[Oxymandias]

@Potemkin

I think it is to be noted that logic and mathematics do not have the weight many assume them to have. Logic and mathematics are sciences and therefore everything within them is challengeable if evidence is provided.

Btw, you can prove 2+2=5. Numbers are representations of quantities so as long as people agree that 5 is equivalent to 4, it is entirely possible to make 2+2 = 5.

[Sivad]

[Victoribus Spolia]

@Oxymandias, I am going to elaborate on my position a bit in response to @Potemkin's astute observations.

VS is defining morality as being a set of logically derived propositions which are imperative, which can and most be imposed on every human being's behaviour. This, it seems to me, is the basis for VS's rather quixotic desire to based morality on logic - logical thought, after all, is the only form of thought which almost everyone agrees to have imposed on them. From early childhood onwards, we are expected to simply accept that 2+2=4, or else. VS wants moral propositions to have the same force as logical or mathematical propositions. Personally, I think this is misguided. Moral propositions are not of the same type as logical or mathematical propositions, and attempting to force human thought into that straitjacket would be counterproductive.

Good sir,

I think your explanation is quite close, but does not entirely encompass my criteria for what would constitute a morality.

I suppose my point in this debate has been to argue that if morality is to be distinguished from arbitrary preference, it must have some external criteria to justify its claims beyond oneself. Logic, being necessarily presupposed as objective, is a predictible candidate for such justification-criterion; however, I do not limit qualifications-for-candidacy merely to that (as you seem to be implying); rather, I am arguing that if you want to make a claim as binding upon others as an obligation (as moral par excellence), then the justification must match the force of the claim.

For instance, for the criteria, I argued:

A non-fallacious logical proof that implies a necessity that is binding upon all, or some grounds that would justify a universal obligation (like a force of coercion that none can escape, etc.).

(Note the section in bold)

The section in bold more-or-less would be my default against Dostoevsky's criticism If I were to concede his point. For if observation cannot yield morality (naturalistic fallacy, courtesy of Hume), and if a logical morality still lacks the force to obligate (coutesy of Dostoevsky), a presupposing of a theistic worldview with divine commands would still provide a justification-criterion for my moral claims; that is, given my worldview presuppositions, I would still have a consistent basis for my objective moral claims. This of course being, because If i were to choose to defy moral precepts, I would be punished by thus God (which is different than a morality derived from pure logic, which has no claim for the power to compel compliance, or to punish non-compliance as a god would).

My only point has been, really, that the claim to a subjective morality is really oxymoronic at base. If one believes that morality boils down to their whims, then their claims against the actions of others (as if having some sort of authority) should be dismissed likewise as whims.

It would be like saying "YOU ARE WRONG TO DISLIKE CHOCOLATE! THAT IS EVIL!" when the only justification for that claim is "I LIKE CHOCOLATE." The latter justification is insufficient as a criteria to rationally make the former judgment to someone else with any seriousness, for the statement assumes an objective force of authority, but the justification-claim is clearly a mere personal-preference.

If people wish to define their morality as merely preference, then their moral claims should be stated as such or treated as such. If this requirement is impossible for man to do in order to have a functioning society, then a worldview that denies God or laws of reasoning must be admitted as incapable of preserving society itself (which is a conclusion that I believe should've been obvious given that Christians have made that point for the last 1,000 years).

Now, all the aforementioned discussion still assumes that I do in fact concede Dostoevsky's critique, which I don't. Rather, I appeal to the use of logic as still sufficient for this reason:

Just as an intelligible conversation necessitates the objective character of logic, so to having an intelligible grounds for morals requires such an objective basis as well.

Dostoevsky's objection is not so much against morality being objective as it is against logic being-itself-able to compel compliance. Obviously logic doesn't have such a power-to-comple in the sense that God can compel; however, its universal-obligating power comes from the fact that if one refuses to abide by its demands, their actions can neither be called rational or moral:

FOR, if one chooses not to use logic, they cannot have an intelligible conversation, cannot do math, cannot argue, and cannot think and when they do they are acting irrationally given their claims against logic. Similarly, if morality is grounded in logic, and one refuses to accept logic, his actions are either just an execution of his own fancy or preference (hence we are back to my original criticism against "subjective morality" as being no morality at all) or if trying to obligate others while having this view, the person is clearly being irrational and inconsistent given his claims to non-logical subjectivity.

That is the whole point.

Without an objective basis (whether logical or divine or both), one has no epistemic right to tell others what to do or what to believe and the very act of doing so is utterly irrational.

As far as disputation is concerned, that is fine by me. For my opponent to admit that he refuses to believe in morality because he can refuse logic is a sure-victory for any moral philosopher and I am honest enough to admit that such is good enough. If my opponent is forced to admit that his denial of an objective morality amounts to a denial of rationality by his arbitrary choice, I am entirely satisfied.

I do not claim to have the power to force people to act rationally and never said that i did, I am only pointing out that the claim that morality is subjective disqualifies one from making moral judgments for others beyond oneself, rationally speaking.

Such people should be dismissed whenever they attempt otherwise if we still believe that reason is the standard of debate. That is my point.

I hope this is quite clear to all.

[Potemkin]

@Oxymandias, I am going to elaborate on my position a bit in response to @Potemkin's astute observations.



Good sir,

I think your explanation is quite close, but does not entirely encompass my criteria for what would constitute a morality.

I suppose my point in this debate has been to argue that if morality is to be distinguished from arbitrary preference, it must have some external criteria to justify its claims beyond oneself. Logic, being necessarily presupposed as objective, is a predictible candidate for such justification-criterion; however, I do not limit qualifications-for-candidacy merely to that (as you seem to be implying); rather, I am arguing that if you want to make a claim as binding upon others as an obligation (as moral par excellence), then the justification must match the force of the claim.

For instance, for the criteria, I argued:

(Note the section in bold)

The section in bold more-or-less would be my default against Dostoevsky's criticism If I were to concede his point. For if observation cannot yield morality (naturalistic fallacy, courtesy of Hume), and if a logical morality still lacks the force to obligate (coutesy of Dostoevsky), a presupposing of a theistic worldview with divine commands would still provide a justification-criterion for my moral claims; that is, given my worldview presuppositions, I would still have a consistent basis for my objective moral claims. This of course being, because If i were to choose to defy moral precepts, I would be punished by thus God (which is different than a morality derived from pure logic, which has no claim for the power to compel compliance, or to punish non-compliance as a god would).

My only point has been, really, that the claim to a subjective morality is really oxymoronic at base. If one believes that morality boils down to their whims, then their claims against the actions of others (as if having some sort of authority) should be dismissed likewise as whims.

It would be like saying "YOU ARE WRONG TO DISLIKE CHOCOLATE! THAT IS EVIL!" when the only justification for that claim is "I LIKE CHOCOLATE." The latter justification is insufficient as a criteria to rationally make the former judgment to someone else with any seriousness, for the statement assumes an objective force of authority, but the justification-claim is clearly a mere personal-preference.

If people wish to define their morality as merely preference, then their moral claims should be stated as such or treated as such. If this requirement is impossible for man to do in order to have a functioning society, then a worldview that denies God or laws of reasoning must be admitted as incapable of preserving society itself (which is a conclusion that I believe should've been obvious given that Christians have made that point for the last 1,000 years).

Now, all the aforementioned discussion still assumes that I do in fact concede Dostoevsky's critique, which I don't. Rather, I appeal to the use of logic as still sufficient for this reason:

Just as an intelligible conversation necessitates the objective character of logic, so to having an intelligible grounds for morals requires such an objective basis as well.

Dostoevsky's objection is not so much against morality being objective as it is against logic being-itself-able to compel compliance. Obviously logic doesn't have such a power-to-comple in the sense that God can compel; however, its universal-obligating power comes from the fact that if one refuses to abide by its demands, their actions can neither be called rational or moral:

FOR, if one chooses not to use logic, they cannot have an intelligible conversation, cannot do math, cannot argue, and cannot think and when they do they are acting irrationally given their claims against logic. Similarly, if morality is grounded in logic, and one refuses to accept logic, his actions are either just an execution of his own fancy or preference (hence we are back to my original criticism against "subjective morality" as being no morality at all) or if trying to obligate others while having this view, the person is clearly being irrational and inconsistent given his claims to non-logical subjectivity.

That is the whole point.

Without an objective basis (whether logical or divine or both), one has no epistemic right to tell others what to do or what to believe and the very act of doing so is utterly irrational.

As far as disputation is concerned, that is fine by me. For my opponent to admit that he refuses to believe in morality because he can refuse logic is a sure-victory for any moral philosopher and I am honest enough to admit that such is good enough. If my opponent is forced to admit that his denial of an objective morality amounts to a denial of rationality by his arbitrary choice, I am entirely satisfied.

I do not claim to have the power to force people to act rationally and never said that i did, I am only pointing out that the claim that morality is subjective disqualifies one from making moral judgments for others beyond oneself, rationally speaking.

Such people should be dismissed whenever they attempt otherwise if we still believe that reason is the standard of debate. That is my point.

I hope this is quite clear to all.

That is quite clear, thank you. My point was, of course, that the force of logic is entirely inadequate as a basis for any system of morality which can or must be imposed on others. After all, someone might simply reject logic by refusing to have its rules imposed on their thought, and as you say there is no apparatus of coercion which can make them think or behave otherwise. And why should they have to think logically or rationally if they don't want to?

This means that the only means of making morality objective, which is to say imposable on others, is to root it in religious belief. And if you are doing that, then there is simply no need to root it in logic or rationality as well. It would be nice if God's moral commandments made logical sense as well, but it's entirely unnecessary that they do so. In this respect, your thinking seems to be Scholastic rather than Christian as such.

As you may have guessed, my own view is that any system of objective morality is impossible - at most, it can be inter-subjective, a collective social delusion. As such, my own moral beliefs cannot, and probably should not, be imposed on others. I have my own personal moral code by which I live, but I don't expect anyone else to even understand that code, let alone obey it as well. I have my moral preferences, but I accept that other people have different moral preferences. Why should that unduly concern me?

[Victoribus Spolia]

That is quite clear, thank you. My point was, of course, that the force of logic is entirely inadequate as a basis for any system of morality which can or must be imposed on others. After all, someone might simply reject logic by refusing to have its rules imposed on their thought, and as you say there is no apparatus of coercion which can make them think or behave otherwise. And why should they have to think logically or rationally if they don't want to?

They don't, but as I stated, such a denial of rationality is quite satisfactory for me as a debater as it amounts to a forfeiture of their right to moral judgement (if being on those beyond themselves) and what would be considered in almost any debate as concession and since this is the topic of debate, that makes me all the more joyous.

This means that the only means of making morality objective, which is to say imposable on others, is to root it in religious belief. And if you are doing that, then there is simply no need to root it in logic or rationality as well. It would be nice if God's moral commandments made logical sense as well, but it's entirely unnecessary that they do so. In this respect, your thinking seems to be Scholastic rather than Christian as such.

I don't disagree with this, I just find it even more satisfying when people being openly impious also happens to be openly irrational.

As such, my own moral beliefs cannot, and probably should not be imposed on others.

Would you say that about your communist values as well then too?

I have my moral preferences, but I accept that other people have different moral preferences. Why should that unduly concern me?

Far be it from me to tell an old scottish cynic what should "concern him"

I suppose my attempted answer to this (in appeal to your better nature) would be two-fold:

Firstly, It should be concerning if such a standard were universalized, as the lack of an objective criteria for morality will inevitably erode stable societies based on any kinds of commonly accepted legal standard (the current fracturing of the west can be directly traced to this Nietzschean-prophecy-come-true).

Secondly, it should be concerning if you wish to make any kind of objective moral claims with any sort of seriousness or honesty. For instance, if you bemoan the treatment of workers in Ediburgh through a public-access article and call for some sort of policy change, it should concern you that your claims in that instance are no more serious and ethical than that of a food critic discussing the problems he had with his latest dish of “Lièvre à la Royale” and it should also concern you that in that instant, if you were challenged on that basis, you would be rationally obligated to concede the arbitrariness of your position.

In fact, I can hardly think of two points more worthy of concern; however, I tag you a cynic more than an actual Marxist and I am sure this appeal falls of deaf ears; however, that the point is quite cogent I think would be hard for most reasonable men to deny.

Why am I wrong?

[Hong Wu]

I don't think logic is necessarily inadequate, so much that it is inadequate for most people. I believe the average Joe can't be motivated to do something good or bad by a philosophical argument, rather he is influenced by cultural pressure, which itself can be influenced by philosophy or logic. This is not strictly the same as Joe being influenced by philosophy or logic though; there's a degree of separation.

So similar to what I wrote in that thread I started about not having to justify ethics... some people actually want to justify or at least to analyze them, yet if ethics are to be a broadly shared thing, I wouldn't argue about basic ethical ideas with most people at this point in my life.

[Victoribus Spolia]

@Hong Wu,

I think in the case of many Americans who are evangelical, by appealing to a worldview that presupposes Divine Commands, they do provide a justification for their ethical claims. Indeed, many of these uneducated high-school drop-out bible-thumping mechanics technically have a better justification for their moral claims than the likes of Dr. Peter Singer!

This is in spite of the fact that the appeal this uneducated mechanic makes is no way known to him to be "called" a justification; however, It is a justification nonetheless and is actually a far more serious justification for moral judgment than Singer's fallacious appeal to observed-sentience (naturalistic fallacy).

I relish the irony of this scenario.

[One Degree]

It is irrational to always act based upon logic. If you don’t allow your ‘child’ out to play, you become miserable and use faulty logic. Play is natural to animals and this becomes imagination, feelings, and prejudices in humans. It is logical we pursue the illogical because that is who we are.

[Victoribus Spolia]

It is irrational to always act based upon logic.

It is logical we pursue the illogical because that is who we are.

[One Degree]

Do you think you are a logical being instead of an emotional being? Why should all our actions be based upon logic if we are not logical beings. That is not logical. Even if you grant we are some of both, then it remains logical our acts should be based upon some of both.
How would it be logical to act against our nature?

[Victoribus Spolia]

Do you think you are a logical being instead of an emotional being? Why should all our actions be based upon logic if we are not logical beings. That is not logical. Even if you grant we are some of both, then it remains logical our acts should be based upon some of both.
How would it be logical to act against our nature

If you wish to discuss what might be called; the non-analytic aspects of human existence and how such should be judged or not-judged then lets have that discussion, that does not mean you need to engage in silly attempts at rhetorical flourish that make you look retarded.

[One Degree]

If you wish to discuss what might be called; the non-analytic aspects of human existence and how such should be judged or not-judged then lets have that discussion, that does not mean you need to engage in silly attempts at rhetorical flourish that make you look retarded.

I enjoy my rhetorical flourishes. They are not required to meet your standards. The post was not addressed to you. The thread is, “what’s the value of human life?” I think ‘play’ adds value to human existence. That may be all that does.

[Albert]

Logic is limited to one's knowledge. For example.

You relative is sick and you are trying to deliver urgent medicine to them.

You come to a river that has two paths. One path is afforded with a bridge to cross the river the other leads to the river's ford, whereas you will have to swim across the river. Logically knowing that walking over a river is more preferable then swimming through it, reasonable people will conclude that it is better and safer to walk across the river over the bridge.

Yet, what is not known to you is that the path over the bridge leads to the woods, it will also take you twice as long to get to town where your ill relative is. Whilst if you took the path where you had to swim across the rive you would have to walk the rest of the way by a straight road that is much faster.

So here with a simple example it shows, that sometimes logical decision will seem illogical and incorrect. As for a person that knows about the paths will take to ford the river, whilst a person who does not know about the paths will think that is wrong way to go about it.

In this how I see philosophical disagreement about morality arise. It is usually not a matter of logic but knowledge and understanding. The debate about morality is made all the more difficult, because you simply can not say, I know that this is wrong as I just know through seeing it, as that will suppose a moral superiority over another and thus making the matter personal. Most people simply wont listen to you and take offense to that, as to fully understanding morality it is supposed, to be a matter available to all.

[Victoribus Spolia]

@Albert,

Don't fall into stupidity with the misuse of terms.

So here with a simple example it shows, that sometimes logical decision will seem illogical and incorrect.

"logical" in the formal sense as it has been used in this thread by me, is either referring to the law of logic (identity, non-contradiction, the excluded-middle), or the inference of a conclusion from valid premises without fallacy (formal or informal).

Your whole discussion above has only to do with making reasonable or common-sense decisions that end up not being the best outcome, which has absolutely NOTHING to do with what we are discussing in this thread.

For instance, this silly remark:

It is usually not a matter of logic but knowledge and understanding.

Knowledge presupposes logic, you cannot seperate the two.

For if A does not equal non-A is invalid, then no intelligible interpretation or description of reality can obtain and no proposition can be formulated to validate as either true or false (only propositions can be true or false).

If truth cannot be established, then knowledge cannot be established either as knowledge is a justified true belief.

You cannot think or argue without the presupposing of logic, so criticizing logic's ubiquitous role in human thought is as futile as it is naive.

[Potemkin]

They don't, but as I stated, such a denial of rationality is quite satisfactory for me as a debater as it amounts to a forfeiture of their right to moral judgement (if being on those beyond themselves) and what would be considered in almost any debate as concession and since this is the topic of debate, that makes me all the more joyous.

They may lose the argument, but they aren't going to change their mind. A person who rejects logic is going to be impervious to all disputation. Lol.

I don't disagree with this, I just find it even more satisfying when people being openly impious also happens to be openly irrational.

Thomas Aquinas would be proud of you, VS!

Would you say that about your communist values as well then too?

Far be it from me to tell an old scottish cynic what should "concern him"

I suppose my attempted answer to this (in appeal to your better nature) would be two-fold:

Firstly, It should be concerning if such a standard were universalized, as the lack of an objective criteria for morality will inevitably erode stable societies based on any kinds of commonly accepted legal standard (the current fracturing of the west can be directly traced to this Nietzschean-prophecy-come-true).

Secondly, it should be concerning if you wish to make any kind of objective moral claims with any sort of seriousness or honesty. For instance, if you bemoan the treatment of workers in Ediburgh through a public-access article and call for some sort of policy change, it should concern you that your claims in that instance are no more serious and ethical than that of a food critic discussing the problems he had with his latest dish of “Lièvre à la Royale” and it should also concern you that in that instant, if you were challenged on that basis, you would be rationally obligated to concede the arbitrariness of your position.

In fact, I can hardly think of two points more worthy of concern; however, I tag you a cynic more than an actual Marxist and I am sure this appeal falls of deaf ears; however, that the point is quite cogent I think would be hard for most reasonable men to deny.

Why am I wrong?

You are wrong because I am not a moralist. Fortunately for me, Marxism is not a moralistic ideology. In fact, scholars have long recognised what Althusser called Marx's "epistemological break" midway through his career. The young Marx was a Young Hegelian and a strict moralist. He decried the capitalist system as being fundamentally immoral in its social and human outcomes. The young Marx denounced alienation as a grave social evil, which had to be abolished. By from the late 1840s onwards, Marx changed his tune. He abandoned the moralism of his youth, and he sublated his moral outrage into a devastating scientific critique of capitalism, based on objectively valid criteria of political economy. In fact, he took this so far that I have read Marx being denounced for his "immorality" precisely because he (Marx) claimed that morality is not objective nor is it universally valid, but changes depending on historical period and geographical location, and is always and everywhere the morality of the ruling class, and which is always and everywhere self-serving. In other words, Marx applied logic and reason to his analysis of the capitalist mode of production, and condemned it on logical and rational grounds rather than on moral grounds. The tendency of the rate of profit to decline mattered more to Marx than the brutal treatment of striking workers, though he could see how the two things were connected. Marx regarded morality as subjective (or, at best, as inter-subjective), as I do, and he regarded the only form of thought which has the right to make universal claims as being logical, rational thought, as I do.

[Sivad]

condemned it on logical and rational grounds

What? What the hell is logical condemnation? Cold logic can only describe and predict, it can't constitute a basis for condemnation.

[Potemkin]

What? What the hell is logical condemnation? Cold logic can only describe and predict, it can't constitute a basis for condemnation.

If a given mode of production has its own decline and destruction built into it, and it can be logically and rationally demonstrated that it has, then it is entirely logical and rational to condemn it and propose that we establish a different mode of production.

[Victoribus Spolia]

They may lose the argument, but they aren't going to change their mind. A person who rejects logic is going to be impervious to all disputation.

Sure, and we have some of that going on in this thread right now, but I can walk away from a lunatic in a back alley quite satisfied, which is my point. Debate is how arguments are advanced, and when it comes to morality, Dostoevsky's position amounts to more of a concession than it does as actual critique worth worrying about.

Thomas Aquinas would be proud of you, VS!

Well, I can't count that as bad company I suppose (though I would consider myself a variety of Nominalist if anything).

You are wrong because I am not a moralist.

Which amounts to the same as being a cynic in my opinion; however, I will be quite curious to see how consistent you are on this. I will make a point to be more discerning of what might be called "moral tones" in your posts from here on out.

....he regarded the only form of thought which has the right to make universal claims as being logical, rational thought, as I do.

Well in this sense I don't disagree with Marx and you don't disagree with me, the disagreement only seems to lie in the claim that morality can be tied to logical and rational thought.

I suppose the next question I would ask you is this;

If a moral claim was demonstrated as logical and rational, would you then regard it as being universal?

I know this contrasts a bit with Dosteyvesky's claim; however, you are a Marxist not a Russo-Christian Existentialist.

If you believe the standard for making universal (objective) claims is logic, If I were to prove a moral position as such, would you then accept it as objective (contra inter-subjectivity)?

I am just curious as to how serious you take this claim, for it would make for a fun debate would it not? (after I am finished with Saeko, of course).

What? What the hell is logical condemnation? Cold logic can only describe and predict, it can't constitute a basis for condemnation.

If a given mode of production has its own decline and destruction built into it, and it can be logically and rationally demonstrated that it has, then it is entirely logical and rational to condemn it and propose that we establish a different mode of production.

This is an interesting exchange, Sivad is quite right if by "condemnation" you mean a moral condemnation, but its seems here you only mean a critique of inefficiency, etc.

[Albert]

@Albert,

Don't fall into stupidity with the misuse of terms.



"logical" in the formal sense as it has been used in this thread by me, is either referring to the law of logic (identity, non-contradiction, the excluded-middle), or the inference of a conclusion from valid premises without fallacy (formal or informal).

Your whole discussion above has only to do with making reasonable or common-sense decisions that end up not being the best outcome, which has absolutely NOTHING to do with what we are discussing in this thread.

For instance, this silly remark:



Knowledge presupposes logic, you cannot seperate the two.

For if A does not equal non-A is invalid, then no intelligible interpretation or description of reality can obtain and no proposition can be formulated to validate as either true or false (only propositions can be true or false).

If truth cannot be established, then knowledge cannot be established either as knowledge is a justified true belief.

You cannot think or argue without the presupposing of logic, so criticizing logic's ubiquitous role in human thought is as futile as it is naive.

I dont know I just walked into this thread. I'm also replying to Potemkin in a way. I totally disagree with his whole moral relativism. With that said though.

Logic alone can not lead to the truth, as logic is based on set up concepts between which connection are formed. You can have completely logical positions that are actually untrue in reality. For example people thought the earth is the centre of the universe before. It was a logical argument that they had used to support this claim, like the sun moves around the earth, one just have to look out of their window. Or if the earth moved around the sun, would not the clouds fly off? These are logical concussions but as we now know are are not true.

So in conclusion more is needed then just logic to arrive to truth.

[Potemkin]

Which amounts to the same as being a cynic in my opinion; however, I will be quite curious to see how consistent you are on this. I will make a point to be more discerning of what might be called "moral tones" in your posts from here on out.

I prefer to be called an "idealistic cynic". Or a "cynical idealist", whichever you prefer.

Well in this sense I don't disagree with Marx and you don't disagree with me, the disagreement only seems to lie in the claim that morality can be tied to logical and rational thought.

Indeed.

I suppose the next question I would ask you is this;

If a moral claim was demonstrated as logical and rational, would you then regard it as being universal?

Yes.

I know this contrasts a bit with Dosteyvesky's claim; however, you are a Marxist not a Russo-Christian Existentialist.

Indeed. I regard Dostoyevsky as a great man, but he was wrong about pretty much everything. Lol.

If you believe the standard for making universal (objective) claims is logic, If I were to prove a moral position as such, would you then accept it as objective (contra inter-subjectivity)?

As I said, yes.

This is an interesting exchange, Sivad is quite right if by "condemnation" you mean a moral condemnation, but its seems here you only mean a critique of inefficiency, etc.

That is correct.

I dont know I just walked into this thread. I'm also replying to Potemkin in a way. I totally disagree with his whole moral relativism. With that said though.

Like Nietzsche, I am a moral perspectivist, not a moral relativist. The difference is a subtle but important one.