[pikachu]

If this becomes a war of attrition, Assad loses though as he's in the demographic minority. Particularly considering the reports that 30% of Alawite fighting-age males have died during the war.

Has this not been a war of attrition for a while already?

The defeat by attrition argument has been around for a while and I feel that it is flawed.
1. The fact that Assad himself belongs to a minority group doesn't tell us much in terms of the war-related demographics. We know that it's not just the Alawites who support the government - many Christians, Twelvers, Druze, and some Sunni Arabs also support it. Together, they may very well add up 40% of Syrians. Kurds are another 10%, and they don't fight the government.
2. The government side is a lot better armed than all of its opponents, and therefore able to inflict a lot more casualties on the enemy than vise versa in battle.
3. In war, it doesn't matter as much the raw number of people who support you, compared to their motivation and stubbornness. In this too, the government side probably has an advantage over many of the rebels (except the most crazy ones), because for the Syrian minorities this is likely the war for survival. If the government falls, they're all fucked, thus their motivation should be very very high, especially so when fighting for their home turf - but not only.
4. Finally and probably most importantly, since when is this a war limited to Syrians only? There are tens of thousands of foreigners fighting on each side, coming from all over the world, with more ready to be introduced upon necessity as Iran recently indicated. Probably up to 20% of the fighters on both sides are foreigners, if not more. Comparing the intra-Syrian demographics tells us nothing about the amount of foreign fighters available to both sides, so how can it tell us much about the future of this war?

Did I convince you that this argument is weak?

[GandalfTheGrey]

Ahrar ash-Sham, not Ahrar al-Sham, is the biggest group in that coalition. Those are two different brigades apparently, although often confused.

errr... methinks someone has led you up the garden path here pik. Transliterated, the pronunciation "Al Sham" is actually grammatically incorrect Arabic. The correct pronunciation is "Ash-Sham" for the word "الشام" (The Levant) - since the letter 'shin' is what follows the definite article 'al' - and is pronounced "ash" and not "al-sh..." in accordance with the arabic 'sun' and 'moon' letter rule ('shin' is a so called 'sun' letter, and therefore the 'l' sound in the definite article is silent). But its quite understandable for non-Arabic speakers to mistakenly transliterate it as "Al-Sham" - unaware that the "l" should be silent.

So it seems fairly clear to me that Ahrar ash-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham are just two ways for non-Arabic speakers to say the same name - because as I think you'd agree, it would be pretty ludicrous for an Arabic group to give themselves a name in mispronounced arabic!

[wat0n]

Has this not been a war of attrition for a while already?

Sure, but obviously the question is if it remains one until the very end.

The defeat by attrition argument has been around for a while and I feel that it is flawed.
1. The fact that Assad himself belongs to a minority group doesn't tell us much in terms of the war-related demographics. We know that it's not just the Alawites who support the government - many Christians, Twelvers, Druze, and some Sunni Arabs also support it. Together, they may very well add up 40% of Syrians. Kurds are another 10%, and they don't fight the government.
2. The government side is a lot better armed than all of its opponents, and therefore able to inflict a lot more casualties on the enemy than vise versa in battle.
3. In war, it doesn't matter as much the raw number of people who support you, compared to their motivation and stubbornness. In this too, the government side probably has an advantage over many of the rebels (except the most crazy ones), because for the Syrian minorities this is likely the war for survival. If the government falls, they're all fucked, thus their motivation should be very very high, especially so when fighting for their home turf - but not only.
4. Finally and probably most importantly, since when is this a war limited to Syrians only? There are tens of thousands of foreigners fighting on each side, coming from all over the world, with more ready to be introduced upon necessity as Iran recently indicated. Probably up to 20% of the fighters on both sides are foreigners, if not more. Comparing the intra-Syrian demographics tells us nothing about the amount of foreign fighters available to both sides, so how can it tell us much about the future of this war?

Did I convince you that this argument is weak?

No, not really to be honest. Even assuming that Sunni Arabs are defeated, it doesn't really mean that Assad would be able to remain as the ruler of Syria if his Alawite demographic base is wiped out (literally) as the Druze and Christians (not to mention remaining non-Islamist Sunni Arabs) would be in a position to challenge him.

The fact that the SAA is better armed hasn't helped it lately and it is also not clear that its qualitative edge will remain forever - particularly since it seems that Turkey and Saudi Arabia have decided to better arm the rebels, having an impact on recent SAA losses.

As for the last two points, if anything I think those two are the main selling points for the attrition argument - the Syrian rebels are just as motivated as pro-Assad Syrians, and foreigners fighting against Assad with a high motivation likely outnumber those fighting for him (which in the latter case means basically Hezbollah), because of the Iraqis in ISIL since 1) this has become an existential war for them too, 2) they regard Syria as part and parcel of their claim to statehood, 3) ISIL is probably the foreign group in the best position to intervene in Syria by virtue of its geographic position separating the Shi'ite populations in both countries and 4) it is reasonable to assume that ISIL will set its priority on fighting Assad rather than the rebels sooner or later, like in Palmyra, further straining the SAA.

The only way for Assad to go from "fucked in the long run" state to "not fucked in the long run" one is for ISIL to start being defeated in Iraq, and I mean it to happen real soon. I don't see how this is going to happen soon enough given that the Iraqi Army is in disarray and Iraqi Shi'ite militias are busy fighting ISIL Iraq.

[Typhoon]

I feel that attrition is a strong element of the war for both sides and big contributor to recent events, trained manpower, equipment, finance and the ability to regenerate these is shaping events on the ground.

This goes beyond IS, which is just a pawn. Get rid of IS and something else would take the position, the main problem is the hostile nations around Syria that want to destroy the government.

[pikachu]

So it seems fairly clear to me that Ahrar ash-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham are just two ways for non-Arabic speakers to say the same name - because as I think you'd agree, it would be pretty ludicrous for an Arabic group to give themselves a name in mispronounced arabic!

You may be right, maybe it's just one brigade under different English names. There's so many different Ahrars and ash-Shams in Syria that's it's easy to get lost.

wat0n

Even assuming that Sunni Arabs are defeated, it doesn't really mean that Assad would be able to remain as the ruler of Syria if his Alawite demographic base is wiped out (literally) as the Druze and Christians (not to mention remaining non-Islamist Sunni Arabs) would be in a position to challenge him.

I don't really understand what you are saying. My point one is that we don't know exactly how many people are supporting Assad, we can't assume that it's just the Alawites. We don't know how many people are supporting the rebels either, for that matter. For all we know, it could be closer to 50% - 50%. And if that's the case, even assuming all else is equal, neither side can possibly hope to wipe out the other without also wiping out itself. This does not mean that I am claiming that Assad will win or the rebels will win - it simply means that the attrition scenario cannot be used to predict an outcome, since we have no reliable information of the amount of supporters each side has, or how that number may change in the future.

The fact that the SAA is better armed hasn't helped it lately and it is also not clear that its qualitative edge will remain forever - particularly since it seems that Turkey and Saudi Arabia have decided to better arm the rebels, having an impact on recent SAA losses.

The qualitative edge has indeed eroded somewhat over time, but it remains very significant, and I see no indication so far that it will disappear in any foreseeable future. Turkey and the GCC will continue to help the rebels as they are helping now, but they appear to have reached the limit of the kind of help they can offer. Do you foresee them supplying heavy arms - tanks, heavy artillery, and airplanes? This seems impossible given how they were prohibited even from supplying the anti-air portable missiles to the rebels, by none other than the United States. That's not even mentioning the fact that supplying advanced hardware isn't very meaningful without crews or extensive training - in other words it may as well be a direct invasion if they go that route. But if they don't, meaning the international situation stays the same as it is now, then the qualitative edge of the Syrian Army will remain indefinitely. Either way, the Syrian demographic composition unfortunately offers no cues as to whether Turkey will decide to invade one day or not.

1) this has become an existential war for them too, 2) they regard Syria as part and parcel of their claim to statehood, 3) ISIL is probably the foreign group in the best position to intervene in Syria by virtue of its geographic position separating the Shi'ite populations in both countries and 4) it is reasonable to assume that ISIL will set its priority on fighting Assad rather than the rebels sooner or later, like in Palmyra, further straining the SAA.

How is this an existential war for the Sunnis in Syria? Should the rebels somehow lose, and Assad come back to rule Syria - sure they can expect some reprisals and political repression, but that is not an existential threat. An existential threat is when your entire community is threatened with extermination or forced deportation and property confiscation on the basis of its identity alone - that's an existential threat. And the Sunnis fighting on either side of this conflict don't have that threat. Should Assad win, no one seriously believes that he would try to wipe out or displace the Sunnis, or even somehow restrict the Sunni religious practice - it is just not feasible, plus it would undermine the regime's own support base (which includes some Sunnis) and its own ideology. But should ISIL or al-Qaeda win - no one can tell what will happen to the minorities, but you can expect the worst. That's where the difference lies. The Syrian minorities have no choice but to stick with Assad, whether they even like him or not, while the Sunni Arabs have the privilege of choice - they can back the rebels, the government, or stay out and resent both equally. That doesn't mean that the Sunnis cannot make highly motivated and stubborn rebels, they certainly can, especially if they are driven by extremist ideas, but how many? The stubbornness of the Sunni community as a whole cannot be taken for granted, unlike that of the minorities, because for the Sunnis this is a war of ambition, not survival.

and foreigners fighting against Assad with a high motivation likely outnumber those fighting for him

That is quite possibly true, but the description of current reality doesn't allow us to make any sort of prediction of the future, just like the base case is insufficient for a proof by induction. What if Iran suddenly introduces several divisions worth of foreign fighters as it is planning to? Or what if the Turks do? This is far from being outside of the realm of possibility, and it can totally turn the tide one way or the other. And what this means is that the foreign forces at work in Syria are too strong for the analysis of the internal Syrian demographic dynamics to even be meaningful. Every dead native Syrian Assad loyalist or rebel can be substituted by a foreign fighter or several fighters should the international dynamic permit this. That's why it is probably more prudent to look at the international situation for hints of resolution to the conflict rather than Syrian demographics, the latter will mislead more than offer cues.

[roxunreal]

The Idlib appendix as it was for the last three years is no more, it's now more of a bulge centered on the al-Ghab plain, which itself is directly south of Kufayr and Jisr al-Shughur. The rebels conquered the remaining section of the highway to the east yesterday and today, taking up to a dozen villages. The remaining SAA held area is a little wider to the east due to their offensive, but a little shortened on the west as the rebels expanded in that area two days ago and took another hill (the green bulge from the west on the map).

This map may be outdated as there is talk for a while now that Tall Hamakeh and even Frikka and everything east of them is also in rebel hands, but this is unconfirmed so far.

Ahrar ash-Sham, not Ahrar al-Sham, is the biggest group in that coalition. Those are two different brigades apparently, although often confused.

As Gandalf said they are one and the same, just romanised differently. I have the al- version stuck in my head because early on they were always reported as such, I guess the correction found its way into the discourse later.

How do you think this war will end?

No idea, it could drag on like the Lebanese war until everyone is fed up and accepts some concessions, thereby bringing an unstable peace before the next shitstorm.

If the status quo would continue without notable increase in support from Hez, Russia and Iran, the rebels would likely make a Deir ez-Zor out of Aleppo and expand into Hama and partially Homs countryside, while the government would probably retain the major cities and the bulk of what people have come to (somewhat erroneously) call "useful Syria". But really it's impossible to make long term predictions about territory, and as I said, this is taking into account the status quo, Iran can change this if it is willing to commit enough. Latakia pobably won't be penetrated in any significance as everyone and their mother in the SAA would come rushing back in that case.

In the short term the rebels may expand towards Hama a bit, and in the following months we will witness IS expanding towards Hama and Homs as well. The south is pretty stable now (some rebel-IS fighting) although there have been rumors of some sort of rebel offensive for a while now, but that may just be propaganda as nothing substantial has happened yet. I really hope the Kurds take Tall Abyad, and while I think the chances of this happening are well over 50%, I still think there is a real chance of the push stalling before the city, but we will see. If anything maybe the YPG can cut it off and go around, the strategic implications for IS would be almost the same.

Barring a very serious streak of defeats for the SAA that would start eating away at its insides, Assad will likely remain where he is. IS will be contained rather than defeated, I seriously doubt the Kurds have the means or the will to go after Raqqa after Tall Abyad if they do take the later.

[jessupjonesjnr87]

Who's winning?

[Rich]

I don't know what's gong to happen, but I can't imagine that Turkey is just going to stand by and let the Kurds cut the Islamic State off from their Turkish supply routes.

[pikachu]

The Idlib appendix as it was for the last three years is no more

Ever since Idlib fell, it was a matter of time before the appendix was removed as well. It would have probably made sense to simply abandon the whole thing at once, but I guess that would have been politically unacceptable to the loyalists, so they pretended to be stubborn about it.

No idea, it could drag on like the Lebanese war until everyone is fed up and accepts some concessions, thereby bringing an unstable peace before the next shitstorm.

But again, when you have Assad, Baghdadi, and Zawahiri as your biggest players, it's hard to imagine any concessions emerging, ever. That's one thing that makes it different from the Lebanese war. Another thing - the Lebanese war ended AFAIK with Syria coming in and occupying the entire country. Now that Syria is in chaos - who will come in to occupy Syria?

[roxunreal]

I don't think Zawahiri really calls the shots in Syria, I may be mistaking but I think that JaN's allegiance with AQ is more of a symbolic/doctrine thing than them actually being AQ's formal arm in Syria and the AQ leadership directing their war strategy. I never considered Baghdadi, just the "rebels" and the regime, as I said IS will (hopefully) be contained east of Homs/Hama/Damascus.


In other news, the SAA has pushed IS back a bit on the outskirts of Hasaka, looks like the IS "offensive" there has ended up being a rather pitiful endeavour.

This is what Idlib salient is supposed to look like now, as I thought the rumor of Frikka's capture was untrue.


Tall Abyad area, the battle for Slouk is looming

[wat0n]

I don't really understand what you are saying.

That, the longer the stalemate rages and Alawites keep dying, the more likely Assad gets replaced by someone else within the alliance against Sunni Islamists.

My point one is that we don't know exactly how many people are supporting Assad, we can't assume that it's just the Alawites. We don't know how many people are supporting the rebels either, for that matter. For all we know, it could be closer to 50% - 50%. And if that's the case, even assuming all else is equal, neither side can possibly hope to wipe out the other without also wiping out itself. This does not mean that I am claiming that Assad will win or the rebels will win - it simply means that the attrition scenario cannot be used to predict an outcome, since we have no reliable information of the amount of supporters each side has, or how that number may change in the future.

But even in that case, even if the Sunnis lose, it doesn't mean that Assad necessarily wins.

The qualitative edge has indeed eroded somewhat over time, but it remains very significant, and I see no indication so far that it will disappear in any foreseeable future. Turkey and the GCC will continue to help the rebels as they are helping now, but they appear to have reached the limit of the kind of help they can offer. Do you foresee them supplying heavy arms - tanks, heavy artillery, and airplanes? This seems impossible given how they were prohibited even from supplying the anti-air portable missiles to the rebels, by none other than the United States. That's not even mentioning the fact that supplying advanced hardware isn't very meaningful without crews or extensive training - in other words it may as well be a direct invasion if they go that route. But if they don't, meaning the international situation stays the same as it is now, then the qualitative edge of the Syrian Army will remain indefinitely. Either way, the Syrian demographic composition unfortunately offers no cues as to whether Turkey will decide to invade one day or not.

I don't see them supplying heavy arms though I can definitely see them ignoring the US on anti-air missiles, just as they have ignored the US on their coordination on Syria anyway.

How is this an existential war for the Sunnis in Syria? Should the rebels somehow lose, and Assad come back to rule Syria - sure they can expect some reprisals and political repression, but that is not an existential threat. An existential threat is when your entire community is threatened with extermination or forced deportation and property confiscation on the basis of its identity alone - that's an existential threat. And the Sunnis fighting on either side of this conflict don't have that threat. Should Assad win, no one seriously believes that he would try to wipe out or displace the Sunnis, or even somehow restrict the Sunni religious practice - it is just not feasible, plus it would undermine the regime's own support base (which includes some Sunnis) and its own ideology. But should ISIL or al-Qaeda win - no one can tell what will happen to the minorities, but you can expect the worst. That's where the difference lies. The Syrian minorities have no choice but to stick with Assad, whether they even like him or not, while the Sunni Arabs have the privilege of choice - they can back the rebels, the government, or stay out and resent both equally. That doesn't mean that the Sunnis cannot make highly motivated and stubborn rebels, they certainly can, especially if they are driven by extremist ideas, but how many? The stubbornness of the Sunni community as a whole cannot be taken for granted, unlike that of the minorities, because for the Sunnis this is a war of ambition, not survival.

But for more Islamist Sunnis, this is an existential war as it should be clear that Islamism would not be allowed in Syria were Assad to win.

And in any event, I could add that it is not clear whether it makes all that much sense to separate Syria from Iraq now that ISIL is a relevant force in the region (even if one doomed to fall). Interestingly, once you see Iraq and Syria as a single entity, tables turn and Shi'ites become the majority and Sunnis the minority - however, the Shi'ites are cut off from each other by the Sunnis.

That is quite possibly true, but the description of current reality doesn't allow us to make any sort of prediction of the future, just like the base case is insufficient for a proof by induction. What if Iran suddenly introduces several divisions worth of foreign fighters as it is planning to? Or what if the Turks do? This is far from being outside of the realm of possibility, and it can totally turn the tide one way or the other. And what this means is that the foreign forces at work in Syria are too strong for the analysis of the internal Syrian demographic dynamics to even be meaningful. Every dead native Syrian Assad loyalist or rebel can be substituted by a foreign fighter or several fighters should the international dynamic permit this. That's why it is probably more prudent to look at the international situation for hints of resolution to the conflict rather than Syrian demographics, the latter will mislead more than offer cues.

Indeed, but which area outside Syria is the one that is in a best position to send men, by virtue of geography? I'd say that it is that which holds the bulk of Sunnis in Iraq.

If it's about foreign intervention, I believe that sooner or later one will have to look at Iraq, were the Shi'ites manage to retake the land under ISIL's control (which will require having a competent army), I can see an Iraqi intervention (by the Shi'ite government) happening eventually - though quite some time from now.

However, if the above doesn't happen soon enough, I can perfectly see Assad getting overrun by the Sunnis as a result of attrition and I honestly don't think it will given that the Iraqi government is in total disarray.

[abu_rashid]

pikachu,

Ahrar ash-Sham, not Ahrar al-Sham, is the biggest group in that coalition. Those are two different brigades apparently, although often confused.

Are you meaning to say there's a brigade called "Ahrar al-Sham" and another called "Ahrar ash-Sham"? This is an issue of transliteration only. Whilst in Arabic it is indeed written al-Sham, it is pronounced ash-Sham as the "l" assimilates with the "sh".

GandalfTheGrey,

errr... methinks someone has led you up the garden path here pik. Transliterated, the pronunciation "Al Sham" is actually grammatically incorrect Arabic. The correct pronunciation is "Ash-Sham" for the word "الشام" (The Levant) - since the letter 'shin' is what follows the definite article 'al' - and is pronounced "ash" and not "al-sh..." in accordance with the arabic 'sun' and 'moon' letter rule ('shin' is a so called 'sun' letter, and therefore the 'l' sound in the definite article is silent). But its quite understandable for non-Arabic speakers to mistakenly transliterate it as "Al-Sham" - unaware that the "l" should be silent.

So it seems fairly clear to me that Ahrar ash-Sham, and Ahrar al-Sham are just two ways for non-Arabic speakers to say the same name - because as I think you'd agree, it would be pretty ludicrous for an Arabic group to give themselves a name in mispronounced arabic!

Whilst this is a good explanation, there's one small correction to be made there. The "l" of the definite article (al at-ta'reef) does not become silent, it is assimilated and it doubles the "sh" of Sham.

[pikachu]

That, the longer the stalemate rages and Alawites keep dying, the more likely Assad gets replaced by someone else within the alliance against Sunni Islamists.

Not sure why he would, AFAIK replacing the leader in the middle of a conflict is generally considered a very bad idea. But even if he was replaced by someone else "from within the alliance" as you said, that wouldn't mean much, precisely because whoever comes to replace him is from the same alliance. The war would go on.

But even in that case, even if the Sunnis lose, it doesn't mean that Assad necessarily wins.

You mean if it's 50-50? Yeah, in that case attrition leads to mutual annihilation. But we don't know if it's 50-50. Again, my point is that we just don't know. Do you know? Cause I don't, and i haven't seen anyone who does. It could be 50-50, it could be 20-80, 20-20 with 60 more who don't give a shit and just want the war to end, or god knows what else. Furthermore, the ratio can change over time.

I don't see them supplying heavy arms though I can definitely see them ignoring the US on anti-air missiles, just as they have ignored the US on their coordination on Syria anyway.

Well so far anyway it doesn't seem like they've supplied any MANPADs, and the Syrian airforce keeps flying relatively unmolested. But either way you agree with me about heavy weapons - and if the rebels don't get heavy weapons, then Assad will continue to have an advantage in inflicting casualties on his enemies. This factor skews any potential attrition equation.

But for more Islamist Sunnis, this is an existential war as it should be clear that Islamism would not be allowed in Syria were Assad to win.

Again that's just nowhere near the same as being threatened with genocide or ethnic cleansing. Islamism is an ideology, not a religion or ethnic identity. Should the war end in Assad's victory, any former Islamist has the option of simply ceasing to be an Islamist or keeping his Islamism to himself - and he'll be fine. An Alawite, regardless of his level of support for the government, cannot cease being an Alawite, and should Assad lose, he will most likely not be fine at all. That is a decisive difference.

but which area outside Syria is the one that is in a best position to send men, by virtue of geography? I'd say that it is that which holds the bulk of Sunnis in Iraq.

Iraq is of course the most excellent example of the fact that the conflict is not Syrian only, in fact the two conflicts have practically merged together. But there's also Lebanon, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, France, Russia, US, Israel, and the entire world really. Whatever they decide among themselves, that's what it's going to be.

However, if the above doesn't happen soon enough, I can perfectly see Assad getting overrun by the Sunnis as a result of attrition and I honestly don't think it will given that the Iraqi government is in total disarray.

Well you have noted yourself that the two conflicts (Iraq and Syria) are connected. If that is so, and if the Shia have an advantage in Iraq, they don't have to wait till ISIS is defeated in Iraq, they can perfectly well go to Syria today to bolster the pro-Shia forces there, nothing is stopping them.


By the way, here's someone's explanation for the recent rebel gains:

In March, Nusra received injections of funds and guns – which found their way to IS – from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the US as well as an influx of fresh fighters routed through Turkey. US-supplied artillery shells, mortars and Tow anti-tank missiles were key to the battle for Idlib in April and continue to account for advances of the so-called Army of Conquest, which has taken control of most of Idlib.

http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middle-east/iranian-fighters-go-to-syria-to-help-defend-damascus-1.2240812

If this is accurate, then Assad probably has nobody but himself to blame - he stirred up the beehive with his attempt to encircle Aleppo, there was no way that Turkey and company would have let that happen.

[roxunreal]

Regarding the last part, the opposition has accused Assad of playing "ISIL's airforce" in its recent attack on the Aleppo province rebels, while on the other hand the US has also bombed ISIL in that very same area. Assad wants ISIL to tie up the rest of the rebels as much as possible, the US doesn't want that and also wants to weaken ISIL on the northern fronts, but at the same time probably knows and is ok with the fact that this diverts ISIL to other fronts against Assad in the south. Thus we have this weird scenario where both Assad and the US/coalition are both using ISIL which is belligerent to them as a tool for their own strategic interests against the other side. Proxy galore.

[pikachu]

the opposition has accused Assad of playing "ISIL's airforce" in its recent attack on the Aleppo province rebels

It's funny - if SAF is "ISIL's airforce" because it bombs al-Qaeda and other Salafist rebels while ISIL is attacking them - then doesn't that also mean that the USAF is al-Qaeda's and Salafist's airforce, because it bombs ISIL while al-Qaeda is attacking them? XD
Hell, I'm pretty sure Assad bombs ISIL positions way more often than Obama bombs Nusra's.

Of course, when rebels fight each other - Assad prefers that ISIL wins, because for him they're all about equally bad, yet internationally ISIL is seen as the "worst of the worst" and has plenty of enemies. This isn't some devious plan, this is common sense.

[jessupjonesjnr87]

Like pikachu said there is a little thing during times of war known as strategy.

[Potemkin]

It's funny - if SAF is "ISIL's airforce" because it bombs al-Qaeda while ISIL is attacking them - then doesn't that also mean that the USAF is al-Qaeda's airforce, because it bombs ISIL while al-Qaeda is attacking them? XD

Welcome to the Middle East, pikachu.

[abu_rashid]

Looks like there's a pretty simple dynamic here, if IS & other Islamists continue fighting one another, they'll lose and Assad & Kurds will win. Otherwise Assad & Kurds are finished, if the former can get their acts together and stop infighting.

[Rich]

Over and over again its been the Sunni Muslims that have collaborated with America, NATO and behind the scenes sometime Israel. All the Sunni Arab monarchies, Saudi, Kuwait, etc, the Pakistanis, the Afghan Mujahdaine against the Soviets, Mubarak, but it was the west that encouraged him to cede power to Morsi and the brotherhood. It was the West that encouraged Turkey's generals to cede power to the Islamists. It was Saddam who collaborated with the West to attack Iran. Some say French pilots even flew missions for him. It was Sunni Arab Islamists who collaborated with America in Syria and Libya.

The Shia have collaborated with the West far less. The Shia establishment collaborated with America to overthrow Mossadegh. The Shia collaborated with America as much as they had to in 2003, but that was only because they remembered how the Sunni Arabs had collaborated with British after the first world war and sold them down the river. The Christians and the Alawites have collaborated far less.

[abu_rashid]

You're confusing the general population with the puppet rulers.

Whilst puppet "Sunni" leaders do indeed collaborate with the West, the general Sunni population are the most anti-Western. The Shi'a on the other hand both the regimes and the general populace are willing to collaborate.