ISLAM AND NAZI GERMANY’S WARISLAM AND NAZI GERMANY’S WAR
DAVID MOTADEL
The Egyptian and Iranian ambassadors in Berlin, who insisted that their peoples were “kindred” with the Germans,
were assured that the press reports were baseless and that the Nuremberg laws targeted only Jews.91 Yet, the delicate question of whether Arabs and Iranians were considered “kindred” with Germans remained open, and
whereas the Egyptian ambassador in Berlin merely demanded clarifi cation that Egyptians were not targeted by German racial laws, Tehran’s ambassador insisted on a defi nite statement that Ira ni ans were considered racially
related to the Germans.92 After all, Riza Shah had, a year earlier, ordered that his country be called “Iran” instead of “Persia” in international affairs; the name “Iran” is a cognate of “Aryan” and refers to the “Land of the Aryans,” and Iranian offi cials had internally made no secret that they believed this term useful given that “some countries pride themselves on being Aryan.” 93
By contrast, Germany’s Persian service— staffed with notorious propa-
gandists such as head announcer Shah- Bahran Shahrukh, po liti cal dissident
Nezameddin Akhavi, and Davud Monshizadeh, who after the war would Muslims in the War Zones
[ 104 ]
found Iran’s Fascist Sumka Party— increasingly drew on religious themes.
After the occupation of Iran in the summer of 1941, German propaganda
would routinely accuse the Allies of violating religious sites and sentiments
in the country. Among the standard propaganda slogans was the claim that
“Anglo- Soviet troops” had “defi led mosques in Iran.”182 As the Germans
advanced into the southern regions of the Soviet Union in the summer of
1942, nearing the Ira ni an border, new guidelines were given out, which, in
addition to the usual slogans, explicitly instructed propagandists to denounce
the British and Soviet “policy of oppression” in “other Mohammedan
countries.”183 Radio Berlin accused Washington of pursuing “missionary ac-
tivity” in Iran, London of not only meddling in “po liti cal” but also “reli-
gious” matters of the country, and Moscow for its general “hostility toward
religion.”184
A particularly pop u lar trope of German propaganda in Iran was Shi‘a
messianism. As early as February 1941, Erwin Ettel, then envoy in Tehran,
made specifi c suggestions in this respect. From the Ira ni an capital he re-
ported that numerous Shi‘a “clergymen” had spoken to the people “from
old divinations and dreams, and interpreted them as saying that the Twelfth
Imam was sent to the world by Allah in the form of Adolf Hitler.”185 Ettel
suggested supporting these developments and trying to “clearly emphasize
the fi ght of Muhammad against the Jews in history and that of the Führer
in modern times. Connected by an equation between the British and the
Jews, an extremely effective anti- English propaganda would be carried to
the Shi‘a Ira ni an people.” Ettel proposed using the famous Qur’anic verse
5:82 (85) alongside a quotation from Mein Kampf (“Hence today I believe
that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by
defending myself against the Jew, I am fi ghting for the work of the Lord”)
to prove that Muslims and Nazis shared the “same objectives in the fi ght.”
The propaganda offi cer of the German embassy in Tehran had already col-
lected material about the issue. German propagandists were to take it up in
their broadcasts and, in the case of positive feedback, supplement it with
pamphlet propaganda. Yet he urged caution, as “crude propaganda” could
offend the “deep feelings of the faithful.” Local channels seemed best
suited to convey propagandistic messages, and Ettel emphasized in par tic-
u lar the po liti cal signifi cance of the clergy in Iran, with its effi cient infor-
mation and propaganda network with hubs in Mashhad and Qum, which
German propagandists should try to exploit.186 These views were shared Islam and the War in North Africa and the Middle East
[ 105 ]
by his colleagues. Assessing German propaganda in Iran, Hans Alexander
Winkler, who had been cultural attaché at the German embassy in Tehran
before the Allied occupation, wrote in early 1942 that the most promising
propaganda themes for Iran were those drawing on the religious beliefs
and aspirations of Ira ni ans, particularly the return of the Twelfth Imam.187
Winkler asserted that among both the rural population and the urban in-
telligentsia, beliefs were expressed connecting the rise of Adolf Hitler to
the return of the Mahdi. Even the Shi‘a clergy, according to the diplomat,
cultivated these ideas. Given the “disposition of the Ira ni an towards reli-
gious fanat i cism,” Winkler saw in such beliefs “strong forces” that German
propaganda could employ, ideally connected to anti- Jewish resentment. Ap-
parently German propaganda did indeed present Hitler as a God- sent sav-
ior.188 Soon, even the newly installed shah, Muhammad Riza Pahlavi, pub-
licly expressed concern about Axis broadcasts portraying the German
dictator as a religious fi gure and defender of Islam.189
Propaganda targeting the Muslims of British India— an area also cov-
ered by the “Orient Offi ce” of Radio Zeesen— was particularly sensitive.
Berlin aired three different daily programs to India, including Azad Mus-
lim (Free Muslims) in Urdu. Yet, in 1943, it was broadcasting only fi fteen
minutes a day. Instead of addressing individual religious groups, the regime’s
India propaganda usually blamed En gland for cultivating religious hatred.190
Research on the reception of Na-
zism in different parts of North Africa and the Middle East suggests that
its impact should not be overestimated.214 On the whole, opinions expressed
in the public sphere were quite diverse— refl ecting the heterogeneity of the
societies in the region— ranging from fascination and sympathy to con-
cern and contempt. Yet, what ever their views, the vast majority showed no Islam and the War in North Africa and the Middle East
[ 109 ]
reaction to Berlin’s calls for religious violence and revolt. It is, moreover,
striking that the Islamic slogans of Germany’s propaganda also had little
resonance in religious circles and among the leading ‘ulama— as a broad-
sketch view quickly reveals.
Among the listeners of Radio Berlin in Iran is said to have been the
young mullah Ruhollah Musavi, in the holy city of Qum.215 Every eve ning,
Musavi, who had a radio set built by the British manufacturer Pye, appar-
ently hosted numerous mullahs and seminary students who came to his
house to listen to Zeesen’s Persian ser vice. Mullah Musavi, who later be-
came known to the world as Ayatollah Khomeini, seemed little impressed
by the German program. In 1942 he published the tract Kashf al- Asrar
(The Revealing of Secrets), his fi rst po liti cal statement, in which he not only
agitated against the antireligious polemics of the Pahlavi state and called
for rule on the principles of Islam but also raged against oppressive regimes
more generally, denouncing the “Hitlerite ideology” (maram- i Hitleri) as
“the most poisonous and heinous product of the human mind.” 216 Some
other younger clerics had more pro- German leanings, most famously the
ardent anti- imperialist Ayatollah Abu al- Qasem Kashani, whose father, the
late Ayatollah Mostafa Kashani, had died fi ghting British troops in south-
ern Iraq during the jihad of the First World War, and who, in 1943, was
arrested for pro- German activities by British authorities.217 The conserva-
tive clerical establishment in Iran, however, abstained from politics, re-
signed to their seminaries.218 Prominent clerics such as Ayatollah Muham-
mad Husayn Burujirdi, who shortly after the war emerged as the sole
marja‘- i taqlid, the highest religious authority in Shi‘a Islam, preached po-
liti cal quietism.219 Outside Iran, too, Shi‘a authorities remained cautious.
The Shi‘a ‘ulama of Najaf and Karbala was not, unlike during the First World War, united behind Germany.220 In early 1940, Amin al- Husayni, then in
Baghdad, tried to persuade some of the Shi‘a leaders of southern Iraq to
endorse his jihad, approaching the se nior clerics ‘Abd al- Karim al- Jaza’iri
and Muhammad Kashif al- Ghita, who had both played prominent roles in
Iraqi politics during the interwar years.221 While al- Jaza’iri gave short
shrift to the Palestinian mufti, Kashif al- Ghita was more receptive, issuing
a fatwa with a call for holy war against the British Empire, which was also
announced by Yunus Bahri on Radio Berlin on 13 February 1940— though
with little effect.222 No major Shi‘a uprising broke out during the war. The
Germans had little more impressive to record than some graffi ti: in early Muslims in the War Zones
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1942 a German diplomat reported that in both Beirut and Damascus the
slogan “Hitler, the successor of ‘Ali” had appeared on the walls, scrawled
by Shi‘a rebels or possibly by German agents.223
In the Mashriq, German propaganda received a mixed reception. On
the fringes of the Arab world, in the Persian Gulf region, Muhammad al-
Qasimi, who would later become amir of Sharjah of the United Arab Emir-
ates, recalled the propaganda war in his memoirs: “The news from the
German radio station, with the sharp tongue of the Iraqi broadcaster Yu-
nus Bahri, would infuriate the supporters of the Allies, just as the news
coming from the BBC Middle East Ser vice through the voice of the Syrian
Munir Shamma angered the supporters of the Axis. From the windows
overlooking the fort’s front square we children watched the fi ghting be-
tween the two sides.” 224 According to al- Qasimi, war time propaganda di-
vided the listeners: “Half of the people supported the Allies and half sup-
ported the Axis powers.” This diversity of opinion prevailed in many parts
of the region. Prominent ‘ulama and religious authorities, however, in most
cases remained silent, with only a few notable exceptions. After the 1941
invasion of the Vichy Levant, for instance, the powerful mufti of Lebanon,
Shaykh Muhammad Tawfi q Khalid, openly sided with the Allies.225
Closer to the North African front line, in Egypt, the attitude of the
population was similarly mixed.
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Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World by JEFFREY HERF
In a memo to Hitler of September 7, Ribbentrop wrote that the mood in Iran was "on our side."
German diplomats were fully aware of the differences between Sunni and Shi'ite Islam and of the distinctive views coming from Iran. In February 1941, before being driven out of the country by the British and Soviets, the German Embassy in Tehran sent a memo that offered interesting observations about propaganda possibilities. Awareness that "certain religious expectations are still alive in the Iranian people" was "important for our own propaganda work."
The greatest and the highest of these expectations is the belief in the appearance of the twelfth Imam who will come to earth as the redeemer. The worse things are for the broad mass of people, the stronger is the belief in the coming libera tor.... For months, the embassy has heard from various sources, that in the whole country preachers are coming forward to speak to the faithful of old, secret prophecies and dreams which indicate that in the form of Adolf Hitler, God has sent the twelfth Imam to the world.... These assertions make a deep impression on these Mullahs' pious listeners. The Fiihrer appears to them as their idea of a saint who will not only free them from their difficult social worries but will also, despite all Iraqi resistance, return to them the greatest of Shi'ite holy places, the mosque in Karbala.
The director of propaganda in the embassy has collected a comprehensive body of material of these kinds of prophecies and dreams from the clergymen as well as reactions of their listeners to them. Without any effort on the part of the embassy, all of this has more and more developed into a spreading propaganda which sees in the Fiihrer and thus in Germany rescuers from all distress and suf- fering.210
The memo further reported that one publisher in Tehran had produced a photo of Hitler along with "Ali;" the first Imam, showing Hitler as the second. Such material was spread from mosque to mosque. If the Iranian clergy could be influenced by German propaganda, "we would thereby be able to reach the great mass of the people in its full breadth." Tact was essential. The idea of Hitler as the twelfth Imam had emerged in Iran "without any effort on our part." Although such ideas could be encouraged "with astute and careful nourishment;" they could also be "completely destroyed if we hurt the feelings of the believers with tactless propaganda." The memo continued:
One way to encourage this development would be to clearly lay out Mohammed's struggle against the Jews in ancient times and that of Hitler's struggle against them in recent times. In so doing, if we were to equate the British and the Jews, we would bring an extremely effective anti-English propaganda to the Shi'ite, Iranian people. The more these ideas could be developed with documents, the more convincing they would be. So, for example, on the one hand, one could present Adolf Hitler's battle against Jewryin his own words and parallel to that present Mohammed's battle against the Jewish tribes in and around Medina with the words of the Arab historians of the most ancient era of Islam. Moreover, all of those British assertions in verbatim quotations that claim that the British are the lost tribe of Israel should be collected and published. Thereby, the Fiihrer's battle will appear to the Moslems as the renewal of the prophet's battle against the same enemy.
The identical goal of these struggles is especially impressively expressed in the Koran Sura 5.82: "You will meet no greater enemy of the believers than the Jews." This should be juxtaposed to Hitler's words: "I believe that today, I am acting in accord with God's creation. By resisting the Jews everywhere, I am fighting for the Lord's work," Mein Kampf, p. 69.211
The following January, Hans Alexander Winkler, whose leaflets from North Africa we have examined, wrote a memo about Iran for the Foreign Ministry based on his experience as cultural attache in Tehran from 1939 to 1941. He had found much friendship toward Germany due to the Iranians' high regard for German politics, economics, and culture. As Germany was far from Iran, the Iranians did not fear it. They understood that it was the enemy of Iran's enemies, Britain and Russia. Winkler also thought German propaganda in Iran was most likely to succeed if it made connections to "Iranian religious conceptions and expectations." For a thousand years, Iranian Shi'ites had expected the return of the twelfth Imam, who would bring order to a "depraved world." Winkler found that the peasantry as well as the urban intelligentsia entertained "the idea that Adolf Hitler himself is either the pathfinder of or even the Imam himself who has returned. These ideas have been fostered and spread by the clergy, often in the form of dreams of prominent clergy that the glory of the Imam is seen in Adolf Hitler." The Iranians' inclination "to religious fanaticism" was a powerful current that the Nazi regime could use. Such expectations could be "encouraged by bringing Hitler close to the Iranians through his words" and with the "depiction of his inspiring life story. Treatment of the Jewish question forms the immediate connecting link to Shi'ite conceptions. The Muslims view the Jewish question as a religious one and for that very reason [it] brings them close to National Socialism on religious grounds."212
Winkler continued, writing that most Iranians lacked an "understanding of racial knowledge." It existed in the upper classes thanks to European influence "with the result that the Iranians think of themselves as Aryans." He was aware that Allied propaganda claimed that German race theory depicted Orientals as inferior, although Mohammed saw no racial differences before God. These comments about German racial views were "the most dangerous theme of enemy propaganda." German propaganda could counter it by stating that "races are unities created by God" and therefore should be "kept pure" whereas "the Jew brings the races together who otherwise would live alongside one another peacefully. Thereby he is the adversary of God's order." In order to counter Allied propaganda and reach the Iranians, Winkler placed "all emphasis on the religious motivation of our propaganda in the Islamic world. Only this kind of propaganda will win the Orientals over to us. Indeed, only a believing National Socialist can carry out this kind of propaganda." Winkler thought cartoons drawn by "Oriental cartoonists" were more effective than photos. Poetry was preferable to academic-sounding essays. German engineers and business people in Iran made valuable contributions to spreading a favorable view of Nazi Germany, but writings that could be camouflaged as having been produced by Iranians were more convincing than those that obviously came from Ger- mans.213 As we will see, Winkler was not alone in raising the possibility of associating Adolf Hitler with themes of Shi'ite and general Islamic religious belief. Heinrich Himmler and leading officials of the SS and their intellectual advisers also thought this was a point of entry to Muslim sensibilities very much worth exploring.
In the last half of 1942, Nazi Germany's Arabic-language broadcasts, and most likely its Persian-language broadcasts to Iran as well, hammered away at the idea that a victory for the Axis would be a victory for Arabs and Muslims, while a victory for the Allies would be a victory for the Jews and for Zionists. While incitement in Germany amounted to assuring readers and listeners that the government was engaged in exterminating the Jewish enemy, in propaganda aimed at the Middle East, incitement included direct appeals for audience participation. In addition to the usual suspects, who in Nazi Germany were vilified as the leaders of the international Jewish conspiracy, the Arabic (and again presumably Persian) broadcasts added another powerful villain, Chaim Weizmann, to the list of the presumably powerful Jews who had plunged the world into World War II in order to realize Zionist ambitions. Although the regime in its propaganda at times explicitly called for killing the Jews, its Arabic-language programs said not a word about the Jews who were murdered on the killing fields and in the extermination camps of Nazi-dominated Europe in 1942.