- 08 May 2017 21:16
#14803454
For the history record there was not much difference between Vichyite foriegn policy and de Gaulle. They both destrusted Britain and America and pleaded for a Franco-Arab alliance against the British and the Zionists, stressing French and Arab common interests.
stephen50right wrote:Yep - Europe felt badly about what they did to 6 million Jews and others, so they let in Muslims to sort of show their new found tolerance. They compounded one horrific mistake for another.
Basically they traded 6 million Jews for over 20 million Muslims. History will decide what kind of trade that was.
For the history record there was not much difference between Vichyite foriegn policy and de Gaulle. They both destrusted Britain and America and pleaded for a Franco-Arab alliance against the British and the Zionists, stressing French and Arab common interests.
After France’s exclusion from the 1945 Yalta negotiations between the U.S., Britain, and Soviet Russia about Europe’s future. Gaullist practitioners of realpolitik had formulated a strategy to restore France’s influence. This entailed two convergent policies, which they hoped to implement both in Europe and in the Arab-Muslim world: the unification of Europe as an international counterweight to America and an alliance with the Arab and African Muslim world, which they considered an economic and geopolitical element of France’s postcolonial sphere of influence. The latter position was strongly advocated in 1945 by Haj Amin al-Hussaini, the former mufti of Jerusalem and a notorious Nazi ally who was Hitler’s guest in Berlin from 1941. After the German defeat he was declared a war criminal and was actively hunted by the British for having fomented a coup d’état in Iraq in 1941 to establish a pro-Nazi government. De Gaulle refused to let him be judged as a war criminal by the Nuremberg tribunal. A preeminent leader among the Muslim masses, and especially the Muslim Brotherhood, the mufti became an agent of French influence in the Arab countries. He pleaded for a Franco-Arab alliance against the British and the Zionists, stressing French and Arab common interests. Through his powerful Arab networks, he proposed a French policy of solidarity with the Arab world.
After Algeria gained its independence in 1962, de Gaulle set out to reorient France’s policy toward the Arab/Islamic world. He pursued economic and strategic long-range planning designed to unite the European and Arab countries of the Mediterranean into a single, interdependent economic bloc that would oppose America. They believed that France’s association with a Muslim federation extending over North Africa and the Middle East would bring it an ascendancy that would impress the Soviet Union and rival the United States. Pierre Lyautey—nephew of Marshall Lyautey, the first French governor of Morocco—championed a Franco-Muslim association in several studies on Euro-Arab relations. In May 1962 he stated, “A French Islamic policy carried out together with the new Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, perhaps linked tomorrow with a North African federation, and with the states of the Middle East, would bring us a prestige which would impress the United States and the USSR.” De Gaulle shared with his collaborators his wish to build a community with all the Mediterranean countries, different from the American model. He presented France’s cooperation with the Arab world as “the fundamental basis of our foreign policy.”13 The Association of Franco-Arab solidarity was created at that time, with the blessing and participation of distinguished Gaullist diplomats, ministers, and intellectuals.
Two elements thus cemented the Franco-Arab alliance in the 1960s: French anti-Americanism fed by frustrated power ambitions, and a convergence of French Vichy antisemitism with the Arab desire to destroy Israel. From then on, America and Israel were inextricably linked in this policy. They hoped that a pro-French Islam would facilitate the quiet control of former colonies within the French orbit and spread French culture (the so-called Francophonia), associated with the benefits of an enormous market, across Muslim Africa. The rapidity of the Franco-German submission to the Arab threat of an oil boycott arouses the suspicion that this threat represented a pretext for Europeans leaders to reverse previous EEC economic policy toward Israel and the Arab world. This seems all the more plausible since America had pledged to cover Europe’s oil needs and had called the Arab states’ bluff by demonstrating their total dependence on the West. The oil embargo offered France a long-awaited chance to drag the whole of a reluctant EEC into the Arab anti-Zionist political orbit.
As strange as this may have seemed in the years immediately following America’s rescue of France from Nazi tyranny, French hostility toward America ran high. It was fed on the left by the communists and their sympathizers and on the right by pro-Nazi collaborators from the Vichy regime. They remained influential and continued to serve even at the uppermost levels of the postwar French government. Anti-American animus in French government circles was so intense that the eminent French philosopher Raymond Aron noted in 1968 that France “was supporting wittingly and deliberately all those in the Third World who professed the most hostile feelings to Americans and Westerners.” He wondered: “Is every friend of the United States an enemy of France?” Aron commented, “in fact everything transpires as if General de Gaulle’s supreme objective was to oppose everywhere and always the United States…. Does not the current anti-American obsession resemble the anti-British obsession of Vichy in 1940?”
The security of European territory was obtained in exchange for anti-Israel and anti-American policies. Even before the advent of widespread terrorism, de Gaulle’s France had adopted such a policy. According to Jean Bourdeillette, former French ambassador to Israel (1959–1965), “[In June 1967] the world discovered that Paris had crossed into the camp of the USSR and the Arab nations. . . . Israel was sacrificed to the demands of a conjugated anti-American pro-Arab policy.” According to Raymond Kendall—three times elected Interpol General Secretary—the meeting of the International Criminal Police Organization (Mexico, October 1968) refused by a majority vote to consider a report on hijacking planes. After the Munich massacre (1972), Jean Nepote, himself an Interpol General Secretary (1963–1978) and former collaborator with the Nazis in the Vichy Government, refused to gather information on Arab terrorists on the pretext that the Munich crime was political and that Interpol should not interfere. The Report of the Interpol General Assembly in Frankfurt (September 1972) does not mention the Munich massacres although it had been heatedly discussed by the assembly.
Source:Eurabia
Last edited by noir on 08 May 2017 21:50, edited 2 times in total.
If you can show some parallels in their policy and fascist ideology, fair enough. But I don't think you can, because it's nonsense.
I'll be stocking up on my popcorn over here 
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