like fairies.

[ingliz]

Ok, so basically you are giving up the argument then?

No.

The Tree

Berkeley failed to distinguish the perceptual act from the perceptual content. When I conceive of an idea that is my perceptual act. However, I can isolate from that act the content of the idea I am perceiving. The content of my idea can still be: unconceived tree. The fact that I am now conceiving that idea has no effect on the content itself. The content of my idea is still unconceived tree. Berkeley is trying to say that there is an inherent contradiction in saying that there exists some X that is both unconceived and conceived by me, and he is right to say this. However, he is overlooking the fact that what is really happening when I conceive of an unconceived tree is this: I am conceiving that there exists some X that is unconceived, with the act of conception outside of the proposition, or content of the perception. As Ramsey used to say to Wittgenstein, "it just is possible to think of such a thing" (Zettel §272).

the reader has been challenged to do a certain trick and he does it without any difficulty at all. (Tipton 1994)

Why couldn’t Berkeley manage it?

Idealism does not deny the ontological priority you mention

Are you sure you meant to say that? I only ask because you have seemingly not denied a mind-independent reality.

[Victoribus Spolia]

No.

Oh good.

When I conceive of an idea that is my perceptual act. However, I can isolate from that act the content of the idea I am perceiving. The content of my idea can still be: unconceived tree.

There is no perceptual act, there are only perceptual events. You have an idea and it is a tree, you cannot isolate that idea from the content of the idea because they are the same thing.

If you claim that the tree in your mind is a perceptual act, how can you differentiate it from its alleged content? A process of abstraction? Inference? How do you know it has a content beyond the perceptual given of the idea itself, and how could you prove to me that such a content was unconceived without conceiving of it?

Berkeley is trying to say that there is an inherent contradiction in saying that there exists some X that is both unconceived and conceived by me, and he is right to say this.

Indeed.

what is really happening when I conceive of an unconceived tree is this:

Petito Principii.

I am conceiving that there exists some X that is unconceived

Nonsense and a piss-poor attempt at sophistry, that you have an object-conceived X cannot be said to be an instantiation of the unconceived without demonstration. Your argument is basically that something is a conceived-of-unconceived (contradiction) in virtue of perception as an act (which is also unproven).

This crappy argument reminds me of sort of tripe one would read in G.E. Moore.

with the act of conception outside of the proposition, or content of the perception.

If its outside of propositions or perception it is unintelligible and meaningless.

Why couldn’t Berkeley manage it?

He did, as I just have.

Are you sure you meant to say that?

Sure, God is prior to our perceptual experience ontologically, but its not a mere speculation (unlike your unconceived objects); Rather, God is inferred necessarily.

If you can give me a necessary inference for the existence of the unconceived, please do so.

I only ask because you have seemingly not denied a mind-independent reality.

I deny anything that is neither a mind or mental content. I deny such a category as unintelligible and improvable.

[ingliz]

There is no perceptual act

If all percepts were apprehended unconsciously, the subjective experience of a percept would be no different from the subjective experience of nothing at all.

How does that work?

I deny anything that is neither a mind or mental content.

Berkeley does not deny a reality independent of his mind.

I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question. (Principles §35)

... it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience of be independent of it. (DHP §230-231)

God

Your God arguments are not coherent.

sense is a passion; and passions imply imperfection (Berkeley, Siris §289).

[Victoribus Spolia]

If all percepts were apprehended unconsciously

"apprehended unconsciously" is a contradiction in terms. To be conscious is to have conscious content (A consciousness with nothing to be conscious of, is a contradiction in terms), but that content of consciousness is received passively. There is no "perceptual act" in that sense, we have percepts as conscious content. Simple as that.

Thats how that works.

Berkeley does not deny a reality independent of his mind.

I am not getting into 18th century textual criticism with you regarding Berkeley. I am broadly Berkeleyan, but I am not a clone. FYI.

The position I stated is ontologically no different than Esse est percipi aut percipere
which is Berkeley's stated position and that is his system of Idealism, any text that actually contradicts this is an error on the part of the author, a misreading on your part (most likely), or written in his earlier works before his mature thought (Like when you quoted from his treatise on vision).

I do not argue against the existence of any one thing that we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things I see with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the least question.

Yes, perceptual objects are real, they are not illusions.

it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind, since I find them by experience of be independent of it.

We beat this fucking dead horse to a bloody pulp already, but here we go again; neither I or Berkeley deny that objects can exist apart from our own individual minds (contra solipsism), we only deny that they can exist apart from ANY mind (contra realism). Your continual insistence on equivocation on this is exhausting.

our God arguments are not coherent.

To a simpleton, yes.

but the syllogism is valid irrespective of your powers of comprehension.

ALSO:

You have not shown me how you can demonstrate the existence of the mind-independent and the unconceived.

You said you have proven this, please show me.

[ingliz]

Thats how that works.

No.

If it did, you and me both would be drowning in a sensory sea of irrelevant noise.

neither I or Berkeley deny that objects can exist apart from our own individual minds

Then you are stuck with the Indirectness problem.

such is the nature of spirit or that which acts, that it cannot be of it self perceived, but only by the effects which it produceth. (Principles §27)

from ANY mind

God's mind?

sense is a passion; and passions imply imperfection (a mature Berkeley, Siris §289).

Like I said, your God arguments are not coherent

To a simpleton, yes.

I am not the simpleton here.

You said you have proven this

Wittgenstein, Brassier, and Moore is proof enough.

If they are too cerebral for you, here's a more muscular response.

Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone, till he rebounded from it, ‘I refute it thus.'

More Moore:

The belief that everything is really just an object of experience in some mind must be necessarily true in order to have its intended consequences for the idealist scheme. Yet it seems clear that the belief is not analytic, since there is at least a conceptual difference between being on the one hand and being perceived on the other.

Thus idealists simply assume without evidence the truth of their most important principle. (Moore 1903)