John Rawls's Difference Principle - Page 2 - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

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#14253448
Like Spin says, it's about improving conditions for the worst-off. I do not know the exact wording Rawls uses but if he doesn't specifically mention wealth/income it would be fair to say that a very large increase in wealth/income for the elite accompanied by a small increase in wealth/income for the worst-off can violate Rawl's principle because it gives the elite too much power over the worst-off, greatly offsetting the small increase of wealth/income for the worst-off.
#14270930
John Rawls wrote:Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.


I read it as Rawls is more concerned about the absolute position of the least advantaged group rather than their relative position. If a system of strict equality maximizes the absolute position of the least advantaged in society, then the Difference Principle advocates strict equality. If it is possible to raise the absolute position of the least advantaged further by having some inequalities of income and wealth, then the Difference Principle prescribes inequality up to that point where the absolute position of the least advantaged can no longer be raised.
#14271660
One of the problem with Rawls is that there is too little by way of discussion of the time-scales over which relevant effects of legal changes take place.

For example, a one-off confiscation of the property of the wealthy, and its distribution to the needy will undoubtedly make the needy better off in the short term. But a government based on ongoing confiscations (or even a material risk of such confiscations) will, in the medium to long term, be very detrimental to the general welfare, including the welfare of the needy.

In fact, while Rawls is generally viewed as rationalising the (modern) liberal perspective (by enshrining many rights as trumping the difference principle, but excluding economic rights from that category), a proper understanding of economics, coupled with a long-term perspective on the improvement in the lot of the worst-off would, imo, qualify anarcho-capitalists as Rawlsians.

I claim that capitalism in general, and anarchic capitalism as its purest form, is the form of societal organisation most conducive to, amongst other things, economic growth. If that claim is accepted, than anarcho-capitalism is the policy conclusion from the Difference Principle.

Others may disagree, but that disagreement merely exposes another of Rawls's mistakes, namely the assumption that policy conclusions can be derived rationally and in an ideologically-free way from his Difference Principle.
#14276941
Others may disagree, but that disagreement merely exposes another of Rawls's mistakes, namely the assumption that policy conclusions can be derived rationally and in an ideologically-free way from his Difference Principle.


I couldn't agree more. However, what you say seems to be more relevant towards Rawls's "veil of ignorance", from which the Difference Principle is to be deduced.
#14277321
Indeed, my critic of Rawls has several prongs.

First, I disagree with the entire "veil of ignorance" procedure. We each have responsibility to (indeed we cannot help but) develop our own moral standards. It is unreasonable to expect us to set those aside, or feel committed to, an alternative set of principles developed in the theoretical ivory-tower heights of the "veil of ignorance".

Second, Rawls subjects his Difference Principle to "side constraints". It is far from clear what those side-constraints ought to be. Famously, he discounts property rights relative to various civil rights. I don't think that bias is justified.

Third, it is far from clear that the Difference Principle is a good idea. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which slightly improving the lot of a tiny minority deemed "worst off" comes at the price of bringing the rest of society down to their level.

Quantifying (for illustration purposes only), imagine we start with
1 person - 99 well-being
99 people - 999 well-being

And now consider a policy that will convert the world into:
1 person - 100 well-being
99 people - 100 well-being.

Technically, the Difference Principle requires that we adopt this policy, but I am not sure that's a sensible thing to do.

Finally, as agreed, even adopting the Difference Principle and Rawls's particular set of side-constraints, it isn't clear what set of policies would emerge, as reasonable and thoughtful people routinely disagree on the likely consequences of various policy choices.
#14685596
Thanks for the thread, which I find stimulating. Although the philosophy of justice is not really my thing, the model of Rawls is crucial for economic and sociological theories. Therefore I like to make some comments, preceded by the facts as I know them. Note that Rawls presents a contract theory, and thus he employs the liberal approach. This contrasts with the communautarian approach. For instance, Rawls does not consider the general interest or morality. See also Eran:
Eran: We each have responsibility to (indeed we cannot help but) develop our own moral standards.


Rawls assumes that all individuals act in a rational way. Civil (negative) rights have the highest priority. They guarantee the individual freedom and integrity. The social justice is secondary and leads to the principle of equal opportunities. It prevents discrimination, and requires for instance access to education for all. The distribution comes only in the third position. The idea of the veil of ignorance results in the choice for the difference principle. The benefit of the poorest people should get priority in policy, and this benefit is measured by means of an index of primary goods (income, access to rights). Just institutions will lead to solidarity. Solidarity, trust and cooperation will also benefit the richest groups. Note that Rawls does not apply his model at the global level. So it is not obligatory to favour the poorest states.

The ideas of Rawls are opposed by Robert Nozick, who defends the traditional liberal position. He does not acknowledge social rights. I do not sympathize with his point of view. But he does show that the assumptions of Rawls are not universally accepted.

Now let me make my comments. First, Rawls supposes obviously, that people are averse to risks. They are not guided by the expected social wealth, but by the worst possible case. This is indeed in accordance with human nature, but not without limits. For if the odds are overwhelmingly in their favour, then people are willing to take a chance.

Second, the difference principle resembles the maximin strategy, but not completely. For the former uses the index of primary goods as a measure, whereas the latter uses the individual utility. This has important consequences. For instance, science states that people are averse to inequality and to a lack of reciprocity. This means that the poorest people will be unhappy in an extremely unequal society, even if their absolute income of primary goods is made maximal.

Obviously some of the forum members believe that the poorest people should control their inclination for equality (or jealous impulses; equality seems to be the scientific term). See SpaciousBox:
SpaciousBox: I have no issue with people being rich, just as long as their riches have come from honest work, without exploitation, coercion, or anything that might negatively effect those around them.

This adheres to the ideal of human rationality. Personally I think that the human capacity to control natural impulses is limited. Therefore, since excessive inequality harms the poorest people, it must be forbidden (as a negative right).

Thus I prefer the maximin strategy instead of the difference principle. Since the maximin strategy takes the utility as her measure, she accounts for the violation of the just (in)equality. So I whole-heartedly support the remark of Spin:
Spin: Inequality may be deemed to harm the self respect of the poorest in the society and may be considered to have a questionable impact on institutions.


Third, could the difference principle lead to a dictature by the poorest? Eran writes:
Eran: It is easy to imagine a scenario in which slightly improving the lot of a tiny minority deemed "worst off" comes at the price of bringing the rest of society down to their level.

As long as the lot of the poorest is measured by their consumption of primary goods, this problem may be controllable. For instance, it is obvious that capital gains and investment are indispensable for economic growth. See also JohnRawls:
JohnRawls: But for example if a manufacturer purchases more efficient production machine that are more clean and help his workers be healthy, then its okay. Since although the best off is growing in a sense of production and asset numbers but the workers recieve also more by having more health and being productive themselves a lot more.


However, Eran may have a point for the minimax strategy. Clearly the application of utility as a measure has far reaching consequences. For instance, since satisfaction or utility in the broad sense is partly determined by morals, the strategy could cause a domination of social ethics by the poorest.

Apparently, there are quite a number of arguments, that the social justice of Rawls is not the definite answer to the social problems. At its best it is an interesting first approximation.
#14687201
MeMe wrote:Although the philosophy of justice is not really my thing, the model of Rawls is crucial for economic and sociological theories.

I don't know why anyone pays any attention to Rawls's nonsense. He does not even present a theory of justice, but merely of redistributive equity. He entirely ignores the question of justice: i.e., what people deserve. He ignores the fact that justice is not about where people are, but how they get there.

Disclosure: I decided not to pursue graduate studies in philosophy largely because Rawls was then the darling of moral theory, and I knew an academic establishment that accorded him such status would never take philosophical analysis based on scientific fact and logic seriously.
#14687880
@ Truth To Power
Indeed she is not perfect. But she is more than redistributive equity.
anticlimacus: All I would add is that the difference principle is not to be taken by itself. It is to be considered as it relates to the conditions of justice as fairness, where a public conception of justice, arrived at under "fair conditions", guides democratically oriented institutions.

It is easy to criticize any theory of justice. The difficulty is to find a better one. Your remark is interesting, but a bit short. And since I am new in the forum, I am unfamiliar with your standpoint. Are you saying that effort and intent are more important than the personal capabilities? Could you elaborate on that? If you are lacking time, it is OK to refer to previous threads.
#14689831
Soixante-Retard wrote:Is this a fair interpretation of Rawls's "Difference Principle"?


The very SEP article you've quoted informs us that Rawls intends for the Difference Principle to be applied as part of a nested collection of principles:

SEP wrote:
1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.

2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society. (Rawls 1993, pp. 5–6. The principles are numbered as they were in Rawls' original A Theory of Justice.)


SEP notes that, according to Rawls, principle 1 has priority over principle 2, and principle 2a has priority over 2b, and it's 2b that's called the "Difference Principle".

This seems to pose a stricter set of constraints on distributive justice than what's entailed by the claim "the Difference Principle permits diverging from strict equality so long as the inequalities in question would make the least advantaged in society materially better off than they would be under strict equality". In some scenarios, divergence from strict equality will nevertheless satisfy conditions 1, 2a, and 2b. In other scenarios, divergence from strict equality will not satisfy conditions 1, 2a, and 2b. I suppose the former may be called "just" and the latter "unjust" in keeping with the system you're discussing.

That seems a whole lot more constraint than "if all boats are lifted, no matter how unequally, everything's a-ok." Moreover, it seems that what's "permitted" by these principles is not, as you suggest, turning a blind eye to inequality so long as all boats are lifted more or less, but merely an acceptance of divergence from strict equality for cases in which the distribution makes the most disadvantaged better off than they would be under conditions of strict equality. You seem to have interpreted this, I think wrongly, as an acceptance of inequality so long as the least well-off are "better off than they were four years ago," so to speak.

As for magnitude: One might argue, for instance, that where the Gini coefficient passes a certain threshold, there is an increased tendency -- perhaps even a rapidly increasing tendency -- for all three principles (1, 2a, and 2b) to be violated.
#14691189
@ Truth To Power
How's this for a better one: rewards commensurate with contributions, penalties commensurate with deprivations. That's it.

Do you mean that (dis)incentives are needed to motivate people? If so, the overwhelming majority will agree with you. However, why should this be irreconcilable with the theory of justice of Rawls?

@ American Serf
One might argue, for instance, that where the Gini coefficient passes a certain threshold, there is an increased tendency -- perhaps even a rapidly increasing tendency -- for all three principles (1, 2a, and 2b) to be violated.

Of course one might argue this, but not without a convincing evidence. Since the three principles themselves are quite vague, I suspect that this can not be done. For instance, the requirement of a fair equality of opportunity can be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps this explains why the philosophy of justice is not really my thing.
#14691273
MeMe wrote:@ Truth To Power

Do you mean that (dis)incentives are needed to motivate people?

Whether they are "needed" or not, they DO motivate people. And the entire concept of justice, its very existence, derives from the fact that my concept of justice gets the incentives right.
If so, the overwhelming majority will agree with you. However, why should this be irreconcilable with the theory of justice of Rawls?

Because Rawls doesn't care about the incentives, or the process by which people get to where they are. For him, it's all about the result, the distribution of advantage, regardless of how it happens. That's not justice.
Of course one might argue this, but not without a convincing evidence. Since the three principles themselves are quite vague, I suspect that this can not be done. For instance, the requirement of a fair equality of opportunity can be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps this explains why the philosophy of justice is not really my thing.

Maybe your problem is that Rawls's theory is not actually a theory of justice. Look at his idea of "equality of opportunity." You could have a certain distribution -- log-normal, say -- resulting from people being rewarded according to their contributions. The exact same distribution could arise through a lottery, the lottery could be designed to produce it. Both systems afford everyone equal opportunity. Rawls can't tell the difference.
#14693044
@ Truth To Power
Your judgement of Rawls is rather harsh. Rawls advocates equal opportunities for all, which does guarantee a certain justice.
Because Rawls doesn't care about the incentives, or the process by which people get to where they are. For him, it's all about the result, the distribution of advantage

Indeed Rawls does not reward effort or intent. I suppose that he is concerned about productivity, since she determines the collective wealth and richness. It may be an enormous achievement for a blind man to learn walking without any guidance but yet in a safe way through his home town. But the economic value is just the saved cost for the guidance (stick, cane , dog) that he has made superfluous. I suppose that Rawls would not give the blind man a claim on a top salary - like you seem to do. In the end it is vital that justice does not drain or prey upon the productive forces in the society. Or to put it more friendly, justice requires first of all the physical well-being of all. The pyramid of Maslow is adopted. Remember Bertold Brecht: "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral".
The exact same distribution could arise through a lottery

Apart from the difference principle Rawls does not address the income distribution. It is impossible to decide which distribution is just (as I pointed out to American Serf), with the exception of the criterion, that the inequality should not be too large.
#14860245
Eran wrote:Third, it is far from clear that the Difference Principle is a good idea. It is easy to imagine a scenario in which slightly improving the lot of a tiny minority deemed "worst off" comes at the price of bringing the rest of society down to their level.

Quantifying (for illustration purposes only), imagine we start with
1 person - 99 well-being
99 people - 999 well-being

And now consider a policy that will convert the world into:
1 person - 100 well-being
99 people - 100 well-being.

Technically, the Difference Principle requires that we adopt this policy, but I am not sure that's a sensible thing to do.


Here's what I think is an even stronger argument against lowering the well-being of the 99 people from 999 to 100 for the sake of raising it from 99 to 100 for the 1 person:

Behind the veil of ignorance, anyone would gladly take a 1% risk of having only 99 well-being instead of 100 well-being as the (fantastically low) price to pay for a 99% chance of having 999 well-being instead of 100 well-being. Anybody would gladly *slightly risk a little* like that for an *almost guaranteed very big gain* like that. And it would be the smart thing to do.

What would Rawls say to that?

Why does Rawls and so many of his followers assume that behind the veil of ignorance one would always make the most "cautious" choice possible: minimizing the badness of the worst case scenario at literally any cost, rather than the choice expected to be *on average most profitable* even at the cost of it not necessarily minimizing the badness of the worst case scenario? How does a Rawlsian explain why people are usually not as "cautious" as possible in their everyday life? Everybody takes at least some minor risks daily, for the sake of having more happiness, greater experiences, a greater life - and for good reason. Life would be too boring if you always tried to choose such as to make the absolutely worst imaginable outcome of your choice as good as possible at the cost of missing out on absolute everything good in life if that's what it takes. Nobody believes in being literally that super-cautious. So why should we expect that such super-caution would be the rational choice behind the veil of ignorance? It clearly wouldn't! And yet Rawls seems to assume it would! Why?

I do however think the veil of ignorance thought experiment is a good way of testing an ethical theory. When used the right way, it makes you choose "what you would choose if you were everybody" rather than what happens to be profitable for you in particular under your particular circumstances, circumstances which usually say nothing universally morally relevant about how you should treat or be treated by others, any more than the circumstances of others do.

I just don't see why Rawls and his followers think the choice one would make behind the veil of ignorance would be one that supports Rawlsian ethics in any way whatsoever. If anything, wouldn't one's choice behind the veil of ignorance rather be that society be governed by utilitarianism, as utilitarianism is precisely "what you would choose if you were everybody"?
#14860249
Like Thinking wrote:Here's what I think is an even stronger argument against lowering the well-being of the 99 people from 999 to 100 for the sake of raising it from 99 to 100 for the 1 person:

Behind the veil of ignorance, anyone would gladly take a 1% risk of having only 99 well-being instead of 100 well-being as the (fantastically low) price to pay for a 99% chance of having 999 well-being instead of 100 well-being. Anybody would gladly *slightly risk a little* like that for an *almost guaranteed very big gain* like that. And it would be the smart thing to do.

What would Rawls say to that?

Why does Rawls and so many of his followers assume that behind the veil of ignorance one would always make the most "cautious" choice possible: minimizing the badness of the worst case scenario at literally any cost, rather than the choice expected to be *on average most profitable* even at the cost of it not necessarily minimizing the badness of the worst case scenario? How does a Rawlsian explain why people are usually not as "cautious" as possible in their everyday life? Everybody takes at least some minor risks daily, for the sake of having more happiness, greater experiences, a greater life - and for good reason. Life would be too boring if you always tried to choose such as to make the absolutely worst imaginable outcome of your choice as good as possible at the cost of missing out on absolute everything good in life if that's what it takes. Nobody believes in being literally that super-cautious. So why should we expect that such super-caution would be the rational choice behind the veil of ignorance? It clearly wouldn't! And yet Rawls seems to assume it would! Why?

I do however think the veil of ignorance thought experiment is a good way of testing an ethical theory. When used the right way, it makes you choose "what you would choose if you were everybody" rather than what happens to be profitable for you in particular under your particular circumstances, circumstances which usually say nothing universally morally relevant about how you should treat or be treated by others, any more than the circumstances of others do.

I just don't see why Rawls and his followers think the choice one would make behind the veil of ignorance would be one that supports Rawlsian ethics in any way whatsoever. If anything, wouldn't one's choice behind the veil of ignorance rather be that society be governed by utilitarianism, as utilitarianism is precisely "what you would choose if you were everybody"?


1) Holy necropost.

2) We don't claim that the people will choose this. We are claiming that certain choices are more just than others though. Utilitarian theory can't explain justice to a full degree. In a sense having slave labour should be permitted under utilitarianism as long as it produces maximum amount of benefit in certain situations but we can't call it just by modern standards.
#14860689
JohnRawls wrote:2) We don't claim that the people will choose this. We are claiming that certain choices are more just than others though. Utilitarian theory can't explain justice to a full degree. In a sense having slave labour should be permitted under utilitarianism as long as it produces maximum amount of benefit in certain situations but we can't call it just by modern standards.


To my knowledge Rawls claims that the difference principle follows from people making a selfish, rational choice behind a veil of ignorance.
That makes little sense to me. People are risk-averse, but not THAT risk-averse.
#14860816
Rugoz wrote:To my knowledge Rawls claims that the difference principle follows from people making a selfish, rational choice behind a veil of ignorance.
That makes little sense to me. People are risk-averse, but not THAT risk-averse.


Kind off. Problem is, you guys are taking 2 different statements from different paragraphs out of context. One paragraph was about choices and another paragraph was about comparing utilitarianism and rawlses ideas on the matter. In a sense rawls provided a scenario where utilitarianism didn't match the real world situation as we see it right now.

Also there is a problem in quotations. I do not believe that Rawls stated that a individual WILL act in a particular manner but more of MIGHT. Then again, its been a while since i last read it.

Finally, I will quote myself again " This is a theory of justice ". There is no "Law of justice" from a theoretical/philosophical standpoint right now. Rawlses theory of justice as fairness is the most modern version that we have but it doesn't mean that it is the only one. There are literally 10+ theories of justice in the modern world. Rawlses one just happens to be the more accepted one at this point in time.

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