[stalker]

Piano Red

About missile defence

Why increase the number of offensive missiles for little or not gain in capability? The US nuclear triad is already more than sufficient to destroy all of it's intended targets (and then some). Besides, AFAIK the cost of building and installing GBIs is relatively cheaper than the cost of having to build or re-activate new ICBM silos that aren't really needed.

Well, presumably it would be wise of Russia to increase the number of its offensive missiles if the US increases the number of its interceptor missiles, so that capability doesn't decline.

I think this is really the crux of the argument.

Regardless of technological advances (presume accuracy converges to 100% by 2020), you still need one interceptor missile for every ICBM. As it stands, the US has around 50-60 GBI interceptor missiles (about 25 in Alaska, 25 in Vandenburg) and plans 10 more in Poland.

To neutralize the Russian arsenal, which has around 500 ICBMs and 200 SLBMs, you'll need a slightly bigger number of interceptor missiles to ensure all kills. (So at this moment in time the US possesses the capability of killing 5-10% of all Russian incoming missiles during a Russian first strike.)

For this to happen, the US must massively expand its numbers of GBI. Is this something they plan on doing?

And what do they do after that? That isn't far enough of a future force posture outlook, i'd even go far to say that it serves to highlight the growing gap between the US and Russia in terms of their strategic nuclear forces. By 2020 the US will already have had the full ABM Shield completed and operational, and will be working on revamping it's current offensive nuclear triad with more advanced systems and delivery platforms.

Presumably Russia will start producing Topol SS-27 missiles en masse, as well as continuing to modernize its submarine forces and building its own ABM system.

BTW, I've got two questions on this:

Firstly, again, how large is the US ABM proposed to be? How many GBI missiles do they plan to install?

Secondy, do you know anything about the equivalent Russian ABM program? Indeed, is any country in the world building actually building, instead of planning, an ABM along the lines of what already exists at Vandenburg and Greely?

The reason so few are being produced is because it'd be too expensive to open up older nuclear production facilities. The rate of production on Topol-Ms is the best the Russians can do.

IIRC I also think the SORT Treaty places restrictions on how many nukes either side can be actively making.

Russia has no shortage of decomissioned warheads / fissile material, and in any case it would not cost more than a few billion dollars. I would think the second reason is far more germane to the situation.

Because, as I said, at the strategic nuclear level of though intentions become capabilities in and of themselves. If the US (along with a host of other countries) all intend to pursue viable ABM technology then such developments will only naturally mean that the ICBM will lose alot of the value it once had. As that happens, it's again only natural that alternative offensive capabilities would be pursued.

The ICBM certainly isn't obsolete now, and likely won't be a decade from now, but as better and better offensive weapon systems are devised it's become increasingly apparent that it's days as the principal offensive tool/weapon in a nuclear arsenal are numbered.

What is envisioned as the best part of the nuclear triad in the future then? The submarine forces, because presumably, as was the plan in the early Cold War, that they could sneak up to enemy coastlines and lob nukes from there, thus bypassing ABM?

Will bombers also decline in value?

On the contrary it's dead wrong. With an ABM MDGE established it doesn't take much money to simply add more interceptors to the system. As i've said, they only cost 10 percent of the cost of the system as a whole.

Besides, GBIs have less components that need to be mass produced when compared to ICBMs. To say the least when it comes to the industrial infrastructure necessary for ICBM production as well. It's not just the missile that has to be made, but the fissionable material that has to be created and weaponized. A process that still remains complex to this day, and can still be prone to faults.

The main difference in missiles would be that one will have nuclear warheads and the other won't (it will have EKV's). Nuclear warheads are more expensive. OK, I accept the logic.

Nonetheless, in the ultimate scheme of things, Russia today certainly has no shortage of fissile material which is simply lying around, and compared with conventional forces, building and maintaining strategic forces continues to be extremely cheap. But I suppose you're right that if there's a nuclear arms 'race to the death' scenario, the offense will lose against the ABM side.

Russian bragging aside, how is it impervious exactly?

Russian bragging? Point is I've got no data / idea of its real performance against US ABM and whether it will indeed penetrate the shield as claimed without problems.

It's more than capable of deflecting a Chinese first strike, why haven't they raised their alert status? Besides, as i've already mentioned more than a couple times now, it'd be rather inexpensive for the ABM missile screen to be thickened. So, when (not if) it is, if the Russians still don't raise their alert levels then will you be convinced? Or what about when the first ABM sites go up in Eastern Europe?

Well, if as you say the US now has the ability to nullify even a Chinese first strike, then they now they are strategically impotent and there's no reason to raise their alert status.

As for Russia, well that depends on what the US does with the missile shield. How many GBI missiles do they plan to deploy? If it's in the hundreds range, then I'd assume Russia will do everything it can to increase its offensive power and do a crash program of its own ABM.

About Russia as Great Power

Anybody can design rockets these days. While I won't deny that human capital and social development aren't important pre-requisites to great power status, they're not really facets of that status in and of themselves.

The comment about rockets was really just to illustrate a point.

In that case, what does make a country a Great Power (you reject the theory that it is something given / recognized)? I would contend that human capital and social development are rather important factors when considering whether a country qualifies, and it is heavily weighted in the Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power, the only system in which power is computed numerically.

No argument from me on that, though I would simply re-assert the fact that a claim to great power status based off of oil production alone isn't going to be long lived.

The point is that its a combination of sovereigty and energy resources.

If Saudi Arabia had an independent foreign policy with its own industrial base, the human capital to sustain it and nuclear force, then I would consider it a Great Power considerably more important than any European state.

It's not a speculative exercise to point out the fact that oil is bound to be replaced by alternative sources of energy when the cost/benefit ratio of exploiting it is no longer profitable.

OK. Barring a step change in the role of renewables, the gap will have to be closed by coal, nuclear power and natural gas. The latter two are especially promising, and Russia is strong in the former and dominant in the latter.

Agreed. But that's still no safegaurd against the need to not to solely rely on it as so many countries have, including Russia.

Russia does not 'rely' on it in any meaningful sense of the term. Directly, all hydrocarbons account for just 9% of the economy (as per the World Bank a few years back). The reason it dominates exports is because of comparative advantage. The budget is not dependent on oil revenue, since it will break even only at a low oil price of around 25$ / barrel. The idea that Russia's economy is some kind of oil bubble is a myth.

7th, and only in terms of one indicator, even then (in terms of per capita PPP) it ranks 55th. The fact that it's economy is roughly the size of France's only serves to prove my point. Economically, while it doesn't mean Russia is a shell of itself, it also doesn't mean they can meaingfully compete with other economic powers.

7th, my bad, although it should be pointed out it will be 6th next year, when it should overtake the UK.

In economics, competition between nations is somewhat of a nebulous concept, becoming meaningless at a global level.

The thing that matters most for well-being is productivity (and labor participation). While Russia's productivity lags behind the US, this is no different a situation to Germany in the 1950's. While back then Germany was about three times poorer than the US, its levels of social / educational development were similar - the difference was due to historical things like Nazism and getting bombed. Similarly, Russia was constrained under state socialism - since structural readjustment started delivering benefits from the late 1990's, Russia's GDP growth has been growing around 7% / annum. It would not be surprising if as in the German case this process goes on until convergence is reached, which should happen by the 2020's.

Considering Russia's negative population growth (current and projected)? I doubt it.

The population growth rate is completely irrelevant.

(As an aside, however, the rate of decline has been falling rapidly due to fast falls in mortality and not so fast rises in the birth rate. Assuming the twin trends continue, natural population growth should be zero by 2010).

What is slightly relevant is the age dependency ratio. However, here, Russia's share of working age people of population is projected to decline from from 67% to 60%, compared with a similar decline in China and with a 62% to 54% decline in the G6 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy). Hardly apocalyptic. (I can dig up these projections if you wish).

In the end, however, since mature industrial growth rates are 2-3%% / annum, and in the case of Russia during its catch-up phase seems to be around 7%, this working age population decline slides into irrelevance, being covered by just two years growth max.

It would be instructive to look also at other examples. Estonia has also had a rapidly falling population, yet it has recently overtaken Portugal in per capita GDP. Meanwhile, countries like Mexico seem to have difficulty at growing beyond 5% for any amount of time (despite its 1.5% populatin growth rate), and I would argue this is because its opportunities for growth have simply been exhausted, and poignantly explainable by its results on international tests of scientific/mathematical literacy like PISA, where its students score significantly lower than in any advanced industrial country (and some other countries like Russia, eastern European countries, etc).

Which only proves what I said, namely that those are the only real claim to great power status that Russia has ever had.

Look, there's no one thing that if you possess will make you a Great Power. It's a combination. And Russia's key combination is sovereign, energy, guns, and people who can design and make guns.

A caveat of WWII, not a claim to great power status, just recognition of it.

Diplomatic influence is usually considered one of the pre-requisites of being a Great Power.

Polls are hardly are a substantial validation of whether Russia really is or will remain a world power, especially in terms of future geo-political trends. They only serve to reflect the opinions of people at the time they are taken, and can change just as easily as world events can.

Yes, but they are useful as reflections, if distorted, of reality, and a form of soft power in of themselves.

I think you misinterpreted me. I never meant to say that Russia isn't a great power. Only that as a great power it's only real claim to that status has primarily rested on it's geo-strategic military power. Power that was vastly weakened or loss after the Cold War, and which the Russians are trying to re-assert.

Take away all that strategic military force and Russia's importance and prestige internationally as a great power are more or less equal to that of France.

OK. What is France's claim to being a Great Power?

[Typhoon]

Round err 3?

The error you make in that line of reasoning is by assuming that MAD is a strategic doctrine that provides some form of tangible defence......Furthermore, ABM was never meant to compete with MAD, or the "full spectrum of threats" that you associate with it.

I don't accept that MAD offers no substantial value in terms of defence, it does, situations in which MAD exists are severely handicapped when escalating to the point of nuclear war, regardless of if the nations involved acknowledge MAD or not. The only point you make on this is that the concept of MAD is being challenged and that ABM will render the MAD model redundant, I disagree for reasons outlined.
The cruise missile point was done to show the futility of trying to argue that the Russian deterrent is dead because of ABM, it isn't because it is so much more than the ICBM (indeed it is premature to say that ABM will ever effectively counter ICBM, see below) and trying to counter all the possibilities would make a system grossly out of proportion in terms of cost and manpower than the level of effectiveness it could ever offer, even for the US.

The only reason (at least for the US) that it wasn't deemed feasible (it was very much realistic) was because of political jockeying within policy-maker circles during the Kennedy-Johnson-Carter era that downgraded making an ABM Shield a priority for national defence.

ABM was never realistic at the time, the technology was too expensive to deploy on such a scale as to ensure national defence, and too immature (terminal phase, reliance on nuclear warheads, short range, reliant on radar, poor target identification) to be practical to operate in a realistic situation. Proposals, a few limited deployments and nothing more was all that came out of the early US ABM programs, the US knew that these systems were unrealistic that is why it did not pursue them, the point that the US proposed an ABM treaty in 1967 underscores the issue.

Of course it's not going to guarantee sufficient protection against a Russian attack. A decade from now though?....Well i'd beg to differ.

This would appear to be a major point of disagreement.

MIRV isn't a counter to ABM, it's simply a method to increase the lethality of an ICBM over it's target area. As for the RV (if the Russians ever get it to work), the US still has another layer of ABM defense that would be more than adequate at intercepting it.

Unless your a terminal phase interceptor, see AEGIS points below, you are still making sweeping statements without a hint of evidence on this RV technical/sea based interceptor issue, see below.

BM interception is easy though, and it can be done in a variety of ways.

To do this as part of a dependable ABM system however is not. I unfortunately don't have your source on the missile tests but comparing ABM to anti-tank or anti-shipping missiles is not a good comparison, the drive and finance between such programmes is different, as is the bar when it comes to determining failure, one failing anti-tank missile in not going to lose the war, one failing interceptor could lose you ten cities, even with a very low fail rate ABM is severely handicapped.
The test program of ABM itself does not read very well, for a start its hard to get a complete picture because of the number of tests being cancelled or delayed, the project is being rushed. Complete tests that have taken place have not gone without incident or failure, the US will probably continue to push the system, but the system is facing problems on all levels, it will be years (if ever) before we see a credible treat to the Russian/Chinease deterrent.

Which is impossible.

The only thing you can say is that they are not in service yet, they are definitely on the horizon.

If the ballistic trajectory of an ICBM were altered in flight than it's not going to be a large hindrance. It's still going to be illuminated by the early warning radars, to say the least of the fact that GBIs are capable of source programmable autonomous guidance.

Well lets look at these statements in detail and how the hardware actually operates. GBI intercepts ballistic missiles by first relying on an accurate track of the missile provided by radar, once a track is obtained the missile can be fired and will manoeuvre so that its path will cross that of the incoming missile, an intercept point. Once an appropriate altitude and course have been reached the EKV is deployed (around 1,400 km from target), it acquires its target and uses its own thrusters to produce the fine course corrections required to hit the missile (with a closing speed of up to 16,000 mph).
So what about a manoeuvring missile, GBI is only capable of major trajectory corrections during its powered phase of flight, this is short as GBI aims to achieve rapid burn-out to maximise speed and range, so once the EKV is deployed it is essentially locked onto a narrow flightpath crossing the intercept point of the ballistic missile, it lacks the fuel, time or power for major corrections and is incapable of further acceleration. A ballistic missile that makes course changes during its flightpath will at the minimum require multiple shots to knock out, a missile releasing decoys during manoeuvres, could exponentially increase the number of missiles required to intercept it if target discrimination is poor, which we currently believe it is.

Which is also impossible. A long range ballistic missile does not in fact fly a perfect ballistic trajectory from launch to impact.

The picture in wiki (not sourced hmm) is a cartoon illustration to show the stages of a ballistic missile. Countermeasures can be deployed at any stage of flight of the ballistic missile, it just depends on what kind of countermeasure you are discussing. In the case of the bus, RV and decoys I suggest you read point 6 of the notes associated with your source. GBI can intercept a target out of atmosphere, exactly when that happens or what GBI will actually be intercepting is dependant on a host of other factors outside of its control.

Like what? Name one counter to ABM Systems for ICBMs that actually manages to bypass every layer of defense.

The multitude of Russian innovations that are on-line or coming on-line at this time, naming one counter to all is not the point since current and future ballistic missiles have and are adopting a range of counters to deal with the different components of the treat.

There you go, it's an old article that has a number of things wrong. But the points made at the end are what I believe you're referring to.

I don't get how you derived the RV suffering from technical or financial problems from this source which if anything seems to credit its development and its potential against the US ABM systems as a success.

Again: Source programmable autonomous guidance.

You acknowledge that range is not the only factor yet one paragraph down you use exactly the same argument? To quote the MDA themselves Aegis BMD “are capable of intercepting short to intermediate range ballistic missiles”. In short they lack the performance to deal with current or future Russian ICBM, guidance has nothing to do with it.

90 ships have already been fitted with the MDGE equipment, just not the SM-3 missiles. Aside from that, the USN always has patrol routes that coincide with being the most probable area from which missile defence ranges could be taken into consideration, so that wouldn't be a problem either.

To quote the MDA again, “eighteen aegis ships are scheduled to receive the engagement capability by the end of 2009”, so the effective figure of 90 is an overstatement. The US would have to dedicate a large number of active vessels to provide the level of protection required, this is acknowledged even by institutes that support ABM like Claremont.

Wrong.

I suspected I would get a list detailing the differences between the two systems (many of which are dependant on where the SLBM fires from), but that still does not remove the fact that the techniques/systems used to engage ICBM are the same as those for SLBM as are the techniques to counter (Note that new generation SLBM are adopting the ABM techniques developed for the Topol series). We are all still talking ballistic missiles here even if SLBM can be used to provide some additional advantages over ICBM.

[/quote]Security made moot by the fact that the infrastructure gives away any sense of security such rail networks are meant to provide. What security does the rail network provide when a number of intelligence assets can be used to detect what they support. [/quote]
Trains containing ICBM are not readily identifiable, it would be difficult to keep a track on one and the extensive rail networks operated by a nation like Russia give them a huge territory to roam, making a knock out strike impractical. Nuclear penetration bombs, concentric detonation patterns are unusual terms which don't really address the problem.

As I said, the USSR didn't even begin to reach nuclear parity with the US until the late 60s to mid-70s. Not before.

You are making your points with a little benefit from hind-sight, the USSR demonstrated a nuclear capability in 1949 and would test its first thermo-nuke in 1953. NATO had only estimates of the Soviet arsenal and its conventional supremacy in Europe was already widely known, thus there was pressure on the US not to escalate the conflict after the Chinese entered even though the use of nukes had been considered as a contingency. The possibility of escalation to Europe was not worth it, despite the blatant USSR and PRC intervention in Korea, in effect the US was deterred.

Hegemony is only dented when a challenger is able to successfully rival the leading power. In addition to the other nations bandwagoning to that challenger.

Fair enough though I would be inclined to say that Iraq and Afghanistan has challenged the status of the US and its inability to deal with either of the situations has damaged the US internationally, perhaps its too soon to say if terrorism has mounted a successful challenge to the US but the current situation is certainly putting diplomatic pressure on the US and organisations like NATO, though to what extent do you define bandwagoning either way, full on alliances or more subtle changes in posture, or both?

It does nothing to prevent enemies from coming back at you through new means.

Ok.

Not really, primarily because a lot of that opposition (save Russia) are working on ABM tech of their own.

Non of these programs are really directed against a large nuclear power and resemble the limited deployments that as I have said before have no issue with, inaccurate as Russia itself has continued development of ABM systems (S-400 for instance), it just maintains itself within ABM treaty for the moment.

How is ABM an illusion?

Because ABM is being promised or in this case extolled as being able to make the US immune to ICBM and nullify the Russian deterrent, it can do neither, see above.

Russian developments will not be able to perpetuate MAD because MAD isn't a strategic doctrine that ensures tangible results. It's a theoretical model of how nuclear warfare works.

To re-phrase it Russian developments will continue to perpetuate the current model.

The idea that “one flies all fly” is not necessarily true, I have seen scenarios which could call for a limited nuclear engagement, in any case your scenario is very dependant of a few assumptions that are inaccurate today, that of poor early warning and that one missile could knock out a nations deterrent.
Additionally non of this I am really arguing against, limited low capacity ABM systems such as what are deployed in Russia and other nations are not really the problem and they could cope with this scenario, its only the uncontrolled ABM program being sought by the US at the moment and the problems that are coming with it that I dislike.

The world is made a more (or alternatively, less) dangerous place based on the actions, dynamics, and power plays that oscillate between the various Great Powers. The environment is not solely determined by artificial treaties if there is no brains/brawn to enforce them.

Though treaties do moderate the actions, dynamics and play of great powers and that's what makes them useful and why the US and other continue to use them.

....ABM tech can be introduced as a viable counter to the ICBM class of ballistic missiles.... Doing so simply serves to start another cycle in R&D development....but the move away from a reliance on ICBMs in the presence of ABM is the one that is most readily agreed upon.

All of this validates my argument that trying to rely on ABM to guarantee national defence against a strategic deterrent like what the Russians possess is useless, regardless of the system employed to defeat ABM, ICBM included. Few nations actively support a modern ballistic missile capability, none of the major players rely totally on ICBM today nor do they consider them redundant.

Agreed. Forms that have never had a historical precedent that dictated that such forms resemble or operate exactly as their predecessors did.

Then why do you continue to argue that the ballistic missile will be rendered redundant, the ballistic missile (regardless of its ICBM/SLBM/IRBM/SRBM class) is and will continue to adapt into ever more complicated forms to overcome a threat like ABM.

On the contrary the pace of technical development only serves to play into the US own interests.

Technical development will mean that the ICBM stays in the game, as said ABM offers no reliable foundation for security against ICBM or any other method of attack, it just stimulates the development of more and better methods of attack, as any defence technology will.

[Piano Red]

Been busy the last few days, sorry for the delay again.

stalker

Well, presumably it would be wise of Russia to increase the number of its offensive missiles if the US increases the number of its interceptor missiles, so that capability doesn't decline.

I think this is really the crux of the argument.

It's got the right intentions, but the crux is misplaced. Russia would be better served increasing and diversifying it's offensive capabilities, not solely it's offensive missiles. Especially when the costs and modes of production for such missiles (among other things) is much more of an economic burden than the simple construction of interceptors designed to counter them.

Regardless of technological advances (presume accuracy converges to 100% by 2020), you still need one interceptor missile for every ICBM. As it stands, the US has around 50-60 GBI interceptor missiles (about 25 in Alaska, 25 in Vandenburg) and plans 10 more in Poland.

To neutralize the Russian arsenal, which has around 500 ICBMs and 200 SLBMs, you'll need a slightly bigger number of interceptor missiles to ensure all kills. (So at this moment in time the US possesses the capability of killing 5-10% of all Russian incoming missiles during a Russian first strike.)

For this to happen, the US must massively expand its numbers of GBI. Is this something they plan on doing?

Yes, unequivocally so:

As required by Section 223 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 (PL 108-136), the estimated production rate capacity of the facilities that will produce the assets being fielded is one GBI per month, two SM-3s per month, three THAAD interceptors per month, and two AN/TPY-2 radars per year

Presumably Russia will start producing Topol SS-27 missiles en masse, as well as continuing to modernize its submarine forces and building its own ABM system.

The first of those scenarios is rather unlikely given to provisions signed by Russia regarding the SORT Treaty. Their arsenal of nuclear warheads can only be so big.

As for the other two, as i've already mentioned, the Russians are (albeit slowly) beginning to do both.

BTW, I've got two questions on this:

Firstly, again, how large is the US ABM proposed to be? How many GBI missiles do they plan to install?

Information like that isn't going to be readily availible i'm afraid.

The true number planned is probably confidential, but i'd assume that the Pentagon will base the extent of how large the ABM Shield should be (ie in terms of how many interceptors are needed) as based on present and projected strategic nuclear threats to the CONUS and it's allies/assets abroad.

Secondy, do you know anything about the equivalent Russian ABM program?

Yeah, anything you want to know excatly?

Indeed, is any country in the world building actually building, instead of planning, an ABM along the lines of what already exists at Vandenburg and Greely?

Yep, there are plenty. The Chinese are actively pursuing parallel ABM and ASAT programs, the latter of which most of the rest of the world are probably more familiar with. India also has it's own multi-layered ABM development program up and running, with two tests that took place early last year and later on in June.

So, at the moment....the US, Russia, France, Germany, the UK, Japan, South Korea, India and Israel all have active ABM programs (with a few working on ASATs too).

Singapore, Taiwan, Pakistan, Australia, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy are all actively buying into said programs. That's a total of 16 countries, of whom 12 are very serious contenders. There's undoubtedly a few more after that like Saudi Arabia, Egpyt, and a few others, but I thought it best to mention those that are seriously committed to the endeavor.

Russia has no shortage of decomissioned warheads / fissile material, and in any case it would not cost more than a few billion dollars. I would think the second reason is far more germane to the situation.

After further research into the subject i'm inclined to agree.

What is envisioned as the best part of the nuclear triad in the future then? The submarine forces, because presumably, as was the plan in the early Cold War, that they could sneak up to enemy coastlines and lob nukes from there, thus bypassing ABM?

What is envisioned as the best part of the nuclear triad in the future then? The submarine forces, because presumably, as was the plan in the early Cold War, that they could sneak up to enemy coastlines and lob nukes from there, thus bypassing ABM?

Will bombers also decline in value?

An increase in SSBNs as launch platforms in the short term (primarily as a stopgap measure), followed by the development of long-range hypersonic manned sub orbital bombers for the long term.



As already made evident with the "proposed" plans the Pentagon has put forth for the B3 bomber. In addition to some rather shady initiatives underway between the USAF and DARPA on Project Blackswift (what many believe is the inhouse precursor to what might become the B3).

Link

After that i'd assume it'd be some reliance on the ubiquitous "Solution X" (the thing that technology will make possible in ten or twenty years time).

Nonetheless, in the ultimate scheme of things, Russia today certainly has no shortage of fissile material which is simply lying around, and compared with conventional forces, building and maintaining strategic forces continues to be extremely cheap.

On the contrary, it's extremely hard. Hence one of the reasons why only a handful of countries actually have/maintain them. The only reason conventional forces appear (at prima facie) to be more expensive is because of the sheer scale that can be involved. Relatively however, building strategic forces is an entirely different ball game.

Russian bragging? Point is I've got no data / idea of its real performance against US ABM and whether it will indeed penetrate the shield as claimed without problems.

Exaggeration then? The Topol is exactly the kind of system that the US ABM system is designed to counter. The point I was trying to make is that you'll have to be more specific if you're going to claim that it's impervious to being intercepted.

Well, if as you say the US now has the ability to nullify even a Chinese first strike, then they now they are strategically impotent and there's no reason to raise their alert status.

True, but it doesn't prevent the Chinese from pursuing other objectives and alternatives in spite of that reality.

As for Russia, well that depends on what the US does with the missile shield. How many GBI missiles do they plan to deploy? If it's in the hundreds range, then I'd assume Russia will do everything it can to increase its offensive power and do a crash program of its own ABM.

We'll have to wait and see.

In that case, what does make a country a Great Power (you reject the theory that it is something given / recognized)? I would contend that human capital and social development are rather important factors when considering whether a country qualifies, and it is heavily weighted in the Chinese concept of Comprehensive National Power, the only system in which power is computed numerically.

Well of course the Chinese system is calibrated in such a way, that's one of their Permanent Operating Factors.

As for what makes a country a great power, well IMO (and I would agree with you about human capital and social development being important), it's mainly dependent on the traditional definition: That is, the pillars of diplomatic prestige/renown, economic, military, and cultural strength.

In addition to how a country views each of those pillars, which it then goes about structuring and later exerting them as an expression of it's foreign policies. Of which are also important in determining that country's geo-political aims.

None of those pillars can be "given", they can be recognized or given their due diligence through caveats from other powers. But (historically speaking) only after they have been achieved/reached.

Don't take me wrong, Russia is by all means worthy of being called a great power these days. It's just that, since the collapse of the USSR, it's fall from superpower status, as well as it's struggles to retain great power status, any views of what it can and cannot do should be viewed pragmatically.

The point is that its a combination of sovereigty and energy resources.

If Saudi Arabia had an independent foreign policy with its own industrial base, the human capital to sustain it and nuclear force, then I would consider it a Great Power considerably more important than any European state.

Read above.

It just can't merely be a combination of such things, it has to be the synergy of all those attributes freely working in tandem with one another.

OK. Barring a step change in the role of renewables, the gap will have to be closed by coal, nuclear power and natural gas. The latter two are especially promising, and Russia is strong in the former and dominant in the latter.

The problem with that assessment is that it completely sidelines (admittedly) the heavy role that renewable/alternative energy technologies will play in the transition away from fossil fuels.

Russia does not 'rely' on it in any meaningful sense of the term. Directly, all hydrocarbons account for just 9% of the economy (as per the World Bank a few years back). The reason it dominates exports is because of comparative advantage.

Which is exactly the point i'm trying to make. Annual Russian exports amount to more than 350 billion dollars, the vast majority of them being based on supplying petroleum to customers in Europe. It's that surplus in money from those sales that Russian policymakers have used to their benefit in terms of having free capital to spend on military investments.

In economics, competition between nations is somewhat of a nebulous concept, becoming meaningless at a global level.

Rival then? That take on the concept of economic competitiveness might be right or wrong, but i'd still assert the same notion that I did in my last post.

The thing that matters most for well-being is productivity (and labor participation). While Russia's productivity lags behind the US, this is no different a situation to Germany in the 1950's. While back then Germany was about three times poorer than the US, its levels of social / educational development were similar - the difference was due to historical things like Nazism and getting bombed. Similarly, Russia was constrained under state socialism - since structural readjustment started delivering benefits from the late 1990's, Russia's GDP growth has been growing around 7% / annum. It would not be surprising if as in the German case this process goes on until convergence is reached, which should happen by the 2020's.

We'll have to see.

The population growth rate is completely irrelevant.

(As an aside, however, the rate of decline has been falling rapidly due to fast falls in mortality and not so fast rises in the birth rate. Assuming the twin trends continue, natural population growth should be zero by 2010).

Tell that to the Chinese eyeing Siberia.

What is slightly relevant is the age dependency ratio. However, here, Russia's share of working age people of population is projected to decline from from 67% to 60%, compared with a similar decline in China and with a 62% to 54% decline in the G6 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy). Hardly apocalyptic. (I can dig up these projections if you wish).

In the end, however, since mature industrial growth rates are 2-3%% / annum, and in the case of Russia during its catch-up phase seems to be around 7%, this working age population decline slides into irrelevance, being covered by just two years growth max.

It would be instructive to look also at other examples. Estonia has also had a rapidly falling population, yet it has recently overtaken Portugal in per capita GDP. Meanwhile, countries like Mexico seem to have difficulty at growing beyond 5% for any amount of time (despite its 1.5% populatin growth rate), and I would argue this is because its opportunities for growth have simply been exhausted, and poignantly explainable by its results on international tests of scientific/mathematical literacy like PISA, where its students score significantly lower than in any advanced industrial country (and some other countries like Russia, eastern European countries, etc).

Very well. I'll concede that argument on the basis that i'm not as well versed in economic models to be able to counter the information you've provided.

Look, there's no one thing that if you possess will make you a Great Power.

Agreed. But there can be one thing (above the others) that can be recognized of that great power (whether internally or externally) of being the principal claim to it's power.

It's a combination. And Russia's key combination is sovereign, energy, guns, and people who can design and make guns.

Sovereignty isn't a claim to being a great power, it's a claim to being a nation-state. Energy resources is (as i've already referred to) more analogous to the Saudi Arabia quote, and the gun/people who make them attributes are pretty much the same thing as the rockets concept.

Diplomatic influence is usually considered one of the pre-requisites of being a Great Power.

True, in that regard Russia's influence is just a par above France.

Yes, but they are useful as reflections, if distorted, of reality, and a form of soft power in of themselves.

The first part of that I could agree with, the second not so much. Polls can be integrated to help formulate the utilization of soft power, but they are not power in and of themselves.

OK. What is France's claim to being a Great Power?

The cultural/territorial holdovers and footprints left from it's colonial/imperial past. That gives it alot of throwing weight diplomatically. Militarily it's at best a regional power, though it does retain a limited capacity to project power to some of it's former overseas holdings, mainly places in Africa and such.

The same could be said of the UK.

Typhoon

I don't accept that MAD offers no substantial value in terms of defence, it does

And again I have to point out that you're misinterpreting what MAD is. It isn't a miliary strategy, but a theoretical model. There's no such thing as it offering anything other than a prediction of how a nuclear warfare would develop.

MAD was viable given the grand strategic environment that existed back during the Cold War. It has since become increasingly irrelevant as that strategic environment has changed, first beginning when the USSR collapsed.

situations in which MAD exists are severely handicapped when escalating to the point of nuclear war, regardless of if the nations involved acknowledge MAD or not.

This is simply not the case.

As i've already pointed out, situations where MAD exists only serve to ensure that the only likelihood of increasing escalation results in a nuclear exchange. If one ICBM launches, then they all launch, and it won't matter if it was all a mistake in the first place or not.

ICBMs are too dangerous to be allowed to exist without some form of counter in the modern world. There are too many imbeciles out there who want to throw them around.

Back in the old days of the Cold War when the two superpowers faced off, both were relatively responsible players that knew what the rules were. The situation worked because both wanted it to work and that made the risks inherent in deploying ICBMs acceptable. That isn't the case now, we have players who are not rational and don't care what the rules are. That makes ICBMs too dangerous to have around.

The proliferation of ABM means that ICBMs are being taken off the table so everybody, not just the US, is a lot safer.

That's an inherently good thing.

The only point you make on this is that the concept of MAD is being challenged and that ABM will render the MAD model redundant, I disagree for reasons outlined.

Reasons that, as i've already pointed out, are no longer viable.

The cruise missile point was done to show the futility of trying to argue that the Russian deterrent is dead because of ABM

Which, as I pointed out, was an unrealistic misnomer. Other assets are designed to counter the threat of a submarine getting to that position, not ABM.

ABM was never realistic at the time, the technology was too expensive to deploy on such a scale as to ensure national defence

Not the case. It was simply handicapped from being developed further by means of the ABM Treaty.

and too immature (terminal phase, reliance on nuclear warheads, short range, reliant on radar, poor target identification) to be practical to operate in a realistic situation.

Wrong in almost every possible way.

Projects like Nike-Hercules and Nike-Zeus, which later grew into other systems like Spartan and Sprint, prove that entire argument invalid.

Many of the systems and technologies being developed currently are practically just re-inventions built off the foundations those earlier programs established.

You really should look at some of the tests the US conducted off of Kwajalein Atoll from the late 50s to early 70s. Likewise for the Soviets at their Sary Shagan facility.

Proposals, a few limited deployments and nothing more was all that came out of the early US ABM programs, the US knew that these systems were unrealistic that is why it did not pursue them

Had more to do with the political fallout and disillusionment with ABM tech that the ratification of the treaty caused actually.

the point that the US proposed an ABM treaty in 1967 underscores the issue.

A treaty which was a natural result of the debate between political circles in the US at the time, and was rejected mind you. It wasn't intended to limit the development of ABM tech anyway.

As I said, the period of the late 60s and 70s was when the US lost it's strategic focus. Any reference to political developments and policy decisions during that time should be put in the proper context.

This would appear to be a major point of disagreement.

Care to elaborate?

Unless your a terminal phase interceptor, see AEGIS points below, you are still making sweeping statements without a hint of evidence on this RV technical/sea based interceptor issue, see below.

Then perhaps I should be more succinct.

Decoys and RVs aren't a problem. Nobody has yet made a decoy that works, seperating decoys from the RV is a serious problem that hasn't been fully solved and the only viable decoy would be one that is precisely the same as a live warhead and would have to replace one.

Furthermore MARVs (the maneuvering RVs the Russians spin as their ace in the hole) do not - repeat not - maneuver to avoid an interceptor.

They maneuver during the final stages of their attack run on the target to improve terminal accuracy. Usually they do this by radar terrain matching, and the footprint within which they can change course is actually quite small. They gain that terminal accuracy at great cost in weight and complexity (and cost) and essentially are unitary warheads (they can't be MIRVed). They are specific tools for a very specific job and evading ABMs isn't even mentioned as a footnote in that requirement, regardless of the wank surrounding them.

For an ABM system such RVs actually work to their advantage because they essentially do their work for them, reducing the amount of warheads they have to intercept from 12 to 1.

By the way, something that the media reports have missed out on with the recent shootdown of that US spy satellite (and which I just learned) is this; As the satellite decayed, the intercept solution was very much like the atmosphere-skimming re-entry vehicles the Russians have been playing with.

So in a way it could be said that the shootdown also served as a very pointed message to them - "You think you had something good? Well, watch this."

To do this as part of a dependable ABM system however is not.

Which, as i've said time and time again, is simply not the case. You're going to need some more substantial evidence backing up such statements if you want me to take you seriously.

I unfortunately don't have your source on the missile tests but comparing ABM to anti-tank or anti-shipping missiles is not a good comparison

Of course it isn't. I was just trying to make a simple comparison to other weapons systems that have performed far worse than the current ABM system ever has (or will), yet still have proven to be quite good once that R&D eval period was over.

one failing anti-tank missile in not going to lose the war, one failing interceptor could lose you ten cities, even with a very low fail rate ABM is severely handicapped.

Hence why 2-3 interceptors can be fired at every one missile. Triple redundancy eliminates the risk of depending on a single interceptor, especially if it fails.

The test program of ABM itself does not read very well, for a start its hard to get a complete picture because of the number of tests being cancelled or delayed, the project is being rushed.

It's not supposed to be read very well.

Aside from the method of R&D being performed, you don't really think the US wants every facet of the development phase of the program readily availible to public consumption do you? Many of supposed hinderances and setbacks with the program could easily be an effort to establish a shade of gray around how effective the system actually is. Which is, ironically, pretty fitting given that the ABM Program (and other projects like the F-22) are labeled as "grey projects".

Complete tests that have taken place have not gone without incident or failure, the US will probably continue to push the system, but the system is facing problems on all levels

Depends on what aspect of the system you're referring to. Besides, and i'm beginning to sound like a broken record now, any failures or incidents that occur are exactly what the designers and technicians working in the R&D phase want to achieve. It all goes with the development methods being employed.

it will be years (if ever) before we see a credible treat to the Russian/Chinease deterrent.

Sounds more like supposition then any established conclusion really. Though I would agree that it will take a couple more years for the ABM Screen to fully mature. You seem to have made the mistake of believing that it's an active deterrent to the Russian nuclear capacity currently, it isn't. The same probably can't be said of the Chinese arsenal however.

Ultimately, it's still a work in progress.

The only thing you can say is that they are not in service yet, they are definitely on the horizon.

I already said everything I need to on that subject. It's not possible for a missile bus to deploy countermeasures at that stage in it's deployment.

So what about a manoeuvring missile, GBI is only capable of major trajectory corrections during its powered phase of flight, this is short as GBI aims to achieve rapid burn-out to maximise speed and range, so once the EKV is deployed it is essentially locked onto a narrow flightpath crossing the intercept point of the ballistic missile, it lacks the fuel, time or power for major corrections and is incapable of further acceleration.

Out of the question. ICBMs are designed to hit their target going in very fast, and along a very precise pre-programmed ballistic trajectory.

Everything you said about fuel and power hindering any efforts for a major course change is exactly why ICBMs aren't capable of maneuvering, and conversely, are so easy to shoot down. Things like circular error probability (CEP), approach speed, terminal accuracy, space/carrying capacity, and throw weight are all integral to an ICBM's effectiveness (so much so that even the weight of paint is kept to a minimum).

Also, the point about the GBIs not being able to maneuver simply isn't true. You seem to have left out some of the more recent breakthroughs made with it in terms of source programmable autonomous guidance, or the ability to use active home-on guidance, that give it a makred advantage in it's interception capabilities. Not to mention that it's total range envelope is much larger once it hits the exoatmospheric stage and deployment and the EKV is launched.

A ballistic missile that makes course changes during its flightpath will at the minimum require multiple shots to knock out, a missile releasing decoys during manoeuvres, could exponentially increase the number of missiles required to intercept it if target discrimination is poor, which we currently believe it is.

Read above. I've already elaborated on how a maneuvering missile bus isn't feasible, why decoys don't work, and on how the GBIs are designed to intercept the missile bus before it even reaches the stage where it could potentially deploy decoys.

ICBMs are designed to fly along their programmed ballitic flightpath, they can't maneuver or make changes while on it. Especially at the deployment stages where the GBIs would intercept them.

As for target discrimination, you're going to have to be alot more explicit in explaining how it would be poor.

Countermeasures can be deployed at any stage of flight of the ballistic missile, it just depends on what kind of countermeasure you are discussing.

Well technically they could (though how they'd overcome the technical limitations is beyond me, it'd basically require an ICBM to be radically redesigned for little or no increase in effectiveness), but it would be counterproductive if they were during boost or midcourse phases.

In the case of the bus, RV and decoys I suggest you read point 6 of the notes associated with your source.

I'm not using it as a source, it's wikipedia, hardly the most informed site with regards to an issue like this. I just wanted to show a pic of how the launch of an ICBM typically works. With the exception of the maneuvering RVs the Russians are working on, the way a Minuteman III works is no different from a Topol-M.

The multitude of Russian innovations that are on-line or coming on-line at this time, naming one counter to all is not the point since current and future ballistic missiles have and are adopting a range of counters to deal with the different components of the treat.

So...you can't name any specifically then?

I don't get how you derived the RV suffering from technical or financial problems from this source which if anything seems to credit its development and its potential against the US ABM systems as a success.

Well I probably should've elaborated that I derived that from non-online sources. With regards to the link however, you speifically asked for a source so I dug up one. Mind you I did point out that it got a number things wrong, but it was a source nonetheless.

Like i've said, it's somewhat difficult to actually find good info on this sort thing from online references.

You acknowledge that range is not the only factor yet one paragraph down you use exactly the same argument?

No, I was trying to respond to aspect of your comment about missing the ideal interception point and the potential to be saturated. SPAG negates that.

To quote the MDA themselves Aegis BMD “are capable of intercepting short to intermediate range ballistic missiles”. In short they lack the performance to deal with current or future Russian ICBM, guidance has nothing to do with it.

If you recall what I originally commented about on the atmospheric-skimming maneuvering RVs the Russians are working on, they still fall within the upperlimits of the range envelope of the Aegis BMD to successfully intercept them. I think you misinterpreted me as asserting that they'd also be able to intercept other ICBMs too.

To quote the MDA again, “eighteen aegis ships are scheduled to receive the engagement capability by the end of 2009”, so the effective figure of 90 is an overstatement.

The "engagement capability" they're referring to is the SM-3 missile.

Not the MDGE for the AEGIS BMD system itself, of which more than 90 ships in the USN have already been outfitted with. 18 ships are the current number of ships that have received SM-3s and can actually fire them.

I think I already covered this. It's not much of an engagement capability if there are 90 ships that could act as ABM platforms, but only 18 that actually have the means to do so.

The US would have to dedicate a large number of active vessels to provide the level of protection required, this is acknowledged even by institutes that support ABM like Claremont.

The USN is working on it. It'll take some time for SM-3s to be installed on all those 90+ ships.

but that still does not remove the fact that the techniques/systems used to engage ICBM are the same as those for SLBM as are the techniques to counter

Uh...no they aren't, for reasons that i've already explained. You're going to have be pretty specific in explaining how they supposedly are.

(Note that new generation SLBM are adopting the ABM techniques developed for the Topol series).

I assume you're referring to the new Bulava SLBMs that are essentially just scaled back Topol-Ms? The answer to that is: On the contrary no, they're not. It's just cheaper to make them based off of an existing design so that an entirely new SLBM system isn't necessary. Also cuts down on the manufacturing costs too.

Any counter-ABM systems on them are still countered by other aspects of a missile defense screen.

Trains containing ICBM are not readily identifiable, it would be difficult to keep a track on one and the extensive rail networks operated by a nation like Russia give them a huge territory to roam, making a knock out strike impractical.

The overall railway networks that support them are. Tracking them is far easier than you think due to remote sensing technologies that have been around for quite some time. Digital beamforming is a new i've heard mentioned, but there are plenty of others that do the job more than adequately.

Nuclear penetration bombs, concentric detonation patterns are unusual terms which don't really address the problem.

How don't they? They're more than useful in negating the main supposed advantages rail mobile ICBMs are meant to provide: hardened protection from a direct nuclear strike.

You are making your points with a little benefit from hind-sight, the USSR demonstrated a nuclear capability in 1949 and would test its first thermo-nuke in 1953.

Actually I am, my notions are based directly from US NSC strategic doctrine from that period.

Regardless of when the Soviets first tested their nuclear designs, their rates and modes of production of a nuclear arsenal didn't automatically translate into any form a major deterrent or threat to the US for almost 25 years. From the late 40s and early 50s al the way to the late 1960s the United State had a virtual monopoly of nuclear strike power.

It could dump literally thousands of warheads on any target it chose and would've been very lucky if the number it got back in return went far into single digits.

NATO had only estimates of the Soviet arsenal

Estimates that were very accurate. The US was well aware of how long it would take for the Soviets to reach parity. So while their rate of production in the early 50s might have been offsetting given how soon they were popping nukes out (primarily b/c the Soviets were outright petrified of how outclassed they were, and were adamant to catch up with the US strategically), it would've done nothing in checking US policy in Korea if Truman (and later Eisenhower) had so chose.

and its conventional supremacy in Europe was already widely known

Precisely why the US offset the conventional advantage the Soviets had with pentomic divisions and it's latest strategic nuclear forces in the European theater. I've already pointed this out twice now.

thus there was pressure on the US not to escalate the conflict after the Chinese entered even though the use of nukes had been considered as a contingency.

And as i've already pointed out, MacArthur's delusions aside, it was never the interest nor any intention of US policy to escalate the Korean conflict past conventional arms. Which is why MacArhur got sacked the moment he even raised such a notion.

The possibility of escalation to Europe was not worth it, despite the blatant USSR and PRC intervention in Korea, in effect the US was deterred.

At a time when it had virtual nuclear supremacy? Ironically, it's that same misinterpretation that fits with other assertions of the US being deterred at that period of the Cold War. The US was never deterred, it simply had no interest in pursuing such a policy.

Fair enough though I would be inclined to say that Iraq and Afghanistan has challenged the status of the US and its inability to deal with either of the situations has damaged the US internationally

I wouldn't. Iraq and Afghanistan have only served to demonstrate that as hegemon the US has been free to pursue it's agendas and other geo-political objectives with little or no resistance. Partly because everyone else is either bandwagoned around the US, or because the other who aren't either don't care, or aren't strong enough to do anything about it.

Whether the US initially blundered in Iraq is irrevelant of that, and (according to both Maximal & Minimal Realism) is damaging to the US in any meaningful way.

perhaps its too soon to say if terrorism has mounted a successful challenge to the US but the current situation is certainly putting diplomatic pressure on the US and organisations like NATO

It hasn't, especially when no nation-states have bandwagoned to it. It's the one subject that the established powers that be (whether they're the US, Russia, China, whoever) have pretty much agreed they could all do with out. No one wants to rock the boat of the international order that far.

though to what extent do you define bandwagoning either way, full on alliances or more subtle changes in posture, or both?

Play a game of red rover and come back to me.

Honestly though, analyzing what constitutes as a major geo-political paradigm shift that is representative of the bandwagoning effect can be very hard. Suffice to say, it depends. Bandwagoning is typically expressed by dedicated formal/informal coalitions and alliances that may come about as a result of changes in posture and policy, but that may not always be the case.

Non of these programs are really directed against a large nuclear power and resemble the limited deployments that as I have said before have no issue with

Really? India and Pakistans aren't? China's isn't? You'd have to be kidding yourself to say that they aren't. You also have to take into consideration that most programs are primarily being used to create the MDGEs for said systems, once that's made it's rather easy and inexpensive to thicken those defense up.

inaccurate as Russia itself has continued development of ABM systems (S-400 for instance), it just maintains itself within ABM treaty for the moment.

S-400 is a work in progress in that department at this point, the Russians are still trying to work the kinks out of it as a viable ABM platform, something that won't be complete until at least 2012.

It would've done you better to mention the missile batteries of the A-135 system that the Russians are slowly trying to expand. Which isn't much of a developmental revolution for Russian ABM tech as much as it is an evolution of it.

IIRC they have 36 51T6 Gorgon and 64 53T6 Gazelle interceptors operational and organized in a 2-phase force which they're trying to expand (both in terms of the MDGE and active missiles) in order to provide more coverage. The ABM is non-existant, so there's no reason for them to comply with stipulations that have been defunct for awhile now.

Because ABM is being promised or in this case extolled as being able to make the US immune to ICBM and nullify the Russian deterrent, it can do neither, see above.

All of which i've repeatedly stated is not the case. Read above (and back along a good 2 posts).

To re-phrase it Russian developments will continue to perpetuate the current model.

Which would be a horrible policy decision.

The idea that “one flies all fly” is not necessarily true, I have seen scenarios which could call for a limited nuclear engagement

Such as? List them.

in any case your scenario is very dependant of a few assumptions that are inaccurate today, that of poor early warning and that one missile could knock out a nations deterrent.

On the contrary, all of those scenarios was pre-disposed to assume the best case scenario with regards to early warning capabilities. As for where I raised the notion that one missile could knock out a nation's entire arsenal, you're going to have to point that out to me, b/c if I were implied then I certainly didn;t mean to.

Additionally non of this I am really arguing against, limited low capacity ABM systems such as what are deployed in Russia and other nations are not really the problem and they could cope with this scenario

Please back up where you're asserting this notion of such limited ABM systems being worked on by other nations. Furthermore, as i've already noted, the Russians themselves are working on expanding their current system.

its only the uncontrolled ABM program being sought by the US at the moment and the problems that are coming with it that I dislike.

How is the US ABM system any more "uncontrolled" than the ABM programs of other countries? Moreso, I believe i've already addressed all the problems you believe come attached with it.

Though treaties do moderate the actions, dynamics and play of great powers and that's what makes them useful and why the US and other continue to use them.

Not as they relate to ABMs, fortunately.

All of this validates my argument that trying to rely on ABM to guarantee national defence against a strategic deterrent like what the Russians possess is useless, regardless of the system employed to defeat ABM, ICBM included.

I fail to see how.

Especially if the R&D trend leads to the development of weapons that bypass ABM (and are countered by other systems), but don't rely on ICBMs as their launch platform.

Few nations actively support a modern ballistic missile capability, none of the major players rely totally on ICBM today nor do they consider them redundant.

The emphasis put on ABM Tech will only ensure that that fact remains so. It sets the bar much higher for any nations out there seeking to join the nuclear club. Aside from that, where did I ever say that all the major players totally rely on the ICBM? Some of them do, but it's been accepted dogma for 40 years or more that an effective nuclear arsenal is based on more than just ICBMs. Mainly in order to retain redundancy and diversity of offensive and defensive capabilities.

ICBMs nevertheless still make up a hefty portion of (in this case the US and Russia) strategic strike capacities.

Then why do you continue to argue that the ballistic missile will be rendered redundant, the ballistic missile (regardless of its ICBM/SLBM/IRBM/SRBM class) is and will continue to adapt into ever more complicated forms to overcome a threat like ABM.

I'm not arguing that the ballistic missile (in the general sense) will become redundant, only that the ICBM (with others decreasing in value) will. Whatever the ICBM is adapted into won't resemble the ICBM after that occurs.

Technical development will mean that the ICBM stays in the game, as said ABM offers no reliable foundation for security against ICBM or any other method of attack, it just stimulates the development of more and better methods of attack, as any defence technology will.

This is simply not the case. You're going to have to back up statements with better evidence (or point it out to me if i've missed it) if you want to continue with such an argument.

[stalker]

@Piano Red,

Missile Defence

It's got the right intentions, but the crux is misplaced. Russia would be better served increasing and diversifying it's offensive capabilities, not solely it's offensive missiles.

Wouldn't US missile defence defend against SLBM's too? (Unless they're launched right from near the coast...but presumably that's what THAAD is for).

Whatever the defence burden, it is much more expensive to construct nuclear submarines capable of launching SLBM's rather than the equivalent amount of silo- or rail- based ICBM's.

Should Russia embark on the construction of stealth, high-altitude, hypersonic bombers? (It has already done much of the preliminary concept work - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayaks).

As required by Section 223 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 (PL 108-136), the estimated production rate capacity of the facilities that will produce the assets being fielded is one GBI per month, two SM-3s per month, three THAAD interceptors per month, and two AN/TPY-2 radars per year

Interesting. So that means 12 GBI missiles per year? Wouldn't it then take decades to account for all the hundreds of ICBM's and SLBM's in Russia's arsenal? (Assuming rates of production stay the same).

(As far as I know, SM-3's and THAAD only work on short and medium range ballistic missiles).

The true number planned is probably confidential, but i'd assume that the Pentagon will base the extent of how large the ABM Shield should be (ie in terms of how many interceptors are needed) as based on present and projected strategic nuclear threats to the CONUS and it's allies/assets abroad.

Is Russia considered a strategic threat, or is it limited to 'rogue' states?

Yeah, anything you want to know excatly?

Well, I know that Russia has the equivalent of THAADS in its A-135 Moscow ABM system and of the Patriot in its S-300's, S-400's and planned S-500's.

Does Russia plan to install GBI missiles that will carry kinetic kill vehicles to destroy ICBM's in midcourse, as the ones in Greely and Vandenburg are supposed to do (or will it come in the form of a national expansion of the Moscow system)? If so, what will be the scale?

In general, do you think that nuclear weapons in general will become increasingly irrelevant because they can be shot down? Secondly, will this mean a reversion to the pre-nuclear tendency when the probability of large-scale conventional war was higher?

An increase in SSBNs as launch platforms in the short term (primarily as a stopgap measure), followed by the development of long-range hypersonic manned sub orbital bombers for the long term.

As already made evident with the "proposed" plans the Pentagon has put forth for the B3 bomber. In addition to some rather shady initiatives underway between the USAF and DARPA on Project Blackswift (what many believe is the inhouse precursor to what might become the B3).

Fascinating that the first leg of the nuclear triad also seems to be the last to fall. So basically this new plane will be some kind of SR-71/Aurora spy plane and B-2 bomber hybrid?

What is the proposed strategy to counter such planes?

On the contrary, it's extremely hard. Hence one of the reasons why only a handful of countries actually have/maintain them. The only reason conventional forces appear (at prima facie) to be more expensive is because of the sheer scale that can be involved. Relatively however, building strategic forces is an entirely different ball game.

I agree that conventional forces certainly appear more expensive than strategic. When I looked at the Russian Armed Forces published budget for 2007, only a small sum (0.5bn $) was allocated for "Nuclear weapons complex", which was the only mention of it. I know the MoD frequently fudges its figures, but do you mean to suggest the real cost would be orders of magnitude higher?

Exaggeration then? The Topol is exactly the kind of system that the US ABM system is designed to counter. The point I was trying to make is that you'll have to be more specific if you're going to claim that it's impervious to being intercepted.

OK. The key point is that it will not be able to change its trajectory in mid-course, and as such will not be different from other ICBM's (i.e. vulnerable to the Greely and Vandenburg GBI missiles). It might be invulnerable to existing missile defence like THAAD in its terminal phase, but only by sacrificing its MIRVs. Am I getting it correct?

Russia as Great Power

As for what makes a country a great power, well IMO (and I would agree with you about human capital and social development being important), it's mainly dependent on the traditional definition: That is, the pillars of diplomatic prestige/renown, economic, military, and cultural strength.

I would agree with that, although I would contend that the number of pillars is much greater than mentioned, and would include things like: self-sufficiency, national will, degree of social mobilization, scientific-technical resources, etc. The importance of these pillars varies according to what kind of historical phase international relations are in at the moment (peaceful/anarchic, stable/unstable, rapid/slow technological growth, etc).

Don't take me wrong, Russia is by all means worthy of being called a great power these days. It's just that, since the collapse of the USSR, it's fall from superpower status, as well as it's struggles to retain great power status, any views of what it can and cannot do should be viewed pragmatically.

I would contend that Russia's fall from superpower is but a temporary phenomenom. The way I see it, the world in 20-40 years will be tripolar, with the US, China and Russia as the poles (although Russia will be the weakest one, it will be a 'swing state' which will decide which alignment will be the stronger).

Read above.

It just can't merely be a combination of such things, it has to be the synergy of all those attributes freely working in tandem with one another.

Erm, what's the difference?

The problem with that assessment is that it completely sidelines (admittedly) the heavy role that renewable/alternative energy technologies will play in the transition away from fossil fuels.

No serious assessment that I've come across sees renewables coming anywhere near displacing traditional energy sources like hydrocarbons and nuclear within the next 50 years.

Which is exactly the point i'm trying to make. Annual Russian exports amount to more than 350 billion dollars, the vast majority of them being based on supplying petroleum to customers in Europe. It's that surplus in money from those sales that Russian policymakers have used to their benefit in terms of having free capital to spend on military investments.

Actually, the entire Russian federal budget, including military expenditure, is predicated on world oil prices of 25$ per barrel. This is the reason why Russia runs big budget surpluses and so much money accumulates in foreign reserves and the various Investment Funds the government has set up for them. Russia is cautious about injecting these directly into the economy generally (as opposed to specifically targeted like the Nanotechnology Fund) because of inflationary concerns.

Tell that to the Chinese eyeing Siberia.

The spectre of a Chinese demographic takeover of Siberia exists only in the minds of uninformed Western journalists and some of our own yellow press.

The vast majority of Chinese in the Far East region are seasonal traders who make a tidy profit selling Chinese goods or performing manual labor and return to spend it with their families in China, where things are cheaper and more familiar to them anyway.

Agreed. But there can be one thing (above the others) that can be recognized of that great power (whether internally or externally) of being the principal claim to it's power.

I simply disagree. By that metric a country like Japan, by virtue of having the world's second largest advanced economy, is a Great Power if not superpower. While France or Britain aren't as big economically, they are better 'rounded' and thus more deserving of Great Power status than semi-demilitarized Japan.

Sovereignty isn't a claim to being a great power, it's a claim to being a nation-state. Energy resources is (as i've already referred to) more analogous to the Saudi Arabia quote, and the gun/people who make them attributes are pretty much the same thing as the rockets concept.

I never said sovereigny is a claim for being a Great Power, its a prerequisite.

Saudi Arabia is heavily influenced by the US and cannot be said to possess full sovereignty. That's why I am emphasizing combinations of those pillars of yours, rather than looking at them in isolation.

The thing about guns is metaphor.

The first part of that I could agree with, the second not so much. Polls can be integrated to help formulate the utilization of soft power, but they are not power in and of themselves.

Well, let me rephrase then. Polls are a manifestation of people's hearts and minds; controlling people's hearts and minds is the essence of soft power. That people consider Russia to be the world's third Great Power is a form of soft power that can be illustrated by the use of such polls.

The cultural/territorial holdovers and footprints left from it's colonial/imperial past. That gives it alot of throwing weight diplomatically. Militarily it's at best a regional power, though it does retain a limited capacity to project power to some of it's former overseas holdings, mainly places in Africa and such.

Russia has even greater influence over its Central Asian holdovers. Even in the Visegrad countries, most of the older generations can still speak Russian.

As for power projection, the same can be said for Russia. In fact, unlike France, it still has military bases dotting the former Soviet Union.

Russia has everything that France has and more.

[Typhoon]

This would appear to be a major point of disagreement.
Care to elaborate?

That's what I have been doing the last few posts , anyway I think its time to take stock, fish out the main points and try to sum it up a bit with some sources or this will just go point to counter point till the end of time.

1,My main disagreement is the idea that the US ABM systems coming on-line today and in the foreseeable future will render ICBM, or ballistic missiles in general obsolete.
2,Second point which is tied to the first, will the US ABM be able to void the Russian deterrent and provide the US security against it today or tomorrow.
3, ABM is this a preferred alternative or suppliment to the current situation of opposing arsenals.

The side arguments, I will go into at the bottom.

Point one, which can be easily solved by the historical perspective that “no class of weapon has ever been eliminated or rendered obsolete, they have only developed into more and more advanced forms”, with which you agree. Yet you argue that the ICBM will be rendered redundant by ABM, considering the arbitrary definition of an ICBM as a land based missile with a range in excess of ~>5000 km on a roughly ballistic profile that is an unlikely prospect.

The main question is how will the ICBM evolve to counter ABM? This as stated is all about countermeasures of which several are available for each stage of flight, the points you make above against countermeasures are inaccurate. Contrary to your claims, decoys are a serious problem for ABM, this is a widely accepted opinion and they are widely deployed for both the ( US ) and Russia. Such countermeasures were the bane of previous interceptor systems like Safeguard and continue to confound NMD, no ( test ) has realistically attempted an intercept involving such countermeasures and the test program has been criticized as being flawed and insufficient.
The source at the bottom of this section should prove enlightening since decoys need not resemble or replace a warhead or be deployed (along with RV) in the manner you suggest.
Its unlikely that the bus would be intercepted before it has at least started to deploy its warheads and decoys, since they can be deployed as soon as the missile has finished accelerating (even during the boost depending on the missile) and while the missile is still in ascent, modern ICBM with solid propellant have a rapid boost phase down to around 5 minutes so to say that the GBI would be able to engage before deployment of the payload is unrealistic. This is the realm of boost phase interceptors.
While it can be classed as a MARV the new Russian RV has shown fundamentally new capabilities and has been directly ( stated ) as a counter to ABM. This should not be considered as an analogue of the Pershing RV you describe in either operation or concept.
On manoeuvrability the ICBM has the advantage since it has a large window in which to make a course alteration, the GBI can manoeuvre but only during the boost phase to put the interceptor onto an intercept point and during the terminal phase where the interceptor acquires the target and corrects for a collision. Even a minor course change is magnified over time and would require a new missile to be launched at a new intercept point. Buzzwords do not change the fundamental aspects of the system as I have described.
On SM-3 the new RV is a component of an ICBM, the SM-3 is not designed to engage ICBM, the new RV falls outside the capabilities of the interceptor. Simply put the SM-3 has not been intended to knock out a manoeuvring target travelling around Mach 6. It is unlikely that the recent satellite interception would have represented more than a narrow cross section of the new RV flight profile at best, this was ( acknowledged ) by the US strategic command.
Additionally can I have your actual source on the Russian RV (even if name alone), the one provided wasn't relevant to your argument. So as not to consider it an unfair trade ( this ) link details the points above as well as many others (200 pages), on countermeasures against ABM.

To conclude you have a wide range of countermeasures available for deployment on current and future ballistic missiles, interception of missiles before these can be deployed is not an option for GBI or a viable form of ABM in general (at least for the Russian question). Thus the current generation of ICBM technology has the potential to seriously degrade the effectiveness of the NMD system, future innovations will only further this trend. US NMD is currently unable to handle these situations and it remains to be seen if the programme will ever be able to cope with a realistic simulation of the treat or propose realistic counters to the ICBM or any other ballistic missile technology. Looking at the projected program of NMD I believe that it is highly unlikely that you will get your decade timeframe or even close.

Point two, easier with the conclusion of point one, since ABM are unlikely to eliminate the ICBM, then ABM will be unable to void the Russian deterrent or ensure security against it.
Its cost-effectiveness has also now been put in question, the arsenal of defensive missiles required to counter an attack would have to be far larger than the arsenal it faces, to ensure redundancy. If purely on rockets to counter the Russian land based deterrent then a missile shield which allows for only two shots per missile will require 900 interceptors, on incoming warheads the shield would require 3354 interceptors! If for every missile deployed the US has to deploy two to counter then ABM rapidly loses any economic advantages. Not to mention that the advantage is with the attacker when it comes to rolling out new systems, so not only must the system be built to a sufficient level but continually rebuilt and upgraded over time, playing catch up to the attacker.
As an additional note even if the ICBM component of the Russian arsenal was rendered impotent the SLBM and air-force component would not, these two are also not static entities and could take on additional capabilities as more was required of them. One potential point would be the generation of long range hypersonic cruise missiles, the development was stalled with the close of the cold war but could be easily restarted since hypersonic/long range cruise is an on-going research area. One such example is the ( Meteorite ) project, a cruise capable of reaching over 3000-5000 km at Mach 3, unveiled recently at MAKS 2007.

Finally is ABM a preferable course for national defence as an addition or replacement for a strategic deterrent, well yes and no, it all depends on the system you employ. ABM doesn't eliminate the need for a national deterrent since it is unable to counter all that treats and the threat of destruction offered by a strategic deterrent is the greatest deterrent to attack available today.
Additionally ABM doesn't foster the kind of responses that ensures national security, since the US has its own offensive forces alongside its defensive forces ABM, it just encourages an ( arms race ) and the removal of arms controls which we are seeing now as nations seek to counter a nations ABM to maintain a credible deterrent against the nations offensive forces. If the US posed no threat then an large ABM program would not need a response, unfortunately it does so ABM just encourages further developments to ensure deterrent.

A lot has been said about the benefits of removing ICBM. You have to question the logic of developing a system to counter one weapon when the presence of the system will just further the development of another (or the same) which poses exactly the same risks, in a similar timeframe. ABM also increases the likely-hood that a nation would fire its arsenal in one go, since it would maximise the chance of success, having a large and redundant deterrent alone or with a limited defensive system does not since it would be able to absorb mistakes and limited strikes and allow for either a measured retaliation or dialogue.

Contrary to the views of some there are very few irrational states, if any that exist when it comes to their own survival, none of the nuclear or ballistic missile states would “throw them around” on a whim. I don't think its wise to cut and paste the attributes of terrorists onto nations, even when they may act like or support the former. Iraq is an ideal case study of this, during the first gulf war Iraq had WMD and ballistic delivery platforms but ( decided ) not to use them because to do so would evoke such a crushing retaliation from the coalition that the regime would not survive.

Contrary to claims no other country is working on such an expansive system as the US, nor are they really threatening the deterrence capability of others. The Israeli system is low performance and low capacity, geared to local threats like Iran, which is non-nuclear anyway. Chinese progress in ABM is as glacial as their progress on their deterrent and they have been critical of the US deployment. India has taken up the technology, current systems are limited but progress is expected, though how much actually gets deployed we will see, since Pakistan has already diversified its arsenal. Russia see below. No one else particularly is worth mentioning.

As an alternative to the US current course of action, I would propose that the US along with other nuclear states adopt a new ABM treaty limiting the number and capability of ABM deployed. This would allow the US and others to achieve their stated goals on ABM as well as satisfy all of the valid points you have raised as to the advantages of having an ABM system. Further more it would negate the strategic arms race that is currently growing and make the withdrawal from further arms limitation treaties unnecessary.

Other Points:
On Russian ABM developments, the S-400 is a deployed and tested system at the end of a long lineage of successful short and medium range missile defence systems, built to be compliant with the ABM treaty. The Russians will most ( likely ) develop a full spectrum package for the follow on S-500 air defence system. Though due to the modular nature of the S-x series the new missiles and radar will probably be compatible with S-400.
Your information on the A-135 is out of date, while aspects of the system were recently modernised, there are no plans to expand it. Indeed the 51T6 interceptors have been withdrawn from service, you see while some capability will be retained (the Don radar for example) the A-135 suffers many of the problems faced by Safeguard all those years ago. Expansion for national coverage is not practical or realistic.

Ясно, что построить эффективную систему ПРО от массированного применения ракетного оружия США и других стран НАТО практически невозможно. Признание этого неоспоримого факта в свое время и заставило США и СССР отказаться от создания территориальной системы ПРО. В этих условиях единственным средством обороны опять же является стратегия сдерживания.

Реально может быть создана зональная ПРО от ограниченных ударов БР "третьих стран" с недостаточно развитым ракетным потенциалом. BKO

On mobile ICBM, they do not provide hardened protection being either a train or a glorified lorry, their primary advantage is that they are difficult to spot and track and can roam huge distances to ensure security against a first strike. While observation has improved over the years and you can potentially track a train on a network you cannot tell what that train carries, nor can you provide the persistent real time surveillance to ensure you always know where it is. In any case I have demonstrated that rail mobile missiles are not a waste of time as was originally believed but subject to pro's and con's like any delivery system, if they were not worth their cost Russia or the SU would not use/d them.

On historical ABM systems, while the ABM treaty would have stalled their development it does not remove the fact that non of the systems developed were suitable for national coverage against the Russian deterrent. The technology available today that makes ABM possible against a limited attack did not exist during that era and the systems today are fundamentally different to those of the past in everything other than purpose. The point that the Russians are not expanding the A-135 underlines the point or perhaps you could demonstrate how Safeguard would have provided an adequate defence?

On Korea and deterrence, some quotations from NSC-68 would be relevant.

Should a major war occur in 1950 the Soviet Union and its satellites are considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be in a sufficiently advanced state of preparation immediately to undertake and carry out the following campaigns.
a. To overrun Western Europe, with the possible exception of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas; to drive toward the oil-bearing areas of the Near and Middle East; and to consolidate Communist gains in the Far East;

So there was an acknowledged threat to Europe from the conventional forces of the SU.

We do not know accurately what the Soviet atomic capability is but the Central Intelligence Agency intelligence estimates, concurred in by State, Army, Navy, Air Force, and Atomic Energy Commission, assign to the Soviet Union a production capability giving it a fission bomb stockpile within the following ranges:
By mid-1950
10-20
By mid-1951
25-45
By mid-1952
45-90
By mid-1953
70-135
By mid-1954
200
This estimate is admittedly based on incomplete coverage of Soviet activities and represents the production capabilities of known or deducible Soviet plants.

The graph is reasonably accurate but its above and below that is important, we may know it was accurate but they did not.

The United States now has an atomic capability, including both numbers and deliver ability, estimated to be adequate, if effectively utilized, to deliver a serious blow against the war-making capacity of the USSR. It is doubted whether such a blow, even if it resulted in the complete destruction of the contemplated target systems, would cause the USSR to sue for terms or prevent Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe against such ground resistance as could presently be mobilized.

The US atomic power of the time was not a guaranteed victory (note that arsenals have changed over the years), indeed for NATO it would have probably been rather a Pyrrhic victory.

The US did contemplate the use of the bomb in Korea as a contingency to Chinese intervention and the generals were not the only ones to consider its use, Truman did as well and stated this in public. Though to attack the Chinese, nukes or otherwise could have brought the SU into the war (conventional or otherwise), that was an escalation that European NATO and the US was not prepared to make.

[Patman]

Democracy is submitting to the people's will

Maxim, im sure you will remember that rather embarrassing incident in our countrys not so distant past when 77% of our compatriots decided that a leaky boat full of refugees was such a threat to Australia's security that we should leave them all to starve on the Tampa. Im sure you will join me in congratulating John Howard for his heroic conduct in upholding the peoples will and refusing to be swayed but such rediculous notions as common sense or respect of humanity.

[stalker]

*bump*

[Far-Right Sage]

Umm... this isn't the Poles, this is their conservative government.

And it isn't "Americans" in Iraq - It's their conservative government. Give me a break, Max!

First of all, from a democratic standpoint, the government of Poland was democratically elected. It is doing what it believes to be in the best interests of Poland without directly consulting the Polish people. Why? Because Poland is not a direct democracy; neither is the United States, nor Australia, nor any other modern state I can think of. In this case, the hosting of these systems is the will of Poland as it is the will of Poland's represenatives to the world - The government in Warsaw.

Now, as to whether or not the hosting of these systems and potentially an additional NATO facility is actually in Poland's national interests in another story. Foreign policy wise, it will further damage relations with the Russians, but Poland's ties with Russia haven't been halfway decent since the Yeltsin era anyway.

In any event, what is beneficial to Washington, not Warsaw will essentially be the most pressing concern of the Bush administration and the U.S. State Department, as well it should be.

[W01f]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7283408.stm

The controversial US plan to build a missile defence shield in Europe is likely to dominate talks between President George Bush and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk at the White House on Monday.

It is Mr Tusk's first visit to Washington as prime minister and many people in Poland had expected that a deal on missile defence would be reached there.

But that does not seem likely now. Mr Tusk's government has taken a much tougher stance during negotiations than its predecessor led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, whose twin brother Lech is still the country's president and an ardent supporter of missile defence.

Russia has threatened to target Poland if the base, including 10 interceptor missiles, is built.

Mr Tusk wants concrete assurances that the Americans will agree to modernise the Polish military and specifically beef up Poland's air defences in exchange for the base.

"Co-operation with the Americans is for us one of the real guarantees of our security. That's why we take seriously any form of co-operation the Americans propose," Mr Tusk told the BBC.

"But the installation of the missile defence system will not by itself increase our security, just the opposite. That's why we expect from the Americans a parallel effort to concretely increase Poland's security, not just US security."

'Rogue states'

The Polish government's position is now much more cautious than in the neighbouring Czech Republic. There, despite strong public opposition to the US proposal to host the system's radar, the administration has already agreed in broad terms with Washington.

The Polish government has never confirmed it, but the likely site for the base is a disused airstrip next to the tiny community of Redzikowo, near the Baltic Sea coast.

The plan is for 10 interceptor missiles designed to shoot down long-range ballistic missiles fired from what President Bush calls "rogue states", such as Iran or North Korea.

For decades the airfield, and its Cold War-era aircraft hangars, were home to the Polish Air Force until it was closed down in 1999.

Tucked away in a forest of birch trees you would never know it had any importance today, were it not for the small blue rigs drilling test holes into the ground beside the runway. The tests will determine if the ground is suitable for the missile silos.

"I agree with the idea of building this base in our district," said primary school teacher Lukasz Koss, from the nearby town of Slupsk.

"I think it can give us a chance to build something new, for example the new aqua park, new roads. Maybe the Americans can help us to cut unemployment."

I asked him whether he was afraid the base might become a target for the Russians or terrorists.

"No, I think we are a part of some military organisations, for example Nato, the European Union - and I think we are safe here and I'm not afraid of it," he said.

'Nuclear reprisals'

But many locals are opposed to the idea.

It is unlikely that a deal will be reached during Mr Tusk's US visit

"I'm very much against it. This base will give us nothing," said retired air force officer Tadeusz Krajnik, from Redzikowo.

"On the contrary, it threatens us and increases the danger of a nuclear attack from the east, from Russia, just like Putin said. I'm not even talking about North Korea or Iran, because they don't have missiles that could reach us."

The mayor of Slupsk district, Mariusz Chmiel, has followed the talks for many months and last October even visited California to see the US missile defence installations.

He believes the base will not bring his constituents an economic boom and he has written a letter in protest to the prime minister.

But the government is pressing ahead with the negotiations, despite both the local concerns and the strong objections from the Russians, who say the base will destabilise regional security.

There is also the problem that the forthcoming US elections might return an administration lukewarm on missile defence.

Ahead of Mr Tusk's visit to Washington, foreign minister Radek Sikorski acknowledged a missile defence deal was far from wrapped up.

"The outcome of this negotiation is not a foregone conclusion yet. There is some political risk involved in these negotiations because the next US administration might take a different view. It's an unusually complex decision," he told the BBC.

Tough talks ahead

Until recently Washington did not even want to talk about offering Poland anything in return for the base.

Mr Sikorski is aware missile defence is not popular - the most recent opinion polls suggest more than half of Poles are against it.

That is why, he says, the Americans must agree to help modernise the Polish military if the deal is to make it through parliament.

Mr Sikorski says it is very unlikely an agreement will be reached during Mr Tusk's visit and there are still months of tough bargaining ahead.

Yep, this is definitely in the best interest of "democratic" Poland.

[soron]

Poland would gain a lot more if they would get some regular NATO bases, perhaps some training area or something where you have a regular influx of soldiers who will actually spend some cash in the local markets, instead of supporting a such a highly questionable political project without any obvious military value.

[stalker]

*bump*

[Piano Red]

My apologies for not being able to reply lately, i'm caught head & shoulders in the middle of mid terms at the moment.

[stalker]

That's OK. I'm just making sure it doesn't sink into the second page, where we might all forget about it.

[Piano Red]

Ok, finally got the free time to post on this...

stalker

Wouldn't US missile defence defend against SLBM's too? (Unless they're launched right from near the coast...but presumably that's what THAAD is for).

THAAD could, but I would note that it's not that easy. The primary defense against that kind of attack has always been more dependent on proper intelligence that allows for an SSBN to be intercepted before it ever gets into a position where it can launch it's nukes. Something that's very hard to achieve in and of itself.

That's the great thing about SSBNs, they can literally sneak up off a target country's coastline and shower their target with multiple warheads on depressed trajectories. A type of attack where the defense would literally have only a matter of minutes at best to respond.

Whatever the defence burden, it is much more expensive to construct nuclear submarines capable of launching SLBM's rather than the equivalent amount of silo- or rail- based ICBM's.

Yes it is, an inherent factor that has worked to the US' advantage. It's not only a matter of building SSBNs, but getting them (and their main armament) to work properly too. Something that the US and Russia both had problems with early on, and which the Chinese and Indians are trying to work out today.

That's the thing about military arms races, one way to win them is to make the economic price for one's competitor(s) so high that they simply cannot afford to deploy new toys that are qualitatively or quantitatively better than your own. If they can deploy them at all. You can see the same approach being taken by the US with regards to the development of ABM tech and the inevitable effects it has/will have on nuclear warfare.

Should Russia embark on the construction of stealth, high-altitude, hypersonic bombers? (It has already done much of the preliminary concept work - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ayaks).

It should be a priority about a decade down the road, and would definitely rely on them getting the other problems they have with their military worked out.

Interesting. So that means 12 GBI missiles per year? Wouldn't it then take decades to account for all the hundreds of ICBM's and SLBM's in Russia's arsenal? (Assuming rates of production stay the same).

Well you have to remember that Russia only has some 500 ICBMs and less than 1,500 warheads in it's combined arsenal. Besides that i'm fairly certain that those figures are the initial production rates based on the number of silos and ships the missiles could be fitted in at any one time. The rate will probably be increased (if it hasn't been already) until the number of deployed GBIs, SM-3s, reaches the set number that the Pentagon wants fielded for the time being, which is undoubtedly confidential.

Is Russia considered a strategic threat, or is it limited to 'rogue' states?

Well the new language used at the Pentagon these days designate Russia as a "peer competitor". It's nuclear arsenal certainly put it in the category of being a potential strategic threat, but compared to actors like N. Korea or Iran that threat is fairly low. The US is very familiar with how Russia handles it's nukes, which is pretty much the same as how US handles its own.

Does Russia plan to install GBI missiles that will carry kinetic kill vehicles to destroy ICBM's in midcourse, as the ones in Greely and Vandenburg are supposed to do (or will it come in the form of a national expansion of the Moscow system)? If so, what will be the scale?

Well given that they're already expanding the Moscow system, it's probably going to be the latter. The ABM tech they have currently is still pretty good, so there'd be no need to spend money trying to develop an entirely new system.

As for the scale, i'd say there'd be alot of emphasis put on shoring up ABM coverage of strategic areas in Central and Eastern Russia, most likely with the construction of new phased array radar systems and other MDGE assets. Doing so would achieve the closest thing Russia could get towards having national coverage, after that it'd simply a matter of building the missile farms and installing the interceptors.

In general, do you think that nuclear weapons in general will become increasingly irrelevant because they can be shot down?

Of course not. It will only necessitate that new means of delivery for them will have to be devised. ICBMs will be of less value, but the nuclear warheads they carry will not.

Secondly, will this mean a reversion to the pre-nuclear tendency when the probability of large-scale conventional war was higher?

It might, we'll have to wait and see. Though I will say that it's of my opinion that the most likely setting of a nuclear event of some kind in the next 20-30 years will be Central or Eastern Asia.

India and Pakistan might go at it, N. Korea could easily snap, crackle, and pop in the next decade, and (as i've said) China has alot of motive and ambitions for Siberia.

Fascinating that the first leg of the nuclear triad also seems to be the last to fall. So basically this new plane will be some kind of SR-71/Aurora spy plane and B-2 bomber hybrid?

Pretty much.

What is the proposed strategy to counter such planes?

Um...none at the moment. High altitude hypersonic interceptor aircraft maybe?

I agree that conventional forces certainly appear more expensive than strategic. When I looked at the Russian Armed Forces published budget for 2007, only a small sum (0.5bn $) was allocated for "Nuclear weapons complex", which was the only mention of it. I know the MoD frequently fudges its figures, but do you mean to suggest the real cost would be orders of magnitude higher?

Considering the present revamping the Russians are going through now? Yep.

Also keep in mind that alot of the expense for strategic forces is the amount of money put into building them, divided by time. A process that can take a decade or more. Much of Russia's force has already been built, not to mention the vast amounts that were slashed or dismantled due to treaties and the end of the Cold War. Now that the system is being rebuilt again, money again has to be spent on re-tooling certain assets, expanding or upgrading different components, as well as putting new designs into production.

It takes billions of dollars alone for each of the new Topol-Ms to be put in service each year alone, and even then there have been a number of funding problems.

OK. The key point is that it will not be able to change its trajectory in mid-course, and as such will not be different from other ICBM's (i.e. vulnerable to the Greely and Vandenburg GBI missiles). It might be invulnerable to existing missile defence like THAAD in its terminal phase, but only by sacrificing its MIRVs. Am I getting it correct?

For the most part, although it'd be the Sea-based ABM system that would be used to intercept the atmosphere skipping RV, not THAAD.

I would agree with that, although I would contend that the number of pillars is much greater than mentioned, and would include things like: self-sufficiency, national will, degree of social mobilization, scientific-technical resources, etc.

All of which could be cataloged under the more general pillars of geographic, economic and cultural power with regards to access to resources, national will, and so on.

The importance of these pillars varies according to what kind of historical phase international relations are in at the moment (peaceful/anarchic, stable/unstable, rapid/slow technological growth, etc).

Very much agreed.

I would contend that Russia's fall from superpower is but a temporary phenomenom.

How do you think Russia could reclaim Superpower status then?

The way I see it, the world in 20-40 years will be tripolar, with the US, China and Russia as the poles (although Russia will be the weakest one, it will be a 'swing state' which will decide which alignment will be the stronger).

On the contrary I see differently. 20-40 years from now the power structure will undoubtedly have changed very much among the great powers of the world, but the US will still be at the perverbial top.

Remember that according to maximal realism the global hierarchy and distribution of power is top-heavy. That makes the US itself the real swing state that shapes the arena in which other actors base their moves.

As I see it, Russia and China will also be vying with the EU (albeit still politically confederated) and a newly emergent India in a quad-partite geo-political alignment. With the still pre-dominant US acting as the fulcrum (ie the "800 pound gorilla") in the room b/w all of them.

Erm, what's the difference?

My own play on words.

I wanted to point out that it's not just a matter of a state having such attributes accessible, but also in mobilizing and utilizing/exploiting them effectively. Russia has more or less achieved this in a sustainable fashion with regards to its energy resources.

No serious assessment that I've come across sees renewables coming anywhere near displacing traditional energy sources like hydrocarbons and nuclear within the next 50 years.

I'm not just talking of renewables exclusively, but the whole range of alternative energy sources as well. Which are basically anything that isn't derived from fossil fuels, increased reliance on nuclear power is one of those altnatives for example.

Either way, given the state of the current global energy problem (not to mention environmental concerns), reliance on fossil fuels and hydrocarbons as a principal energy source is bound to decrease in one way or another before the half-turn of this century.

Actually, the entire Russian federal budget, including military expenditure, is predicated on world oil prices of 25$ per barrel. This is the reason why Russia runs big budget surpluses and so much money accumulates in foreign reserves and the various Investment Funds the government has set up for them. Russia is cautious about injecting these directly into the economy generally (as opposed to specifically targeted like the Nanotechnology Fund) because of inflationary concerns.

Isn't that just a parallel statement to my own?

The spectre of a Chinese demographic takeover of Siberia exists only in the minds of uninformed Western journalists and some of our own yellow press.

Who said anything about a demographic takeover? It might very well turn into a military confrontation over the region. It certainly wouldn't be the first time it's occurred in recent history.

I simply disagree. By that metric a country like Japan, by virtue of having the world's second largest advanced economy, is a Great Power if not superpower. While France or Britain aren't as big economically, they are better 'rounded' and thus more deserving of Great Power status than semi-demilitarized Japan.

I disagree with your general assertion, but I do agree with the contrasts b/w the UK/France and Japan. Japan is a great power today b/c of the economic power it's wielded internationally in the Post-WWII era. Despite the "de-militarized" state of it's armed forces and no formal recognition of it's status in the UN (ie not a permanent member on the UNSC).

That said, i'll be the first to say that there is no unanimous agreement among the leading IR authorities on what attributes define and characterize a great power. That debate is as old now as it was two centuries ago at the Congress of Vienna where the term was first coined.

My take on it is that it's a matter of how one chooses to see the "dimension" with which a country is viewed as a great power both internally and externally, in addition to how it chooses to wield such power.

Saudi Arabia is heavily influenced by the US and cannot be said to possess full sovereignty. That's why I am emphasizing combinations of those pillars of yours, rather than looking at them in isolation

Got it. However, unless you want to branch off into another debate on sovereignty, I would disagree on the point about the Saudis not having full sovereignty.

Well, let me rephrase then. Polls are a manifestation of people's hearts and minds; controlling people's hearts and minds is the essence of soft power. That people consider Russia to be the world's third Great Power is a form of soft power that can be illustrated by the use of such polls.

Agreed.

Russia has even greater influence over its Central Asian holdovers. Even in the Visegrad countries, most of the older generations can still speak Russian.

It does, but i'd say it's relative to certin geo-graphic areas. In some like Eastern Europe, that influence is contested, in others many countries still remain in line. It's also worth noting that Russia still retains much of the influence on its former holdings through the application of heavy handed diplomacy policies.

As for power projection, the same can be said for Russia. In fact, unlike France, it still has military bases dotting the former Soviet Union.

France has virtually the same capabilities. There are French bases all over northern Africa, and they still have holdings in the Caribbean and elsewhere.

Russia has everything that France has and more.

Like what specifically? Economically Russia is no more powerful than France, in some interpretations that fact alone would be enough to point out their parity in power.

It's only the result of its strategic arsenal and overall military strength, in addition to the levied prestige still carried over from the spectre of the USSR, that Russia could be viewed in such a fashion.

Typhoon

That's what I have been doing the last few posts Smile, anyway I think its time to take stock, fish out the main points and try to sum it up a bit with some sources or this will just go point to counter point till the end of time.

Agreed.

1,My main disagreement is the idea that the US ABM systems coming on-line today and in the foreseeable future will render ICBM, or ballistic missiles in general obsolete.

And I would point out that such an outcome is certainly a possibility and shouldn't be ruled out, it isn't set in stone. What I meant to imply was that as ABM becomes more prevalent, the value of ICBMs as the principal strategic weapon of choice will inevitably decrease.

That's not to say that there won't be developments made for the ICBM to resist or counter ABM in some way, but as of now none of the concepts devised so far are really going to much that ends the feasbility (practically and economically speaking) of ABM altogether.

Besides that, even if ICBMs are rendered obsolete, I would further contend that such a development would be an inherently good thing. ICBMs are very destabilizing weapons systems that simply should not go uncountered by more ICBMs on the other side alone. Once one leaves its silo, even if for an accident, then nothing from that point forward is going to prevent a disastrous nuclear exchange from taking place.

More so than that, because of the destabilizing power that ICBMs represent in the strategic nuclear world, the re-introduction of viable ABM technology also serves to raise the price it takes for nations that seek nuclear weapons to actually go through with getting them.

2,Second point which is tied to the first, will the US ABM be able to void the Russian deterrent and provide the US security against it today or tomorrow.

It's still a work in progress. However it's important to realize that its not going away anytime soon, and is only bound to get more efficient as the technology and systems being developed are able to mature.

3, ABM is this a preferred alternative or suppliment to the current situation of opposing arsenals.

Considering the amount of countries working on ABM tech, the answer for that should be self-evident.

Point one, which can be easily solved by the historical perspective that “no class of weapon has ever been eliminated or rendered obsolete, they have only developed into more and more advanced forms”, with which you agree. Yet you argue that the ICBM will be rendered redundant by ABM, considering the arbitrary definition of an ICBM as a land based missile with a range in excess of ~>5000 km on a roughly ballistic profile that is an unlikely prospect.

I agree with it on the basis of the fact that (historically) a weapon is typically eliminated or rendered obsolete if a new weapon (or one based off the original weapon's design) comes along that either invents a better way of doing the same job, or if it's so good that it eliminates the reason for the original weapon to exist in the first place.

It doesn't necessarily mean that the ICBM's "more advanced form" will consist of a better missile. It could easily be an entirely different delivery platform that still accomplishes the same role.

The main question is how will the ICBM evolve to counter ABM?

That's the 100 billion dollar question lingering in the air.

Contrary to your claims, decoys are a serious problem for ABM, this is a widely accepted opinion and they are widely deployed for both the ( US ) and Russia.

How can they be a problem for ABM when the missile bus is shot down before they can be deployed? I've posed this question numerous times now.

The source at the bottom of this section should prove enlightening since decoys need not resemble or replace a warhead or be deployed (along with RV) in the manner you suggest.

What other manner could they be deployed in then?

Its unlikely that the bus would be intercepted before it has at least started to deploy its warheads and decoys, since they can be deployed as soon as the missile has finished accelerating (even during the boost depending on the missile) and while the missile is still in ascent, modern ICBM with solid propellant have a rapid boost phase down to around 5 minutes so to say that the GBI would be able to engage before deployment of the payload is unrealistic. This is the realm of boost phase interceptors.

And what difference would the decoys make then? You do realize that the missile bus would have a far higher thermal signature than anything the decoys could hide right? Aside from the fact that any half-decent radar wouldn't be thrown off if the decoys were deployed at that phase either? It's be an exercise in futility.

The vast majority of decoy systems are meant to mask the de-orbiting tracjectory of the MRV as it begins to enter the atmosphere. Deploying in them in the missile's boost phase in an attempt to throw off interception would be useless.

While it can be classed as a MARV the new Russian RV has shown fundamentally new capabilities and has been directly ( stated ) as a counter to ABM. This should not be considered as an analogue of the Pershing RV you describe in either operation or concept.

Such as? It's demonstrated no new capabilities that either the US or Russia weren't already aware of. Regardless of whether it's stated as a counter to ABM or not, the fact still remains that it can still be intercepted itself. Or that implementing them on a widescale would be strategically counterproductive in terms of reducing the overall number of warheads that could be deployed in an exchange.

On manoeuvrability the ICBM has the advantage since it has a large window in which to make a course alteration

ICBMs don't maneuver. They only have so much throw weight and fuel with which to achieve their ballistic approach to their target.

Even a minor course change is magnified over time and would require a new missile to be launched at a new intercept point. Buzzwords do not change the fundamental aspects of the system as I have described.

Uh yes they do, quite thoroughly even. Source programmable autonomouus guidance isn't some buzzword, it's an accurate description of the advantage ABM has in being able to intercept an ICBM by nature of the fact that the EKV is able to compensate for it's trajectory more efficiently than any possible ballistic profile would be able to throw it off.

On SM-3 the new RV is a component of an ICBM, the SM-3 is not designed to engage ICBM, the new RV falls outside the capabilities of the interceptor.

And as i've already pointed out, new RV is designed to maneuver endo-atmospherically, thus putting it within the sea-based ABM system's range envelope. It doesn't have to engage the ICBM if the RV itself can be take out.

Simply put the SM-3 has not been intended to knock out a manoeuvring target travelling around Mach 6.

And yet, as the most recent USA 193 shootdown has shown, accomplishing that is well within the system's capabilities.

It is unlikely that the recent satellite interception would have represented more than a narrow cross section of the new RV flight profile at best, this was ( acknowledged ) by the US strategic command.

The Pentagon acknowledged that the conditions of the shootdown were a special case, not that the system would be unable to duplicate said results in a combat environment. As a favor for you, i'd recommend not sourcing articles from the CDI on the subject of the US missile defense. They're one of the lobbied defense industry NGOs within the US MIC that's been adamantly opposed to the program for quite some time.

Additionally can I have your actual source on the Russian RV (even if name alone), the one provided wasn't relevant to your argument. So as not to consider it an unfair trade ( this ) link details the points above as well as many others (200 pages), on countermeasures against ABM.

Can I have yours? You would seem to have a better source than any I can find.

Also, much in the same way with the link you posted from CDI, that "study" also isn't very objective in it's analysis either. Aside from being somewhat out of date, it was made by one of many advocacy groups that have been opposed to any US missile defense policy since before SDI.

To conclude you have a wide range of countermeasures available for deployment on current and future ballistic missiles, interception of missiles before these can be deployed is not an option for GBI or a viable form of ABM in general (at least for the Russian question).

Nothing has been provided proving a case for why it couldn't be.

Thus the current generation of ICBM technology has the potential to seriously degrade the effectiveness of the NMD system, future innovations will only further this trend.

Based on...what? We're going back to square one again it seems.

US NMD is currently unable to handle these situations and it remains to be seen if the programme will ever be able to cope with a realistic simulation of the treat or propose realistic counters to the ICBM or any other ballistic missile technology. Looking at the projected program of NMD I believe that it is highly unlikely that you will get your decade timeframe or even close.

I fail to see why, or more importantly, how.

Point two, easier with the conclusion of point one, since ABM are unlikely to eliminate the ICBM, then ABM will be unable to void the Russian deterrent or ensure security against it.

Read above. ABM doesn't have to eliminate ICBMs altogether if it's more than capable of rendering their overall effectiveness inert or redundant.

If purely on rockets to counter the Russian land based deterrent then a missile shield which allows for only two shots per missile will require 900 interceptors, on incoming warheads the shield would require 3354 interceptors!

Incoming warheads wouldn't be a factor seeing how the GBIs are designed to shoot down the missile bus before it ever gets to the stage where the individual warheads can be deployed.

If for every missile deployed the US has to deploy two to counter then ABM rapidly loses any economic advantages.

Uh...not really. I've already pointed out several times now that the individual unit cost for even a single interceptor missile is far less expensive than the money required to field just a single ICBM.

Just take a second to think about the amount of money that goes into the individual components and technology required for an ICBM, then contrast that to the components needed for a GBI.

Not to mention that the advantage is with the attacker when it comes to rolling out new systems, so not only must the system be built to a sufficient level but continually rebuilt and upgraded over time, playing catch up to the attacker.

Um...that's one of the inherent advantages of the ABM system actually. Because it's more cost prohibitive for an ICBM to be built compared to the numerous GBIs that could be fielded in return, the attacker essentially loses the technical initiative once the MDGE for the defender is established. The cost of thickening the interceptor screen for such a system is relatively inexpensive compared to what must be done in order to break through it.

As an additional note even if the ICBM component of the Russian arsenal was rendered impotent the SLBM and air-force component would not, these two are also not static entities and could take on additional capabilities as more was required of them.

Something that would cost money, and are already two areas where the US enjoys a clear qualitatively and quantitative advantage. The point is entirely valid however.

One potential point would be the generation of long range hypersonic cruise missiles, the development was stalled with the close of the cold war but could be easily restarted since hypersonic/long range cruise is an on-going research area. One such example is the ( Meteorite ) project, a cruise capable of reaching over 3000-5000 km at Mach 3, unveiled recently at MAKS 2007.

Agreed, but again this is also another field where the US is well ahead of in terms of viable development and production.

Finally is ABM a preferable course for national defence as an addition or replacement for a strategic deterrent, well yes and no, it all depends on the system you employ. ABM doesn't eliminate the need for a national deterrent since it is unable to counter all that treats and the threat of destruction offered by a strategic deterrent is the greatest deterrent to attack available today.

Agreed.

it just encourages an ( arms race )

Another development where (if pursued) the US would enjoy the natural advantage.

and the removal of arms controls which we are seeing now as nations seek to counter a nations ABM to maintain a credible deterrent against the nations offensive forces.

Arms controls (specifically the ABM treaty) that were never effective to begin with, and were an inevitable development already before such controls were removed.

If the US posed no threat then an large ABM program would not need a response, unfortunately it does so ABM just encourages further developments to ensure deterrent.

Yep. That cat's essentially out of the box at this point, it's not going back.

A lot has been said about the benefits of removing ICBM. You have to question the logic of developing a system to counter one weapon when the presence of the system will just further the development of another (or the same) which poses exactly the same risks, in a similar timeframe.

Not really. Removing ICBMs from the equation of nuclear warfare doctrine would ensure that breathing space is given should an accidental launch or malfunction occur. In addition to the notion i've already raised on how the incorporation of ABM "raises the stakes" for nations that seek nukes.

ABM also increases the likely-hood that a nation would fire its arsenal in one go, since it would maximise the chance of success

Russia is the only country with an arsenal large enough to break through the ABM screen as it stands now. Besides that, they'd already do that anyway in most scenarios.

Contrary to the views of some there are very few irrational states, if any that exist when it comes to their own survival, none of the nuclear or ballistic missile states would “throw them around” on a whim.

Fortunately the US and many other countries (hell i'd even throw Russia in there) working on ABM tech don't base their defense policies on such re-assurances. It's always better to be safe than sorry.

I don't think its wise to cut and paste the attributes of terrorists onto nations, even when they may act like or support the former.

I'd argue that a notion like this relative to the relationship between the nation and the groups they support.

Iraq is an ideal case study of this, during the first gulf war Iraq had WMD and ballistic delivery platforms but ( decided ) not to use them because to do so would evoke such a crushing retaliation from the coalition that the regime would not survive.

And what about those Scuds Saddam tossed at Israel during that conflict?

Contrary to claims no other country is working on such an expansive system as the US, nor are they really threatening the deterrence capability of others.

This would be patently inaccurate.

The US system is simply far more advanced than any of the ones being pursued by others at the moment. That doesn't negate the fact that there are plenty of other countries working on their own which are based on their own missile defense needs.

The Israeli system is low performance and low capacity, geared to local threats like Iran, which is non-nuclear anyway.

For now, and even then that may be subject to change. The Israeli program is a special case in terms of an internal debate within the Israeli government on the manner in which an ABM system should be deployed given the potential of future threats from Syria and Iran. It's not a question of whether the system should or shouldn't be deployed as it is in the US.

Chinese progress in ABM is as glacial as their progress on their deterrent and they have been critical of the US deployment.

Again, you have to understand some of the specific details of their program directly. Incidentally, it should be noted that more money has flowed into the Chinese ASAT and ABM programs in the last 5-6 years then at any one point in the last decade. They haven't been blind to what's on the horizon one bit.

No one else particularly is worth mentioning.

Japan, S. Korea, Great Britain, France, Germany, Singapore, and a number of other developed and modern countries aren't worth mentioning?

As an alternative to the US current course of action, I would propose that the US along with other nuclear states adopt a new ABM treaty limiting the number and capability of ABM deployed.

It's too late for that at this point. The US and many other countries (and i'm not just talking about the other nuclear powers) would see such a treaty as counter-productive to their interests. It'd have to act in tandem to an entirely new START Treaty as well, which would only open a different can of worms.

Further more it would negate the strategic arms race that is currently growing and make the withdrawal from further arms limitation treaties unnecessary.

Let it continue I say, it's not like it won't turn into a race of attrition if it continues longer.

Your information on the A-135 is out of date, while aspects of the system were recently modernised, there are no plans to expand it.

I take it you haven't been keeping up with some of the stuff going on at sites like Sary Shagan. Or even some of the developments that have taken place at the organizational level regarding plans for either a modification or outright replacement of the A-135 system.

Indeed the 51T6 interceptors have been withdrawn from service, you see while some capability will be retained (the Don radar for example) the A-135 suffers many of the problems faced by Safeguard all those years ago. Expansion for national coverage is not practical or realistic.

Only last month, and only because of systems that have (literally) come online that allow for them to be replaced.

On mobile ICBM, they do not provide hardened protection being either a train or a glorified lorry, their primary advantage is that they are difficult to spot and track and can roam huge distances to ensure security against a first strike.

The infrastructure required to support them gives them away, aside from the fact that they aren't very cost effective.

If rail-mobile systems really are so good, then why has the US never built any?

While observation has improved over the years and you can potentially track a train on a network you cannot tell what that train carries, nor can you provide the persistent real time surveillance to ensure you always know where it is.

You don't have to. Just saturate the system by pre-programming target points for ICBMs to hit.

In any case I have demonstrated that rail mobile missiles are not a waste of time as was originally believed but subject to pro's and con's like any delivery system, if they were not worth their cost Russia or the SU would not use/d them.

They weren't worth the cost, which is primarily why the US never employed them for it's ICBM fleet. The reasons for why Russia used them are varied, but AFAIK it really came down to a matter of doctrine.

On historical ABM systems, while the ABM treaty would have stalled their development it does not remove the fact that non of the systems developed were suitable for national coverage against the Russian deterrent.

They were suitable, as i've pointed out a rediculous number of times now. It was purely the result of bureaucratic wrangling within the Pentagon that the systems were scaled down or cancelled from what they were originally envisioned.

The technology available today that makes ABM possible against a limited attack did not exist during that era and the systems today are fundamentally different to those of the past in everything other than purpose.

....

I'm seriously beginning to question your understanding of the history of ABM technology. Many of the systems in use today are fundamentally no different from those that were being tested 50 years ago, and many owe their success to the trials, errors, and solutions that were made in that period.

IIRC I think I pointed out rather clearly in my first or second post that practically any country with access to modern guidance and ballistic technology can get an ABM program up and running, cost not-withstanding. The period from the late 40s through to the 60s was essentially when all that technology was first pioneered.

The point that the Russians are not expanding the A-135 underlines the point or perhaps you could demonstrate how Safeguard would have provided an adequate defence?

Care to provide some evidence of them not expanding the A-135? Or on them not working on some form of upgrade to the existing MDGE for it?

On Korea and deterrence, some quotations from NSC-68 would be relevant.

The graph is reasonably accurate but its above and below that is important, we may know it was accurate but they did not.

And? I fail to see how that points to anything I proving that the US was sufficiently deterred by the USSR at that point.

The US/NATO already had policies in place to counter the Soviet's conventional force advantage. Not to mention that the first ICBMs didn't start to be fielded until the late-50s, or the rediculous lead the US had in terms of nukes overall at that point.

The US atomic power of the time was not a guaranteed victory (note that arsenals have changed over the years), indeed for NATO it would have probably been rather a Pyrrhic victory.

Hindsight is 20/20. As i've said, NATO wouldn't be syonymous with the US in terms of the virtual strategic monopoly the US enjoyed during the period. Europe probably would've buried under a sea of horrific losses and destruction, but the continental US would've pulled through such a conflict relatively unscathed. A virtual repeat of what happened during WWII.

The US did contemplate the use of the bomb in Korea as a contingency to Chinese intervention and the generals were not the only ones to consider its use, Truman did as well and stated this in public. Though to attack the Chinese, nukes or otherwise could have brought the SU into the war (conventional or otherwise), that was an escalation that European NATO and the US was not prepared to make.

There was no need to make it, there was no contingency for the use of nukes if the Chinese entered the war. The US and other UN allies never believed the Chinese were prepared to enter the conflict. Hence why the big shock and unpreparedness of the UN forces in Korea when the Chinese crossed the Yalu and attacked. Aside from that, the Soviets were already in the war by default at that point.

If anything it was the changing conditions of the war on the ground which proved that there was no need to escalate it beyond the conventional realm. Specifically the consolidation and rallying of the US 8th Army under Matthew Ridgway and his strategy of stretching out the Chinese supply lines long enough to then launch a counter-offensive when they lost the battlefield initiative.

I'm not denying that Truman and others at the Pentagon weren't contemplating the use of nukes for a time, but Ridgway's turnarounds stood as an alternative that they chose to go with instead. The US was never deterred from going nuclear during that conflict, doing so would simply have led to a pre-mature nuclear war at that point in time that the Soviets weren't really prepared to wage.

[Typhoon]

the long awaited reply, though I had hoped for a similar effort to include supportive material on your part, it would really improve the discussion.

On the first topic,
While you may dislike the CDI for their opposition to NMD and the problems they raise on the issue it does not render the content of the work presented at their site as void and it is still very relevant to the discussion and the times. If you will be critical then at least criticise the content, an ideal opportunity to insert your own material!

It would also be of benefit to read the study, you would gain a much better understanding of countermeasures and the problems surrounding ABM. One frequently recurring problem (despite my previous post) is the belief that EKV would intercept the missile before the release of RV and decoys. The GBI of GMD could not travel the distance of several thousand kilometres fast enough to do this as modern ICBM burnout around five minutes into the flight and as soon as the boost is over and an exo-atmospheric altitude reached the bus can start to deploy its payload, well before apogee and any intercept point of GMD. To ( illustrate ) the point during one ABM test a target was fired over a distance of 4500 km, ~20 minutes after it launched the interceptor launched and ~10 minutes after that the intercept occurred, as said getting the missile before the payload is released requires a boost phase interceptor not GMD.
The second problem is understanding of how certain decoys operate, since the bus is long made redundant before EKV arrives on the scene the RV is the actual target of the interceptor. There are many types of decoy and trajectory concealment is not the main goal but rather to make target discrimination impossible, again read the study for details.

No RV to date has demonstrated the kinematic performance of the Russian RV. There may be a cost in the number of warheads but this can be mitigated by using modified missiles (such as the recently unveiled RS-24) and since each warhead has a greater probability of reaching its target, lower numbers of warheads can be excused. The SM-3 issue surrounding this presents another error, SM-3 could not make an endo-atmospheric interception. US 193 the last time I ( checked)was treading a well known non-manoeuvring orbit, it in no way realistically replicates Igla or any other threat that NMD would face, other than a test of integration it was a show piece and Cartwright admitted as much (see above article).
One particular source that sums up the major points and speculation (I notice I still havn't had yours..) http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/040224.htm

ICBM do manoeuvre, during their first phases of flight and on the latest models during the Mid and Terminal phases as demonstrated by Igla and earlier RV. The majority of the work done to get the EKV to the target is done by the booster, the EKV can be told how to position itself, where to look and is given a threat map so it knows what to look for but it would be travelling to fast and with too little propellant to make a major diversion away from the initial projected interception point to the new target position.

Boost phase ABM is limited by the need to be positioned close to the target as a result of the speed of the engagement and the effort required to catch the missile, very difficult in Russia or China where missiles have space to roam and are generally of an advanced design.

On the second point,
Well really its just a case of replacing the word eliminate with inert or redundant with regards to my previous statement, ICBM though the introduction and use of current and future penetration aids as demonstrated above will remain a potent force.
Cost is an interesting point and I have let that lie till recently but we are yet to see any figures on the table to justify your conclusion. So rather than taking just a second lets look at some figures, according to ( FAS ) two Topol-M regiments in 2001 cost 3.7 billion roubles or 156 million $ (today's rate) for a total of 20 missiles and support, each EKV alone costs the US between 20-25 million $ according to ( MissileThreat ), while a bit of a dirty comparison I would find it very hard to justify the statement that two or more US interceptors were equal or superior in cost effectiveness to one Russian ICBM. Additionally the cost of increasing the number of penetration aids on a missile is far more effective than building more missiles to shoot them down since such aids are simple in concept and manufacture and can be easily deployed in bulk.

I'm pleased that you recognise that the Russian deterrent would not be neutered by NMD if only so far on the grounds of the diversity of potential delivery methods available, I guess we can consider this point resolved.

On point three,
While the US may have certain advantages in the area of an arms race it does not make such a race desirable, the situation is excused without justifying its need. I would say that such treaties were very effective while they were in force and that returning to such a state, though not necessarily exactly the same state would be a desirable path.
Any strategic system is prone to accidental launch or malfunction, the ICBM is not unique in this regard and not is any future system, ICBM or otherwise. Considering the ease of production and implementation of penetration aids for ICBM the barrier point is questionable, not to mention there are several other delivery systems available today which are very much cheaper to develop than ICBM, cruise being the obvious choice. On examination any of the major land based nuclear powers (Russia, US, China) could penetrate a US style future NMD system, as it stands now it stands no chance.
As of Iraq for a case study Saddam may have fired Scuds but they were never loaded with BC agents and that is the important distinction. If you could submit information supporting your claim of other nations constructing ABM on the scale of NMD it would really help your argument, Israel is unlikely to develop anything on the scale of NMD there is just no threat that would make it worth while, without figures the Chinese comparison was meaningless, recent ASAT testing was a show piece the same as US 193 and is very much linked to the Russia/China proposal against the further weaponisation of space.

Such a treaty need only involve certain powers (Russia, US and maby China) to be effective, I would say that the only barrier would be a US willingness to co-operate on the matter.

Other points,
Apparently not, what has been happening at Sary that I should know about, I have already said A-135 has been recently modernised but there has been no expansion of the system (the scale-back of which was announced in 1998), nor is there any planned expansion to my knowledge. New Russian ABM developments have been stated around the future S-500. A-135 as a legacy system that will be retained and maintained, no more.

Historical ABM like Safeguard developed from SAM systems and as such adopted SAM characteristics being radar reliant, terminal phase interceptors using nuclear warheads. Two major problems mark this generation of systems, with no ability to take down the missile before RV and decoys are deployed the system was vulnerable to saturation and deception. Its reliance on radar was also a problem since any nuclear detonation would knock out the surveillance and guidance radars making the system vulnerable to the USSR “walking” nukes onto the system and even to its own nuclear interceptors. The US DoD acknowledged these deficiencies through its own study and drove the final nails in the coffin of the project itself, such systems are a dead end and why Russia has not expanded (or will expand) the A-135.
Today's systems for national defence (GBM,SM-3,BPI) differentiate themselves from previous operational systems and use entirely new modes of guidance and intercept technology. Making use of optics and hit-to-kill does away with the vulnerable radar and nuclear warheads of the past. This effort started life in an entirely different fashion and development process to Safeguard and is really an acknowledgement of the limitations of the Safeguard system, today's EKV owe their existence to the Homing Overlay Experiment from 1976 rather than Zeus of 56 (Global Security).
While discussing the origins of the EKV it would be good to point out that during the testing of previous systems a problem was discovered which has still not been addressed some 30 years later, while an interceptor can spot and collide with a target in space it has never been shown to be able differentiate between a countermeasure and a target without being told beforehand which is which. This links back to the top and why NMD would be highly ineffective against any force employing penetration aids and ( here ) is another PDF (from MIT) detailing some of the points.

Trains are relatively expensive to operate but significantly less so than an SLBM, there are many divergences between US/USSR military, just because the US doesn't or did not do it does not make it a bad or unworkable idea and they do have significant advantages over silos which have already been explained. The infrastructure does not tell you which trains carry the missiles, where they are going or where they will be in X-hours from the time the train is spotted. Attacking pre-set targets would be effective against known garrisons but not against dispersed trains.

The Ridgeway point doesn't quite fit, Truman considered the use of the bomb well before Ridgeway's takeover during the darkest days of the retreat and Ridgeway himself requested nuclear weapons (which was refused), indeed the US was still thinking about the bomb in 1951 when B-29 conducted mock bombing runs. Additionally the US never acted to escalate the conflict despite the handicap of allowing the continued easy intervention of China which resulted in the eventual stalemate. What the previous points show is that the US was not assured that it knew what it was dealing with in terms of the USSR or that it could assure the defeat of the USSR should conflict between the two occur. Escalation into China could have provided the USSR with an excuse to move into Europe which would have decimated Europe, either by the invasion or the nuclear strikes that would have been required to contain it. The SU conventional forces held Europe hostage, deterring any escalation of the crisis by carrying the war to the Chinese homeland, hence why there was never a response (nuclear or conventional) to the Chinese intervention despite persistent consideration of both throughout the war.

I end with a link to a article showing (reassuringly) that some Americans at least are wondering if all those billions of dollars are justified....
http://www.thenation.com/blogs/edcut?pid=295515

[soron]

Trains are relatively expensive to operate but significantly less so than an SLBM, there are many divergences between US/USSR military, just because the US doesn't or did not do it does not make it a bad or unworkable idea and they do have significant advantages over silos which have already been explained. The infrastructure does not tell you which trains carry the missiles, where they are going or where they will be in X-hours from the time the train is spotted. Attacking pre-set targets would be effective against known garrisons but not against dispersed trains.

The MX (LGM-118A) missiles was designed for a "rail garrison" system. However such a system does have several weak spots:
#1 A moving train is constantly putting lateral G-Forces on the missile which might have a negative effect on the missile's frame. It wouldn't be much of a second strike if the missiles would malfunction due to structural stress they encounter during their years long train ride.
#2 While thousands of kilometers of railroad sounds like a good hiding place, in reality it's far less formidable. For example it doesn't really compare to finding a submerged submarine: You just have to surveye the rails, and thanks to radar satelites and computers which can be programmed to look for a certain kind of train, it really wouldn't be that hard for any power whith access to satellites to track the trains in question - far easier in fact than tracking a submarine since the missiles can't leave their track.
#3 Security - An ICMB silo is a pretty safe place to keep a missile out of reach of terrorists. A train - no matter how armored - could be derailed, and that would already take care of a lot of it's defenses.

[Typhoon]

#1 A moving train is constantly putting lateral G-Forces on the missile which might have a negative effect on the missile's frame.

The forces the missile would have to cope with would be reflected in its design and service life, the missile would be continually monitored and maintained during this. Standard practice is to conduct test launches of the missile through its service. On the 11/29/96 a rail mobile SS-24 was tested after a service life of 10+ years, the test was a total success. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA)

You just have to surveye the rails, and thanks to radar satelites and computers which can be programmed to look for a certain kind of train, it really wouldn't be that hard for any power whith access to satellites to track the trains in question -

The trains were built on standard carridges so identification would be very difficult. A synthetic apeture radar from space wouldnt have the resolution to distinquish this, also providing persistant coverage of the lattitudes in which the trains would operate is difficult, since you cannot use a geostationary orbit. These trains can travel up to 1000 km a day and prediction of movement on the network would be impossible.

Security - An ICMB silo is a pretty safe place to keep a missile out of reach of terrorists. A train - no matter how armored - could be derailed, and that would already take care of a lot of it's defenses.

Like silos trains have the advantage of operating deep within your territory, to ambush the train you must first know where it is going, the train would also be accompanied with security forces.

[soron]

Germany's Radar reconnaissance Satellites do have a resolution of "less than 1 m" which would be sufficient to detect a missile of 21.8 m length and 2.3 m diameter inside a boxcar.

So it's possible using existing technology (mind you SAR-Lupe is actually a "low cost" alternative to the more ambitious "Helios" project). I also don't see what advanatage you would have by putting your missiles inside some trains instead of some submarines.
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[Typhoon]

Below is a image showing tanks at a variety of resolutions obtained using SAR, you would certainly be able to spot a train on the tracks, getting enough detail to identify it as an ICBM train is less likely. The radar would be unable to tell you what lurked inside the train as carridges are constucted of metal.

http://www.sandia.gov/radar/images/lynx_tanks.jpg

For a start cost is a very strong advantage for trains vs submarines.

[soron]

Those pictures really don't prove all that much.
First, I am not a expert of overhead imagery, and neither are you I suppose. Somebody with expert knowledge and proper equipment could probably get a lot more information out of them than either of us.
Second, SAR-Lupes abilities are so far unmatched so pictures from our satellites would have a better resolution.
Third, since your pictures are public domain the probability is very high that we don't see what the satellites are really capable of.