Starting around July this year the situation has become a lot more clear and transparent, it confirmed a lot of things which, until then, were mostly the realm of speculation.
The emergence of two rival governments also drastically simplified the otherwise complex situation, reducing the number of major factions of interest by an order of magnitude.
As you may have heard, in late August, Libya's capital Tripoli was overrun by the pro-Islamist faction, and the recently elected (with 16% turnout) anti-Islamist legislature consequently ran away to Tobruk, Libya's easternmost major city. Since then most of the western media appears to have all but written off the anti-Islamist government, seeing it as helplessly hanging on to its last bastions in Tobruk and Bayda. The government, however, has no apparent intention of giving up and continues to fight on. Since it appears that no one had done it yet, I've decided to map out the current dividing lines, still fresh and highly blurry.
This is basically what I've got:
So that's basically Libya Today from what I can gather.
The main factions are of course the Tripoli and the Bayda/Tobruk governments, both being broad coalitions composed of many factions - the main ones among them are listed.
Though both of them are pretty diverse in their overall composition and serve as outlets for regional and tribal rivalries more than anything, it is also true that the Tripoli government has an overall "Islamist" flavor to it, while the Bayda government (the legislature is in Tobruk but the actual ministries are supposedly in Bayda) brands itself as more nationalist and liberal, for that reason it makes sense to shorthand them as "Islamist" and "nationalist" forces respectively.
Besides these two, and as usual in such cases, all the ethnic minorities also have their own factions which are ultimately looking out only for their own narrow ethnic interests - though they may ally others as part of that struggle. There are three main minorities in Libya - Berber (Amazigh), Tobou, and Tuareg, each with their own organizations and militias of course.
Among these three, the Berbers are said to have currently sided with the Islamists, though they have given them nothing more than token verbal support thus far. On the other hand the Tuaregs, which fought overwhelmingly on Gaddafi's side during the civil war, are said to be backing the nationalists, though again they appear to be settling their own scores right now more than anything. The Tobou's allegiance is unclear, but they seem to have problems with the Tuaregs.
You may note that since the last time I've made an attempt at such a map, two additional factions had ceased existence - the "green resistance" and "ansar al sharia".
Ansar al Sharia had become one of the leading forces of the "Libya Dawn" coalition - for now, at least. It operates primarily in the Benghazi and Derna regions, where it is actively engaged in fighting against the nationalist forces nominally on behalf of the Tripoli government. Though really, of course, it obey no one and that will be a problem eventually, if it isn't already (there are rumors of clashes among various Islamist factions in Derna, one of which is Ansar al-Sharia).
As for the Gaddafi loyalists, ever since their last major attack in January of this year they had gone quiet and apparently all but disappeared. There's a good reason for that. As the antagonism between the victors of the 2011 civil war picked up pace in early 2014 and turned into an armed confrontation in May, the nationalist faction had reached out to the tribes and figures known for their Gaddafi sympathy and allied with them out of fear of being overwhelmed by the opposition. The weight of circumstances had forced the "nationalist alliance" to open its arms to the losers and outcasts of the 2011 civil war - those who had either supported Gaddafi in 2011, tried to remain neutral, defected late in the war, or had a long history of serving the Gaddafi regime prior to defection. One of the most notable examples of this policy is Zintan's alliance with the Warshfena tribe, based in south-western suburbs of Tripoli, as well as Warfalla tribe to the south-east, both known for being pro-Gaddafi since 2011. Both of those are currently engaged in fighting against Misratan forces near Tripoli, while the Gaddafi's native Qaddadfa tribe is engaged near Sabha itself. The tribes are of course looking out for themselves, so they are more than willing to drop or at least tone down the "green" ideology if it helps to meet their demands - all it takes is to abstain from flying the green flag. Hence, despite all the tribal warfare, there's no "green resistance" for over half a year.
Analyzing the distribution of forces, it becomes apparent that the Bayda/Tobruk government is not actually in such a bad position at all as some people assume it might be. Despite being forced out of Tripoli, it maintains a wide network of supporters among tribes, regional population centers, military infrastructure, and perhaps most importantly - oil and gas. It is indeed a very bad situation for the Islamist coalition, that despite controlling all three of Libya's biggest population centers - Tripoli, Benghazi, and Misrata, they control basically none of the oil that the country produces. They do, however, control the financial infrastructure in Tripoli, including Libya's Central Bank, which is directly involved in oil export and other financial transactions, and that gives them at least some leverage - but not a lot. If a compromise isn't found, the Bayda government can eventually set up its own Central Bank and other financial institutions as well. This would of course force the Islamists to take the energy infrastructure under direct control. So if a compromise isn't found soon, a war over resources is probably looming. The Islamist alliance does however appear to have the numbers and morale on its side, for now.
Some links which may also help to explain the situation:
http://www.fairobserver.com/region/midd ... bya-66018/
http://www.janes.com/article/42323/liby ... fracturing