[annatar1914]

@annatar1914

To clarify, what the Greeks meant by "the best" is the best qualified to govern. Plato felt that only a well educated populace in a democracy would elect the "the best" qualified to govern. The notion of "the best" is NOT "the strongest" in the same context as you placed in your above post. "The best" merely means the best qualified to govern. This is why I say the Greeks were right and it makes sense. The Greeks didn't advocate a Darwanian notion of only having "the strongest" or "fittest" to govern. They advocated having "the best qualified" to govern.

@Politics_Observer ;

The very existence of this Forum and the arguments here show that many disagree even now as to the ''best'' or ''most qualified'' to rule, everywhere in all places and at all times there is this contention about it. Ideally we would want the most moral of leaders in power, and it's a great blessing, but it is also as rare as moral persons are themselves.

However, there is another function of government in any society, to restrain everyone at least a little bit so that everyone gets something rather than everyone except a few get nothing. To even have a society means that there is a tacit agreement among it's members to restrain some of our individual greed and desires and allow for the fact of everyone having something of what they wish, even if it means some get more than others. But when a society cannot restrain the greed and envy of it's individual members it's dissolution is near, unless it forces restraint, law and order, upon them. This is even true when the leaders of a society are greedy and selfish themselves, the immoral still put a check on the immoral.

But when the great mass of people learn via demogogues that they can plunder the common funds to reward themselves on some pretext or other, and squeeze other citizens of what they have, the whole society descends into chaos and war.

So on a practical level, I'd say yes, calling for ''the best'' to rule only leads to destruction.

[Politics_Observer]

@annatar1914

The very existence of this Forum and the arguments here show that many disagree even now as to the ''best'' or ''most qualified'' to rule, everywhere in all places and at all times there is this contention about it. Ideally we would want the most moral of leaders in power, and it's a great blessing, but it is also as rare as moral persons are themselves.

However, there is another function of government in any society, to restrain everyone at least a little bit so that everyone gets something rather than everyone except a few get nothing. To even have a society means that there is a tacit agreement among it's members to restrain some of our individual greed and desires and allow for the fact of everyone having something of what they wish, even if it means some get more than others. But when a society cannot restrain the greed and envy of it's individual members it's dissolution is near, unless it forces restraint, law and order, upon them. This is even true when the leaders of a society are greedy and selfish themselves, the immoral still put a check on the immoral.

But when the great mass of people learn via demogogues that they can plunder the common funds to reward themselves on some pretext or other, and squeeze other citizens of what they have, the whole society descends into chaos and war.

So on a practical level, I'd say yes, calling for ''the best'' to rule only leads to destruction.

It's not necessarily true that the immoral will check the immoral. This line of thinking leads one to believe that the immoral are well qualified to combat what is immoral. Those who are immoral are not very well suited to combating the immoral of society. In many cases, the immoral will work together to commit even more immoral acts. True, sometimes the immoral will do harm to the immoral, but that's not necessarily checking that which is immoral.

It is also important to considered when making decisions that have moral implications we have to take emotion out of the equation and put reason into the equation. The reason for this is that taking emotion out of the equation and injecting reason to base decisions on makes those moral decisions more consistent and fair. If we appeal to our own personal feelings rather than reason then our moral decisions will be subjective and hence inconsistent. So, as a society, we would want to elect leaders who will base their moral decisions on reason rather than emotion to ensure consistency and fairness in decisions that will affect the rest of society.

[annatar1914]

@annatar1914



It's not necessarily true that the immoral will check the immoral. This line of thinking leads one to believe that the immoral are well qualified to combat what is immoral. Those who are immoral are not very well suited to combating the immoral of society. In many cases, the immoral will work together to commit even more immoral acts. True, sometimes the immoral will do harm to the immoral, but that's not necessarily checking that which is immoral.

It is also important to considered when making decisions that have moral implications we have to take emotion out of the equation and put reason into the equation. The reason for this is that taking emotion out of the equation and injecting reason to base decisions on makes those moral decisions more consistent and fair. If we appeal to our own personal feelings rather than reason then our moral decisions will be subjective and hence inconsistent. So, as a society, we would want to elect leaders who will base their moral decisions on reason rather than emotion to ensure consistency and fairness in decisions that will affect the rest of society.

@Politics_Observer ;

But there's a real paradox involved with this, first of all because while it seems reasonable to rule and decide things rationally, it is not reasonable to expect that from a realistic appraisal of our fellow human beings. Note my signature line, from Dostyoevsky. Man will even make a decision that appears totally irrational if it is the free choice he believes it to be, and will tear down any option that limits his possibilities even if that less-free option is the logically better one.

The second paradox is that the wicked really do restrain-but not totally-the wicked, because power eliminates them to a degree that allows societies to exist (which is a natural good), but cannot fully avoid the evils and sufferings within even a peaceful everyday existence. Both you and I can probably agree that were there no government at all, people would all but exterminate themselves in a matter of days until government were restored.

Reason is great, but even the best of us are not entirely so, entirely dispassionate. And it's not clear that in man's integral freedom that an attempt to be so would be completely wise in itself.

[Patrickov]

Ideally we would want the most moral of leaders in power, and it's a great blessing, but it is also as rare as moral persons are themselves.

I think of other points of consideration:

1. Morality does not always mean competence. I still think Jimmy Carter is one of the most moral leaders in recent history (and he became president for this very reason. Mind you, I never view Ford as immoral either) yet he's often seen as incompetent. Meanwhile, other leaders fell because they became relatively more moral (e.g. Gaddafi). In some cases, the display morality often means one's inability to control the situation and the need of this as a last resort.

2. Power itself can distort one's morality. The only aspect I disagree with Political Observer is that he believes the (often bad) personality with power is the "true" one, while I think it merely a distortion by power.

[Politics_Observer]

@Patrickov

2. Power itself can distort one's morality. The only aspect I disagree with Political Observer is that he believes the (often bad) personality with power is the "true" one, while I think it merely a distortion by power.

Well, in the Stanford Prison Experiment, they sought to eliminate the "bad apples" in the barrel to test to see if the barrel itself was bad. However, how can one be sure that the participants in the Stanford Prison Experiment were not "bad apples" themselves? Just because they didn't have criminal records doesn't mean they were not "bad apples."

That being said, it would appear that power can distort one's morality, can be addictive and bad for the person who wields it for too long. Take Vladimir Putin for example. My understanding is that he didn't even want power when he became President but once he assumed power, over time, he became worse and worse because of the addictive and coercive effects of power.

So, given some of what we observed in the Stanford Prison Experiment and what we observed with political leaders who wield unchecked absolute power it's probably important to have the following:

• A system with VERY REAL checks and balances against those who have and wield power in political settings or institutional settings that serve the public. These checks and balances need to have REAL TEETH and not just be symbolic or not have any sort of real teeth.
  
• All politicans who wield power need term limits. That includes members of Congress or Parliament or whichever the legislative body might be in any given country and also includes leaders or Presidents or Prime Ministers of countries. Any institution that serves the public good needs to have term limits on those that lead them in addition to check and balances against their power that have real teeth. These checks and balances having real teeth need to extend to those below these leaders that wield power to some of their subordinates that wield power as well.
  
  The reason for this, when looking at the Stanford Prison Experiment and what happened at Abu Grahib during the Iraq War is to prevent power from harming those that wield that power and making them worse off than they were before wielding that power AND to protect the public from somebody who turns sadistic and evil and using that unchecked absolute power to oppress others. So checks and balances and term limits on power not only protect the public but also those that wield that power themselves.

[GandalfTheGrey]

Power takes away our inhibitions and reveals to the world who we really are in our true character. We can act as who we really are without fear of punishment. When we do not possess power, we do not always act as who we really are because we could face punishment for doing so. Thus, our true character is not shown when we do not possess power.

My problem with this analysis is the assumption that power merely 'reveals' true character - as opposed to it actually causing it to change.

The old adage - power corrupts.

You refer to the Stanford Prison experiment. There are other similar cases - including the high school teacher who basically turned some of his class members into neo-nazi thugs by creating a sort of militant class cult. I forget who it was, but there was a movie made about it. In such dramatic cases of character transformation, I think it would be a hard-sell to argue that all these seemingly normal students/kids were at heart brutal thugs all along - thwarted only by not having a sufficient level of power. It would be a pretty sad and scary indictment on humanity if it was true. Surely its far more plausible to say that their character fundamentally changed when they were given power?

This of course then raises the question - what defines their "true" character - and is their "pre-power" character any more "true" than their "post-power" character? I don't really have an answer to that. However it doesn't invalidate the core problem I have with Plato's analysis - which seems to insist that the role of power is "character revealing" rather than "character transforming".

[Potemkin]

My problem with this analysis is the assumption that power merely 'reveals' true character - as opposed to it actually causing it to change.

The old adage - power corrupts.

You refer to the Stanford Prison experiment. There are other similar cases - including the high school teacher who basically turned some of his class members into neo-nazi thugs by creating a sort of militant class cult. I forget who it was, but there was a movie made about it. In such dramatic cases of character transformation, I think it would be a hard-sell to argue that all these seemingly normal students/kids were at heart brutal thugs all along - thwarted only by not having a sufficient level of power. It would be a pretty sad and scary indictment on humanity if it was true. Surely its far more plausible to say that their character fundamentally changed when they were given power?

This of course then raises the question - what defines their "true" character - and is their "pre-power" character any more "true" than their "post-power" character? I don't really have an answer to that. However it doesn't invalidate the core problem I have with Plato's analysis - which seems to insist that the role of power is "character revealing" rather than "character transforming".

I think Plato was referring more to potential rather than realised character. After all, human beings have all sorts of potential behaviours locked up inside us, which can only be actualised in concrete situations. It is such actualisation which, in some sense, gives other people our 'measure', which tells them what sort of person we actually are. In fact, it is only then that we ourselves discover who we are, as our character is formed by what we do.

[GandalfTheGrey]

I think Plato was referring more to potential rather than realised character. After all, human beings have all sorts of potential behaviours locked up inside us, which can only be actualised in concrete situations. It is such actualisation which, in some sense, gives other people our 'measure', which tells them what sort of person we actually are. In fact, it is only then that we ourselves discover who we are, as our character is formed by what we do.

Social psychology would argue that our "character" and "who we are" is shaped entirely by the social context we find ourselves in and how we identify ourselves in those contexts. I guess this view looks at character the opposite way to what Plato did: rather than having a set of pre-existing potential behaviours that may or may not be actualised depending on what situations we find ourselves in - we actually start out as a 'clean slate', and are only able to acquire behaviours, and even potential behaviours once we get exposed to our various character-defining social contexts.

I'm not sure if I entirely subscribe to this view, but the point I was making basically comes from this line of thinking: that social and environmental contexts form character - more or less from scratch, as opposed to 'actualising' or revealing character that is pre-existing.

Also a brief comment on Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment - and others similar...

As shocking as they seem to be, I would also point out the fact that it is still a staged experiment, and most importantly, that the participants - however "off the rails" they might have seemed - always remained aware of this. As such, right up until the point the experiment was prematurely aborted, everything they did was accepted and legitimised, not necessarily as acceptable behaviour in the real world, but acceptable role-play or even acting within the rules of the experiment. Yes of course they were dicks, and probably got more jollies from their "roleplay" than the organiser(s), or outside observers would expect - yet despite all that it remained a clearly defined roleplay, not real world behaviour.

Make what you will of that in terms of what it revealed about "true character".

[Potemkin]

Social psychology would argue that our "character" and "who we are" is shaped entirely by the social context we find ourselves in and how we identify ourselves in those contexts. I guess this view looks at character the opposite way to what Plato did: rather than having a set of pre-existing potential behaviours that may or may not be actualised depending on what situations we find ourselves in - we actually start out as a 'clean slate', and are only able to acquire behaviours, and even potential behaviours once we get exposed to our various character-defining social contexts.

I'm not sure if I entirely subscribe to this view, but the point I was making basically comes from this line of thinking: that social and environmental contexts form character - more or less from scratch, as opposed to 'actualising' or revealing character that is pre-existing.

I suspect the truth lies somewhere in between. We are not a 'tabula rasa', but neither do we have a fully-formed pre-existing 'character' which our actions only reveal. There is likely to be a dialectical relation between our identity and our social environment....

Also a brief comment on Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment - and others similar...

As shocking as they seem to be, I would also point out the fact that it is still a staged experiment, and most importantly, that the participants - however "off the rails" they might have seemed - always remained aware of this. As such, right up until the point the experiment was prematurely aborted, everything they did was accepted and legitimised, not necessarily as acceptable behaviour in the real world, but acceptable role-play or even acting within the rules of the experiment. Yes of course they were dicks, and probably got more jollies from their "roleplay" than the organiser(s), or outside observers would expect - yet despite all that it remained a clearly defined roleplay, not real world behaviour.

Make what you will of that in terms of what it revealed about "true character".

As Kurt Vonnegut pointed out, "We are what we pretend to be. We should therefore be very careful what we pretend to be." We wear masks, we adopt various social roles, and we always seem to think that our inner being somehow transcends these roles, that we can cast off our various masks whenever we please. Yet underneath these masks, we have no true face, only further masks....

[Wellsy]

We all play our part but some better than others.

[ckaihatsu]

So, you bring up morals which I think is an important aspect to consider when discussing power. I would say moral philosophy is the study of how human actions that affect beings capable of being harmed in some way (both humans and animals) and the principles that people appeal to when they act. People with power make decisions and some of those decisions have moral implications. A populace educated in the principles of moral philosophy can better choose leaders who will make decisions that have positive moral implications. But how would you define what is moral? How would you define an act that has positive moral implications? What exactly is it about that decision that makes that decision have positive moral implications? What makes an act or decision permissible or impermissible? Obligator? Or supererogatory? Should morals be also duty based?

This line, though, plays right into the overall assumption that society has to be *hierarchical* ('better choose leaders'), and that decision-making can't just be *mass*-based, and bottom-up.

Given mass conditions in common -- the need for food, housing, etc. -- 'agreement' would follow that people need food and housing, etc., which would be virtually unanimous and unopposable if the ruling-class-type elitism of a separatist specialized administration (capitalist governance or Stalinist-type bureaucratic elitism) could be disavowed and made superfluous.

The kind of 'morals' that you speak of are really a matter of *substitutionist*-type politics, meaning how do individuals work-over the choices for Tweedledee or Tweedledum to be their chosen substitutionist representative. Really, these matters of political *personnel* serve to obfuscate the politics *itself*, meaning the *issues* at hand, from real-world mass conditions.


Anatomy of a Platform

Spoiler: show

3-Dimensional Axes of Social Reality

Spoiler: show

And:


Components of Social Production

Spoiler: show

[Robert Urbanek]

In the information age, we have people like Bill Gates and Mark Zuckerberg who acquired great power, at least initially, not through greed but through innovations that captured a huge market share and created quasi-monopolies.

The true struggle for power may not be in the halls of government but in who controls access to information, and determining the character of such people has not been an easy task.

[ckaihatsu]

Social psychology would argue that our "character" and "who we are" is shaped entirely by the social context we find ourselves in and how we identify ourselves in those contexts. I guess this view looks at character the opposite way to what Plato did: rather than having a set of pre-existing potential behaviours that may or may not be actualised depending on what situations we find ourselves in - we actually start out as a 'clean slate', and are only able to acquire behaviours, and even potential behaviours once we get exposed to our various character-defining social contexts.

I'm not sure if I entirely subscribe to this view, but the point I was making basically comes from this line of thinking: that social and environmental contexts form character - more or less from scratch, as opposed to 'actualising' or revealing character that is pre-existing.

Also a brief comment on Zimbardo's Stanford Prison Experiment - and others similar...

As shocking as they seem to be, I would also point out the fact that it is still a staged experiment, and most importantly, that the participants - however "off the rails" they might have seemed - always remained aware of this. As such, right up until the point the experiment was prematurely aborted, everything they did was accepted and legitimised, not necessarily as acceptable behaviour in the real world, but acceptable role-play or even acting within the rules of the experiment. Yes of course they were dicks, and probably got more jollies from their "roleplay" than the organiser(s), or outside observers would expect - yet despite all that it remained a clearly defined roleplay, not real world behaviour.

Make what you will of that in terms of what it revealed about "true character".

I'm not sure if I entirely subscribe to this view, but the point I was making basically comes from this line of thinking: that social and environmental contexts form character - more or less from scratch, as opposed to 'actualising' or revealing character that is pre-existing.

I suspect the truth lies somewhere in between. We are not a 'tabula rasa', but neither do we have a fully-formed pre-existing 'character' which our actions only reveal. There is likely to be a dialectical relation between our identity and our social environment....

As Kurt Vonnegut pointed out, "We are what we pretend to be. We should therefore be very careful what we pretend to be." We wear masks, we adopt various social roles, and we always seem to think that our inner being somehow transcends these roles, that we can cast off our various masks whenever we please. Yet underneath these masks, we have no true face, only further masks....

I'll immodestly note that I developed the following diagrams for practical (discussion-board-type) situations / discussions such as this one -- we have to include *both* 'subjective' *and* 'objective' portions of social reality in any given situational (political) assessment in front of us:


[6] Worldview Diagram

Spoiler: show

Worldview Diagram

Spoiler: show

[ckaihatsu]

The Philosophy of Power

What Stephanie / postmodernists mainly mean here is 'influence', and not 'power'.

Yes, military prowess *is* power, since militaristic hegemony determines the world's reserve currency and international finance policy (IMF, World Bank).

But at the *interpersonal* scale people have the legal freedom to *walk away* and to not-sustain any given personal relationships, so the invoking of 'power' for that scale is *misapplied*. People's ground-level, arbitrary, voluntary interpersonal relationships are subject to *influence*, but not really 'power', because of this freedom to walk-away, though Marxists will note that *all* social relationships are ultimately mediated through capitalist *commodities*, since the overall capitalist political economy is based on *commodity production*, for the things that people need and want.

Unfortunately this postmodernist position / focus, towards the *interpersonal* scale, implies a 'psychological determinism', meaning that it treats individuals as 'black boxes' that are only defined in terms of external social forces ('influence', 'power'), foregoing the individual's own individuality, cognition, and decision-making / self-determination -- crude *behaviorism*, in other words.


philosophical abstractions

Spoiler: show

Worldview Diagram

Spoiler: show

And:


‭History, Macro-Micro -- politics-logistics-lifestyle

Spoiler: show

[late]

Forest v. trees...

You guys are tree guys, you focus on the individuals.

I'm a forest guy, I focus on the forest the trees live in. The institutions, the cultures, the formal and informal power structures.

[ckaihatsu]

Forest v. trees...

You guys are tree guys, you focus on the individuals.

I'm a forest guy, I focus on the forest the trees live in. The institutions, the cultures, the formal and informal power structures.

History, Macro-Micro -- politics-logistics-lifestyle

Spoiler: show

[1] History, Macro Micro -- Precision

Spoiler: show