How come Americans dislike communism so much? - Page 6 - Politics Forum.org | PoFo

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Why do Americans despise Communism?

It always or almost always leads to dictatorship
19
22%
Capitalism is too ingrained in American Society
8
9%
Cold War Era Mentality
23
26%
Fear of reduced progress
4
5%
They benefit from Capitalism
9
10%
Misconceptions
15
17%
Other
9
10%
#14814451
LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX wrote:Lets not also forget that war is built into the communist ideology. Violent revolution is the foundation of most communist regimes.


I hope you aren't saying you think this is unique or particular to communist movements, since this is true for liberal democracy as well. Capitalism either expands or dies. The imposition of colonial rule continues every time one of "our guys" is installed to power, or we destroy one of myriad elected governments. Violence is exercised against threats to our economic interests, and internally against movements that could reshape our political structure.
#14814475
Capitalism either expands or dies.

Indeed... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Primitive_accumulation_of_capital

Beyond the above, establishing capitalism entailed some very violent revolutions the world over. Which were progressive in the sense that relative to that which was prior to them. They prompted change against that which served as fetters to actualizing certain possibilities.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch01.htm
Spoiler: show
Let us take an example. No philosophical proposition has earned more gratitude from narrow-minded governments and wrath from equally narrow-minded liberals than Hegel’s famous statement: “All that is real is rational; and all that is rational is real.” That was tangibly a sanctification of things that be, a philosophical benediction bestowed upon despotism, police government, Star Chamber proceedings and censorship. That is how Frederick William III and how his subjects understood it. But according to Hegel certainly not everything that exists is also real, without further qualification. For Hegel the attribute of reality belongs only to that which at the same time is necessary: “In the course of its development reality proves to be necessity.” A particular governmental measure — Hegel himself cites the example of “a certain tax regulation” — is therefore for him by no means real without qualification. That which is necessary, however, proves itself in the last resort to be also rational; and, applied to the Prussian state of that time, the Hegelian proposition, therefore, merely means: this state is rational, corresponds to reason, insofar as it is necessary; and if it nevertheless appears to us to be evil, but still, in spite of its evil character, continues to exist, then the evil character of the government is justified and explained by the corresponding evil character of its subjects. The Prussians of that day had the government that they deserved.

Now, according to Hegel, reality is, however, in no way an attribute predictable of any given state of affairs, social or political, in all circumstances and at all times. On the contrary. The Roman Republic was real, but so was the Roman Empire, which superseded it. In 1789, the French monarchy had become so unreal, that is to say, so robbed of all necessity, so irrational, that it had to be destroyed by the Great Revolution, of which Hegel always speaks with the greatest enthusiasm. In this case, therefore, the monarchy was the unreal and the revolution the real. And so, in the course of development, all that was previously real becomes unreal, loses it necessity, its right of existence, its rationality. And in the place of moribund reality comes a new, viable reality — peacefully if the old has enough intelligence to go to its death without a struggle; forcibly if it resists this necessity. Thus the Hegelian proposition turns into its opposite through Hegelian dialectics itself: All that is real in the sphere of human history, becomes irrational in the process of time, is therefore irrational by its very destination, is tainted beforehand with irrationality, and everything which is rational in the minds of men is destined to become real, however much it may contradict existing apparent reality. In accordance with all the rules of the Hegelian method of thought, the proposition of the rationality of everything which is real resolves itself into the other proposition: All that exists deserves to perish.

But precisely therein lay the true significance and the revolutionary character of the Hegelian philosophy (to which, as the close of the whole movement since Kant, we must here confine ourselves), that it once and for all dealt the death blow to the finality of all product of human thought and action. Truth, the cognition of which is the business of philosophy, was in the hands of Hegel no longer an aggregate of finished dogmatic statements, which, once discovered, had merely to be learned by heart. Truth lay now in the process of cognition itself, in the long historical development of science, which mounts from lower to ever higher levels of knowledge without ever reaching, by discovering so-called absolute truth, a point at which it can proceed no further, where it would have nothing more to do than to fold its hands and gaze with wonder at the absolute truth to which it had attained. And what holds good for the realm of philosophical knowledge holds good also for that of every other kind of knowledge and also for practical action. Just as knowledge is unable to reach a complete conclusion in a perfect, ideal condition of humanity, so is history unable to do so; a perfect society, a perfect “state”, are things which can only exist in imagination. On the contrary, all successive historical systems are only transitory stages in the endless course of development of human society from the lower to the higher. Each stage is necessary, and therefore justified for the time and conditions to which it owes its origin. But in the face of new, higher conditions which gradually develop in its own womb, it loses vitality and justification. It must give way to a higher stage which will also in its turn decay and perish. Just as the bourgeoisie by large-scale industry, competition, and the world market dissolves in practice all stable time-honored institutions, so this dialectical philosophy dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth and of absolute states of humanity corresponding to it. For it [dialectical philosophy], nothing is final, absolute, sacred. It reveals the transitory character of everything and in everything; nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher. And dialectical philosophy itself is nothing more than the mere reflection of this process in the thinking brain. It has, of course, also a conservative side; it recognizes that definite stages of knowledge and society are justified for their time and circumstances; but only so far. The conservatism of this mode of outlook is relative; its revolutionary character is absolute — the only absolute dialectical philosophy admits.


There is no moral high ground on which to defend capitalism and why many moral points are moot in that they would require a double standard in which one violence is okay but not another. Which is true to our ideological notions where the cop beating the shit out of some citizen can have state authority when one still retains the view of the legitimacy of the state to do so rather than people to oppose it. The same objective reality but perceived through a different lens based on one's values.
As such, criticism of the means are often obscured rejections of the ends, it emphasizes the means to position itself as not of the same means for different ends even as the maintenance of the status quo requires such a means.
Many more be subject to violence, their lives ruined as a natural consequence of the status quo and it barely registers much of an emotional impact, it's business as usual, but things turn hysterical should someone of a greater position within the system be hurt. Should those with power and influence have their interests threatened.

"No body panics when things goes according to plan. Even if the plan is horrifying. If Tomorrow I tell the press that like a gangbanger will get shot or a truck load of soldiers will be blown up, no one panics. Because it's all, part of the plan. But when I say that one little old mayor will die, well then everyone loses their minds."
Attention should be paid to what occurs in order to see the sort of meaning given to that reality.

Those who wish to side with workers don't subscribe to the morality of a ruling class which would would downplay one's violence but condemn another's.
A great modern example is the struggle of blacks in the US, something beautifully articulated by MLK Jr of the reactionary nature of those that prioritize order and stability over justice.
Thus in practice, they effectively prioritize the status quo and must experience it as legitimate when they oppose any efforts to right the wrongs.
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html
I must make two honest confessions to you, my Christian and Jewish brothers. First, I must confess that over the past few years I have been gravely disappointed with the white moderate. I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro's great stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White Citizen's Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, who is more devoted to "order" than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice; who constantly says: "I agree with you in the goal you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action"; who paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man's freedom; who lives by a mythical concept of time and who constantly advises the Negro to wait for a "more convenient season." Shallow understanding from people of good will is more frustrating than absolute misunderstanding from people of ill will. Lukewarm acceptance is much more bewildering than outright rejection.

I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that law and order exist for the purpose of establishing justice and that when they fail in this purpose they become the dangerously structured dams that block the flow of social progress. I had hoped that the white moderate would understand that the present tension in the South is a necessary phase of the transition from an obnoxious negative peace, in which the Negro passively accepted his unjust plight, to a substantive and positive peace, in which all men will respect the dignity and worth of human personality. Actually, we who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive. We bring it out in the open, where it can be seen and dealt with. Like a boil that can never be cured so long as it is covered up but must be opened with all its ugliness to the natural medicines of air and light, injustice must be exposed, with all the tension its exposure creates, to the light of human conscience and the air of national opinion before it can be cured.

Means are significantly related to the means rather than to be considered in some abstract universalizing morality that is but a reflection of the ideas and interests of a particular class over others.
(See 'Dialectic Interdependence of End and Means' of Trotsky's Their Morals and Ours & 'Means and Ends' in the Marxist Glossary).
And that morality must be grounded rather than some abstract uniuversal, because when the ruling class speaks of 'we', it is to blind the fact that they speak from the perspective of themselves as if it were shared by all. Which is why one must always be suspect of one's use of we, to question the substance of whether there really is a 'we' among you.
https://www.guernicamag.com/john_berger_7_15_11/
The word we, when printed or pronounced on screens, has become suspect, for it’s continually used by those with power in the demagogic claim that they are also speaking for those who are denied power. Let’s talk of ourselves as they...


A simple but intuitive question I think should be posed, and I draw it from Alfred North Whitehead's thoughts.
He [Whitehead] has a strong materialistic sense of history: ‘The great convulsions happen when the economic urge on the masses have dove-tailed with some simplified end.' He also recognizes why 'gradualism' may be insufficient: 'It may be impossible to conceive a reorganization of society adequate for the removal of some admitted evil without destroying the social organization and the civilization which depends on it.' Can war, for example, be eliminated without eliminating an economic system that seems to require war? (History 282)


And I have wondered of this tendency to oppose conflict that is inevitable on the basis of the objective conditions in which we live, that peace and stability are but periods of one holding hegemonic power over another and conflict is what occurs when another group develops another power to challenge another.
And many shy away from this conflict, it hurts their very sense of the world, no doubt violence and war is one of the most ghastly and destructive things for any group of people to experience. But one's aversion to war and conflict doesn't resolve conflicts embedded in the conditions of a society. And I like Evald Ilyenkov's summary of the debates between Machists and Leninist Dialecticians. I think he shows philosophically the sort of perspective that is adopted by some that may, like the white moderate, seem even supportive of progressive development but lack revolutionary character and instead have an evolutionary view of society's progress.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positii.htm
Spoiler: show
The reader has probably already managed to notice how often and persistently the magical word equilibrium is repeated in the quotations from those texts. Yes, here we are dealing not simply with a word, but a genuine symbol – a symbol of faith, a fundamental and key category of the logic of their thinking. No matter where their arguments originate, or where they lead to, they inevitably begin with equilibrium and end with equilibrium.

From their works the reader discovers that equilibrium is not simply or solely an equal balance on the scales with which everyone is familiar from personal experience, but it is something much more important and universal, something metaphysical.

It turns out that this magical concept contains within it both the secret of life and the secrets of the functioning of social organisms, and even the mysteries of all cosmic systems and events. It turns out that all these mysteries, secrets and enigmas are simple and easy. One only has to apply to them the magical 'lock pick' – and they become transparent and simple.

It turns out that the entire infinite Universe strives to achieve equilibrium. Thus the history of mankind, the history of social organisms (people, lands, states and civilisations), is directed towards and yearns for equilibrium.

Immediately, everything becomes clear: both the condition of economic and political relations and the organisational principle of the living body of the frog, and the direction of the evolution of the solar system.

It is remarkable that in not one of the works of the Machists will we find an intelligible explanation of the meaning of this word. They all prefer to explain it by means of examples. But throughout the entire system of such examples, the actual meaning of this 'empirio-symbol' clearly shines through: it is first of all a state of inviolable rest and immobility. It is the absence of any noticeable changes or deviations, the absence of motion.

Equilibrium means the absence of any state of conflict, of any contradictions whatsoever, i.e. of forces which pull in different, contradictory directions. And where is this seen? You will never see such a state, even in the shop, even in the example of the scales. Even here equilibrium is only a passing result, an ephemeral effect, which is achieved at precisely that moment because two opposing forces are directed at each end of the lever: one presses upward, and the other presses downward.

In the Russian language, equilibrium means: 'A state of immobility, of rest, in which a body is under the influence of equal and opposing forces.' But according to the logic of Machism, the presence of opposing forces exerting pressure at one point (or on one body) is already a bad state of affairs. It resembles the state which is designated in Hegelian language as contradiction, as 'a body's state of discomfort', in which two opposing forces exert pressure, either squeezing the body from two opposite sides or tearing it in half.

Such an understanding of equilibrium is therefore unacceptable for the Machists. How could it possibly be that equilibrium turns out to be only the passing and quickly disappearing result of contradiction, the result of the action of opposites applied at one point, i.e. the very state which every living organism tries to escape as soon as possible, and by no means the state which it supposedly is striving to achieve.

Here then arises the concept of equilibrium which the Machists want to counterpose to contradiction, which is the presence of two opposing forces. It is a state in which two opposing forces have ceased to exist and therefore no longer squeeze or tear apart the ideal body (or the equally ideal point of their application). The forces have ceased to exist and have disappeared, but the state which they have established at a given point still remains. Equilibrium is a state of this kind. A state characterised by the absence of any opposing forces whatsoever, be they internal or external, physical or psychic.

In this form, equilibrium is the ideal. It is the ideal model of the cosmos and the psychics, the fundamental philosophical category of Machism, and the starting point of Machist arguments about the cosmos, about history, and about thinking. The aspiration to escape once and for all from all contradictions whatsoever from whatever kind of opposing forces, is the striving for equilibrium.

In addition to all the rest, equilibrium finds under these conditions all the characteristics which ancient philosophy describes with the words 'inner goal', 'objective goal', and 'immanent goal'. According to Machist logic, equilibrium is by no means a real state, given in experience, even if in passing, but only the ideal and the goal of nature, man, and being in general.

Such an equilibrium is static, complete, disturbed by nothing, an equilibrium of rest, an equilibrium of immobility, a state of 'suspension in the cosmic void'. It is the ideal model of the Machist Bogdanovian concept of equilibrium.

Simply put, they reject the dialectical view in which things are in conflict and instead idealized a sort of passive equilibrium, ignoring that such a state exists in tensions.
And I wonder if this is inevitably a result of the sort of linear view of causality prominent among many un-dialectical thinkers (at least in the simplest sense of what dialecticalism can be summarized as).
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/spirkin/works/dialectical-materialism/ch02-s06.html
The cause-effect connection can be conceived as a one-way, one-directional action only in the simplest and most limited cases. The idea of causality as the influence of one thing on another is applied in fields of knowledge where it is possible and necessary to ignore feedback and actually measure the quantitative effect achieved by the cause. Such a situation is mostly characteristic of mechanical causality. For example, the cause of a stone falling to the ground is mutual gravitation, which obeys the law of universal gravitation, and the actual fall of the stone to the ground results from gravitational interaction. However, since the mass of the stone is infinitely small compared with the mass of the earth, one can ignore the stone's effect on the earth. So ultimately we come to the notion of a one-way effect with only one body (the earth) operating as the active element, while the other (the stone) is passive. In most cases, however, such an approach does not work because things are not inert, but charged with internal activity. Therefore, in experiencing effect they in their turn act on their cause and the resulting action is not one-way but an interaction.

It's basically a sort of abstract thinking that is distant from considering the world, its a mentality that has detached itself from the concrete. I should know in that I actually have a significant tendency to block things out in order to maintain an illusion of peace and this illusion is quite destructive in it's neglect, it's passivity, it's lack of confrontation to find resolution to problems.
History shows people acting in confrontation with problems that act on their lives.
http://www2.oberlin.edu/external/EOG/BlackHistoryMonth/MLK/CommAddress.html
Somewhere we must come to see that human progress never rolls in on wheels of inevitability. It comes through the tireless efforts and the persistent work of dedicated individuals. Without this hard work, time becomes an ally of the primitive forces of social stagnation. So we must help time and realize that the time is always right to do right.

There is always a struggle, always conflicts and confrontation and it's not guaranteed that things won't turn simply into barbarism. But such chaos and crisis is also the opportunity for progressive developments in overcoming fetters of human potential. If not, then what were the bourgeoisie revolutions if they were not progressive developments. One would then reject all that has developed under capitalism presumably and turn into some sort of anti/post-modernist that seems self destructive.
#14814494
Another good reason for disliking communism is that those that self-identify as communists are generally obnoxious and obtuse. Americans in particular value courtesy and plain-speaking, consequently if there is nothing to like in the ambassador's of communism it is not a unrealistic assumption to think there is also something unlikeable in their belief system.

Whether the belief system adversely affects character or the belief system attracts people of a certain disposition is something to ponder.
#14816434
Communism, i.e. financial and economic equality of people, is one of the core demands of the Bible. As such its a very old concept of mankind and it will thus be tried again.

Cant speak of the US people as I'm not living there. But those who have priviledges over others tend to fight for those priviledges. A communist society wouldnt have any priviledges of single people over others.
#14817444
Negotiator wrote:Cant speak of the US people as I'm not living there. But those who have priviledges over others tend to fight for those priviledges. A communist society wouldnt have any priviledges of single people over others.


It would have some people being privileged over others because the lazy and the stupid would have privileges over the diligent and the smart. Also because privileges incentivise people communist privileges would incentivise people to become stupid and lazy. And this is the real reason communists say communism must be global to work because if one part of the world is incentivising laziness and stupidity while other parts are not then the communist part of the world will eventually fail in comparison with the non-communist parts of the world. USSR vs the rest of the world being an example of that.
#14817447
Other: Because this nation was formed based on an ideology other than Communism and we don't feel the need to change, especially since every attempt at forming a Communist nation has resulted in 10s of millions of people being slaughtered when they don't agree with it, and/or have ultimately imploded upon itself and become something other than a Communist nation. Bottom line: Communism is a wonderful thing in THEORY, but in every case, the PRACTICAL application has been a total disaster.
#14817456
Other: communism manages at the same time to ignore human nature and pretend it can mandate changes to it. It doesn't survive five minutes of honest scrutiny. Luckily for communists, most people are economically ignorant, 'cause that's the only milieu in which it makes any sense.
#14817461
Hey Joe long time no see.

Americans disliking communism in the emotional sense is a holdover from the cold war. Ideological disagreements with fuedalism don't generate nearly as much antipathy.
#14817463
mikema63 wrote:Hey Joe long time no see.

Americans disliking communism in the emotional sense is a holdover from the cold war. Ideological disagreements with fuedalism don't generate nearly as much antipathy.


Why should anybody in his right mind not dislike the concentration camps, the GULAG-System, the genocide against own people?

You can be tolerant to this ideology, if you or your relatives/ancestors were not among the victims of this ideology.

Commie-Ideology killed more civilians even before Fascists and National Socialists came to power, and they got a chance only because of the Commie-Threat in Italy and Germany.
#14817469
Joe Liberty wrote:Other: communism manages at the same time to ignore human nature and pretend it can mandate changes to it. It doesn't survive five minutes of honest scrutiny. Luckily for communists, most people are economically ignorant, 'cause that's the only milieu in which it makes any sense.

The appeal to human nature is often an empty one in that the common conception of human nature is an ahuistorical one.
https://monthlyreview.org/2012/07/01/some-theoretical-implications/
Spoiler: show
Thus as the theological solution of the dilemma became untenable in the age of the scientific revolution and the advancing Enlightenment, bourgeois thought made an attempt to salvage the vitally important concept of the autonomous individual independent of society by freeing it of all religious connotations and placing it on a more rational, more scientific basis. It put into its place what was taken to be a biological and psychological fact: human nature. Comprising a bundle of physical traits and psychic instincts of the human species, human nature was postulated as invariant, and thus able to serve as a constant, universally agreed upon standard for judging the efficacy of any economic and social organization. This view which evolved in the age when the foundations of bourgeois ideology were laid, is probably best summarized in the statement of Hume: “Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of nothing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal principles of human nature.”xvii It is echoed in a remark of Voltaire: “Man in general has always been what he is. This does not mean that he has always had fine cities and so on: but he has always had the same instinct…”

To be sure, the history of thought on this subject displays a wide variety of opinions on the specific properties and what constitutes human nature, and to those who considered it to be essentially “good,” the thesis of its invariance served as a basis for both social criticism and the construction of schemes of ideal social organizations in which the “true” human nature would be allowed to come into its own.xviii Bourgeois economics, on the other hand, travelled a different course, and following the first major exponents of bourgeois-liberal thought, identified human nature “in general” with that of the man born, reared and living in the capitalist society.

No less than later on with Bentham who, as Marx observed, “with the driest naiveté…takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper as the normal man,”xix do Hobbes and Locke equate the nature of man with that of their contemporaries in the already essentially capitalist England.xx If Hobbes “to get the state of nature…has set aside law, but not the socially acquired behaviour and desires of men,” Locke was “generalizing some attributes of seventeenth-century society and man as attributes of pre-civil society and of man as such.” And if Hobbes hypostatized the capitalist society and the capitalist man into a “natural” society and a “natural” man, Locke went so far as to “attribute to the state of nature a commercial economy, developed to the point where large estates (of thousands of acres) are privately appropriated for the production of commodities for profitable sale.”xxi xix Marx, Capital, Volume 1, Chapter 24, Section 5.xx Sir John Clapham, A Concise Economic History of Britain from Earliest Times to 1750, Cambridge, 1949, p. 13.xxi C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford 1962, pp. 22, 216, and 229. This incisive study is an invaluable contribution to understanding the foundations of bourgeois political and economic thought.

This simple view of the matter could hardly be maintained, however, in the light of accumulating anthropological and psychological evidence. For while changes in human attitudes towards many aspects of life have come about slowly and unevenly, today there can be no doubt that the most far-reaching transformation of human characters, propensities, tastes, and habits have taken place in the course of history. The postulate of an invariant human nature coinciding with the nature of capitalist man is thus no more tenable than that of an individual governed by the will of God.

As a consequence, the present position of economics in this regard is more sophisticated. Eschewing unsupportable ontological assertions, it seeks now to preserve the traditional doctrine by casting it into the form of a useful working hypothesis. Without questioning the occurrence of important changes of men in the course of historical development, it insists on the permissibility, or, indeed, necessity of abstracting from such historic specificities, and on the concentration on what all men have had—and therefore must be expected to retain—in common.xxii These common traits are treated then as the essential elements of human nature, or, at any rate, as those that primarily matter to economic thought. The strength of this approach lies in the fact that there are in all probability some aspects of economic behavior that men have had in common regardless of the socioeconomic formation in which they have lived. “Yet,”—as Marx already noted—“if the most highly developed languages have laws and characteristics in common with the most undeveloped ones, then we must above all single out what constitutes their development, the deviation from the common and the universal. This…must be segregated so that the essential diversity is not forgotten in view of the unity which indeed derives from the fact that the subject, mankind, and the object, nature, are the same. Forgetting this diversity, for instance, comprises the entire wisdom of modern economists who propound the eternity and harmony of existing social relations.”xxiii 1
[spoiler]
Marx overcomes their limitation by positing both a universal and historically specific aspect of human nature, where the intuitive parts of human nature that are universal are our base drives, but these are mediated through historically contingent and social means as man is not simply an animal without reason and his reason is developed in relation to his society.
[spoiler]
https://www.marxists.org/archive/mikhailov/works/riddle/riddle3a.htm
Here is a case in point, based on documentary fact. A normal child with all the means of perception that we have in common with the animals was lost and for a time lived with a pack of wild animals. It lost the ability to perceive things that any normal human being would notice immediately and stopped developing as a personality. On the other hand, another child, Olga Skorokhodova, lost her sight, hearing and speech because of illness, but thanks to the efforts of those who in the given case represented the socio-historical experience of generations she later grew up to become a poet and a scientist, a truly creative personality. The story is told in her book, How I Perceive, Imagine and Understand the World Around Me.

The mentality of social man differs from that of the animal not because of any immanent, innate “additions”, but thanks to that which in general distinguishes one person’s inner world from another’s – their external world, the world around them, their being. It is in being that one must look for the qualitative difference between human and animal mentality.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/mikhailov/works/riddle/riddle3b.htm
In man, on the other hand, we encounter a diametrically opposite mode of inheritance. Man inherits part of the “species programme” of life-activity, but the greater part (and precisely the specifically human part) is geared into the “mechanisms” of his life by his mastering the objectified means of culture in intercourse with other people. He even develops his bodily needs and abilities in the process of mastering the historical ways and means of activity and intercourse, such as the need for communication, for prepared food, for “instruments” to consume it with, for objects that provide for the human functioning of his organs, creating the conditions for normal sleep, rest, labour, and so on. And, particularly important, the infinitely diverse and infinitely developing means of realising the inherited “programmes” of life-activity are acquired only in the form of the socially significant instruments of activity and intercourse created by the labour of previous generations.

Academician N. P. Dubinin writes: “The possibilities of human cultural growth are endless. This growth is not imprinted in the genes. It is quite obvious that if the children of contemporary parents were deprived from birth of the conditions of contemporary culture, they would remain at the level of our most remote ancestors who lived tens of thousands of years ago. Whereas the children of such “primitive people” placed in the conditions of contemporary culture would rise to the heights of contemporary man.” [2]

https://www.marxists.org/archive/fromm/works/1961/man/ch04.htm
Marx did not believe, as do many contemporary sociologists and psychologists, that there is no such thing as the nature of man; that man at birth is like a blank sheet of paper, on which the culture writes its text. Quite in contrast to this sociological relativism, Marx started out with the idea that man qua man is a recognizable and ascertainable entity; that man can be defined as man not only biologically, anatomically and physiologically, but also psychologically.

Of course, Marx was never tempted to assume that "human nature" was identical with that particular expression of human nature prevalent in his own society. In arguing against Bentham, Marx said: "To know what is useful for a dog, one must study dog nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticize all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch." [22] It must be noted that this concept of human nature is not, for Marx -- as it was not either for Hegel -an abstraction. It is the essence of man -- in contrast to the various forms of his historical existence -- and, as Marx said, "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each separate individual." [23] It must also be stated that this sentence from Capital, written by the "old Marx," shows the continuity of the concept of man's essence ( Wesen) which the young Marx wrote about in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. He no longer used the term "essence" later on, as being abstract and unhistorical, but he clearly retained the notion of this essence in a more historical version, in the differentiation between "human nature in general" and "human nature as modified" with each historical period.

In line with this distinction between a general human nature and the specific expression of human nature in each culture, Marx distinguishes, as we have already mentioned above, two types of human drives and appetites: the constant or fixed ones, such as hunger and the sexual urge, which are an integral part of human nature, and which can be changed only in their form and the direction they take in various cultures, and the "relative" appetites, which are not an integral part of human nature but which "owe their origin to certain social structures and certain conditions of production and communication." [24] Marx gives as an example the needs produced by the capitalistic structure of society. "The need for money," he wrote in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, "is therefore the real need created by the modern economy, and the only need which it creates.... This is shown subjectively, partly in the fact that the expansion of production and of needs becomes an ingenious and always calculating subservience to inhuman, depraved, unnatural, and imaginary appetites." [25]

Man's potential, for Marx, is a given potential; man is, as it were, the human raw material which, as such, cannot be changed, just as the brain structure has remained the same since the dawn of history. Yet, man does change in the course of history; he develops himself; he transforms himself, he is the product of history; since he makes his history, he is his own product. History is the history of man's self-realization; it is nothing but the self-creation of man through the process of his work and his production: "the whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human labor, and the emergence of nature for man; he therefore has the evident and irrefutable proof of his self-creation, of his own origins." [26]

And human nature isn't to be one sidedly thought of as purely biological or social as posed in modern dilemma of nature versus nurture, where the ontology of human nature is biosocial. Which is intuitive enough for people yet they can't resolve this matter with an integrated view as they have necessarily fragmented the self into two spheres already into particulars.
Spoiler: show
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/spirkin/works/dialectical-materialism/ch05-s02.html
When discussing biological factors, one should not reduce them to the genetic. More attention should be given to the physiological and ontogenetic aspects of development, and particularly to those that evoke a pathological effect, for it is these that modify the biology of the human being, who is also beginning to perceive even social factors in quite a different way. Dialectics does not simply put the social and the biological factors on an equal footing and attribute the human essence to the formula of biotropic-sociotropic determination favoured by some scientists. It stresses the dominant role of the social factors. Nor does dialectics accept the principles of vulgar sociologism, which ignores the significance of the biological principle in man.

As the highest intelligent being, man is the focal point of all forms of the motion of matter. They are represented in him hierarchically, and the highest ultimately guiding and regulative factor is the social, to which all other forms are subordinate. In other words a human being embodies and sums up, as it were, the whole development of the universe.

https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/essays/essay2.htm
We formulated this problem in the preceding essay. Spinoza found a very simple solution to it, brilliant in its simplicity for our day as well as his: the problem is insoluble only because it has been wrongly posed. There is no need to rack one’s brains over how the Lord God ‘unites’ ‘soul’ (thought) and ‘body’ in one complex, represented initially (and by definition) as different and even contrary principles allegedly existing separately from each other before the ‘act’ of this ‘uniting’ (and thus, also being able to exist after their ‘separation’; which is only another formulation of the thesis of the immortality of the soul, one of the cornerstones of Christian theology and ethics). In fact, there simply is no such situation; and therefore there is also no problem of ‘uniting’ or ‘co-ordination’.

There are not two different and originally contrary objects of investigation body and thought, but only one single object, which is the thinking body of living, real man (or other analogous being, if such exists anywhere in the Universe), only considered from two different and even opposing aspects or points of view. Living, real thinking man, the sole thinking body with which we are acquainted, does not consist of two Cartesian halves ‘thought lacking a body’ and a ‘body lacking thought’. In relation to real man both the one and the other are equally fallacious abstractions, and one cannot in the end model a real thinking man from two equally fallacious abstractions.

That is what constitutes the real ‘keystone’ of the whole system, a very simple truth that is easy, on the whole, to understand.

It is not a special ‘soul’, installed by God in the human body as in a temporary residence, that thinks, but the body of man itself. Thought is a property, a mode of existence, of the body, the same as its extension, i.e. as its spatial configuration and position among other bodies.

This simple and profoundly true idea was expressed this way by Spinoza in the language of his time: thought and extension are not two special substances as Descartes taught, but only two attributes of one and the same organ; not two special objects, capable of existing separately and quite independently of each other, but only two different and even opposite aspects under which one and the same thing appears, two different modes of existence, two forms of the manifestation of some third thing.


Human nature is an important concept for someone like Marx is it's based on their conception of it that one argues for the ethics of a concrete freedom for humans being that which realizes their nature. And one problematic assumption of the typical modern view of human nature is its assumption of egoism.
Spoiler: show
http://isj.org.uk/marxism-and-ethics/
The Marxist philosopher Lucien Goldmann, commenting on Hegel’s claim, suggests a more general weakness with modern moral theories. He argues that “it is not Kant’s ethic which is an empty form but that of actual man in bourgeois individualist society”. By assuming bourgeois individualism Kant is compelled to conclude that the universal moral community posited by the categorical imperative can only exist at a formal rather than at a real level. For him, our very nature causes our needs and desires to be those of atomised, competitive individuals, and so he could conceive of no social basis for acting as he believed we should, except by way of some duty which pulls against those needs and desires.31 Other bourgeois moral theories, by assuming an egoistic model of human nature, are just as incapable of envisaging a way of overcoming the gap between our individual needs and desires on the one hand, and the reality that we live in a social world on the other.
...
A consequence of this assumption is brought out in Marx’s critique of Max Stirner’s anarchism. In The Ego and His Own (1844) Stirner set out to deny the “truth” of concepts such as nation, state, god, humanity, etc, which had up to that point, he claimed, ruled over individuals through the mechanism of moral ideology. He dismissed any movement, including communism, which sought to overcome egoism as but a new version of authoritarian moralism.50 In a devastating critique of this argument Marx argued that Stirner was unable to conceptualise community except as a moral imposition upon individuals because he believed that modern egoism was a universal fact of human nature.51 This assumption informed Stirner’s belief that the concept of workers’ solidarity was “quite incomprehensible”. By contrast, Marx showed that because egoistic and more social forms of individualism had emerged in the modern world, morality, as it was understood by Stirner, was an essential authoritarian characteristic only of bourgeois communities. Alternatively, Marx argued, because solidarity had become a real need for workers, there was no need to impose the idea of community on them. This is why, in stark contrast to modern liberal criticisms of the implicit authoritarianism of his ideas,52 he claimed that “communists do not preach morality”.53

Marx insists that it is a mistake to reduce all modern forms of individualism to the egoistic type. Collective revolts against capital expose the limitations of the liberal concept of freedom while expressing the deep, shared and growing need for solidarity that could provide a concrete content to a new form of social individuality. It is from this perspective that he concretises the abstract idea of freedom by asking “Whose freedom?”54

As against the standard textbook caricature of his ideas as crudely materialist, Marx does not deny the concept of human freedom. Rather he exposes liberalism’s treatment of the unfreedoms of capitalist society as ordained by nature. Indeed, the concept of human freedom is a major theme of both his early and his mature work. Thus in the Grundrisse he defined freedom as a process through which “social individuals” come to realise themselves through their labours.55 Similarly, in Capital he argued:

Freedom…can consist only in this, that socialised man, the associated producers, govern the human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their common control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power.56

In fact “the central theme of Marx’s moral theory is how to realise human freedom”.57 Concretely, he points to the way that the meaning of freedom evolves over time through a process of collective struggles that are best understood against the background of the development of humanity’s productive forces.58 This should in no way be read as evidence that Marx reduced freedom to economic growth, for he insists that “although an individual cannot become free in isolation from others, nonetheless it is only individuals who are free”.59

To further elaborate on the assumption of egoism
http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Ferguson.pdf
On the basis of dialectical materialism, Marx refused to accept the view that the individual can be studied scientifically abstracted from social relations. Criticizing the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx remarks, “But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.” 27 Individuals, for Marx, are by necessity social beings. By viewing the individual as a social being, Marx does not negate our individuality. Rather (unlike the aggregate theories of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke and Adam Smith) a scientific materialist approach begins with social relations as explanans and individuality as explanandum. 28 Who we are, as individuals, is derivative and explained by the character of social relations in which we are enmeshed. In this connection, Marx comments

The more deeply we go back in history, the more does the individual, and hence also the producing individual, appear as dependent, as belonging to a greater whole. . . . The human being is in the most literal sense a political animal, not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society. 29

Criticizing the abstract individualism grounding liberal political theory, Marx further comments

Individuals producing in a society, and hence the socially determined production of individuals, is of course the point of departure. The solitary and isolated hunter or fisherman, who serves Adam Smith and Ricardo as a starting-point, is one of the unimaginative conceits of eighteenth-century Robinsonades; and despite the assertion of social historians, these by no means signify simply a reaction against over-refinement and reversion to a misconceived natural life. As little as Rousseau’s contrat social, which brings naturally independent, autonomous subjects into relations and contract, rests on such naturalism . . . [t]his is . . . nothing but the aesthetic illusion of the small and big Robinsonades. It is, on the contrary, the anticipation of ‘civil society’, which began to evolve in the sixteenth century and in the eighteenth century made giant strides toward maturity. 30

What becomes central in defining the individual as a social being is the ensemble of social relations which the individual is a part of. Material existence (being) is social existence, an ensemble of social relations where the primary relation is the material relations of production. Social being as social relations in addition to determining consciousness molds it in its own image, i.e. consciousness is social consciousness. The assertion that consciousness is social consciousness and existence is social existence does not negate the reality of individual existence and consciousness; however, the social sets an enclosure, a limit, a finity for being and consciousness as determinate individuality. This determinate individuality is a category dependent on and determined by the social.

http://understandingsociety.blogspot.com.au/2011/08/possessive-individualism.html
http://www.toqonline.com/archives/v7n4/743BenoistLiberalismrevised.pdf


The egoistic view of human nature is more clearly faulty and is merely a reflection of the ideology of the capitalist class in a very abstract (distant from the reality, ignoring many real world details).
http://clogic.eserver.org/2007/Ferguson.pdf
Spoiler: show
Bourgeois equality of rights and the corresponding democratic institutions are the general political expression of the most simple and abstract aspect of capitalist commodity production. All the conceptions and ideas of freedom, equality, justice and humanism are based on the declaration of the equality of every person as commodity owner, which blurs the exploitation of labor by capital. Bourgeois democracy is the legal replica of the commodity form of the capitalist economic system. When Marx examines capitalism as a mode of production at the level of the circulation of commodities, he finds that it is essentially an exchange of equivalents. Since the magnitude of commodities dictates an equal exchange, with reference to their socially necessary labor-time, the presence of the appearance is no simple chimera. In fact, workers and capitalists “meet in the market, and deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with this difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law.” 34

The capitalist meets the worker in the market as a free laborer in the double sense that (1) the laborer is unencumbered by relations of legal ownership (as in slavery) or obligation (as in serfdom) to an individual capitalist and is therefore free to sell his or her labor-power for a time to any buyer, and (2) the laborer is freed or separated from ownership of the means of production, and therefore has nothing to sell but his or her labor-power. In this sense, labor-power is a commodity freely exchanged in the market like all other commodities. Consequently, freedom and equality reign within the sphere of the exchange of commodities. Each seller of a commodity confronts as equal every buyer, each equal as seller or buyer before the laws of the market which dictate that equivalent is exchanged for equivalent, value is exchanged for equal value. Marx ironically writes,

This sphere [of simple circulation or of exchange of commodities] . . . within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each other, is the selfishness, the gain and private interests of each. Each looks to himself only, and no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance with the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, work together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all. 35

So, the semblance of equality at the level of the market (or what Marx refers to as the circulation of commodities) acts as a façade concealing the exploitation which occurs in the sphere of production. By developing the law of value beyond the limitations of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, Marx was able to explain the relationship between the proletariat and bourgeoisie according to this law. By distinguishing labor from laborpower, Marx revealed that bourgeois class relations are grounded in the exploitation of labor during the productive process


And so I think it's the view of human nature in it's egoist isolation that is the truly abstract kind and thus faulty, an ideological obscurity that seeks only to legimtize itself rather for apologetic sake than come to a more approximate understand of humans.
#14817483
mikema63 wrote:Americans disliking communism in the emotional sense is a holdover from the cold war. Ideological disagreements with fuedalism don't generate nearly as much antipathy.


No it isn't. As I said, can you or the Communists on this board name one time in history where a Country attempted Communism that didn't ultimately fail in under a centery AND/OR didn't lead to tens of millions of people being killed of imprisioned for long periods of time in harsh conditions for daring to question their government?

As far as fuedalism, not one here (that I can tell) is talking about having the United States become a feudal nation, so that part of your comment is nothing but a red herring.
#14817528
I'm okay with sharing resources, even forced sharing of resources. What I don't agree with is class warfare, central planning, and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Might just be a simple matter of us vs. them at play as well, because I might be on the other side if I saw I could gain something from communism. Those that are most in favor of it tend to be those with the most to gain, like workers, students, teachers, and intellectuals. Professionals, businessmen, salesmen, people generally considered to be bougeoisie or petty bourgeoisie tend to favor capitalism, and they tend to be more politically represented than those at the bottom of the pyramid.

That doesn't mean that I don't think we should provide for those at the bottom, but I don't think that seizing property and taking lives is the way to do it.
#14817533
LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX wrote: Those that are most in favor of it tend to be those with the most to gain, like workers, students, teachers, and intellectuals.
^

Are you serious?
Do you really believe that workers had anything to say in any Commie country?
Do you believe that intellectuals, students or teachers had any freedom in any Commie country?

Oh boy....
#14817584
No it isn't. As I said, can you or the Communists on this board name one time in history where a Country attempted Communism that didn't ultimately fail in under a centery AND/OR didn't lead to tens of millions of people being killed of imprisioned for long periods of time in harsh conditions for daring to question their government?


You know that your own nation was founded on a continent wide genocide right? You know it incarcerates more people per capita than the Soviet Union ever did and that this mass imprisonment seems to mainly link to how dark an individuals skin in? People in glass houses really shouldn't throw stones.
#14817658
ArtAllm wrote:^

Are you serious?
Do you really believe that workers had anything to say in any Commie country?
Do you believe that intellectuals, students or teachers had any freedom in any Commie country?

Oh boy....

No, but they believed they had something to gain. Which is what I said. I am of course speaking historically. You think that the soldiers for the communists sprung from nowhere? No, they fought for the cause of their own free will. You can't dismiss that as propaganda. People who don't like communism think communists are evil, but just like any other ideology, its proponents usually have something to gain from supporting it.

I simply listed a few groups off the top of my head who have supported communism or socialism in the past. I feel that their support for communism was based off the belief that it would benefit society. I don't think communists immediately fall in the category of bloodlust for bourgeoisie scum. It's more nuanced than that.
#14817660
LV-GUCCI-PRADA-FLEX wrote: People who don't like communism think communists are evil, but just like any other ideology, its proponents usually have something to gain from supporting it.
I simply listed a few groups off the top of my head who have supported communism or socialism in the past.


Well, most of them were just fooled. The workers were told that they will own the factories, the peasants were told that they will own the land, the soldiers were told that there will be no officers and no military discipline. The poor were told that there will be no poor and no rich. Even the inmates of jails were told that there will be no jails. And yes, Communists talked a lot about "freedom", "brotherhood", "equality" and "love".

How can you resist these lies?
And some low-IQ-people still fall in this Utopian trap.

You have to look objectively who really gained from Communism, and in this case this was a tiny minority.
Communists killed way more innocent civilians before WWII, than National Socialists did, which is the best prove that Communists had more enemies in their own countries, than National Socialists did.

In other words Communists acted against the interests of a huge majority, their entire ideology was based on blatant lies, and that speaks volumes!
#14821518
ArtAllm wrote:Communists killed way more innocent civilians before WWII, than National Socialists did, which is the best prove that Communists had more enemies in their own countries, than National Socialists did.

What a throwaway post.

First of all, National Socialists only got going on the "killing innocent civilians" route during WW2.

Secondly, many of the "innocent" civilians that communists were forced to kill weren't innocent at all. They were the beneficiaries of the income inequality that was bleeding their societies dry and destroying social harmony. Good riddance to these douchebags.
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