I had written up most of this response long time ago and been busy with other stuff, but wanted to just quikcly throw it out so I can delete the page.
Was bit hard for me to get back in the mindset so understand if its bit messy to respond to, but eh it's something.
Victoribus Spolia wrote:@Wellsy,
A lot of your post was what might be called "descriptive analysis" and not so much in the way of "critique," and I am seeing this a lot in many of your posts.
Are you simply uninclined towards debate and just prefer to assess, describe, and share your own musings?
In any event, I tried to pick out stuff that actually warrants a response, as most of your post was simply a complilation of you "thinking out loud" and referencing other perspectives. So here we go.....
I probably don’t come off as adversarial and part of that is probably how I go on to elaborate things.
Firstly, I would need a good reason to believe this was a problem. For instance, lets say that the Axiom of Human Argumentation is purely an apriori without any empirical basis......so what?
Secondly, I don't think the axiom lacks an empirical basis; after all, I described the axiom as a synthetic apriori statement. That is, the axiom cannot be known apart from experience, but is likewise not dependent upon experience for its validty (which comes from its apriori character).
As I have concern that such a method if it isn’t to be contentless (independent of reality) is often uncritical of it’s presuppositions and the truth of them beyond the relation between the concepts.
It twists the primacy of our concepts having to reflect truth of reality and instead make it that reality has to conform to the concepts which one has made absolute.
Reality is thus deduced from concepts and this is problematic in part because the validity of such a concept is untested as all the concepts evoked are considered valid to the extent they follow logically from the prior concepts.
The idea of a concept having validity only in relation to other concepts seems to be the idealist sentiment that truth is what correspond to certain axiom/s. But how can one determine the validity of any concept if one only relates a concept to another concept? Well the validity of all the other concepts are probably considered sound to the extent that the original axiom is true. Which is established by considering whether every single human being engages in actions, behaviour with purpose. Which is what I accept as a valid universal of the abstract sort (abstract identity).
Which in discussion of concrete universal I say is an abstract universal posited against individuals but lacks mediation of particularity (not an individual case but the archetype characteristics which make thing a particular thing).
The connection between reality and our concepts would be tenuous as we don’t compare concepts with the object we’re considering but with other concepts, leaving reality behind concepts/language.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/activity/index.htmThis seems to imply that human abilities should include the special ability of somehow “correlating” knowledge with its object, i.e. with reality as given in contemplation. This means that there should be a special kind of activity of correlating knowledge and its object, where “knowledge” and “object” are thought of as two different “things” distinct from the person himself. One of these things is knowledge as contained in general formulas, instructions, and propositions, and the other thing is the unstructured chaos of phenomena as given in perception. If this were so, then we could clearly try to formulate rules for making this correlation, and also to enumerate and classify typical errors so that we could warn ahead of time how to avoid them. In instructional theory, one often tries to solve the problem of knowing “how to apply knowledge to life” by creating just this kind of system of rules and warnings. But the result is that the system of rules and warnings becomes so cumbersome that it starts to impede rather than help things, becoming an additional source of errors and failures.
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In fact, knowledge in the precise sense of the word is always knowledge of an object. Of a particular object, for it is impossible to know “in general,” without knowing a particular system of phenomena, whether these are chemical, psychological, or some other phenomena.
But, after all, in this case the very phrase about the difficulties of “applying” knowledge to an object sounds rather absurd. To know an object, and to “apply” this knowledge – knowledge of the object – to the object? At best, this must be only an imprecise, confusing way of expressing some other, hidden situation.
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And this situation is possible only under particular circumstances – when the person has mastered not knowledge of an object but knowledge of something else instead. And this “other thing” can only be a system of phrases about an object, learned either irrespective of the latter or in only an imaginary, tenuous, and easily broken connection to it. A system of words, terms, symbols, signs, and their stable combinations, as formed and legitimized in everyday life – “statements” and “systems of statements.” Language, in particular, the “language of science” with its supply of words and its syntactic organization and “structure.” In other words, the object, as represented in available language, as an already verbalized object.
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Therefore, the very expression “to know an object,” according to Neopositivist logic, is illegitimate, for to a verbally formed consciousness it has the faint odor of “metaphysical” or “transcendental” language, i.e. of a somewhat “other worldly” language. Here, “to know” means to know language, for nothing else is given to humans to know. To the extent that “knowledge” and “object” have turned out to be merely two terms that mean essentially the same thing – namely, language – the problem of “applying” one of these to the other has turned into the problem of correlating (coordinating) various aspects of language – semantics with syntax, syntax with pragmatics, pragmatics with semantics, and so on and so forth. Here, the object is always the verbally formed object. In the Neopositivist conception of things, the object simply does not exist in any form before it “came into being” as a verbal sign, before it was embodied in language.
This position is arrived at in part because of the presupposition of separation from subject and object and often results in a view of reality as subjective due to the passivity of man and the presupposition of man’s separation from nature. Instead of man actively intervening upon nature and thus coming to refine his understanding within some socially organized activity (collaborative project), an individual person is posited in relation to the external world in terms of contemplating things sensuously or rationally.
http://critique-of-pure-interest.blogspot.com/2011/12/between-materialism-and-idealism-marx.htmlBecause traditional materialism stresses one-sidedly the passivity of man with respect to nature, it can understand qualia only as secondary, ie as mere effects in consciousness caused by external objects. And because idealism, in contrast, stresses one-sidedly the (mental) activity of the human subject, it cannot understand qualia as coming from external objects. The result is that materialism and idealism, precisely because of their opposing positions (passivity vs. activity), come to a surprisingly unanimous opinion about the ontological status of sensory qualities: they are merely subjective and not objective. Thus the traditional contrast in philosophy between materialism and idealism has led to a systematic disregard of the true in-between status of sensory qualities.
This issue would make logic uncritical of itself as it would only consider what is already in accordance with its own asserted laws of logic but it hasn’t yet established consciously how such laws are arrived at. Which is where Hegel comes in with expanding logic by expanding the study of thought to not just thought externalized in words and thus limited to personal and subjective stages but as proven in creations of man’s activity as man also expresses thought in activity and externalizes his thought in his works like words. In this way, Hegel was able to consider the truth of a logic in relation to the success of thought being realized in human activity and artefacts.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay5.htmLearning to read Hegel in a materialist way, as Lenin read him and advised reading him, means learning to compare his representation of the object critically with the object itself, at every step tracing the divergence between the copy and the original.
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The real picture of human life activity obtained here is a topsy-turvy, upside-down representation. In reality man thinks because that is his real life activity. Hegel said the contrary, that real human life activity was such because man thought in accordance with a definite schema. All determinations of human life activity, naturally, and through it the position of things outside man’s head, were only fixed here insofar as they were ‘posited by thought’, and appeared as the result of thought.
This is only natural because the logician who specially studied thought was no longer interested in things (or the position of things) as such, as a reality existing before, outside of, and independently of man and his activity (the logician did not look on reality at all as the physicist or biologist, economist or astronomer did), but in things as, and as what, they appeared as a result of the activity of a thinking being, of the subject, as the product of thought understood as an activity, the specific product of which was the concept.
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For logic as a science, however, a fundamental difficulty arises here. If it were only permissible to compare logical principles with logical thought, did that then not wipe out any possibility whatsoever of checking whether or not they were correct? It is quite understandable that these principles would always be in agreement with thoughts that had previously been made to agree with them. After all, it only meant that logical principles agreed with themselves, with their own embodiment in empirical acts of thought. In that case, a very ticklish situation was created for theory. Logic had in mind only logically immaculate thinking, and logically incorrect thinking was not an argument against its schemas. But it consented to consider only such thinking as logically immaculate as exactly confirmed its own ideas about thought, and evaluated any deviation from its rules as a fact falling outside its subject matter and therefore to be considered solely as a ‘mistake’ needing to be ‘corrected’.
In any other science such a claim would evoke consternation. What kind of a theory was it that consented to take into account only such facts as confirmed it, and did not wish to consider contradictory facts, although there must be millions and billions such? But surely that was exactly the traditional position of logic, which was presented by its devotees as standing to reason, and which made logic absolutely unself-critical on the one hand and incapable of development on the other.
That, incidentally, was where Kant’s illusion originated, the illusion that logic as a theory had long ago acquired a fully closed, completed character and not only was not in need of development of its propositions but could not be by its very nature. Schelling also understood Kant’s logic as an absolutely precise presentation of the principles and rules of thinking in concepts.
Hegel had doubts about the proposition that it was the rules of logic that prevented understanding of the process of the passage of the concept into the object and vice versa, of the subjective into the objective (and in general of opposites into one another). He saw in it not evidence of the organic deficiency of thought but only the limitations of Kant’s ideas about it. Kantian logic was only a limitedly true theory of thought. Real thought, the real subject matter of logic as a science, as a matter of fact was something else; therefore it was necessary to bring the theory of thought into agreement with its real subject matter.
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But, that being so, man’s actions, and so too the results of his actions, the things created by them, not only could, but must, be considered manifestations of his thought, as acts of the objectifying of his ideas, thoughts, plans, and conscious intentions. Hegel demanded from the very start that thought should be investigated in all the forms in which it was realised, and above all in human affairs, in the creation of things and events. Thought revealed its force and real power not solely in talking but also in the whole grandiose process of creating culture and the whole objective body of civilisation, the whole ‘inorganic body of man’ (Marx), including in that tools and statues, workshops and temples, factories and chancelleries, political organisations and systems of legislation.
It was on that basis that Hegel also acquired the right to consider in logic the objective determinations of things outside consciousness, outside the psyche of the human individual, in all their independence, moreover, from that psyche. There was nothing mystical nor idealist in that; it meant the forms (‘determinations’) of things created by the activity of the thinking individual. In other words, the forms of his thought embodied in natural materials, ‘invested’ in it by human activity. Thus a house appeared as the architect’s conception embodied in stone, a machine as the embodiment of the engineer’s ideas in metal, and so on; and the whole immense objective body of civilisation as thought in its ‘otherness’ (das Idee in der Form des Anderssein), in its sensual objective embodiment. The whole history of humanity was correspondingly also to be considered a process of the ‘outward revelation’ of the power of thought, as a process of the realisation of man’s ideas, concepts, notions, plans, intentions, and purposes, as a process of the embodying of logic, i.e. of the schemas to which men’s purposive activity was subordinated.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/criterion-truth.htm[/spoiler]
So if we’re to consider truth as not what concepts conforms to a relation with another concept or how a concept correlates to empirical reality, it has to be put in relation to the socially organized activity of people within some tradition/project.
The idea of a concept’s validity being independent of reality seems confused in that it already makes independent form from content (concepts from sensuous reality), this is a very different position to that of a Marxist and is part of the difficulty of our communication because you want to discuss things on terms I reject.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/pilling/works/capital/pilling2.htm#Pill2In an effort to vindicate scientific reason in the light of Hume’s rejection of causation and of knowledge of the external world, Kant argued that the mind is an instrument which, by its very construction, always apprehends isolated, individual facts in rational form. Kant realised that without categories, rational thought was impossible; but for him these categories have their basis in our thoughts, thought which is necessarily sundered from the material world. Sensation and the logical moments of knowledge do not on this view have a common basis – there is and can be no transition between the two. (Or as the Althusserian; would put it, ‘Our constructions and our arguments are in theoretical terms and they can only be evaluated in theoretical terms – in terms, that is to say, of their rigour and theoretical coherence. They cannot be refuted by any empiricist recourse to the supposed “facts” of history’ (Hindess and Hirst, 1975, p. 3).) Concepts, according to Kantianism, do not grow up and develop out of the sensed world but are already given before it, in the a priori categories of reasoning. These categories are supposed to grasp the multifarious material given in sensation, but themselves remain fixed and dead. ‘Sensation’ and ‘reason’ were counterposed to each other in thoroughly mechanical manner, with no connection between them. And the same was true of the content of knowledge and its forms.
The one sided emphasis on reason as independent from the empirical world is the same as divorcing theory from practice and is the mistake of those who ignore the activity of people (activity as inclusive of human thought) and instead limit themselves to what has already passed into human minds through their activity. Part of Kant’s difficulty was dealing with the subject-object relation in an individualist manner.
Words strung together without reference to human activity would be meaningless, such universals have no meaning apart from human activity. As such, argumentation ethics probably has the same limitations as discourse ethics in being a formalism which at most can only be an ethics of debate/discussion but not an ethics about life and the activities which make up people's’ lives.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/habermas-review.htmIt is my contention that any theory which takes as its elementary unit of analysis a simple speech act or utterance, disconnected from the activity within which it is made, can be nothing more than a mere formalism. Severed at its root from the real human relationships of collaboration and conflict, which tie the participants in discourse and motivate their interaction, which give them something to talk about, such a theory must entirely miss essence of its subject matter, since language is for the purpose of coordinating activity or it is just a game.
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Ethics is about what we should do; as such it concerns itself with above all not just with reaching mutual understanding, but with practical activity with other people. Ethical maxims are meaningful only to the extent that they are connected with practical activity with other people. Generally speaking, any activity which is done in isolation from other people, and without any effect or motivation directed toward or responding to other people, is amoral and lacking in ethical content.
Practical discourse, in the sense in which Habermas uses the term, is a practice, and the understandings which arise through practical discourse about ethics are an ethics of discourse, but they do not necessarily have any relation or relevance to any other practice, apart from discourse. In communicative ethics, the life-world of the participants has well and truly retreated into the background. As soon as the participants enter into some other practical interaction, they must leave their discourse ethics at the door.
For a study of ethics which has relevance to human life outside of the philosopher’s study, the unit of analysis must include purposive interaction between at least two people, the activity of doing something with or against someone else, in a unit of analysis which contains both the intentional actions of each of the participants and the “third” party — the “project” in which they participate, the collaborative activity itself. In addition to you and me there has to be a “we”, otherwise you and I have nothing to talk about.
And I find especially poignant the point of it being an ethics about mutual understanding. This has been of great interest to me in that I see why it then becomes appealing to establish that it rationally leads to private property the ideal of anarcho-capitalism. Because makes decision making and communication consensus based which inevitably leads to a status quo for maintaining private property because there can’t be any intervention against the will of any other and the ethics is framed strictly in discourse/discussion. But the history of social change has not been based on consensus nor within the tolerable limits of liberalism as a free market of ideas.
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/Collaborative%20Ethics.pdfConsensus fosters certain duties and virtues which are not fostered by Majority. The ethic of Consensus is above all inclusion. Discussion will continue until every point of view has not just been heard, but taken account of in the proposal. Even laissez faire supports inclusion in that multiple actions are an alternative to pressing on for actual unity. Consensus does not foster solidarity however, because the dissident minority is free to go their own way and is under no obligation to support the majority in their decision.
Consensus expresses respect for others, for the different. Whereas in Majority, the dissident is tolerated, because after all, the collective can always move to a vote. In Consensus, this option is not open; the collective must continue discussing until the dissidents’ point of view has been incorporated. This can lead to intolerance for persistent nonconformity, but at the same time it denotes respect for the different opinion.
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There is a serious problem with Consensus however, which has ethical implications; this is the paradox of the status quo: if there is no consensus, then the status quo ante is the default decision. Let’s suppose someone can’t hear what is being said in the meeting and proposes that the air conditioning be turned off; if anyone refuses to agree, then the air conditioning stays on. But let’s suppose the complainant had simply turned it off and then left it for someone to propose that it be turned on – it would remain off. Let us suppose that all the employees in a privately owned firm meet with the owner with a view to transforming the firm into a cooperative; everyone agrees except the owner; so, under the paradigm of Consensus, the firm remains in private hands. Clearly social transformation cannot be achieved by Consensus, because participation in a social order is compulsory, and there is no possibility of opting out.
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Rawls and all the discourse ethicists assume that when ethical principles are derived by dialogue between participants they presume that Consensus is the mode of collective decision making to be used. I believe that this is the reason that discourse ethics invariably arrives at liberal conclusions.
Majority decision making has its own limitations in regards to social change but isn’t necessarily as restrained necessarily.
But one thing for sure is that any social change hasn’t been due to ethics confined to people coming to consensus/agreement based on a shared understanding. Something which is quite destructive to ethics as derived from consensus decision making as it isn’t to account for the justness of social change, as exemplified in Rawl’s ad hoc addition of dynamic justice in his model to not reject the development of women’s lib/feminism and the civil rights movement.
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/rawls.pdfClearly the Abolitionists and Civil Rights activists resorted to illiberal means and Rawls cannot bend his conception of liberalism to include the use of illiberal means ‒ civil war, non-violent resistance, boycotts, intolerance towards slavery and racism ‒ to overthrow the dominant consensus and institutionalise a new conception of Right. Liberalism is simply a description of a mode of compromise within an established way of life. The fact is that a new consensus was not established through reasoned argument; reasoned argument came into play only once the goal posts had already been moved. In our times, dynamic justice is the norm. That is, it is generally recognised that the series of new claims to recognition and established social practices which will be called into question is indefinite. Rawls’ liberalism solves nothing in this respect.
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By committing itself to the domain of fact and seeking overlapping consensus by excluding counter-factual appeal to comprehensive doctrines, political liberalism does not just tolerate such practices but must actively place itself in opposition to emancipatory projects of this kind. Contrariwise, all emancipatory struggles are illiberal. That is a fact.
As such, the nature of one’s asserted ethics aren’t neutral, and it’s not that I entirely reject the value of consensus decision making within many circumstances. But I think it is something that is to the advantage of opposing change and as such empowers the minority who disagree over the majority. Not that decisions made by a majority are in themselves inherently justified and rational either, as the ethics of the decision making process doesn’t necessarily mean the result is just.
And this tendency to oppose change isn’t exceptional to liberalism but I think in fact exemplifies our present conditions and which as I argued earlier is in fact a reflection of valuing private property rather than it being an ethics of human beings in themselves.
This I found to be a convincing view especially thanks to Alasdair MacIntyre in criticizing liberal individualism criticizes the false objectivity/neutrality of liberal rationality.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/macintyre2.pdfthe social bases of liberalism are two-fold: the raising of property to the status of the primary social relation, and the loss of community, the loss of the capacity to appeal to or rely upon shared meaning beyond the satisfaction of individual desire.
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Nominalism is thus the characteristic epistemology of liberal society.
“the conception of pure reference, of reference as such, emerges as the artefact of a particular type of social and cultural order, one in which a minimum of shared beliefs and allegiances can be presupposed.” (p. 379)
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This observation succinctly points to an interconnection between rationality and ethics, for by the customary use of words simply in the form of reference, all the objects referred to lose their social significance, and one creates the illusion of an “objective” world which can be talked of by means of “pure rationality”, in abstraction from the social relations which have, in fact, created and shaped the thing and given it its social significance. The sole remaining social relation mediating between people is therefore property. MacIntyre believes that English and the other international languages are now impoverished in this way.
Maintenance of the illusion of “objectivity” is essential, and MacIntyre sees the universities as playing a crucial role in the maintenance of this illusion. Since academics rely for their livelihood on disproving each other’s theories, the resulting interminable and esoteric debate continuously re-establishes the impossibility of consensus.
“In the course of history liberalism, which began as an appeal to alleged principles of shared rationality against what was felt to be the tyranny of tradition, has itself been transformed into a tradition whose continuities are partly defined by the interminability of the debate over such principles. An interminability which was from the standpoint of an earlier liberalism a grave defect to be remedied as soon as possible has become, in the eyes of some liberals at least, a kind of virtue”. (p. 335)
Far from this failure to find any firm ground undermining liberalism, MacIntyre believes that it reinforces it, because one of the fundamental bases for liberalism is the conviction that no comprehensive idea (to use Rawls’ term) can enjoy majority, let alone unanimous, support. This then justifies the ban on governments pursuing the general good.
“Any conception of the human good according to which, for example, it is the duty of government to educate the members of the community morally, ... will be proscribed. ... liberal individualism does indeed have its own broad conception of the good, which it is engaged in imposing politically, legally, socially, and culturally wherever it has the power to do so, but also that in doing so its toleration of rival conceptions of the good in the public arena is severely limited.” (p. 336)
Such a ban on governments pursuing the social good of course serves a very definite social interest.
“The weight given to an individual preference in the market is a matter of the cost which the individual is able and willing to pay; only so far as an individual has the means to bargain with those who can supply what he or she needs does the individual have an effective voice. So also in the political and social realm it is the ability to bargain that is crucial. The preferences of some are accorded weight by others only insofar as the satisfaction of those preferences will lead to the satisfaction of their own preferences. Only those who have something to give get. The disadvantaged in a liberal society are those without the means to bargain.” (p. 336)
and consequently,
“The overriding good of liberalism is no more and no less than the continued sustenance of the liberal social and political order”. (p. 345)
In each of the historical settings that MacIntyre investigates, he is able to show that the type of justice and the type of rationality which appears to the philosophical spokespeople of the community to be necessary and universal, turns out to be a description of the type of citizens of the community in question. Accordingly, the justice of liberalism and the rationality of liberalism is simply that justice and that rationality of the “citizens of nowhere” (p. 388), the “outsiders,” people lacking in any social obligation or any reason for acting other than to satisfy their desires and to defend the conditions under which they are able to continue satisfying their desires. Their rationality is therefore that of the objects of their desire.
[/spoiler]
Where liberalism is under an illusion that it isn’t with some tradition/history from which it emerged but it is actually the stripping away of content from things and leading to such a ‘pure rationality’. It is here that the impossibility of any consensus is liberalism’s strength as it is positions pursuit of one’s individual desires as good and the conditions which maintain such conditions as good (maintenance of private property).
This is especially relevant in that I suspect like Kant, you are appealing to pure reason as compelling upon everyone due to it’s universal nature. But you make a mistake like Kant which I suggested earlier about being uncritical to the truth of propositions and essentially leaving them as given/assumed and uninterrogated.
For kant, this was effectively criticized by Hegel in regards to his Categorical Imperative as a law for one’s self can be rationally concluded from whether it would be rational for everyone to do it. That one can universalize something leads at best only to a mere ought from a single person, not a law in actuality. Impotence of wishing things upon people but not an ethically compelling moral rule based in the actual relations governing people.
And in Kant’s categorical imperative we see it’s error in assuming a content which it doesn’t consciously consider, much like I suspect you do. For example one could universalize the ought of private property just as much as property relations antithetical to private property.
So how does one decide which is better? Well the moral ought is derived from the existing culture.
https://scholarcommons.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1048&context=phiThe point is that for the categorical imperative to work we must be given a content—in the sense of a determinant principle of conduct. In other words, our culture has to tell us, for example, that private property is right. Once we have this, Hegel is saying, then the categorical imperative will have no diculty in telling us that walking o with the article from the store was theft. Hegel is not claiming that the categorical imperative has no content. He is claiming that it will not work without content. Where does the content come from? It is certainly not generated out of the categorical imperative itself. It is taken up from culture—it is given by culture as right. Private property must be given as right before we can see that what we did in the store was theft. Hegel makes this point very clearly in the Philosophy of Right
The absence of property contains in itself just as little contradiction as the non-existence of this or that nation, family, &c., or the death of the whole human race. But if it is already established on other grounds and presupposed that property and human life are to exist and be respected, then indeed it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder; a contradiction must be a contradiction of something, i.e. of some content presupposed from the start as a xed principle. 125
The argument against Kant, then, is not that the categorical imperative is contentless. The argument is that the categorical imperative presupposes it content; it takes up its content uncritically. The Kantian formulating a maxim concerning theft assumes that private property is given. As Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology, “Laws are … tested; and for the consciousness which tests them they are already given. It takes up their content simply as it is, without concerning itself … with the particularity and contingency inherent in its reality … its attitude towards it is just as uncomplicated as is its being a criterion for testing it.” 126
I think you do the same thing in thinking the abstractness of your reasoning gives it greater legitimacy but it in actuality presupposes it’s content and merely universalizes it.
This is where I am trying to emphasize the social basis of your ideas as from reality itself rather than no where or some where separated from the world itself.
An area of concern I would suggest. Especially since any universal inferences made from empirical sets are nearly always fallacious; whether by the inductive fallacy, or by any one of the fallacies of causation (cum hoc/post hoc, et al.)
An essential human nature? I don’t see it in the pronatalist argument. What I see in the is a separate debate about abortion and significance of life and personhood.
Regardless, we have a larger divide between us that would have to be closed before we could even get to specifics of sexes.
https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/For%20Ethical%20Politics.pdf#page90
-For Ethical Politics
- By Godstud
- By Rancid
- By FiveofSwords
- By wat0n