- 24 Oct 2012 18:15
#14089454
Seven months ago, already, I posted an "ideological update" staking my positions on particular issues.
Today, I want to do another update but instead of talking about core principles. That is, my political beliefs have different expressions depending on context, but my American antiwar liberalism and French Euro-Gaullism derive from the exact same intellectual-moral foundation (the same for all the positions expressed in the previous update). That foundation is liberal realism. Virtue, decadence and socio-national cohesion are related fundamental concepts.
Realism is nothing more than the acceptance of physical reality and human nature. This implies, above all, a recognition of the limits of politics because of the limits of human nature. The most important "limit" is that we human beings, evolved in small bands in the African savanna, are not capable of lasting identification and solidarity with strangers. When we do identify, this is sharply limited, but can extend as far as the Nation.
This has fundamental consequences for both domestic and international life. Most famously expressed by Machiavelli, this means that internationally States necessarily look out for their own interests and to expect otherwise is naïve and dangerous. Domestically, this means a recognition, as expressed by the Italian school of elitism, that true democracy has always been impossible given technological and biological realities. Disregard of reality in favor of impossible fantasies, Utopia, can only feed absolute oppression as the State attempts to accomplish impossible dreams. At home, this means totalitarianism, abroad, eternal war. Neoconservatism and Leninism are exactly identical in these respects.
I advocate a liberal realism (e.g. a liberal version of a realist core) because that seems to me to be the most compatible with rational and happy human existence. If I had the personal qualities, or the life circumstances, necessary to be part of a dictatorship, perhaps I'd reject liberalism, this not being the case I can only rationally embrace liberalism.
Liberal realism first recognizes our flawed nature, and then seeks to create situations, institutions and values in which our ugliness can do the least damage possible. The classical liberals - Montesquieu, the U.S. Founding Fathers, Hobbes in a sense - were the ones to most brilliantly express this point of view. This leads to a series of principles: limited government, checks and balances, transparency (free speech), the rule of law, etc. These principles are invariably generalized so that the liberal State becomes the liberal democratic State in which equality before the law and suffrage are universalized in principle. The sum of all this could be expressed by the slogan: freedom, equality, law. The liberal recognizes reality - true democracy and good are impossible - but is always striving, pushing society to be the most democratic and good it can be.
So far so good. However, for a realist liberal democrat, one also has to go beyond simple pronouncement of principles, but also explain how they are to be applied and maintained. The challenge today is to explain the failures of Western liberal democracies over the past 30 years, why they have been consistently diverging from their stated principles.
I won't provide a general interpretation, but I will identify the concepts of virtue & decadence. Virtue is an Ancient concept, notably used by Ibn Khaldun to explain the decadence of the medieval Islamic States. In premodern times, a State and society's "virtue" can be summarized by this: Is it doing all it can to continue its existence, that it is functioning well and in particular ensuring its military ability (the prerequisite for its existence)?
In Ibn Khaldun's estimation, urban life, civilization and power inevitably led to license, luxury, waste and flabbiness in the State and society, thereby inevitably leading within a few generations to their replacement by "virtuous" barbarians. (This was typically the case throughout history, as wandering Germans, Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols and others periodically conquered their "more advanced" neighbors.)
This idea of virtue is just as applicable to democracies and even more applicable to industrial societies. Industrial civilization massively enables decadence, the richer and more powerful you are, the more room you have for being sloppy, for cutting corners. The fundamental liberal innovation is that we have mechanisms for self-correction: free press, rule of law, checks and balances, the principles of social equity, the ability to democratically replace the political elite, all these things provide the possibility for liberal regimes to renew themselves. It is only a possibility, but it is I think a far, far greater when than either premodern absolutist regimes or modern totalitarian ones.
Virtue (living within one's means, respect for law, hostility to overconsumption), incidentally, was fundamental to all the ideas of the classical liberals such as Montesquieu and Benjamin Franklin.
Perhaps the most important factor in maintaining virtue, I am finding, is national cohesion. Put another way, "cohesion" (Asabiyyah ) is simply society's version of Stately virtue: Those families, clans, nations and empires which are cohesive - whose different parts work together, sacrifice for one another, and are loyal to the same objective - will conquer and triumph over those which are not.
In turn, the primary determinant for whether a liberal democratic nation is virtuous and cohesive, it seems to me, is the extent to which political power coincides with national feeling. That is: States and societies in which the people do not empathize and identify with one another - whether because of race, class, religion, language or whatever - cannot be cohesive. To the extent a society is apatride, countryless or rootless, it will be corrupted and violent. The reason for this has long be explained by Gaullists: Democracy is when the minority willingly submits to the laws of the majority (and, one might add, when the majority submits to the Constitution). This is only possible when there are a strong sentiment of common feeling in the society in question.
This, I believe, explains much of the recent decadence of the West. In the U.S., the race problem and the excessive distance of federal power - its capture by an oligarchy which ordinary Americans can do nothing about - explains most of its shocking differences, its violence, criminality, lawlessness, socio-economic insecurity, etc, with the rest of the developed world. It is decadent, for example, on its own terms when the regime declared the "War on Terror" a great existential crusade, yet it was still encouraging consumption and individual debt ("stimulate the economy by going shopping") and energy dependence. It is the nation of apatrides par excellence (in some sense indeed the U.S. is not a nation, where the regime to change or collapse, huge parts might secede, which would not be normal for a steady nation like France, Germany or Japan). In Europe, we are developing very similar problems because of the emergence of (and failure to integrate) hated minorities (this is an objective not moral statement), the rootless and literally apatride power of the ECB and other EU institutions, overreliance on the foreign power that is the U.S., and the triumph of uncontrolled free trade and international banksterism in general. Equally, if Japan and the Scandinavian countries are the most civilized, peaceful and developed in the world, it is because the exact opposite factors are at work.
Socio-national cohesion, broadly speaking, can be promoted by: ethnic homogeneity and/or genuinely open national identity (if you're lucky, but this is typically not a choice), economic equality, identification with elites, responsiveness of elites to democratic pressures, a feeling of influence on government by all groups (sectoral unions, young, old, minorities..), strong community life, and "total wars" among others. Places without national cohesion inevitably degenerate into vetocracies, in which small, privileged minorities veto policies for the national good, and are basically "empires." (Federalism, when it binds unlike communities together, degenerates into rootless imperialism. There is no particular problem if federalism binds a single nation together.)
Following these principles, concerning Europe, where political power exists beyond solidarity and community feeling, it should be destroyed. Neither Belgium nor the eurozone are viable democratic entities. The UK must probably leave the EU and Scotland the UK. We shouldn't be dogmatic. People have circles of identity: family, town, region, profession, race, gender, nation, religion, continent, etc. Politically however, the Nation remains the only appropriate fundamental unit. There is some degree of solidarity between Europeans, maybe even enough among Continental Europeans to use majority rules (!) as per the Lisbon Treaty, but there is clearly nowhere near enough to ensure a functioning and democratic monetary union.
And that about sums it up. I am always justified myself as a liberal-social democrat on empirical and historical grounds: It was obvious to me that liberal societies were both the most powerful and the most pleasant to live in. The justification was not based on any understanding of liberal principles or political philosophy (except the elitist-Machiavellian critique of pure democracy). Now, I am going to deepen my understanding of liberalism, realism and decadence, to get a real firm grounding, by my readings (e.g. of or about Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu, the U.S. Founding Fathers, Clausewitz, the modern sociologists, Spengler, De Gaulle, Aron, etc).
I note, in passing, that Gaullism seems to me the most ambitious and interesting synthesis the brutal principles of Machiavellian realism and classical virtue with modern liberal democracy. Probably it was not as lawful and democratic as I would like, but it seems to me French Republican democracy, firmly grounded in civic nationalism, is an interesting answer to the Spenglerian critique that democracy is only the rule of money, license, decadence, corruption, nihilism etc, etc.
Thoughts.
Today, I want to do another update but instead of talking about core principles. That is, my political beliefs have different expressions depending on context, but my American antiwar liberalism and French Euro-Gaullism derive from the exact same intellectual-moral foundation (the same for all the positions expressed in the previous update). That foundation is liberal realism. Virtue, decadence and socio-national cohesion are related fundamental concepts.
Realism is nothing more than the acceptance of physical reality and human nature. This implies, above all, a recognition of the limits of politics because of the limits of human nature. The most important "limit" is that we human beings, evolved in small bands in the African savanna, are not capable of lasting identification and solidarity with strangers. When we do identify, this is sharply limited, but can extend as far as the Nation.
This has fundamental consequences for both domestic and international life. Most famously expressed by Machiavelli, this means that internationally States necessarily look out for their own interests and to expect otherwise is naïve and dangerous. Domestically, this means a recognition, as expressed by the Italian school of elitism, that true democracy has always been impossible given technological and biological realities. Disregard of reality in favor of impossible fantasies, Utopia, can only feed absolute oppression as the State attempts to accomplish impossible dreams. At home, this means totalitarianism, abroad, eternal war. Neoconservatism and Leninism are exactly identical in these respects.
I advocate a liberal realism (e.g. a liberal version of a realist core) because that seems to me to be the most compatible with rational and happy human existence. If I had the personal qualities, or the life circumstances, necessary to be part of a dictatorship, perhaps I'd reject liberalism, this not being the case I can only rationally embrace liberalism.
Liberal realism first recognizes our flawed nature, and then seeks to create situations, institutions and values in which our ugliness can do the least damage possible. The classical liberals - Montesquieu, the U.S. Founding Fathers, Hobbes in a sense - were the ones to most brilliantly express this point of view. This leads to a series of principles: limited government, checks and balances, transparency (free speech), the rule of law, etc. These principles are invariably generalized so that the liberal State becomes the liberal democratic State in which equality before the law and suffrage are universalized in principle. The sum of all this could be expressed by the slogan: freedom, equality, law. The liberal recognizes reality - true democracy and good are impossible - but is always striving, pushing society to be the most democratic and good it can be.
So far so good. However, for a realist liberal democrat, one also has to go beyond simple pronouncement of principles, but also explain how they are to be applied and maintained. The challenge today is to explain the failures of Western liberal democracies over the past 30 years, why they have been consistently diverging from their stated principles.
I won't provide a general interpretation, but I will identify the concepts of virtue & decadence. Virtue is an Ancient concept, notably used by Ibn Khaldun to explain the decadence of the medieval Islamic States. In premodern times, a State and society's "virtue" can be summarized by this: Is it doing all it can to continue its existence, that it is functioning well and in particular ensuring its military ability (the prerequisite for its existence)?
In Ibn Khaldun's estimation, urban life, civilization and power inevitably led to license, luxury, waste and flabbiness in the State and society, thereby inevitably leading within a few generations to their replacement by "virtuous" barbarians. (This was typically the case throughout history, as wandering Germans, Huns, Arabs, Turks, Mongols and others periodically conquered their "more advanced" neighbors.)
This idea of virtue is just as applicable to democracies and even more applicable to industrial societies. Industrial civilization massively enables decadence, the richer and more powerful you are, the more room you have for being sloppy, for cutting corners. The fundamental liberal innovation is that we have mechanisms for self-correction: free press, rule of law, checks and balances, the principles of social equity, the ability to democratically replace the political elite, all these things provide the possibility for liberal regimes to renew themselves. It is only a possibility, but it is I think a far, far greater when than either premodern absolutist regimes or modern totalitarian ones.
Virtue (living within one's means, respect for law, hostility to overconsumption), incidentally, was fundamental to all the ideas of the classical liberals such as Montesquieu and Benjamin Franklin.
Perhaps the most important factor in maintaining virtue, I am finding, is national cohesion. Put another way, "cohesion" (Asabiyyah ) is simply society's version of Stately virtue: Those families, clans, nations and empires which are cohesive - whose different parts work together, sacrifice for one another, and are loyal to the same objective - will conquer and triumph over those which are not.
In turn, the primary determinant for whether a liberal democratic nation is virtuous and cohesive, it seems to me, is the extent to which political power coincides with national feeling. That is: States and societies in which the people do not empathize and identify with one another - whether because of race, class, religion, language or whatever - cannot be cohesive. To the extent a society is apatride, countryless or rootless, it will be corrupted and violent. The reason for this has long be explained by Gaullists: Democracy is when the minority willingly submits to the laws of the majority (and, one might add, when the majority submits to the Constitution). This is only possible when there are a strong sentiment of common feeling in the society in question.
This, I believe, explains much of the recent decadence of the West. In the U.S., the race problem and the excessive distance of federal power - its capture by an oligarchy which ordinary Americans can do nothing about - explains most of its shocking differences, its violence, criminality, lawlessness, socio-economic insecurity, etc, with the rest of the developed world. It is decadent, for example, on its own terms when the regime declared the "War on Terror" a great existential crusade, yet it was still encouraging consumption and individual debt ("stimulate the economy by going shopping") and energy dependence. It is the nation of apatrides par excellence (in some sense indeed the U.S. is not a nation, where the regime to change or collapse, huge parts might secede, which would not be normal for a steady nation like France, Germany or Japan). In Europe, we are developing very similar problems because of the emergence of (and failure to integrate) hated minorities (this is an objective not moral statement), the rootless and literally apatride power of the ECB and other EU institutions, overreliance on the foreign power that is the U.S., and the triumph of uncontrolled free trade and international banksterism in general. Equally, if Japan and the Scandinavian countries are the most civilized, peaceful and developed in the world, it is because the exact opposite factors are at work.
Socio-national cohesion, broadly speaking, can be promoted by: ethnic homogeneity and/or genuinely open national identity (if you're lucky, but this is typically not a choice), economic equality, identification with elites, responsiveness of elites to democratic pressures, a feeling of influence on government by all groups (sectoral unions, young, old, minorities..), strong community life, and "total wars" among others. Places without national cohesion inevitably degenerate into vetocracies, in which small, privileged minorities veto policies for the national good, and are basically "empires." (Federalism, when it binds unlike communities together, degenerates into rootless imperialism. There is no particular problem if federalism binds a single nation together.)
Following these principles, concerning Europe, where political power exists beyond solidarity and community feeling, it should be destroyed. Neither Belgium nor the eurozone are viable democratic entities. The UK must probably leave the EU and Scotland the UK. We shouldn't be dogmatic. People have circles of identity: family, town, region, profession, race, gender, nation, religion, continent, etc. Politically however, the Nation remains the only appropriate fundamental unit. There is some degree of solidarity between Europeans, maybe even enough among Continental Europeans to use majority rules (!) as per the Lisbon Treaty, but there is clearly nowhere near enough to ensure a functioning and democratic monetary union.
And that about sums it up. I am always justified myself as a liberal-social democrat on empirical and historical grounds: It was obvious to me that liberal societies were both the most powerful and the most pleasant to live in. The justification was not based on any understanding of liberal principles or political philosophy (except the elitist-Machiavellian critique of pure democracy). Now, I am going to deepen my understanding of liberalism, realism and decadence, to get a real firm grounding, by my readings (e.g. of or about Ibn Khaldun, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Montesquieu, the U.S. Founding Fathers, Clausewitz, the modern sociologists, Spengler, De Gaulle, Aron, etc).
I note, in passing, that Gaullism seems to me the most ambitious and interesting synthesis the brutal principles of Machiavellian realism and classical virtue with modern liberal democracy. Probably it was not as lawful and democratic as I would like, but it seems to me French Republican democracy, firmly grounded in civic nationalism, is an interesting answer to the Spenglerian critique that democracy is only the rule of money, license, decadence, corruption, nihilism etc, etc.
Thoughts.
A stubborn porcupine: heredity & nationhood. Meditate, brother!
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