[Juergi_Krause]

Turkish authorities try to influence the leadership of the republics of Central Asia in several directions.
Turkey has established strong ties with the Central Asian republics, and at the expense of large capital investments strengthened its economic presence in the region, and after the fall of the Soviet Union, it gradually occupied free space in the economic, political, cultural and military areas.
At stake there are geopolitical power, access to potentially great wealth, the achievement of religious, national goals and security in its most diverse aspects.
Central Asia has vast reserves of minerals, including gold, natural gas and oil. The unique geopolitical position of Central Asia has determined its role as an accumulator of large hotbeds of regional conflicts in areas of instability lying on transport and transit directions. Energy resources of the region play an important role for the world economy and politics, above all, these are the resources of the Caspian Sea.
Who is more important
Russia, Iran and Turkey are the most close countries to the Central Asian region, showing great interest in it and most active in it. Among the countries involved in the rivalry for influence in the region, China, Israel, Pakistan, Western European countries, Saudi Arabia, India, Japan and Egypt should also be noted.
Turkey had understood that material connections work much better than related ones, and began searching for ways to establish links with Central Asia that would be more turned to the mind than to the heart.
Despite the fact that the Turkic countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, as well as the Caucasian Republic of Azerbaijan, have always been the priority countries with which Turkey maintained bilateral relations, the 20th anniversary of their independence, which was celebrated in 2011, pushed Ankara to revise its policy towards these states.
Despite the great importance that Turkey attaches to its “Turkic brothers”, relations with these countries did not always develop in close cooperation; on the contrary, relations have deteriorated due to the Turkish naive and erroneous conviction that relations can persist without much effort because of ethnic and historical reasons. Now it seems that Turkey has begun to build its foreign policy in such a way as to narrow this gap and revive the old partnership.
The Turkish factor in the regional policy of Central Asia (and the border region of Europe and Asia in general) is a phenomenon that makes people talk about themselves in the early 1990s. The fall of the USSR caused significant changes in global and regional geopolitics. Taking into account the geopolitical transformations that took place in the 90s of the last century, Ankara reanimated plans to implement the foreign policy doctrine of Pan-Turkism.
In recent years, the attempts of the Turkish authorities to extend their influence to the most important regions of Eurasia: the Balkans, the Black and Aegean Seas, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Volga region, a part of the Urals, the south of Siberia, and Central Asia and Xinjiang have become very noticeable. Now, however, the Turkish ambitions of the 1990s are no longer so justified. Nevertheless, this factor has not disappeared anywhere, this direct in Turkish foreign policy is not closed, and it should be taken seriously.
Because it can be that the Turkish authorities will seem to themselves to be the main ones, may be even only in Central Asia.
More about ambitions
The initial prerequisite for the implementation of the pan-Turkism doctrine was the assumption of the Turkish leadership that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the weakening of Russia, there was a unique chance to reclaim their political, economic, cultural and military influence within the territory of ex-Ottoman Empire, to realize the strategic goals of Pan-Turkism and the idea to create inter-Turkic national State Association "Turan" under the auspices of Ankara. It is no coincidence that Turkish leaders like to say that “the 21st century will be the golden age of the Turks.”
The policy of Turkey is aimed at creating the institutional foundations of global Turkic integration, the formation of the Turkish economic and cultural space that can provide a new breakthrough in the Turkish economy, as well as become the basis for a geopolitical attack on Greece, Russia, Iran and China. Such initiatives of Turkey include the idea of creating regional microblocks like “Caucasian House”, “Islamic Confederation of the Caucasus”, “Islamic Chechen-Dagestan Confederation”, “Caucasian Common Eurasian Market”; Regional Economic Union of Georgia - Ukraine - Azerbaijan - Moldova (GUAM); Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC); Central Asian Union of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
Turkey has a serious advantage over other centers of power - a religion shared with the Central Asian countries, a Turkic identity. Here you can add a growing influence through culture: Turkish films, TV shows and music videos are very popular in Central Asia.
Anton Evstratov, a political scientist and specialist of the Middle East, states: "Turkey regards itself as the" elder brother "of the Central Asian republics."
Being geographically distant from these states and not being able to compete with Russian political and Chinese economic influence in the region, Ankara mainly focused on what is now called “soft power” - on cultural and image expansion. This includes the educational sphere, including the construction and financing of special educational institutions, and the invitation of local young people to study in Turkey; also cinema, literature, and music.
After Erdogan has become the President, it should be recognized that this vector of Turkish expansion became even stronger, and Pan-Turkism began to coexist with previously tabooed panosmanism. The theme of the revival of the Ottoman Empire more than once became the leitmotif of speeches and speeches of the Turkish leader, and with reference to different countries and regions. Such aspirations are especially painful perceived in Syria and the South Caucasus.

Ottomans are active again
In the 1990s, when the countries of the region were in search of identity, cultural and civilizational guidelines, ways of further development, Turkish “soft” penetration was perceived more loyal and friendly. Later, when the goals of such penetration became clearer, the states of Central Asia began attempts to resist it.
Of course, the most radical measures were taken by the Uzbek leader Islam Karimov, who understood that the national security and independence of his country were at stake. Today Ankara is trying to “buy” the new leadership of the republic, which is experiencing an acute shortage of finances and investments.
Turkish emissaries feel themselves more free in Kyrgyzstan, where the most liberal legislation in the region and there is no clearly articulated attitude to Pan-Turkism. As for Kazakhstan, it is located between these delineated “poles” - undoubtedly, the country has leverage of the spread of this ideology, but it still penetrates.
In Central Asia exist Turkic nomadic traditions, culture, and the question of who is the younger brother and who is the eldest, is open. Moreover, the military power of Uzbekistan, the resources of Kazakhstan are quite comparable with the Turkish ones. It makes sense for the Central Asian countries to radically reconsider relations with Turkey not along the line of their deactivation, but along the line of displacement of the “center of gravity” of the interaction of the indicated states.
Turkish businessmen see the Central Asian market as a place to sell their goods, which they cannot sell on the European market. This was especially noticeable after the fall of the USSR. For example, the products of the Turkish mass culture - pop music, films, serials - were always enthusiastically perceived in the Central Asian countries, even if the authorities did not allow it on state television channels or prohibited the sale of carriers of these products.
According to experts, today Turkey is becoming more active in the region. If younger Turkey was an example of a democratic system with a stronger economy, then after the manifestation of the sultan's manners, this direction was greatly extinguished.
Territorial disputes are still not resolved in the ex-Ottoman space. All this was not in the days of the Ottoman Empire, when stability reigned. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire, although it was similar to the theocratic state, but if we analyze the relations of the state and religion in it, it is more consistent with the modern secular model. The essence of "neo-Ottomanism" states in "strengthening the foreign policy role of Turkey in the region in the name of stability."
It should be borne in mind that in 2019 Turkey will become a presidential republic, taking a step toward authoritarianism, and will try to become a regional superpower. After all, if earlier it considered Central Asia as a zone of Russian interests, then today, when countries in the region are undergoing political rethinking of relations with Moscow (and not always in favor of Russia), Central Asia can again attract Ankara’s attention.


Once the idea of implanting the Turkish model in the republic of Central Asia as an ideal development option was actively supported by the West. For them, the feasibility of this model was that it included three main components: a secular state structure, democratic government, and free market relations. And although the model itself was far from perfect, its introduction was caused by the interest of the West in the economic and geopolitical transformation in the countries of the region.
But now many officials in the West almost openly laugh at the leadership of the republics of Central Asia, which in many respects fell under the dictates of Ankara.
Of course, all Turkic peoples have a common history, common traditions and common values. For a long time attempts were made to bring this community to oblivion, but they all failed miserably. Of course, there are political groups who are not averse to speculating on this topic, including in the interests of their own interests. There are nationalist movements in Turkey, sympathetic people who cherish the hope of coming to power in the wake of ideas of national exclusivity. However, according to political analysts, they have nothing in common with real politics.
PS A part of the program of rapprochement with the Central Asian states has already been completed by Ankara. Their multi-speed and diverse integration is explained by many geopolitical cultural-traditional and socio-economic factors.
However, it must be admitted that modern Turkey hardly has chances for the role of an elder brother in the “Turkic world”. First, the fall of the USSR and the sovereignization of the ex- southern Soviet republics deprived it of the role of an outpost of the West against the "Soviet expansion". Secondly, Ankara does not have sufficient financial and economic opportunities to conquer markets and sources of raw materials in the post-Soviet space.

[JohnRawls]

Turkish authorities try to influence the leadership of the republics of Central Asia in several directions.
Turkey has established strong ties with the Central Asian republics, and at the expense of large capital investments strengthened its economic presence in the region, and after the fall of the Soviet Union, it gradually occupied free space in the economic, political, cultural and military areas.
At stake there are geopolitical power, access to potentially great wealth, the achievement of religious, national goals and security in its most diverse aspects.
Central Asia has vast reserves of minerals, including gold, natural gas and oil. The unique geopolitical position of Central Asia has determined its role as an accumulator of large hotbeds of regional conflicts in areas of instability lying on transport and transit directions. Energy resources of the region play an important role for the world economy and politics, above all, these are the resources of the Caspian Sea.
Who is more important
Russia, Iran and Turkey are the most close countries to the Central Asian region, showing great interest in it and most active in it. Among the countries involved in the rivalry for influence in the region, China, Israel, Pakistan, Western European countries, Saudi Arabia, India, Japan and Egypt should also be noted.
Turkey had understood that material connections work much better than related ones, and began searching for ways to establish links with Central Asia that would be more turned to the mind than to the heart.
Despite the fact that the Turkic countries of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, as well as the Caucasian Republic of Azerbaijan, have always been the priority countries with which Turkey maintained bilateral relations, the 20th anniversary of their independence, which was celebrated in 2011, pushed Ankara to revise its policy towards these states.
Despite the great importance that Turkey attaches to its “Turkic brothers”, relations with these countries did not always develop in close cooperation; on the contrary, relations have deteriorated due to the Turkish naive and erroneous conviction that relations can persist without much effort because of ethnic and historical reasons. Now it seems that Turkey has begun to build its foreign policy in such a way as to narrow this gap and revive the old partnership.
The Turkish factor in the regional policy of Central Asia (and the border region of Europe and Asia in general) is a phenomenon that makes people talk about themselves in the early 1990s. The fall of the USSR caused significant changes in global and regional geopolitics. Taking into account the geopolitical transformations that took place in the 90s of the last century, Ankara reanimated plans to implement the foreign policy doctrine of Pan-Turkism.
In recent years, the attempts of the Turkish authorities to extend their influence to the most important regions of Eurasia: the Balkans, the Black and Aegean Seas, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Near and Middle East, the Caucasus, the Crimea, the Volga region, a part of the Urals, the south of Siberia, and Central Asia and Xinjiang have become very noticeable. Now, however, the Turkish ambitions of the 1990s are no longer so justified. Nevertheless, this factor has not disappeared anywhere, this direct in Turkish foreign policy is not closed, and it should be taken seriously.
Because it can be that the Turkish authorities will seem to themselves to be the main ones, may be even only in Central Asia.
More about ambitions
The initial prerequisite for the implementation of the pan-Turkism doctrine was the assumption of the Turkish leadership that with the fall of the Soviet Union and the weakening of Russia, there was a unique chance to reclaim their political, economic, cultural and military influence within the territory of ex-Ottoman Empire, to realize the strategic goals of Pan-Turkism and the idea to create inter-Turkic national State Association "Turan" under the auspices of Ankara. It is no coincidence that Turkish leaders like to say that “the 21st century will be the golden age of the Turks.”
The policy of Turkey is aimed at creating the institutional foundations of global Turkic integration, the formation of the Turkish economic and cultural space that can provide a new breakthrough in the Turkish economy, as well as become the basis for a geopolitical attack on Greece, Russia, Iran and China. Such initiatives of Turkey include the idea of creating regional microblocks like “Caucasian House”, “Islamic Confederation of the Caucasus”, “Islamic Chechen-Dagestan Confederation”, “Caucasian Common Eurasian Market”; Regional Economic Union of Georgia - Ukraine - Azerbaijan - Moldova (GUAM); Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC); Central Asian Union of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
Turkey has a serious advantage over other centers of power - a religion shared with the Central Asian countries, a Turkic identity. Here you can add a growing influence through culture: Turkish films, TV shows and music videos are very popular in Central Asia.
Anton Evstratov, a political scientist and specialist of the Middle East, states: "Turkey regards itself as the" elder brother "of the Central Asian republics."
Being geographically distant from these states and not being able to compete with Russian political and Chinese economic influence in the region, Ankara mainly focused on what is now called “soft power” - on cultural and image expansion. This includes the educational sphere, including the construction and financing of special educational institutions, and the invitation of local young people to study in Turkey; also cinema, literature, and music.
After Erdogan has become the President, it should be recognized that this vector of Turkish expansion became even stronger, and Pan-Turkism began to coexist with previously tabooed panosmanism. The theme of the revival of the Ottoman Empire more than once became the leitmotif of speeches and speeches of the Turkish leader, and with reference to different countries and regions. Such aspirations are especially painful perceived in Syria and the South Caucasus.

Ottomans are active again
In the 1990s, when the countries of the region were in search of identity, cultural and civilizational guidelines, ways of further development, Turkish “soft” penetration was perceived more loyal and friendly. Later, when the goals of such penetration became clearer, the states of Central Asia began attempts to resist it.
Of course, the most radical measures were taken by the Uzbek leader Islam Karimov, who understood that the national security and independence of his country were at stake. Today Ankara is trying to “buy” the new leadership of the republic, which is experiencing an acute shortage of finances and investments.
Turkish emissaries feel themselves more free in Kyrgyzstan, where the most liberal legislation in the region and there is no clearly articulated attitude to Pan-Turkism. As for Kazakhstan, it is located between these delineated “poles” - undoubtedly, the country has leverage of the spread of this ideology, but it still penetrates.
In Central Asia exist Turkic nomadic traditions, culture, and the question of who is the younger brother and who is the eldest, is open. Moreover, the military power of Uzbekistan, the resources of Kazakhstan are quite comparable with the Turkish ones. It makes sense for the Central Asian countries to radically reconsider relations with Turkey not along the line of their deactivation, but along the line of displacement of the “center of gravity” of the interaction of the indicated states.
Turkish businessmen see the Central Asian market as a place to sell their goods, which they cannot sell on the European market. This was especially noticeable after the fall of the USSR. For example, the products of the Turkish mass culture - pop music, films, serials - were always enthusiastically perceived in the Central Asian countries, even if the authorities did not allow it on state television channels or prohibited the sale of carriers of these products.
According to experts, today Turkey is becoming more active in the region. If younger Turkey was an example of a democratic system with a stronger economy, then after the manifestation of the sultan's manners, this direction was greatly extinguished.
Territorial disputes are still not resolved in the ex-Ottoman space. All this was not in the days of the Ottoman Empire, when stability reigned. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire, although it was similar to the theocratic state, but if we analyze the relations of the state and religion in it, it is more consistent with the modern secular model. The essence of "neo-Ottomanism" states in "strengthening the foreign policy role of Turkey in the region in the name of stability."
It should be borne in mind that in 2019 Turkey will become a presidential republic, taking a step toward authoritarianism, and will try to become a regional superpower. After all, if earlier it considered Central Asia as a zone of Russian interests, then today, when countries in the region are undergoing political rethinking of relations with Moscow (and not always in favor of Russia), Central Asia can again attract Ankara’s attention.


Once the idea of implanting the Turkish model in the republic of Central Asia as an ideal development option was actively supported by the West. For them, the feasibility of this model was that it included three main components: a secular state structure, democratic government, and free market relations. And although the model itself was far from perfect, its introduction was caused by the interest of the West in the economic and geopolitical transformation in the countries of the region.
But now many officials in the West almost openly laugh at the leadership of the republics of Central Asia, which in many respects fell under the dictates of Ankara.
Of course, all Turkic peoples have a common history, common traditions and common values. For a long time attempts were made to bring this community to oblivion, but they all failed miserably. Of course, there are political groups who are not averse to speculating on this topic, including in the interests of their own interests. There are nationalist movements in Turkey, sympathetic people who cherish the hope of coming to power in the wake of ideas of national exclusivity. However, according to political analysts, they have nothing in common with real politics.
PS A part of the program of rapprochement with the Central Asian states has already been completed by Ankara. Their multi-speed and diverse integration is explained by many geopolitical cultural-traditional and socio-economic factors.
However, it must be admitted that modern Turkey hardly has chances for the role of an elder brother in the “Turkic world”. First, the fall of the USSR and the sovereignization of the ex- southern Soviet republics deprived it of the role of an outpost of the West against the "Soviet expansion". Secondly, Ankara does not have sufficient financial and economic opportunities to conquer markets and sources of raw materials in the post-Soviet space.

TinTin dat you again?

[Zionist Nationalist]

The title sounds like a bad translation from google translate