We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and for ever immutable ethical law on the pretext that the moral world, too, has its permanent principles which stand above history and the differences between nations. We maintain on the contrary that all moral theories have been hitherto the product, in the last analysis, of the economic conditions of society obtaining at the time. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality has always been class morality; it has either justified the domination and the interests of the ruling class, or ever since the oppressed class became powerful enough, it has represented its indignation against this domination and the future interests of the oppressed. That in this process there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, no one will doubt. But we have not yet passed beyond class morality. A really human morality which stands above class antagonisms and above any recollection of them becomes possible only at a stage of society which has not only overcome class antagonisms but has even forgotten them in practical life. And now one can gauge Herr Dühring’s presumption in advancing his claim, from the midst of the old class society and on the eve of a social revolution, to impose on the future classless society an eternal morality independent of time and changes in reality. Even assuming — what we do not know up to now — that he understands the structure of the society of the future at least in its main outlines.
Don't often see anyone engage specifically with Marx's conception of human nature
except in a vague implicit sense of asserting it somehow incompatiable.
One which can criticize things on their ill fit with the social nature of human beings but can also express how they can express themselves in historically particular ways which are still alienated from the human essence.
For Marx, essence and essentialism are distinct but united. Essentialism, however, must fundamentally play a role in how we are to view man’s essence at a given time. Essence is also to be expressed by man’s adaptation to his material circumstances, which are regionally unique and historically changing. Thus, we must blend the rigidness of essentialism and its expression against the backdrop of the socio-political society man finds himself in. In so doing, these constant phrases of man “developing” and “transforming” his “human nature” and/or “human essence,” reach a synthesis. Man’s essentialism is developed and most importantly expressed differently, not because it itself is different, but because circumstances, social relations, material factors, etc., are different.
Thus, the missing link between a constant Marxian human nature and this contrary view held by the previously mentioned authors is expression. How human nature is expressed in a particular socio-economic environment is going to be a part of the total essence of man. No matter what mode of production we view man in, his human nature remains an essential component of his capabilities and needs, but its expression can be alienated, mitigated, or flourishing. The essence of man must consider the expression of human nature in conjunction with other socio-economic particulars of a given historical moment (i.e., dialectically).
If his conception of human nature isn't understood then one can't understand his theory of alienation and how it is given a concrete form in his later works when he no longer uses the term alienation but remains the lynchpin of his theorizing.
The act of quoting someone is distinct from whether or not someone aptly understands the quote.
There is an implicit and common point taught in academia that one should use one's own words to express the ideas of others but cite the source as it illustrate more clearly that one understands.
But the idea of independent thought if it's to be considered as thinking up something on your own doesn't register as an improvement upon reading the thoughts of those who are often smarter than us and have devoted a life time to understanding certain issues/topics.
The idea being why re-invent the wheel when you can simply learn how to make it. Similarly, it's faster to learn from those as opposed to try and come up with such wisdom ourselves.
To which the reason we find such quotes compelling is not that they simply illustrate points we wish to make, but that in some way, their words resonate with us. One is disproportionately bound to find the truths that correspond to their felt sense of reality generally.https://www.marxists.org/archive/ilyenkov/works/positive/positi.htm
Of course, the thinking of people is formed first of all not by teachers and philosophers, but by the real conditions of their lives. http://home.mira.net/~andy/works/fichte.htm
As Fichte said, the kind of philosophy you choose depends upon the type of person you are. Everyone is attracted to a philosophy which corresponds to the already formed image of his own thinking. He finds in it a mirror which fully presents everything that earlier existed in the form of a vague tendency, an indistinctly expressed allusion. A philosophical system arms the thinking (consciousness) of the individual with self-consciousness, i.e. with a critical look at oneself as if it were from the side, or from the point of view of the experience common to all mankind, of the experience of the history of thinking.
Fichte insisted that it was necessary to found science on a single principle, but held that such a first principle cannot be derived by philosophical means. Whether you choose a given principle to be the founding principle of your theory of knowledge or not “depends on what sort of person you are” he said. The choice of a theory of knowledge is therefore also an ethical act.https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/johann-fichte/#3
It must be granted that the truth of the Wissenschaftslehre's starting point cannot be established by any philosophical means, including its utility as a philosophical first principle. On the contrary—and this is one of Fichte's most characteristic and controversial claims—one already has to be convinced, on wholly extra-philosophical grounds, of the reality of one's own freedom before one can enter into the chain of deductions and arguments that constitute the Wissenschaftslehre. This is the meaning of Fichte's oft-cited assertion that “the kind of philosophy one chooses depends upon the kind of person one is.”
Which is why it's difficult to engage in certain lines of thought and topics because of reflexive dislikes
as opposed to curiosity.