wat0n wrote:Indeed, I agree with that. It's ridiculous that even the German or the Chilean systems would be labeled as "socialist"
And continuing with the logic, young people today can see that these are not scary and extreme ideas, but instead seem to make economic sense.
And so they come to accept ideas that they have always thought of as socialist.
You have to read further above, but it actually compares it to an estimate of how they would have developed had no rent control been applied. To quote from it:
The control group would correspond to buildings built before 1980. The treated group (which were slapped with new rent controls) corresponds to comparable buildings built after 1980, which were not subject to rent control until 1994. The post-treatment period is after 1994, the pre-treatment period is before 1994.
You can check the paper out here:
https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10. ... r.20181289
Thanks for the link to the actual paper.
Like many of these cases, the article is not perfectly honest about the findings of the study.
Apparently, these drawbacks are not actually measured. Instead, they are based on certain assumptions. This is why they are described as “likely”.
On the other hand, this same study finds clear and definite advantages to rent comtrol.
To examine rent control’s effects on tenant migration and neighborhood choices, we make use of new panel data which provide address-level migration decisions and housing characteristics for the majority of adults living in San Francisco in the early 1990s. This allows us to define our treatment group as renters who lived in small multi-family apartment buildings built prior to 1980 and our control group as renters living in small multi-family housing built between 1980 and 1990. Using our data, we can follow each of these groups over time up until the present, regardless of where they migrate.
We find that between five and ten years after the law change, the beneficiaries of rent control are, on average, 3.5 percentage points more likely to still remain at their 1994 address relative to the control group. Since only 18 percent of the con- trol group still remained at their 1994 address for this long, this estimate represents a 19.4 percent increase in not moving (3.5/18) relative to the control group. We further find that the beneficiaries are 4.5 percentage points more likely to remain in San Francisco relative to the control group, indicating that a large share of the renters who remained at their 1994 address due to rent control would have left San Francisco had they not been covered by rent control. This would likely be viewed as a desirable outcome by rent control advocates.
We next analyze treatment effect heterogeneity along a number of dimensions. We first find that our estimated effects are significantly stronger among older house- holds and among households that have already spent a number of years at their address prior to treatment. This is consistent with the idea that both of these popu- lations are less likely to experience personal shocks requiring them to change resi- dence and thus, are better able to take advantage of the potential savings offered by rent control.
We then examine whether the effects we estimate vary across racial groups. We do not directly observe race in our data, so we use an imputation procedure based on renters’ names and addresses.2 We find rent control has an especially large impact on preventing the displacement of racial minorities from San Francisco, suggesting that rent control helps to foster the racial diversity of San Francisco, at least among the initial cohort of renters covered by the law.
Finally, we analyze whether rent control enables tenants to live in neighborhoods with better amenities. One might expect neighborhoods with the largest increases in market prices and amenities would be ones where tenants would remain in their rent-controlled apartments the longest, since their outside options in the neighbor- hood would be especially expensive. However, for these same reasons, landlords in these high-rent, high-amenity neighborhoods would have large incentives to remove tenants.3 They then could either reset rents to market rates with a new tenant or rede- velop the building as condos or new construction, both of which are exempt from rent control. These landlord incentives would push rent control tenants out of the nicest neighborhoods. In fact, we find the landlords’ incentives appear to dominate. The average tenant treated by rent control lives in a census tract with worse observ- able amenities, as measured by the census tract’s median household income, share of the population with a college degree, median house value, and share unemployed.
The only definite and verified negative impact is that rent controlled properties are not in the richest neighborhoods, but that is not government intervention but simply rich people refusing to allow rent controlled housing in rich neighborhoods.
I mean, the maintenance effort does depend on the government at hand and how good of a landlord it is.
Well, you do not seem to disagree with the financial incentives that I laid out, so I assume that you agree that all other things being equal, governments would provide higher quality housing than private markets.
I wonder if a private landlord would be able to get away with something like that, to be honest.
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You mean, having unsafe amounts of lead in the house? Yes, almost certainly.
That's fair. I think it's relevant, because another issue deals with the fairness of such assignment.
Capitalism decides that the highest bidder gets to live there and everyone else can be homeless.
If you think that is “fairer”, then this apparently subjective tangent is resolved.