Sivad wrote:Many cultures independently converging on certain rational ethical principles, like whatever promotes well-being is good and whatever causes unjustifiable harm is bad, is pretty good evidence for an objective morality.
I do not think that there are many cultures independently converging on certain rational ethical principles, or that this happened in the past.
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Victoribus Spolia wrote:I have given my proofs before, you simply ignore them.
You have. Please note that I was discussing evidence and not proofs.
These are not the same thing.
I don't know how many times I have to say the same thing to you in a different way, but "subjective-morality" is an oxymoron. Morality is not morality if it is subjective because it has no force to bind in lacking a universal or absolute basis that can be called an obligation on others beyond yourself. "subjective" as a term precludes any obligation beyond yourself and morality is about binding obligations upon people in general.
And as I have already pointed out, a universal or absolute basis is not needed in order to obligate others.
And the inter-subjective nature of morality does not preclude an obligation.
Besides the fact that such a ridiculous claim would create implications for fields like science that I don't even think you would agree to, it is also a fact that, logically, this conclusion of yours absolutely does not follow from the premise (non-sequitur), for just because people disagree on something, does not mean that it does not exist. This is even worse when you consider that your actual claim that because two people disagree on the nature of something's existence that it likely doesn't exist at all (which is even MORE fallacious).
Thats like saying because two people disagree as to whether a Panda should be classified in the genus canis or procyon that there is decent chance that the panda doesn't exist at all.
It seems you misunderstood.
Now, if you are making a probability claim (which seems to be the case), that because two people disagree on the nature of something's existence, that there is a decent chance of its non-existence, then like all probability claims you need to explain where you get this relative probability? Perhaps a disagreement as to something's nature is actually a decent case for its existence as the existence of such (objective morality in this case) is not what is being disputed between me and Sivad, but only its nature (your words). Tell me why disagreement on the nature of a thing increases the chances of its non-existence, what statistic did you use to get such a conclusion?
I am comparing your lack of consensus with the consensus of people who agree on actual objective things. When everyone agrees that the thing exists and they all agree on its nature, it almost certainly exists. If people cannot agree something exists and the people who argue it does exist cannot even agree on the nature of the thing, the certainty of the thing existing is significantly less.
I have shown why they are not good justifications, because they are either appeals to individual fancy or attempts to infer obligations from observation (fallacious reasoning).
No, you have not shown why they are not good justifications.
The “appeals to individual fancy” rebuttal ignores the inter-subjective and communal nature of morality, while the “fallacious reasoning” rebuttal comes from your confusion about my demands for evidence.
This really isn't up for dispute, not even in the extreme fringes of moral philosophy. If you treat morality as objective and rational (binding on others because of some reason X), then you must have both a basis for this objective use (binding others), and a reason-X that is not fallaciously derived. I have shown that your approach, no matter how you attempt to construe it, cannot satisfy either conditions. Hence, any moral (and therefore political) claim you make on anyone beyond yourself is either irrational or baseless.
Hence, I have shown why this "assumption" is true. Its simple logic.
You seem to be assuming that the only way morality can be binding on others is if said morality is objective and rational.
History disagrees. Capitalists impose their morality about private property at gunpoint. Authoritarian communists also impose their different morality about private property at gunpoint.
Unless these two moral systems are both objective and rational, your assumption is incorrect.
You have only shown that "beliefs" about morality have come from social norms and that people tend to mimic the behavior of others, you have also presumed evolutionary anthropology without proof, and then made the further claim that how someone evolved to act implies how they should act (which besides being fallacious, would have implications that I doubt you would accept; e.g. patriarchy, racialism, et al.).
All of these claims of yours are merely the observation of human action and does not advance beyond that (an observation of actions). Thus, inferring obligation from any such datum is a fallacy.
You seem to have misunderstood.
I will clarify.
1. I am not sure that there is a difference between having moral beliefs and having a moral system.
2. I have not presumed evolution without proof. Evolution is an observed fact. Darwin’s theory of evolution through natural selection is strongly supported by evidence.
Evolutionary anthropology is not something that needs to be proven. It is simply a term for a number of related scientific fields.
3. I never claimed that we should act as we are evolved to act.
You keep mistakenly assuming I am making moral claims. I am not.
I am discussing how morality came to be, and it would be better to think of it as me making claims
about morality.
4. Again, I am not inferring obligation from anything. I am pointing out that different independent fields of inquiry all lead to the idea that we humans came up with morality as we evolved and developed cultures.
I thought it was subjective?
Subjective and inter-subjective are not the same thing, and inter-subjectivity is basically meaningless in this discussion. All that really means is that a bunch of people decided to follow each other's arbitrary moral preferences without rational justification. That is not morality, that is a social circle-jerk and it does not give you any logical basis to make any claims upon others whatsoever and for the same reasons already discussed.
Dismissing inter-subjectivity is not an argument. The concept is simple and seems to accurately describe the nature of certain phenomena, like money and human rights. And religion.
Anyway, morality is subjective in that it requires sapient minds in order for it to exist. It is intersubjective in that morality is a social or communal relationship that gets developed by people
as a group.
I don't think you understand how axioms work do you? Logic would be axiomatic itself because all arguments (and therefore all conclusions) already assume it in their very formation.
Hence, I would never claim that I could prove logic (which would require me to not-assume it in the premise, which is impossible). I would only claim that it's absolute character was assumed in the very act-of-proving itself (axiomatic).
Thus, the contrary claim against the axiom would require a demonstration without the assumption of the axiom's content (good luck).
So, there is no evidence that logic is absolute and universal.
And you cannot prove it.
You seem to believe it because it suits your favoured methodology. This is similar to arguing that god does not exist because it is methodologically unsound to assume god’s existence in scientific experiments.
No, it only shows why you cannot rationally obligate others given your worldview claims.
Yes, people have opinions, arbitrary beliefs, and preferences.
So there are subjective moralities. We agree on that. Good.
Now, how many objective moralities are there? Is there just one? Are there many?
A non-fallacious logical proof that implies a necessity that is binding upon all, or some grounds that would justify a universal obligation (like a force of coercion that none can escape, etc.).
So the only rational justification for subjective morality you would accept would be for me to show it is actually objective morality.
Now that we have clarified that you have an unreasonable standard for rational justification of a subjective morality, I will ignore this criticism.