SolarCross wrote:Ok, though that is a theoretical construct because in reality the monopoly on violence is notional not actual and it is rare outside of the totalitarianism of the 20th century for the notional "state" to be the only group making and enforcing laws.
Sure, but since this is not relevant to the discussion, I will move on.
VS is using a narrower understanding of state than you I guess. If Robinson Crusoe and Man Friday agree to help each other out, VS says "see contracts don't need the state" but to you Robinson Crusoe and Man Friday are the State or two different states making an alliance.
No, you have misunderstood my position.
Victoribus Spolia wrote:For the third time, they were not states in the modern sense of the term, but this makes me wonder, if you are going to dismiss that the contract during these times were "contracts" because of their ancient character, why do you not dismiss that the force of coercion during this time was not a state on the same basis that its not like "states today"
The claim is patently absurd.
Yes this is the third time you have stated an erroneous notion.
Those points are not salient at all, because contracts done on behalf of children when they are still minors can have affects into adulthood when they could consent. Likewise, it was exceedingly rare in near eastern arranged marriages for the marriage to continue if one of engaged individuals were radically opposed. We are not talking about 0% or 100% consent here, its not that simple anyway.
Yes, they were not states in the modern sense. Thank you for agreeing with one of my points. Please note that this does not change the fact that the governing bodies of ancient Judaic society fit the accepted definition of “state”.
On the other hand, you are arguing that the arranged marriages of those times fit the definition of a contract. The modern definition is a binding agreement wherein the signing parties consent to mutual obligations. The ancient marriage agreements you brought up instead obligate people who never consented to the agreement. To put it in an-cap terms, the accepted definition of a contract does not violate the NAP, while your example of ancient marriage does violate this principle.
You may see this is irrelevant, but it is a significant qualitative difference, especially to a real an-cap.
That is irrelevant as the purpose of the example was only to demonstrate that contracts are done and can be done on behalf of others.
This is not a contract, as there is no consensual agreement between the people who are obligated to act.
Punishing prisoners is not the same as having a contract with them.
Your definition of contract is very stretchy.
Your evidence is rejected because its irrelevant.
And since we are discussing marriage in biblical times, the biblical data is the most relevant information, Jewish commentators who wrotes hundreds of years later are not applicable. The plain text is clear and it does not support your position at all.
Likewise, you never answered my questions regarding nomadic and bedouin marriages that I asked before. How can such marriage contracts exist in such stateless societies if, according to you, there can be no marriage-contracts without state mediation?
We were discussing marriage arrangements and their legalistic frameworks in ancient Biblical times.
I posted an academic study of legal practices of that society at the time, specifically quoting the penalties for adultery.
It showed how the Rabbinical courts acted as a state creating and enforcing this legal framework.
You did not refute it nor did you provide evidence that contradicted the claim.
Also, you never asked me anything about the Bedouin.
I am saying that for contracts to work between disparate groups, there must be a common moral understanding under-girding the contract to make it work.
The nation-state emerged in the enlightenment to enforce contracts because this common moral understanding was eroded by the protestant reformation. Before this time, contracts were upheld independent of a centralized state because of a common connection to the Latin church.
Please provide evidence for the bolded claim.
Begging the question, please provide evidence for this claim. Thanks.
Since there never has been a legal framework for contracts that existed independently of a state, to my knowledge, it is logical to assume that all the contracts implemented in these frameworks were dependent on those states.
While there are examples of nations that are stateless, such as indigenous communities, this is due to things like colonialism wherein the indigenous communities had their systems of government deliberately destroyed. They did not have legal systems that were designed to operate independently from government.
Please explain further, I am still not entirely sure what you mean. Are you asking for an explanation of how laws can exist independent of a state?
I think you have misunderstood.
I was simply commenting on your use of a specific term (i.e. common law) in such a way that the term is divorced from its usual meaning.
Rabbinical courts are not the same as the state, besides, I have already shown from the Biblical texts themselves that third-party moral mediation is not the same as a third party monopolist of coercion. The church was the arbiter of morality in feudal times, but moral crimes were dealt with by the landed class over their own peasantry. This is the exact system that prevailed from the time of Moses until the institution of the monarchy under King Saul.
During this time, justice was rendered privately by the elders of Israel (tribal rulers over their own lands), and were mediated by the clergy (the priests and judges).
The evidence is overwhelming on this.
Please provide evidence for the claim that ancient Rabbinical courts do not fit the defintion of state that we have been using.
Please note that the evidence already provided shows that they made laws, they judged cases, and they meted out punishment, all while holding a monopoly on violence.
The fact that I have shown these contracts to be contracts according the main elements of what makes a contract a contract also refutes your claim.
No, you have not shown that these arrangements fit the defintion of a contract. I have shown that they have not.
Again, I have shown that the parties obligated by these arrangements are not the signing parties and did not consent to the arrangement, and this is qualitatively different from a contract, which requires he consent of the obligated parties.
VS wrote:A contract (according to Ancap thought) is a binding agreement between at least two parties that has terms of enforcement that may or may not appeal to a third party for both the mediation and enforcement of said agreement.
The argument made by Ancaps is that contracts do not require the existence of state necessarily. This is the only claim made, and so long as there can exist only one single example of a contract being enforced independent of a state (as a third-party monopolist of coercion); that definition is sufficient.
Indeed, that not ALL official definitions of a contract require the state in the definition, and since multiple examples of contracts without a state have been shown to exist, there is no reason to take your position seriously.
If you wish to define a state as "any power of enforcement" then Ancaps are actually statists, or if you wish to define a contract as "something requiring a state" then Ancaps don't believe in contracts by definition, just enforceable agreements (which most people regards as contracts in colloquial terms).
Again, you claimed that a deal made between two people on a desert island is a contract. It is not. There is no legal framework to make it binding if one party does not fulfill their obligations.
You also seem to be abandoning your Webster definition for this new definition that an-caps supposedly believe. Even though such a definition does not discuss consent, which is actually a big deal for real an-caps.
Please note that you have not provided “one single example of a contract being enforced independent of a state”.
Finally, since those are not the defintions I am using for “state” or “contract”, I will dismiss that criticism as a strawman. The definition for state already used in thus thread (which I did not originally provide) included a monopoly on coercion. The definition of contract includes a system wherein the parties can be held accountable if they do not hold up their end of the bargain, or if they want to nullify the contract, or otherwise require a legal contrxt to describe how contracts are treated and judged.
VS wrote:So what? If the common thread in all said definitions are "agreement between at least two parties" and "enforceable" then that is all that is needed to vindicate the claim; though, legal definitions are suspect because they assume enforcement by the state in default (and thus beg the question).
Please note that if we include “enforceable” in the defintion, which was not in your Webster definition, then the agreemwnt made between two people on a desert island is not a contract.