[wat0n]

A huge oversimplification. The reality is they'll play up these fears, sign a deal with the US for free $$$$$, then turn around and sign deals sign deals with China anyway.

Even the biggest US ally in the region, Japan, steadfastedly refuses to kowtow to the US and say they'll defend Taiwan.

In terms of land neighbors, only India has continued border disputes with China as well - and if they truly felt threatened, those soldiers on the border would be equipped with more than sticks.

India has nukes, I think there's mutual deterrence between both.

China's neighbors may indeed sign good deals with both China and the US, even Latin American countries do. But the real deal is in defense, and who they need to defend against.

[Fasces]

In my experience, there is a tendency by American thinkers to overstate the threat these countries feel China poses to them. China does pose an existential threat to American hegemonic control in the region, but not to these states - and while there are disputes, none come close to the antagonism regularly shown by the US toward Cuba, much less a significant existential threat.

[Wellsy]

In my experience, there is a tendency by American thinkers to overstate the threat these countries feel China poses to them. China does pose an existential threat to American hegemonic control in the region, but not to these states - and while there are disputes, none come close to the antagonism regularly shown by the US toward Cuba, much less a significant existential threat.

What do you make of the claim that we may be in a different dynamic of international relations where states are unmotivated to disrupt US hegemony and have a series of balancing powers so that no one power dominates and instead abstain from taking sides, especially against the US and its allies?

https://acoup.blog/2023/07/07/collections-the-status-quo-coalition/

My automatic thought is that the above generalizes the present state of affairs as predictive and perhaps doesn’t consider at what point would states side with the likes of China. It is difficult and costly now, but whether it always be can always change, I imagine especially if domestic problems do get out of hand for the US and fails to be a “team captain” to its allies.

[Fasces]

What do you make of the claim that we may be in a different dynamic of international relations where states are unmotivated to disrupt US hegemony and have a series of balancing powers so that no one power dominates and instead abstain from taking sides, especially against the US and its allies?

The number one priority of these states, beyond disputed claims over oil and fishing rights, is maintaining the free movement of the seas. China is as dependent on, and ultimately as committed too, as the US. They've shown a willingness to keep sea lanes clear and safe in the past, and continue to do so in the future.

I think a lot of Americans misunderstand Chinese motives or objectives, and as a result, come up with scenarios that don't make much sense. American conjectures about 'what China will do' thus fail to be predictive. When they try to convince other Asian states who understand Chinese motives, even when they disagree with them, it makes it very easy to default to a state of 'take what we can get'. They know they can profit off a USA that feels a huge sense of dread without much risk to the actual status quo, which is considerably less dreadful. In that sense, I agree with the premise of that blogpost.

The US is a highly individualistic and untrusting international player. They are unwilling to budge from a position of strength, even if they don't particularly use it to their great advantage compared to former colonial empires, because they do not trust others to not do the same. Asian civilization, being considerably older and more populated and with a sophisticated and ancient order of sorts, doesn't have this issue. They're more open to dealing with the 'devils' because they understand politics as a game of networking and relationships more than pure strength or ideology. China is similar in this way, and they can work with that. However, because the US tends to treat every interaction and relationship on the basis of relative strength, they can be a bit stubborn and unbending. China and India were kept in a state of diminishment that won't last, not forever. Asian states can accomodate their resurgence, and even prosper - they've been doing it for millenia - but can the Americans?

If anything worries them is that a resurgent China that challenges US strength will make the US act in unpredictable ways. This air has been carefully cultivated by the US and its working for them for now, but if the US ever starts falling apart at the seams, I don't see them working hard to prop them back up.

[Pants-of-dog]

I thought we were discussing "winning the economic war", can you win the economic war if your economic system isn't a model to look up to?

I mean, if it's about sheer size only (due to population size, for instance) then the one that will eventually beat everyone is India, not China.

So you have no good reason to use GDP per capita as the sole criterion.

But the internal violence is.

No. You seem to be very confused about the violence of Mexican cartels.

No, Burma/Myanmar isn't a mess because of drug smuggling (migration is more complicated here).

Now, even Mexico doesn't have significant border disputes with the US anymore...

So, why are you blaming China for Burma if the violence there is not caused by China?

[wat0n]

So you have no good reason to use GDP per capita as the sole criterion.

Why wouldn't you use per capita GDP?

No. You seem to be very confused about the violence of Mexican cartels.

I'm not.

So, why are you blaming China for Burma if the violence there is not caused by China?

I mentioned Burma as an example of an Asian country with internal violence issues.

China's foreign policy is however increasing tensions in its immediate neighborhood. This is undoubtedly true.

[Pants-of-dog]

Why wouldn't you use per capita GDP?

I never claimed that you should not.

Your confusion about my claims does not mean that per capita GDP should be the sole criterion.

I'm not.

I mentioned Burma as an example of an Asian country with internal violence issues.

China's foreign policy is however increasing tensions in its immediate neighborhood. This is undoubtedly true.

Show how Chinese foreign policy is causing trouble in its immediate neighbourhood and that this will stop China from eventually being the global superpower.

[wat0n]

I never claimed that you should not.

Your confusion about my claims does not mean that per capita GDP should be the sole criterion.

Yet it is a necessary one. If you want a large economy regardless of per capita GDP, then the country that will "win" is India just due to population size.

Show how Chinese foreign policy is causing trouble in its immediate neighbourhood and that this will stop China from eventually being the global superpower.

Fine.

What makes you believe China will become "the" global superpower? I think, mainly due to size, it can become "a" global superpower.

[Pants-of-dog]

Yet it is a necessary one. If you want a large economy regardless of per capita GDP, then the country that will "win" is India just due to population size.

Again, no one is disagreeing that it can be a criterion.

Fine.

What makes you believe China will become "the" global superpower? I think, mainly due to size, it can become "a" global superpower.

Again, provide the evidence (and not just a link) and explain how said evidence contradicts the claim.

[Fasces]

Show how Chinese foreign policy is causing trouble in its immediate neighbourhood and that this will stop China from eventually being the global superpower.

Isn't it equally valid to say that Vietnamese, Philippine, etc foreign policy are causing trouble with their neighbors? Assigning blame without establishing blame seems to be circular logic - if China were to back down unilaterally from its claims, wouldn't this also be a sign that it is failing to become a global power?

It can't be both.

[wat0n]

Again, no one is disagreeing that it can be a criterion.

Do you understand why is it important?

Again, provide the evidence (and not just a link) and explain how said evidence contradicts the claim.

I won't just quote the whole Wikipedia page. It does show China's exercising its claims to the South China Sea in such a way (through accomplished facts) that it's alienating its immediate neighborhood.

Is this good foreign policy?

@Fasces yes, China can't back down. Which is why one may wonder why did it put itself in this position to begin with. There doesn't seem to be an urgent or essential national security concern that would justify its position on the South China Sea.

China's claims go back at least to Mao, if not earlier, but the move towards building artificial islands and other attempts to impose facts on the ground is recent. Now that it chose this route, it will have trouble backing down - illustrating, again, it was a mistake to do so before building a network of firm alliances and finishing in setting up the Belt and Road Initiative.

South Korea and Japan may be lost causes, but the other Asian countries it has been alienating these last few years didn't need to be.

[Fasces]

China can't back down. Which is why one may wonder why did it put itself in this position to begin with. There doesn't seem to be an urgent or essential national security concern that would justify its position on the South China Sea.

China's claims go back at least to Mao, if not earlier,

Specifically, the modern claims go back to the Cairo Declaration and the fact that due to a dispute between whether to invite Mao or Kaishek to the San Francisco Conference, they invited neither - and while the final document says these islands are no longer 'Japanese' they certainly don't say who they belong too now. Other nations argue that any ceding of the islands to Japan in the first place was done by colonial authorities that had no right to cede them - so this was never legal either. The result is that every country involved has a similar claim to the islands as they're in a murky legal position.

Why do so many things in life always track back to colonialism?

the move towards building artificial islands and other attempts to impose facts on the ground is recent.

Abandoning the claims would be equivalent to backing down as ultimately the claims date back to an era preceding the PRC. This goes back to backing down being a sign of China not stepping up to regional hegemony... while pressing the claims of the RoC is also a sign of China not stepping up to regional hegemony?

South Korea and Japan may be lost causes, but the other Asian countries it has been alienating these last few years didn't need to be.

And again, I think you're overestimating the oppositional attitudes of Japan and especially South Korea. South Korea and China get along more or less fine. If it weren't for the US base in Seoul, to be frank, I don't think there would be any issue at all, and that's mainly China being stuck on North Korea. If a certain nation's carrier group hadn't stopped the invasion of Taiwan, it's likely the UN would have united Korea and the matter would be done - all those Chinese troops on top of the Yalu would have been busy uniting China. If MacArthur didn't lose his mind and start advocating for nuking Beijing, even more so.

We're products of history, all of us. China should back down, but won't, but other Asian nations don't hold it against them - or other Asian nations they also have disputes with - to the degree most Americans think they do. They have their own similar shit. It's not a barrier to peace and good business.

[wat0n]

Specifically, they go back to the Cairo Declaration and the fact that due to a dispute between whether to invite Mao or Kaishek to the San Francisco Conference, they invited neither - and while the final document says these islands are no longer 'Japanese' they certainly don't say who they belong too now. Other nations argue that any ceding of the islands to Japan in the first place was done by colonial authorities that had no right to cede them - so this was never legal either. The result is that every country involved has a similar claim to the islands as they're in a murky legal position.

Why do so many things in life always track back to colonialism?

Regarding Japan, yes. IIRC the dispute goes as far as to Indonesia, and those claims are actually older (and clearly involve colonialism).

Abandoning the claims would be equivalent to backing down as ultimately the claims date back to an era preceding the PRC. This goes back to backing down being a sign of China not stepping up to regional hegemony... while pressing the claims of the RoC is also a sign of China not stepping up to regional hegemony?

China didn't need to abandon her claims, it just needed to follow a different strategy.

And again, I think you're overestimating the oppositional attitudes of Japan and especially South Korea. South Korea and China get along more or less fine. If it weren't for the US base in Seoul, to be frank, I don't think there would be any issue at all, and that's mainly China being stuck on North Korea. If a certain nation's carrier group hadn't stopped the invasion of Taiwan, it's likely the UN would have united Korea and the matter would be done - all those Chinese troops on top of the Yalu would have been busy uniting China. If MacArthur didn't lose his mind and start advocating for nuking Beijing, even more so.

We're products of history, all of us. China should back down, but won't, but other Asian nations don't hold it against them - or other Asian nations they also have disputes with - to the degree most Americans think they do. They have their own similar shit. It's not a barrier to peace and good business.

But it is a barrier for building an Asian alliance that could be like NATO or what used to be the Warsaw Pact. Both were key elements in cementing the superpower status of both the US and the USSR.

Sure, no Chinese neighbors will go to war over the South China Sea but they won't align themselves with China more generally either. Instead, they'll look to the US for enhancing their security and deterring new Chinese claims over what they deem their territory.

And as you said, China can't back down. It's hard to understand why did it get into this situation to begin with, I suspect it's more about domestic politics than anything else but it's definitely hurting its long term foreign policy goals.

[Fasces]

But it is a barrier for building an Asian alliance that could be like NATO or what used to be the Warsaw Pact. Both were key elements in cementing the superpower status of both the US and the USSR.

Those sorts of alliances wouldn't exist in East Asia anyway - their preference is for bilateral arrangements or very basic regional trade agreements. Asia isn't Europe, with a history of multinational religious and political networks through Church or Napoleon that created a framework for its contemporary super alliances.

[wat0n]

Those sorts of alliances wouldn't exist in East Asia anyway - their preference is for bilateral arrangements or very basic regional trade agreements. Asia isn't Europe, with a history of multinational religious and political networks through Church or Napoleon that created a framework for its contemporary super alliances.

If so, it's a major obstacle to China's rise as a superpower.

[Fasces]

Sure, but scale is a different beast. All of NATO is less pop than China or India. The capacity is there.

[wat0n]

Well, if anything, India could become the main regional counterweight to China at some point.

I think China will indeed become a superpower, but not "the" superpower and it won't be based on being an example of good economic policy to follow (although many countries, mainly poorer ones, will copy what China did those who have reached middle income status will need to figure out their own strategies) but size (mainly) and technology.

I can also imagine India doing the same as well.

[Pants-of-dog]

Do you understand why is it important?

Yes.

I won't just quote the whole Wikipedia page. It does show China's exercising its claims to the South China Sea in such a way (through accomplished facts) that it's alienating its immediate neighborhood.

Is this good foreign policy?

I have no reason to believe you are even discussing a real thing.

Provide a concrete example.

[Rugoz]

When was the last time China had a war of aggression? 1945.

How can a person be so ignorant.

Anyone who knows anything more than Western propaganda, knows that China will never invade Taiwan.

[wat0n]

I have no reason to believe you are even discussing a real thing.

Provide a concrete example.

Did you read the article or not? Several of China's neighbors don't like that it builds artificial islands in maritime territory they are claiming (even if they've done so themselves).

There was even an international case on the matter.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philippines_v._China