Rugoz wrote:Change implies causation.
Change implies
sequence, which is nothing more than a correlation-observed-through-time, which is why inferring causation from either correlation (which are contemporaneous relationships) or sequence (over time) are both similarly fallacious
[cum hoc ergo propter hoc OR
post hoc ergo propter hoc].
Rugoz wrote:According to you causation can never be proven ever, so we might as well stop talking about it.
Yes, we should stop talking about physical causation, you are correct and
@Potemkin, is right-on with this.
There is no proof for a physical cause because it is impossible for a finite being to establish from an observed correlation or sequence
that the relationship has a necessity inherit in it,
for this would require a universal knowledge of all instances to guarantee the relationship universally obtained (omnipresence).However, this is a problem only between correlation/sequence and causal inference (cum hoc/post hoc)
This does not mean there are no causes
per se,
just that causes cannot be established by observation. Rather, causes as necessary conditions between antecedents and consequents, may be established by necessary inference (deduction).
This is the only way that an absolute or universally-obtaining relationship may be discovered.Berkeley and Hume did brilliant work in demonstrating these problems (along with the naturalistic fallacy as well, which is that moral obligations cannot be inferred from observation).
Like Berkeley, I affirm the existence of both causation and morality, but I
deny that either of them originate from the observation of the phenomenal world,
because that would be logically fallacious.Rugoz wrote:If thoughts equal brain activity, why not. The question is when do we become conscious of our thoughts and can express (i.e. measure) them.
Thoughts do not equal brain activity, they are correlated to brain activity.
Your firing-synapse
is not the same as the experience of a symphony, no (A=A) identity can be demonstrated for qualitative states and observed physical properties. the sensations as subjectively experienced (qualitative states) are philosophically irreducible. The philosophy of mind has basically reached an impasse on this very issue over the last 30 years and for good reason. No qualitative state (basic sensation) can be demonstrated as physically reducible. It cannot be done.
*Hears Berkeley's footsteps coming down the hall* Zamuel wrote:Your right that our minds create it, but it is real, we imbue it with that quality consensually and are then constrained by it. We cannot really compare perceptions, communication requires abstract definition. Thus we arrive at communion and are not alone.
How do you know that
your own mind creates the percept? can you demonstrate this claim?
I would argue that you cannot demonstrate yourself as the origination of the percepts you experience.
B0ycey wrote:So I will take the 'red pill' VS, but I am almost certain I am going to remain a skeptic.
Read
the three dialogues and we'll take the plunge. Let me know.
Otherwise enjoy the fun on this thread.