Sivad wrote:That might be your opinion, but plenty of physicalists would beg to differ.
Easily Refuted and just as many Physicalists have admitted that there exists an impasse on this.
Rugoz wrote:Why not?
Because empirical properties (the observed entities we describe as physical) are reducible to sensation and sensation are the same as qualitative states (which are epistemically irreducible), if one were to claim that such sensations/subjective mental states/qualia (the irreducible) are to be understood in terms of observed properties (the reducible), such a claim would be instantly fallacious (
petito principii).
Likewise, several thought experiments have basically shown that subjective states cannot be duplicated in terms of third-person access (properties).
Nagel's bat, Mary the color scientists, et al. Potemkin wrote:But matter is still matter, and mind is still mind. It's just that they are entangled together at the most fundamental level.
There is no reason to believe in matter, but the reality of one's own experiences are undeniable at the epistemic level without a reduction to self-referential absurdity.
Rugoz wrote:You cannot derive rules for imaginary nonsense by inference. But feel free to demonstrate it.
Whatever is necessitated by inference is reality, regardless of what you may want to call it.
Rugoz wrote:If I observe an outcome as a result of my action often enough, I can reasonably assume action -> outcome. Whether there's hidden variable is irrelevant, that's the point.
This is also NOT causation, which has been the point of this entire thread.
There is no physical causation, it does not exist.
Rugoz wrote:I only believe in matter, I don't see where the "absurdity" lies in that.
Well, I will be debating Saeko on this (if she is still willing)
But the absurdity lies in that you have to explain your subjective mental states (which are categorically irreducible) in terms of properties that reduce to those same mental states in order to demonstrate that the former are in fact physical. Otherwise,
the mental remains philosophically incorrigible. Rugoz wrote:A "mind", LoL, what's that even supposed to be. You just replaced the simple laws of physics with an infinitely complex black box. That's the opposite of Occam's razor.
A mind is a consciousness, that which has percepts or collections of irreducible qualitative states.
Furthermore, if the laws of physics are mostly a bunch of ad-hoc and fallacious bullshit, they are exactly the sort of things that Occam developed his razor for.
Rugoz wrote:I didn't know you are ok with the idea that "minds" can be copied, run at different speeds, reset to different states by the click of a button because they run on a computer.
They cannot be copied, there is no reason to believe that computers or brains have any subjective qualitative states whatsoever.
The mind is not the brain and cannot be logically demonstrated to be such.
Saeko wrote:This debate is guaranteed to be interesting as I take pretty much the exact opposite position in denying the existence of mental entities.
Indeed, though I would probably spend the first part of the debate demonstrating that claim to be false (I don't think that position of yours can actually be held consistently without self-refutation or admitting of a complex system that would then have the burden of proof over-and-against my simpler position).
So, since I am back, how did you want to proceed? I have a format already in mind, but I wanted to hear your input before I start another thread for the purpose.
Let me know your thoughts, or if you are even still interested, thanks.