SolarCross wrote:No it doesn't
Indeed, and it does not seem you are interested in merely analyzing my argument for purposes of constructive criticism, but instead to toss your hat into the ring, eh ol' chap? If its a debate you want, a debate you shall get.
SolarCross wrote:Could you infer self-ownership in a entity which made an argument in a language you did not understand?
This would not be an argument, as the truth of a proposition was not being settled via dispute, but this example is quite besides the point, as the issue is whether or not self-ownership can be inferred from argumentation as an axiom and a
synthetic a priori proposition. Which manifestly has nothing to do with this hypothetical of yours.
SolarCross wrote:The components of self-ownership are self-will and self-power, if both are present in an entity then self-ownership is demonstrated.
This is your own definition, and to impute to my argument is to commit
the fallacy of equivocation, in my debate post I used self-ownership only to mean control of one's own self in regards to making the argument. Your definitions are your own and as the one making the argument I reserve the right to determine my own definitions. Your definitions may indeed be descriptive aspects of my own, but they are ambiguous and not my own nonetheless.
SolarCross wrote:This is because there are no natural rights beyond the right of might.
This is a positive claim that goes beyond an analysis of the argument I gave, rather it is an assertion that requires proof.
Furthermore, let it be noted that if you are serious about this claim, then you forfeit any right to criticize gulags and mass graves, blood for the blood god, and skulls for the skull throne. If might makes right, then you have lost all basis for critique of the very moral systems your propose to critique, which is why I am having this debate against Potemkin the communist in the first place.
SolarCross wrote:If observing wilful behaviour in another is insufficient for demonstrating self-ownership then observing another make an argument will be insufficient too.
False, your mistake here is assuming that my claim is grounded in observation, its not.
I am making an axiomatic claim;
argumentation occurs. The demonstration of that axiom is instantly proven the moment it is challenged.
Period.
I am not "observing people having arguments" and then "inferring" from that observation that there must be self-ownership. Like I said in my last post;
"those are very different claims."
I said this because the former is an assertion of an axiom, the latter is an attempt to infer rights from observed activity. The former is a deductive argument, the latter would necessarily be inductive or naturalistic. Thus, my arguing that inferring agency from the observation of animal behavior is fallacious is true, but this same argument does not apply to my claim that the axiom of argumentation presupposes, logically, self-ownership. They are radically different claims.
SolarCross wrote:Contractual slavery is a performative contradiction.
Note the remark in bold, "performative contradictions" are very specific types of contradictions in philosophy, they only occur when the argument being made assumes what is being argued against. Thus, your claim that slavery is inconsistent with the notion of contractual agreement, if true, cannot be a performative contradiction, its just a plain contradiction.
A performative contradiction is more fundamental, like if you were to say; "logic is false."
That is a performative contradiction because the performance of the argument is self-refuting as any claim made against logic, assumes the validity of logic
in the performance of the argument.
Now that I got that out of the way.....
SolarCross wrote:If you choose to be a "slave" in return for a positive reward then you are a hired servant not a slave.
Depends on what you mean by "positive reward", for being allowed to live is technically a positive reward; however, if we were to assume your argument it would be impossible to sell yourself into slavery, and since all societies that practiced actual slavery comprehended such a practice, its pretty safe to assume your definition is far too narrow. Likewise, such a definition would not comprehend certain biblical definitions of slavery, nor would it comprehend serfdom, which is also considered a form of slavery (even the word serf means slave); likewise, it would not comprehend debt-slaves.
SolarCross wrote:The word slave for clarity should be reserved for involuntary servitude.
If slavery is entirely involuntary, then it is inconsistent with the argument I am making and Anarcho-Capitalism, with the possible exception of slavery in the form of retribution (war captives) taken in response to aggression and loss. That qualification aside, I have stated this in one of the libertarian threads as well.
Chattel slavery is inconsistent with Anarcho-Capitalist principles, but not all slavery is chattel slavery.SolarCross wrote:A threat is a subset of argument. If a propositional claim of truth is an argument then to say "I am a nice guy" is an argument. If I say "I am going to kill you" then I am also making a propositional claim of truth which is therefore also an argument, it is an argument deployed for the purpose of making a threat
A proposition must either be true or false and can be determined via argument, a threat does not meet this criteria as it cannot be established as either true or false via argument; hence a threat is not an argument and I don't know what you mean when you call it a "subset."
A declaration of intent is different than a declaration of truth or falsity. I cannot assess a declaration of intent as being either true or false in the course of argument. Hence, it does not meet the criteria of argument as I had defined it.
Thus threats do not support your attempted response against my position.
SolarCross wrote:Yes I can see that as an acknowledgement of the fact of your self-ownership
This is an admission
which is sufficient for the establishing of my claims.
SolarCross wrote:but not that I should care about respecting it, that you have a right to it or that I couldn't take it from you.
Which is a seperate and irrelevant matter to the point of my argument and its validity.
That you intend to kill me, subjugate me, or disrespect the reality of my self-ownership, does not negate that such is necessarily presupposed in argumentation itself. Self-ownership follows from the undeniable-axiom-of-human-argumentation, and is therefore itself irrational to deny as a necessary presuppositional inference. Period.
SolarCross wrote:because by convincing you to kill yourself I have exactly demonstrated complete contempt for your self-ownership as much as if I had stabbed you myself.
Non-Sequitur. Contempt is NOT negation.
You can have contempt for my self-ownership, but you cannot logically deny it, for even in the process of you arguing your denial,
you are presuming its validity.
Like I already stated, such self-ownership is a necessarily inferred presupposition of the axiom of human argumentation, which itself cannot be denied without a performative contradiction (a REAL performative contradiction mind you).
SolarCross wrote:The reason why I might try convincing instead of physically stabbing will come down to a completely tactical analysis: I might be physically weak but devious while you are strong but emotionally vulnerable, thus persuasion is simply offers a better risk/reward ratio. I may have a better chance of escaping legal complications too.
This may all be valid, but it is irrelevant to the claim I am making.
Whether convincing me to kill myself accomplishes "your end goal" the same as killing me yourself is entirely irrelevant to the matter of whether convincing me through argument to kill myself constitutes an act of aggression.
Otherwise, there would be no ostensive difference between forcing someone to believe something at gunpoint, and them believing it voluntarily.
The distinction would evaporate, which is clearly nonsense. There is a difference between conversion by assent and conversion by coercion, there is a difference between being convinced of an argument for communism, and being forced to be a communist under threat of termination. Your argument is saying that there is no difference.
Thus, if you convince someone to commit suicide, even if it accomplishes the same end as you simply killing them, the difference is still significant because you assumed their self-ownership in the very act of convincing them necessarily (whether you actually believe it or not is irrelevant);
you did NOT violate their natural rights in "convincing them" to kill themselves, this would not be the case if you aggressed directly.Otherwise, would you really say there is no difference between me attempting to get you to convert to Christianity by making an appeal to your reason and forcing you to convert by the sword, even if the ends were the same (your conversion)?
Its the same argument and its clearly absurd.