[Citizen J]

That really depends upon what you define as existence, Mr. Barish. If I were to transfer all of my personality and knowlege into an advanced computer, would that still be continuing my existence?

You have heard of mind over matter, but what about mind over energy? Perhaps someday we can perfect an ability to exist incorporeally. What is death when one needs no body?

Besides, quantom physicists are obsessed with the notion that this universe is not the only one that could exist. Given our current level of understanding, this universe seems to be just one of billions upon billions of universes. Given our level of understanding, the mathematics indicates that conditions within one universe can spawn 'child universes' that continue to expand on their own.
Given enough 'time' and research, we might be able to create another universe to which we can escape. This ability to create and transverse universes could be repeated in perpetuity and would effectively give us infinite time.

[Rbns]

That really depends upon what you define as existence, Mr. Barish.

Exactly. I'm a materialist by the way.

If I were to transfer all of my personality and knowlege into an advanced computer, would that still be continuing my existence?

No, that would be more like your twin.

This ability to create and transverse universes could be repeated in perpetuity and would effectively give us infinite time.

That doesn't count, as it doesn't suit the common definition of 'immortal'.

If that was the case, and let's just assume the universe will remain still, the only thing one had to do would be freezing himself at -273ºC to be immortal.

[Raoul]

You could argue with almost all of that, Barish.

And I would like to mention that philosophical statements, especially the ones concerning ontology, are absolute and cannot be disproven or updated.

Philosophical statements are most certainly not absolute or impossible to disprove - any philosophical statement with faulty logic (X is a man, most men are tall, therfore X is tall) can be shown to be false, and ontological statements within philosophy have no special immunity.

I think you'll find that even those people who study the question almost exclusively don't actually have a defininte answer to that yet.

Even if universe has no beginning, humans do, it's their birth. Life leads to their end, death. End of story.

Now show me the logical argument whereby something that has a beginning must have an end.

Not that it'll help all that much, because even if you proved this, I could argue that a human is born, but before that they grew in the womb, before that they were concieved, before that they were a seperate sperm and egg, before that they were cells growing in their parent's bodie's...apply that logic to all humans right back to the emergence of humans, then everything that they evolved from, then to the matter those things evolved from and so on back to the matter/energy that was there at the beginning (or lack thereof) the universe. So really, no 'beginning' at all.

[Photonmaton]

If you accept multiverse theory then we all are immortal in a various network of infinite ‘universes’ playing out every possible consequence of situation in existence…I think though that all this talk about it being possible to transverse between universes as an argument for immortality is naïve. If you are able to transverse between universes then those universes are indistinguishable from a larger uni-universe. Who is to say that the Sun is not in another universe but that our matter from our universe can travel to it and vice-versa? So I say as much as it sucks ass, entropy and heatdeath are still in the lead and I’ll hopefully be finishing off my last space-cigar and watch it all go down is a boring status of temperature equilibrium. Radical life extension is possible though, especially with advanced nanotechnology or by using nonbiological bodies. A good book if you’re interested in this stuff is Ray Kurzweil’s ‘The Singularity is Near’. Though take it all with a grain of salt of course.

[Rbns]

any philosophical statement with faulty logic

Sure. I didn't even need to mention that. Perhaps you didn't notice, I was comparing philosophy with science.

Now show me the logical argument whereby something that has a beginning must have an end.

I really do not need any proof. This is simply how I perceive the universe.

Not that it'll help all that much, because even if you proved this, I could argue that a human is born, but before that they grew in the womb, before that they were concieved, before that they were a seperate sperm and egg, before that they were cells growing in their parent's bodie's...apply that logic to all humans right back to the emergence of humans, then everything that they evolved from, then to the matter those things evolved from and so on back to the matter/energy that was there at the beginning (or lack thereof) the universe. So really, no 'beginning' at all.

You are manipulating my words. Birth is the beginning of life, but the matter which one is composed of doesn't appear from nowhere.

In fact, using your logic, we must conclude that no human being has ever died at all. The matter which composed them still exists or just turned into energy.

[Torwan]

(...) End of story.

It's always amusing to see people "shaping" their own world around them with simple "laws" and "theories", ending with "end of story".

The lack of imagination shown by those kind of statements makes me sad.

Ever heard of energy-based bodies? Trans-dimensional beings? That's SciFi today. SciFi today is reality tomorrow. What is SciFi tomorrow then?

Be a little more open-minded, please.

[Rbns]

Be a little more open-minded, please.

Can a person turn into a god? Is that possible as well, Mr. Open-Minded?

[Torwan]

Can a person turn into a god? Is that possible as well, Mr. Open-Minded?

Define "god", Mr. Materialist.

I thought you guys didn't believe in gods...

[Rbns]

Define "god", Mr. Materialist.

I like Wiki for times like this: 'The most common among these - definitions - include omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, perfect goodness, divine simplicity, and eternal and necessary existence.'

I thought you guys didn't believe in gods...

Of course we don't Mr. Open-Minded.

[Torwan]

Of course we don't Mr. Open-Minded.

It's just funny. A materialist is saying that immortality is impossible and he tries to beat my open-minded comment by a question related to god.

Really funny. Next thing: Islamist using secularization in a discussion...

'The most common among these - definitions - include omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, perfect goodness, divine simplicity, and eternal and necessary existence.'

Omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence - how can anyone know that he is that when it is unknown how much knowledge there is to be gained, how much ground there is to be covered? Unanswerable question.

Perfect goodness: "Good" is again a question of "point of view". Ask an islamist and an american republican if Osama bin Laden is "good".

Divine simplicity: Define "simplicity".

"Eternal and necessary existence": For that we'd have to define "time".

And now it's getting too philosophical for me; I won't define "time" in a foreign language (I'm no native english-speaker)


My whole point is: Nobody knows what future technology and future development of humanity will bring us, so you can't rule out anything.

[Rbns]

he tries to beat my open-minded comment by a question related to god

Your comment was inconsistent, not open-minded.

Next thing: Islamist using secularization in a discussion...

There is nothing paradoxical with that, as long as he views secularism as a bad thing.

Perfect goodness: "Good" is again a question of "point of view".

No, 'perfect' is an absolute term, not relative.

My whole point is: Nobody knows what future technology and future development of humanity will bring us, so you can't rule out anything.

Again, why would you try to display me as a bigot is beyond my undertanding. It's possible to live a trillion years, but not forever.

[Theodore]

This question is a matter of philosophy, not science. And I would like to mention that philosophical statements, especially the ones concerning ontology, are absolute and cannot be disproven or updated.

I actually wouldn't be so sure. Certain ontological theories are incoherent (Descartes's, for example), others are inconsistent with our empirical knowledge (Aristotle's), and some can be dismissed because they have no evidence to support them (late Schelling's).

You have heard of mind over matter, but what about mind over energy? Perhaps someday we can perfect an ability to exist incorporeally. What is death when one needs no body?

In short, you would have us think without the help of our brains (Barish should get this one)? Every single phenomenon we could view as incorporeal - information, energy and so on - is incapable of supporting human life.

If you accept multiverse theory then we all are immortal in a various network of infinite ‘universes’ playing out every possible consequence of situation in existence…

Actually, Everett explicitly denied that the many-worlds interpretation would entail immortality, mostly since it would effectively destroy his theory.

Ever heard of energy-based bodies? Trans-dimensional beings?

Ever heard of incoherent concepts?

My whole point is: Nobody knows what future technology and future development of humanity will bring us, so you can't rule out anything.

We can, however, say what is most likely to occur. Which is good enough.

[Rbns]

I actually wouldn't be so sure.

I have no reason to doubt it, as we all agree on the subjective nature of philosophy... I hope?

Certain ontological theories are incoherent (Descartes's, for example)

I would love to discuss about that, but my knowledge about ontology is behind my interest.

others are inconsistent with our empirical knowledge (Aristotle's)

Wasn't Aristotle a rationalist as well as an idealist?

and some can be dismissed because they have no evidence to support them (late Schelling's).

That's right. Dismissed, not disproven. Absence of evidence is not equal to evidence of absence.

[Theodore]

I have no reason to doubt it, as we all agree on the subjective nature of philosophy... I hope?

I wouldn't say it's subjective... I mean, most philosophical theories are unprovable nonsense, but there is room for a rational and objective philosophical investigation.

Wasn't Aristotle a rationalist as well as an idealist?

Yes, but certain concepts his metaphysics is based on - enetelechy (the notion that nature moves toward a specific goal), hylomorphism (the notion that an individual object is composed of matter and form), and so on, are incompatible with what we know about the world today.

That's right. Dismissed, not disproven. Absence of evidence is not equal to evidence of absence.

Well, yes, but unless a philosopher can provide evidence (or convincing deductive reasoning), his theory remains just a logical possibility we have no real reason to accept.

EDIT: Spelling.

[galactus]

Considering moving this to The Agora, but meh. My forum needs discussion.

The whole thing is a bit queer. I generally feel some distrust when looking at the concept of something "that is me" over a larger period of time. I mean I am not the same person at all to the person who I remember being as a child, we are only part of the same causal chain and I happen to have these memories. If we manage to extend the human form into an electronic version these memories will -I think- become less important to us, since while we might view organic material to be unmanipulatable and our recollections to be somewhat certain, we have no reason to believe the electronic version of our memories are this(a similar view is hinted at in the movie Ghost in the Shell, I think).

Generally I am a bit uncertain how immortality should be understood. Should it be understood as a continuation of the causal chain 'that is me', or just a continuation of a being that has my memories and my personality? Take as an example this:

In a future world we have found a method to know and copy all the molecules in one brain into a computer, we outfitted this computer with all the equipment that a human body has, that is when the 'brain in the computer' wants to walk/talk/whatever it can do this. Now suppose this becomes a popular method for longevity, as our bodies decay we copy our minds to the computer and live on in it. But what if we did this, we copied the mind of someone into a computer, and then we let that person live on? Would there be two versions of him in the world? Did he multiply by division? The consciousness that was in the body doesn't seem to have been transferred to the computer, only copied.

But what then of our previous selves? How can I claim to be more than a copy of my previous self 8-9 years ago? Surely I don't have that many of my cells left, by which right do I claim to be the same person?

I am quite unsure about all of these questions, all in all I think it is a neurological question and only parts of it touch philosophy. What can be said though is that immortality or even longevity is a bit of muddied concepts, where we think of ourselves as unchanging personalities.

[Rbns]

The consciousness that was in the body doesn't seem to have been transferred to the computer, only copied.

If I defined that 'consciousness' as a material delusion, would I be wrong?

[galactus]

Depends what you mean with the word, there has been some accusations that the concept is a mongrel, most notably I think, by Ned Block. However once you assert a clear meaning to the word, in my case it would be whatever quality or function that makes us have any coherence in our thought vis-a-vis our previous selves, A-consciousness more or less.

In the example I used it is difficult to see what the results are, since we are not used to thinking about our own perception of ourselves as coherent individuals become so muddied, we do not expect to wake up one day and find that we are in another body and the body that one was in is still occupied by... well you get the point.

I do hope you don't just throw the concept aside before studying the issue further though, dogma is so cheap.

[Theodore]

I've just skimmed the article, so if there's something in Block's definitions I've missed, let me know. I don't think we even need to posit an A-consciousness; the brain seems to do quite fine without it. P-consciousness is a bit harder to explain; for now I'm still convinced epiphenomenalism offers the best explanation, even if it goes against common sense.

In any case, regarding the hypothetical consciousness upload, in general we have no access to the conscious aspects of other brains; we have no reason to assume it would be any different with brain-simulating computers. In short, the upload would create a new consciousness. As for the question of whether we're the same person we remember being in the past, this would depend on things like our theory of time and mereology. It's a complex debate, really.

[galactus]

That's a bit strange, since most people tend to say that the brain can do without P-consciousness!

Block uses A-consciousness to replace where we use consciousness to mean "aware of X" or whatever. I don't think there is anything wrong with that, I find that the distinction is of use. Maybe because I can't say that my belief that the clock is a quarter to seven has any phenomenal aspect, yet I seem to be conscious of the fact.

It's quite OT though, we can have another agora debate about it, and since you already know my views about epiphenomenalism I don't need to go into that either.

However the example I used does not at all rely on whatever access we have to see if any certain brain is conscious; we certainly do not have access to that information now but there is no reason to believe that 'the problem of other minds' is unsolvable regardless of our neurological knowledge(or that reality of minds is cognitively closed or unphysical as epiphenomenalism proclaims). It only relies on that we can transfer functions to electronic form.

What if, we instead of transferring ourselves to a computer directly gradually integrated us with it? First we replace large parts of our motor skills, then our memory, etc etc. Would this make a difference, and would this create a new consciousness?

What the example goes to show is that even if it is solvable there seems to be something strange with the notion of transferring consciousness over to an electronic(or other) device, I think this strangeness is related to identity and change, much in the same way as the problem with the ship of Theseus. I don't think this is a problem special for electrophiliacs, it is the same problem with identity in general that is more visible in these kind of experiments.

Anyhow, I think these problems will be solved when/if we start/try to integrate man-made functional devices into the brain. Maybe the concept of personality and identity will desolve, or be identified with its social component(I am the same because everyone calls me 'Nick' and treat me as the same person). Regardless I think it poses a problem to those who think naively about immortality, since it indicates prima facie that continuation in another physical 'incarnation' doesn't seem to be obviously possible.

[Theodore]

Regarding A-consciousness, Block writes:

A representation is A-conscious if it is broadcast for free use in reasoning and for direct “rational” control of action (including reporting).

And it seems (well, to me at least) exceedingly odd to posit the entities manipulated in thought as mental. I mean, thinking is a physical process associated with the brain; one is certainly not conscious of the process of thinking. So, the objects of A-consciousness would either have to be physical (in which case to call them 'elements of consciousness' is abuse of language), or we would have to accept that the brain can somehow manipulate the purely mental (which, again, seems odd). It might not be such a huge problem for Block, who if I remember correctly is a physicalist, but then again physicalism has its problems.

Now, regarding your example (the gradual integration), I would say the identity of consciousness depends more on the function and structure of the physical substrate (the brain in our case) than the matter which makes up the substrate. In the end, though, one could view a consciousness as one changing entity or as a series of entities in a causal relationship. I don't think there's a compelling reason to accept the latter view, however, unless one also accepts nihilism about mereology (or, more limited, about temporal parts).