- 25 May 2020 22:12
#15094258
I didn't understand the second paragraph
By all accounts, they were indeed behind their neighbors when it came to military hardware (even if they were more than able to deal with internal opposition). And economically, they were also in rather deep troubles.
Exactly, the Peruvian regime was overthrown in 1975 but in 1974 this was far from certain and the regime was very much concerned about the Peru issue. Hence the insistence on getting aid, although even afterwards they were uneasy about the relative weakness compared to Peru.
And let's not get into the Argentina stuff that came to head in 1978, again, they preferred to endanger national security when it came to human rights (a rather underappreciated fact about the dictatorship).
No? The military had no other options after the usual policy at the time (advanced by PDC economists) had failed. It wasn't an American experiment, it was a Chilean experiment resulting from having no options.
Why? When carrying out intelligence operations in Cuba, which side has better chances to track? The Cubans, who exercise military control, or the CIA, which is acting clandestinely?
But it's an important fact. What Chavez and Allende truly had in common with each other wasn't so much nationalization of American businesses, but that both governments were hostile to the American interests in Latin America for ideological reasons.
It's questionable whether East Germany would count as a developed country in the early 50s after being virtually destroyed in WWII. But if you want I can find similar operations in other countries within the Soviet Bloc.
Pants-of-dog wrote:This does not contradict my claim.
Congress can put out whatever sound bytes it wants. It does not change the fact that Pinochet had no need of the astonishingly high levels of aid he and his ilk needed until then.
I didn't understand the second paragraph
By all accounts, they were indeed behind their neighbors when it came to military hardware (even if they were more than able to deal with internal opposition). And economically, they were also in rather deep troubles.
Pants-of-dog wrote:Peru was not a threat at the time, despite its large military. In 1975, the coup in Peru basically ended any threat, and it is almost certain that the CIA knew about and helped the Peruvian coup as well.
Exactly, the Peruvian regime was overthrown in 1975 but in 1974 this was far from certain and the regime was very much concerned about the Peru issue. Hence the insistence on getting aid, although even afterwards they were uneasy about the relative weakness compared to Peru.
And let's not get into the Argentina stuff that came to head in 1978, again, they preferred to endanger national security when it came to human rights (a rather underappreciated fact about the dictatorship).
Pants-of-dog wrote:So we agree that the Chilean economy at the time was a US experiment with neoliberalism.
No? The military had no other options after the usual policy at the time (advanced by PDC economists) had failed. It wasn't an American experiment, it was a Chilean experiment resulting from having no options.
Pants-of-dog wrote:Yes, but that does not affect the argument.
Why? When carrying out intelligence operations in Cuba, which side has better chances to track? The Cubans, who exercise military control, or the CIA, which is acting clandestinely?
Pants-of-dog wrote:You did not specify which time.
The discussion was about whether the USA supported or eschewed corporate interests in foreign policy.
The fact that the USA only tried to overthrow a democracy one time (instead of both times) does not support the claim that the US refused corporate influence in foreign policy.
But it's an important fact. What Chavez and Allende truly had in common with each other wasn't so much nationalization of American businesses, but that both governments were hostile to the American interests in Latin America for ideological reasons.
Pants-of-dog wrote:The original claim was that a developing country like Cuba could foil all (or almost all) CIA plans over several decades to overthrow the regime, while simultaneously oppressing the local population.
The evidence provided showed a developed country (with the help of another superpower) was unable to foil many operations. These operations (even taken together) lasted a far shorter time.
The idea that Cuba, a developing country with no help from any superpowers, could effectively all significant operations by the CIA is implausible, even if we ignore the added difficulties of a population that wants regime change.
It's questionable whether East Germany would count as a developed country in the early 50s after being virtually destroyed in WWII. But if you want I can find similar operations in other countries within the Soviet Bloc.