[ingliz]

will always reduce to some agent that originally proposed such a proposition as necessarily self-owning in the sense of being the agent/author of such a claim.

No.

Slaves are non-self-owners by definition and countless slaves have engaged in successful argumentation,

therefore,

you must be wrong when you claim that self-ownership is a prerequisite to debate.

Your error:

You argue that "I do not own myself" is a performative contradiction, because self-ownership is a necessary condition for speaking.

The ability to control one's body (to move one's vocal cords, tongue, lips, etc) is a necessary condition for speaking; it does not follow that the right to control one's body (self-ownership) is necessary. You simply conflate the two concepts, control and ownership, as if they were identical. This is a species of is-ought fallacy, where you jump from the "is" of control to the "ought" of ownership.

It is a non sequitur.

[Sivad]

[Victoribus Spolia]

Slaves are non-self-owners by definition and countless slaves have engaged in successful argumentation,

This is begging the question though, the premise assumes the conclusion; namely non-self-ownership.

Whether one is self-owning (as a logically inferable right) as a necessary condition of argumentation is the point of contention, thus is would be equally begging the question in a debate for me to say that "such slavery is automatically invalid because of self-ownership's given."

This is indeed my position, in point of fact, but the question at hand is whether or not such self-ownership is a necessary presupposition of the axiom of argumentation.

You argue that "I do not own myself" is a performative contradiction, because self-ownership is a necessary condition for speaking.

The ability to control one's body (to move one's vocal cords, tongue, lips, etc) is a necessary condition for speaking; it does not follow that the right to control one's body (self-ownership) is necessary. You simply conflate the two concepts, control and ownership, as if they were identical. This is a species of is-ought fallacy, where you jump from the "is" of control to the "ought" of ownership.

No, the relationship of control to ownership is simply the nature of responsible agency and the two are almost inseperable in this case.

The issue here is that implied in the notion of control is the idea that it is you who are the one making the argument, as long as this is the case, the argument is yours (owned by you) and this is the case likewise on the basis of your own control of yourself to make such an argument in the first place (and round and round we can go).

Hence, control and ownership are integral in their relation in the case of argument, that such is a necessary presupposition or precondition can be seen in how the line of distinction attempted between "control" and "ownership" results in mutual circularity, thus demonstrating its irreducible quality in this context.

Thus, in the case of argumentation, control implies self-ownership because of the nature of responsible agency itself.

Thus, there is no is-ought fallacy; likewise, we are not even talking about an imperative per se here except inasmuch as the standard of the debate (which my original debate post attempts to fulfill) is that if such rights/morals are objectively true, they must be regarded. So have I fulfilled these terms? Yes:

1. The axiom of argumentation cannot be challenged without assuming its content as true (thus it is established as axiomatic); likewise, such presupposes self-ownership which due to the agency requisite in argumentation, means that such cannot be separated from one's self-control.

2. That this is a right, and not merely a description of some event, is proven in that such a right cannot be denied without the performance of contradiction or an act of irrationality, so even if by force such a violation could take place (e.g. the slavery you mentioned) it would not invalidate the truth of the propostion; however, this is not true of mere observed behavior (what Hume's is-ought fallacy was regarding, empirical ethics).

3. My axiom and its presuppositions are not inferred from observation (is-ought); rather, they are demonstrated as logically necessary in their acknowledgement, which is all that rights ever really claim to be. They do not claim to be inviolable in the sense that no one can violate your rights by force, they are only claimed to be natural realities that cannot be rationally denied, and mine are not empirical in that instead of being a mere observed behavior in man, are actually inferred from certain axioms that cannot be denied by any agent.

I have fulfilled this requirement. No non-sequitur and no naturalistic fallacy obtain in this case.

[ingliz]

the argument is yours

No.

I stole it.

What is originality?

Undetected plagiarism.

The axiom of argumentation cannot be challenged without assuming its content as true

No.

One is not necessarily the rightful owner of a piece of property even if control of it is necessary in a debate over its ownership

Imagine that a Georgist were to argue that everyone should own a piece of landed property. The Georgist could go so far as to claim that his position is the only justifiable one. He could correctly observe that anyone debating him would necessarily grant him (the Georgist) some standing room, and then he might deduce from this true observation the conclusion that it would be a performative contradiction to deny that everyone is entitled to a piece of land. We imagine that [you] would point out to such a Georgist that using a piece of land during a debate does not entitle one to its full ownership, and [you] would be correct. But by the same token, [your] argument for ownership of one’s body falls apart; has committed the exact same fallacy as our hypothetical Georgist.

(Callahan and Murphy 2006)

There is clear distinction that all philosophers agree upon between sitting on a chair and being its owner.

they are demonstrated as logically necessary in their acknowledgement

Your attempt to derive a universal right to self-ownership from uncontroversial features of argumentation is not successful.

The mutual recognition argument is intended to show that debate implies mutual recognition of the right to exclusive control of one’s own body. However, the argument is invalid. The most that is shown by the fact that people are engaged in debate is that, for as long as they are engaged in debate, the participants treat each other as if they had the liberty to engage in debate.

That seems a banality.

The argument from pragmatic contradiction is intended to show that any norms essential to argument are binding on all people at all times. The argument is invalid because the premises concern norms that hold in debates, but the conclusion concerns norms that hold in all circumstances. The argument is unsound also because it presupposes that arguers must recognise the truth of norms, but, in fact, an arguer need only behave as if the relevant norms are true. Furthermore, the argument is parasitic on the mutual recognition argument, but fails to link up with that argument, because the norm that is the concern of the mutual recognition argument assigns moral status to people qua participants in argument, whereas the norm that is the concern of the pragmatic contradiction argument assigns moral status to people qua people.

The failure of your arguments is comprehensive.





Reason for edits: 10 is a round number

[Sivad]

self-ownership

I've never liked that term, it's confusing and it's vulgar. Individual sovereignty is clearer and more accurate.

[SolarCross]

I've never liked that term, it's confusing and it's vulgar. Individual sovereignty is clearer and more accurate.

Sovereignty is over-ruling not just ruling / ownership. A sovereign may have underlings but no master. Self-ownership does not necessarily imply being on the apex of a hierarchy. Sovereignty then is impossible for civilised people only kings, emperors and wild people can be sovereign. So self-ownership is the clearer and more accurate.

[Sivad]

Sovereignty is over-ruling not just ruling / ownership. A sovereign may have underlings but no master. Self-ownership does not necessarily imply being on the apex of a hierarchy.

It just means autonomous self-determination, being free from external control.

Sovereignty then is impossible for civilised people only kings, emperors and wild people can be sovereign.

Also . Modern democracy is based on popular sovereignty, you're just making shit up.

[SolarCross]

:knife: It just means autonomous self-determination, being free from external control.

Which isn't a condition civilised people enjoy because being subject to law is external control.

Also . Modern democracy is based on popular sovereignty, you're just making shit up.

No, it's based on political enfranchisement. Republics make the pretence that the citizens are sovereign:

In free governments, the rulers are the servants and the people their superiors and sovereigns

- Benjiman Franklin

Though in practice that is a lie.

[RhetoricThug]

Which ant in the colony understands the purpose of the colony? I see no reason to believe humans are anymore capable of understanding. Our understanding can only be based upon a belief there is anything to understand. We simply rationalize our existence. Tomorrow, someone/something may step on our anthill.

Do you think any of the ants would consider they are just aerating a meaningless piece of land? Maybe humans are just fertilizing a meaningless planet. What objective morality exists then?

Hello, forum image One Degree. RT refrained from typing out a proper response the other day because the human behind the keyboard doesn't like spending a bunch of time on Politicsforum.borg (it has a dense vibration). The reason RT returned to this thread to communicate a hand-typed message--- the man behind the keyboard is shocked to see such a similar insight manifest through the technological extension of consciousness in this thread.

Which ant in the colony understands the purpose of the colony?

This analogy is not necessarily a nihilistic reflection.

Our understanding can only be based upon a belief there is anything to understand.

Yes, we think therefore believe. Most say, I think therefore I am. Being present is an information bias.

We simply rationalize our existence.

Like RT says, Humans invent purpose. But RT isn't saying that such purpose is inherently meaningless. In-fact, it's very meaningful and fruitful. Humans instinctively wish to survive, and the rationalization of such a volatile & impermanent situation can produce many great things, like modern medicine. However, we didn't invent medicine, we discovered it.

Humans reshape the material world (resources, which is a RE-source... A permutation of the ONE source responsible for the ALL, call it God, Big-bang, etc) in their image. The components of medicine exist independently of users and uses, each component found in nature (or nurtured from nature) holds within its material expression a potential material trajectory that enables it to be combined with other natural components. The building blocks of life are discovered, not invented. Humans simply rearrange the elements and express/(re)distribute new forms or systems of BEING.

Take synthetic chemicals for instance--- can synthetic chemicals exist without technological modifications? And what is technology, isn't technology an extension of the way humans interact with reality through the mind/matter interface? See, if you break down the process which ultimately leads to medicine or any scientific discovery, you find out that humanity doesn't invent anything other than purpose. Everything that can be rationalized, invented, or discovered, is here/present. The imagination of mankind has the Midas touch, but unfortunately (and perhaps regretfully) we can fall in love with our own image.

Tomorrow, someone/something may step on our anthill.

Yes, and this remark leads to a story.

A few days ago, I was using a service environment, driving on a road paid for by co-inhabitants aka tax-payers. The truck ahead of my vehicle, traveling at about 50mph, rear-ended the car ahead of it. Onlookers immediately transformed themselves into good Samaritans. People dialed 911, a few folks rushed to the vehicle that had been rear-ended, and others checked on the person inside the truck. I got out of my vehicle and approached the rear-ended vehicle. The victim of the collision, a young caucasian male, appeared to sustain severe head trauma (his vehicle's airbag didn't deploy). His breathing was heavy, his eyes were rolled back, he had a huge gash above his right eyebrow, and his body was seizing up (muscles tightening/shock). The young man was completely unresponsive.

Two minutes later, a sheriff arrived on the scene, and we decided to move the young man's body from the vehicle. I helped to support his head and neck as he was lifted out of the vehicle and onto the ground. I discovered a deep cut on the back of his skull. The sheriff inserted a plastic bite guard in the man's mouth to prevent clenching. As we waited for medics, we tried to get an intelligible response from the victim... Meanwhile, a lady who claimed to be a trauma psychologist consoled the driver of the truck. The driver of the truck was a young caucasian female, and she appeared to be unharmed but deeply disturbed by the accident. The medics arrived within 5 minutes. I watched as the professionals performed their duties. I cleaned the blood off my hands with some wipes the medics had provided and then decided to leave the scene of the accident.



I thought about how fast it happened, I thought about how fast people responded. After mulling over the events, I came to the conclusion that if objective morality exists, it exists through our nature. We're a gregarious species, we're hardwired for empathy. And at the end of the day, we're like ants in a colony. Somewhat unawares of the way civilization is using us, as if civilization is a large autonomic nervous system.

It's easy to sit behind a keyboard and say morality is subjective. Academic and so-called philosophical axioms seem to ignore what actually happens when tragedy strikes.




Morality could be a neurobiological complex.

We can find many fascinating articles produced by The National Center for Biotechnology Information is part of the United States National Library of Medicine, a branch of the National Institutes of Health

Friends or foes: Is empathy necessary for moral behavior?

The information processing required for moral cognition is complex. Many neural regions are involved, including areas that are involved in other capacities such as emotional saliency, theory of mind, and decision-making (see Figure 1). Investigations into the neuroscience of morality have begun to shed light on the neural mechanisms underpinning moral cognition (Young & Dungan, 2012). Functional neuroimaging and lesion studies indicate that moral evaluations arise from the integration of cognitive and affective systems, and involve a network of regions comprising the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), amygdala, insula, ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) (Buckholtz & Marois, 2012; Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Moll et al., 2007; Shenhav & Greene, 2014; Yoder & Decety, 2014a).

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4241340/

Side-note:

What if man-made laws are designed by anti-social humans?

Again, The existence of objective morality or Natural Law protects us from the whim of man-made law. Humankind will be ruled by tyrants If we're unable to get a consensus going for the existence of objective morality. We have countless examples of ruthless dictators that arbitrarily deny the existence of objective morality. Pick one, and ask yourself, is that the kind of society you'd like to live in?

The survival of human civilization as one healthy autonomic nervous system depends on objective moral values that promote the social evolution of society through all aspects of human relations (physical, mental, spiritual, etc). The nuance of human relations produces intersubjectivity, but intersubjectivity operates and is contained in an objective reality. We're interconnected figures moving inside an objective ground. Morality begins where/when the figures and ground blend. This present moment and how/why we blend is the interval BEING hidden from our perceptional interface. We're born classified, smothered in subliminal love. Love is a common experience.

@Victoribus Spolia I think you make some fantastic points

@ingliz I think you make some fantastic points

@RhetoricThug We're in this together.

-ONE LOVE

[Victoribus Spolia]

Oh good. Now we may have a proper debate.

So nice for you to finally come out from under your bridge to have a decent disputation.

Lets see how long this lasts.

No.

I stole it.

What is originality?

Undetected plagiarism.

What?



We are talking about the ownership being yours in the sense that you are the one making it. Don't be facetious for the sake of rhetoric.

No.

One is not necessarily the rightful owner of a piece of property even if control of it is necessary in a debate over its ownership

Imagine that a Georgist were to argue that everyone should own a piece of landed property. The Georgist could go so far as to claim that his position is the only justifiable one. He could correctly observe that anyone debating him would necessarily grant him (the Georgist) some standing room, and then he might deduce from this true observation the conclusion that it would be a performative contradiction to deny that everyone is entitled to a piece of land. We imagine that [you] would point out to such a Georgist that using a piece of land during a debate does not entitle one to its full ownership, and [you] would be correct. But by the same token, [your] argument for ownership of one’s body falls apart; has committed the exact same fallacy as our hypothetical Georgist.

(Callahan and Murphy 2006)

There is clear distinction that all philosophers agree upon between sitting on a chair and being its owner.

You are attempting to critique self-ownership here, not the axiom of argumentation itself, argumentation itself is the term that is claimed to be axiomatic, not self-ownership. I think you have confused the two, in spite of their relationship.

Nonetheless, in address to your argument, the Georgist analogy fails, because we are not discussing transactional ownership or even appropriated ownership when we are discussing self-ownership, we are discussing what is necessary to argumentation itself which is in turn axiomatic, this is not the case for, lets say, the tree in my privately owned yard; however, more below.

The Georgist analogy you gave fails as a critique for three main reasons:

1. Equivocation- For the argument made in the analogy uses a definition that assumes appropriation of some form, this is understood by both the georgist and his hypothetical opponent in the course of their debate, and therefore in your analogy; whereas, self-ownership as a presupposition or precondition of argumentation itself assumes self-ownership as a non-appropriated state, indeed, as a state that cannot be appropriated, but which is self-evident from argumentation itself and which assumes control, responsibility, origin, and agency. From this understanding, ownership as appropriation may indeed be further inferred in addition to ownership as a state of being (and in fact, do just that), but not before hand.

2. Petito Principii-The analogy assumes what has yet to be proven, that of a legitimate means of appropriation.

3. False Analogy- The analogy is a false one, for its still possible for a scenario to exist where a person could contend the Georgist position without assuming it (like if one of them were speaking on a telephone on a distant call from an unclaimed region, like Pluto).

However, the presupposition or precondition of self-ownership is absolute in this regards as it is a necessary inference from argumentation itself, thus, if there is argument, there must be some self-owning agent on either side of the point being contended, thus there is no possible world where argumentation does not assume self-ownership (modal reasoning); however, there are possible worlds where the Georgist thesis could be contended without a performative contradiction. Thus the analogy is a false one and does not obtain.

Hence, even calling this analogy of yours a counter example of a performative contradiction is somewhat disingenuous, for one does not always have to assume the truth of the opponent's position in its contention. The opposite is true of my argument.

Let me also address your comments here (I shall italicize your accusation and then number your critique):

The argument from pragmatic contradiction is intended to show that any norms essential to argument are binding on all people at all times. The argument is invalid because the premises concern norms that hold in debates, but the conclusion concerns norms that hold in all circumstances.

(1) The argument is unsound also because it presupposes that arguers must recognize the truth of norms, but, in fact, an arguer need only behave as if the relevant norms are true.

(2) Furthermore, the argument is parasitic on the mutual recognition argument, but fails to link up with that argument, because the norm that is the concern of the mutual recognition argument assigns moral status to people qua participants in argument, whereas the norm that is the concern of the pragmatic contradiction argument assigns moral status to people qua people.

You are here characterizing my argument as falling under the composition fallacy.

This is evident from the fact that you claim I am arguing from a smaller set of norms which are relevant to argumentation only, and extrapolating from that a broader set of norms that are relevant to mankind in general. This is essentially the summary-case made in the italicized section above.

Critique #1 is more specific than your summary-case accusation made in italics, and it attempts to argue that a person engaged in argument only needs to recognize those norms as true or as are relevant to his task of debating.

Critique #2 is a similar critique to #1, but basically repeats the general charge of a composition fallacy that was mentioned in the italicized section, albeit less redundantly. I shall address critique #2 together with that charge.

Rebuttal:

1. The composition fallacy does not obtain (contra critique #2), because I am not starting with a narrow set of morals and inferring from that a whole corpus of morals which must likewise be assumed as valid, I am only inferring those "sets of morals/rights" which are necessarily inferred for argumentation to be possible for arguers at all.

2. I am not making a distinction between people qua people and arguers (a distinction which is necessary for both your critiques), I am defining people (in the context of this debate) as those engaged or capable of engaging in argument. This should be obvious from my argument.

Thus, when I present my argumentum a contrario (which you refer to as my argument from pragmatic contradiction), I am making the case that without the presumption of appropriation, no argumentation would be possible as no arguers could exist. This is clear from my original argument and it answers the fallacy you are trying conjure, for no distinction between "Arguers" in specific and "People qua People" in general is possible or even assumed.

My original debate posts only acknowledges people as those engaged in or capable of argument (actual persons), or those who could be such like children, the unborn, and the pre-conceived (potential persons).

Other "categories" of human-being are simply not relevant to this argument.

[Victoribus Spolia]

So for God's morals to be objective, everyone has to agree to existence otherwise it is opinion whether to accept his principles or not as there is no consensus.

This is what you need to prove, why does there need to be a consensus for God's commands to be objective?

How do you define objective?

No matter how many times you "repeat yourself." you argument still does not make sense, your conclusion does not follow from your premises.

But be warned VS. I suspect if there was a creator of the universe with any form of morality, it wouldn't be anything you'll find in the bible. Nature is brutal. For humans to advance, like any species before and after it, we have had to restrict our morality from what high standards we give ourselves today to something far more selfish in the past. That and pagan religions that practiced human sacrifices to please the "Gods" predate Christianity's ten commandments. So perhaps following the bible is the road to Hell and brutality is way to Valhalla.

All nonsense. the false-gods of paganism are imaginary, I have given rational demonstration for my God in the Immaterialist thread.

Feel free to challenge it.

[B0ycey]

This is what you need to prove, why does there need to be a consensus for God's commands to be objective?

How do you define objective?

It isn't how I define objective but moral VS. Being that 'moral' is a concept that requires feelings and opinions, without an accepted principle such as the existence of God, morality cannot be complemented with the term objective. Only subjective. In other words 'objective morality' is an oxymoron.

[ingliz]

without the presumption of appropriation, no argumentation would be possible

The fact that people are engaged in argumentation with each other does not imply that each of them recognises that each of them has the right to exclusive control over his own body; it does not imply that each recognises that each of them has the right to engage in debate; and it does not imply that each of them recognises that each has the liberty to engage in debate. It does imply, however, that, for the space of the debate, each behaves as if each of the participants has the liberty to control his body in a way necessary for him to engage in debate. Given that your conclusion—that participants in argument ipso facto recognise each other’s right to exclusive control over his own body—is false, even if your premises are true, your argument is invalid.

[Victoribus Spolia]

It isn't how I define objective but moral VS. Being that 'moral' is a concept that requires feelings and opinions, without an accepted principle such as the existence of God, morality cannot be complemented with the term objective. Only subjective. In other words 'objective morality' is an oxymoron.

If that is the case, you are begging the question in a debate as to whether or not morality is subjective (opinion) or objective (obligatory upon more than oneself).

For you definition assumes that which has to be proven, that morality is subjective.

Furthermore, that definition of morality is inconsistent with the philosophical definition of morality that I gave to you earlier.

Which is that morality is obligation "ought."

This is why the "is-ought" fallacy is a fallacy because of the attempt to infer "obligation" (ought) from observation (is).

Your definition is made-up and, in reality, the idea that morality is subjective is far closer to being an oxymoron, because morality means obligation and subjective means preference, and the notion of an obligating preference is an oxymoron.

If want to deny the existence of morality at all, you might as well do so, since that is what you really mean.

You only believe in the idea of people pursuing their own preferences.

[Victoribus Spolia]

The fact that people are engaged in argumentation with each other does not imply that each of them recognises that each of them has the right to exclusive control over his own body; it does not imply that each recognises that each of them has the right to engage in debate; and it does not imply that each of them recognises that each has the liberty to engage in debate. It does imply, however, that, for the space of the debate, each behaves as if each of the participants has the liberty to control his body in a way necessary for him to engage in debate. Given that your conclusion—that participants in argument ipso facto recognise each other’s right to exclusive control over his own body—is false, and that your premises are true, your argument is invalid.

I already addressed this, you are just repeating yourself as stated in Critique #1.

I already stated that the necessary presumption of appropriation, per my argumentum a contrario, applies to all actual persons as arguers in general.

If there are no arguers, there is no argumentation, thus argumentation assumes for all arguers and would-be arguers, the right of self-ownership and appropriation.

You keep ignoring my rebuttals and refuse to address them.

If you can't keep up, then perhaps this is the wrong medium of exchange for someone such as yourself.

[ingliz]

I already addressed this, you are just repeating yourself as stated in Critique #1.

Correct.

But as you refused to address the point (the point being the presumption of appropriation is not necessary for argumentation), I restated it as simply as I am able. In a form you might comprehend.

[B0ycey]

Your definition is made-up and, in reality, the idea that morality is subjective is far closer to being an oxymoron, because morality means obligation and subjective means preference, and the notion of an obligating preference is an oxymoron.

If want to deny the existence of morality at all, you might as well do so, since that is what you really mean.

You only believe in the idea of people pursuing their own preferences.

And now we have finally reached the conclusion of this little debate. As morality is indeed the principle of distinction between right or wrong, you have no idea what morality is. You cannot just make definitions up and think you know what you are talking about.

Perhaps pick up a dictionary before declaring the philosophical high ground. Your whole argument has fallen apart from your lack of comprehension of a single word.

But as I said earlier, my aim is not to teach you, but to highlight to anyone who cares that you are wrong. I think I have succeeded here a while ago now so perhaps I am now bored and will just ignore you from now on.

[ingliz]

a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation.

Your argument.

(a) A necessary condition of argumentation is that q is true.
(b) In order to decide a truth claim, one must argue.
(c) Therefore, one can dispute the truth of q, only if q is true.
(d) Therefore, anyone who disputes the truth of q is mistaken.
(e) Therefore, q is true.

Premise (a) is false whatever norm of argumentation you may choose because participants in argument need not recognise the truth of q : They need only behave as if it is true.

For example, an error theorist thinks that all moral propositions are false (and thus that the supposed norm is false) because moral propositions ascribe moral properties to things and things do not have moral properties. The error theorist nevertheless often behaves as if specific moral principles are true. In particular, when arguing, he will behave as if it is true that he ought to treat his interlocutors as if they had the liberty to argue, but he will not recognise this norm as true - he may regard it simply as a useful fiction (Arguments invoking mutual recognition are crap because whatever can be explained by an agent’s recognition of another’s moral status can equally well be explained by the agent’s pretending that the other has that moral status in order to interact with him in a way that serves the agent’s purpose).

You lose.

Premise (b) can be challenged by the claim that we might know some things immediately, without argument, such as self evident truths.

You lose.

What does (e) say?

a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation.

So, the norm identified by "q" is:

Each participant in argument has the moral right to exclusive control over her own body.

However, this falls short of your intended conclusion, which is:

Every person (whether engaged in argument or not) has the moral right to exclusive control over her own body.

You lose.

Can this gap be bridged? One might try to get from one to t'other by means of the following sub-argument:

People have a particular right in virtue of being participants in argument;

every person has the capacity to participate in argument;

so, every person has that particular right.

However, this sub-argument is invalid, for participants in argument might have the right in question only because, and while, they are participating in argument, in which case people who are only potentially participants in argument might not have that right. This would be similar to the way in which a tenant has the right to use a property only because, and while, he pays the rent. So saying that each participant in argument has the moral right to exclusive control over his own body is true, is not the same as saying that every person (whether engaged in argument or not) has the moral right to exclusive control over his own body.

You lose.

Your argument was doomed anyway.

A limitation of such arguments is that the truth of the proposition, p, is conditional upon the occurrence of an instance of the type of activity, A. You chose to overlook this limitation and assert p unconditionally.

[Victoribus Spolia]

Your argument.

(a) A necessary condition of argumentation is that q is true.
(b) In order to decide a truth claim, one must argue.
(c) Therefore, one can dispute the truth of q, only if q is true.
(d) Therefore, anyone who disputes the truth of q is mistaken.
(e) Therefore, q is true.

Premise (a) is false, whatever norm of argumentation you may choose, because participants in argument need not recognise the truth of q. Error theorists may regard it simply as a useful fiction: They need only behave as if it is true (Arguments invoking mutual recognition are crap per se because whatever can be explained by an agent’s recognition of another’s moral status can equally well be explained by the agent’s pretending that the other has that moral status in order to interact with him in a way that serves the agent’s purpose).

You lose.

Nonsense, your distinction between pretending and truth is silly, for "pretending" cannot be called a necessary condition of an axiom that itself cannot be denied. A proposition which is a necessary condition for another established reality (in this case the axiom), is itself true necessarily:

P implies Q, if P is true, Q is true.

The-Axiom-of-Argumentation (P) implies The-Necessary-Presumption-Of-Mutual-Self-Ownership (Q).

The-Axiom-Of-Argumentation (P) is True [Demonstrated in that it cannot be denied]

Therefore,

The-Necessary-Presumption-Of-Self-Ownership (Q) is True.

(Q) is True, not pretend.

-Modus Ponens

I Win.

Premise (b) can be challenged by the claim that we might know some things immediately, without argument, such as self evident truths.

You lose.

Only propositions can be true or false.

Self-evident truths are no exception to this, even if their truth can only be demonstrated via axiomatic or transcendental reasoning (including modus tollens, modus ponens, et al.)

I win.

What does (e) say?

a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation.

So, the norm identified by "q" is:

Each participant in argument has the moral right to exclusive control over her own body.

However, this falls short of your intended conclusion, which is:

Every person (whether engaged in argument or not) has the moral right to exclusive control over her own body.

You lose.

Ah.

I get your point a bit better now, and you are correct.

You cannot infer self-ownership for all people from it being necessarily inferred from argumentation itself. However, I said this in the original debate post if you remember;

This is to say nothing else than that a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation. Indeed, it is impossible to deny this and claim this denial to be true without implicitly having to admit its truth, the contrary yielding only the disqualification of one’s own argument [you no longer claim to be making any argument].

[Notice in bold].

However, this is not the point in my argument where I expand self-ownership to potential-arguers, that occurs later.

I do that in my argumentum a contrario by arguing that if the presumption of self-ownership's implication of appropriation is regarded as false (for all would-be arguers), then no argumentation would be possible. You cannot have arguers without would-be arguers, argumentation as the starting point establishes self-ownership, and self-ownership alone, for arguers alone.; however, the argumentum a contrario establishes appropriation rights for all -would be-arguers and therefore also their self-ownership rights as well.

You were just sloppy and confused in your analysis of my argument, which makes your error somewhat predictable.

I win.

Can this gap be bridged? One might try to get from one to t'other by means of the following sub-argument:

People have a particular right in virtue of being participants in argument;

every person has the capacity to participate in argument;

so, every person has that particular right.

However, this sub-argument is invalid, for participants in argument might have the right in question only because, and while, they are participating in argument, in which case people who are only potentially participants in argument might not have that right. This would be similar to the way in which a tenant has the right to use a property only because, and while, he pays the rent. So saying that each participant in argument has the moral right to exclusive control over his own body is true, is not the same as saying that every person (whether engaged in argument or not) has the moral right to exclusive control over his own body.

You lose.

This critique would be valid, if that was my argument; however, I do not claim that self-ownership for all people can be inferred from the axiom of argumentation by itself. I specifically preempted this objection in my original debate post.

I only extrapolate from the specific instance of self-ownership for arguers to would-be arguers via the argumentum a contrario regarding appropriation. That is the "bridge" you speak of, and it is successful.

I win.

Your argument was doomed anyway.

[ingliz]

Perhaps my argument is too subtle for you.

a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body must be presupposed as long as there is argumentation.

I have shown "a mutual recognition of each person's exclusive control over his own body" is not necessary for argumentation to occur.

If P is true, Q is true

"P" is false.

Your argument fails.

You lose.