[noemon]

Dude, this position you posted from marxism.org:

"Pragmatists think that the history of attempts to isolate the True or the Good, or to define the word “true” or “good,” supports their suspicion that there is no interesting work to be done in this area. It might, of course, have turned out otherwise. People have, oddly enough, found something interesting to say about the essence of Force and the definition of “number.” They might have found something interesting to say about the essence of Truth. But in fact they haven’t. The history of attempts to do so, and of criticisms of such attempts, is roughly coextensive with the history of that literary genre we call “philosophy” – a genre founded by Plato. So pragmatists see the Platonic tradition as having outlived its usefulness. This does not mean that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think we should ask those questions any more. When they suggest that we not ask questions about the nature of Truth and Goodness, they do not invoke a theory about the nature of reality or knowledge or man which says that “there is no such thing” as Truth or Goodness. Nor do they have a “relativistic” or “subjectivist” theory of Truth or Goodness. They would simply like to change the subject. They are in a position analogous to that of secularists who urge that research concerning the Nature, or the Will, of God does not get us anywhere. Such secularists are not saying that God does not exist, exactly; they feel unclear about what it would mean to affirm His existence, and thus about the point of denying it. Nor do they have some special, funny, heretical view about God. They just doubt that the vocabulary of theology is one we ought to be using."

Is:

I don't like vanilla I only like chocolate. There is no argument posted, no rebuttal, no addressing, no explaining why. Just I hate vanilla. Perhaps you believe that this is the pinnacle that disproves Aristotle's god proof, but in reality it does not disprove anything, just like a child not liking vanilla, does not mean that vanilla is a bad flavour, or that nobody likes it.

You claimed that "people proved Aristotle's God proof wrong". You have yet to post a single argument to that effect.

[Wellsy]

[url]rickroderick.org/301-paul-ricoeur-the-masters-of-suspicion-1993/[/url]

I will use for example… I will just mention an article by the philosopher Richard Rorty called “The World Well Lost“. This is the upshoot now remember of a tradition that is at least 2500 years old, and now that tradition is produced in tiny little articles – four, five page articles – in journals that are read by a number of people that’s a small enough number that if they were all in a boat and it sank, they would have no readership. And it could be a small boat, it wouldn’t need to be Lusitania, it could be a raft, perhaps. But in any case, Rorty in one of these journals wrote an article called “The World Well Lost” and developed a principle that I think has become widespread toward the end of the 20th Century, concerning philosophy’s role in informing us about ourself, or about the world.

The title itself indicates it: “The World Well Lost”; Rorty’s view is that any problem that has been around for 2500 years for which we still don’t have a solution, the right response by the contemporary philosopher is “I don’t care”. And the charm of Rorty’s answer is it’s so American. It’s deeply rooted in our culture, in both the anti-intellectualism of our culture, in our fear of eggheads and so on, and so in that sense it has a double significance. Positively it means that the work of intellectuals has always been separated off from the work of ordinary people. In other words, you have to be freed from the constraints of manual labour. When I was a dishwasher, I didn’t have a lot of time to do this. When I was a union organiser, I didn’t have a lot of time to do this. Any time I was involved in manual labour, I didn’t really have the time to do this intellectual work.

That separation, that fateful separation between intellectual and manual labour has been with philosophy throughout. It’s rather disappointing though to have that tradition – the great tradition of thinking in general – be reduced to a comment like “Well, gee… I don’t care. We haven’t figured it out”

This is characteristic of pragmatism which is concerned with effects and outcomes more so than a particular method or means other than individual action achieving a desired outcome. There is no theory of truth as much as asking a question does it work? Not how does it work.


And a compatibility view of free will is compatible with God and a determined world I which a free choice is necessarily constrained an often the rational choice may be a specific choice. You may choose otherwise but in a sense it is from not understanding things properly and so less free.

If God exists then rejection of God is a kind of freedom that comes from being misguided about the nature of things and ones place within it. One would make irrational choices based in this misunderstanding.

There can be a suspicion cast upon the psychology of humans in their rejection of God in the same way Freud casts suspicion of God being some fatherly figure projected for our comfort. The idea being a rejection born from anger and a disconnection God’s love and a tendency to a narrow hate and fixation on pain which is unconsciously driven. In both cases it's not enough consciously deny it because its not a conscious thing.

But the idea that nonsenous thing have reality isn’t nonsensical because the effort of nominalists to deny universals or concepts is unspeakable although some try to defend the position despite using language.

http://www.vitalremnants.com/2011/12/hegel-and-nominalism.html?m=1#:~:text=In%20the%20Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit,universals%20do%20not%2C%20undermines%20itself.

One might suppose this is no problem for the nominalist, for of course language deals in universals, and so of course language imposes these universals on what really is. But in this case, the nominalist cannot provide an argument, for whatever he intends to say, he in fact expresses the opposite.

And such an effort for the minimalist view is characteristic of the times to reduce things to their most abstract.

https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/macintyre2.pdf

Thus, the social bases of liberalism are two-fold: the raising of property to the status of the primary social relation, and the loss of community, the loss of the capacity to appeal to or rely upon shared meaning beyond the satisfaction of individual desire.

MacIntyre uses an analysis of the use of place names in foreign countries to point out the difference between a place name for the inhabitants of an area where the name has multiple shared meanings and connotations, and the use of either same name in the context of a foreign language, or the use of a foreign name. For a foreigner, the place name is nothing but a reference pointing to a spatial location, having lost all the connotations and layers of meaning present when a native-speaker utters the name. He refers to this impoverished kind of meaning as “reference.” Nominalism is thus the characteristic epistemology of liberal society.

And the consideration of God today is often reduced to the extent God is the origins of an efficient and mechanical causality, a prime mover but little else. God isn’t a path to a kind of salvation through love but just absolute being, just the biggest thing of existence. There is part of that but I don't get the impression that is all there is to God in any tradition except as its impoverished in modernity perhaps.

[late]

[url]rickroderick.org/301-paul-ricoeur-the-masters-of-suspicion-1993/[/url]

This is characteristic of pragmatism which is concerned with effects and outcomes more so than a particular method or means other than individual action achieving a desired outcome. There is no theory of truth as much as asking a question does it work? Not how does it work.


And a compatibility view of free will is compatible with God and a determined world I which a free choice is necessarily constrained an often the rational choice may be a specific choice. You may choose otherwise but in a sense it is from not understanding things properly and so less free.

If God exists then rejection of God is a kind of freedom that comes from being misguided about the nature of things and ones place within it. One would make irrational choices based in this misunderstanding.

There can be a suspicion cast upon the psychology of humans in their rejection of God in the same way Freud casts suspicion of God being some fatherly figure projected for our comfort. The idea being a rejection born from anger and a disconnection God’s love and a tendency to a narrow hate and fixation on pain which is unconsciously driven. In both cases it's not enough consciously deny it because its not a conscious thing.

But the idea that nonsenous thing have reality isn’t nonsensical because the effort of nominalists to deny universals or concepts is unspeakable although some try to defend the position despite using language.

http://www.vitalremnants.com/2011/12/hegel-and-nominalism.html?m=1#:~:text=In%20the%20Phenomenology%20of%20Spirit,universals%20do%20not%2C%20undermines%20itself.


And such an effort for the minimalist view is characteristic of the times to reduce things to their most abstract.

https://www.ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/pdfs/macintyre2.pdf


And the consideration of God today is often reduced to the extent God is the origins of an efficient and mechanical causality, a prime mover but little else. God isn’t a path to a kind of salvation through love but just absolute being, just the biggest thing of existence. There is part of that but I don't get the impression that is all there is to God in any tradition except as its impoverished in modernity perhaps.

In conversation, I like to describe Rorty as the Moses of philosophy. He could see science was taking over territory that had traditionally belonged to philosophy. But, for all his talent, he couldn't bring himself to work within that space.

While I disagree with much of your post, it starts perfectly. It's not just CAP (Contemporary American Pragmatism) but current philosophy of science only cares about it's ability to work. The usual metaphor is modelling, no one cares is if a model is true, or good, or eternal, or painted cherry red. They only care if it's good enough to get the current job done.

So, nicely done.

Philosophy of science throws overboard pretty much all of the ideas and language of philosophy. You see, verbiage is descriptive, not prescriptive...

Unlike the cat, you can't open the box and have a deity pop out.

One minor detail, science has been studying perception and cognition since the 1800s (perhaps I should have said it got interesting back then, but...)

But we have learned a great deal about both since then. Traditional philosophy starts with how we come to know the world. One of Rorty's observations is that science has that covered, and done a better job than a million philosophers with typewriters.

Rorty saw that philosophy was going to change, and then it did.

https://www.amazon.com/Explaining-Science-Cognitive-Conceptual-Foundations/dp/0226292061/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2110ZLOKSKILB&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.q-VqEG7ftuMDqXn8EHeqAc6sHPYsADK2nGhQ4H3f4_0.MvFB0QrnGe-4RrTMS-yRuhiXcze1YrJXVPIbwV_zbls&dib_tag=se&keywords=explaining+science+ronald+and+giere&qid=1711981786&sprefix=elxplaining+science+ronald+n+giere%2Caps%2C92&sr=8-1