Gavin23 wrote:I'd be interested in an Anarcho Capitalist explaining to me how laws would be enforced, and how this state or lack thereof would be protected from foreign aggression.
Welcome! You have come to the right place. There are quite a few of us libertarians here, about half of which are anarchists (my estimate - no formal poll).
In a libertarian anarchy (I don't like Anarcho-Capitalism for a reason that we can get into separately), there is only one fundamental law - the Non Aggression Principle. Only acts that violate the NAP count as criminal, and countered by force. Every NAP violation has a victim (the person who's rights were violated). The authority to use force ultimately comes from that victim.
Now just as most of us don't grow our own food, one would't expect the typical victim to enforce his own rights. Rather, one would expect a division of labour, whereby specialised organisations will emerge, providing the service of property right protection.
It is impossible to forecast what a market in property right protection services would look like. I have a specific model in mind, which should be treated as an illustration of one possible arrangement, with the understanding that many others are also possible.
In my model, there are several types of services being offered:
1. Passive or pre-emptive defence. That includes the equivalent of today's private security guards, but also neighbourhood patrols. Property owners, separately or (more likely) working together would hire the services of those private security firms.
2. Criminal Insurance. This is very important, as much of the crime problem is associated with its uncertain (and thus risky) character. Criminal Insurance can be seen as a close equivalent of Auto Insurance today. Similar to the latter, criminal insurance provides two separate types of protections. First, it protects victims by compensating them immediately for any losses due to criminal activity. Second, it compensate the victims of the policyholder for any damage caused by the policyholder (equivalent to 3rd party auto insurance).
3. Private Investigators. Firms specialising in identifying and collecting evidence against suspected criminals.
4. Arbitration. People are companies offering the service of arbitration over disputes. There are two modes of operation here:
a. Mutually-acceptable arbitration - the most common (and easy) case in which both sides to the dispute agree to use a given arbitrator, and to abide by their judgement.
b. One-sided arbitration - when the accused refuses to cooperate, and only the (alleged) victim appears in court.
5. Enforcement agencies. The main users of force in society, these agencies follow opinions issued by credible, respectable arbitration firms and enforce their judgement.
6. Private Jails - companies providing the service of secure accommodation and employment opportunities to convicted criminals. While superficially similar to state-run (or state-sponsored private) prisons, several major differences are noteworthy. First, a primary goal of the private jail is to allow the criminal to earn money with which to pay restitution to the victim, as well as support themselves. Second, the convicted criminal may choose amongst multiple competing (acceptably secure) "prisons". That element of choice ensures competition for comfort and productivity.
7. Information sharing agencies. Equivalent to today's credit reporting bureaus, these agencies facilitate the exchange of information regarding past criminality.
So how will the system work?
Most people will carry criminal insurance. As a victim of a crime, your first port of call is your insurance company. You report the crime and, in line with your contract with them, your insurance company compensates you for your loss (subject, perhaps, to a deductible). In return, the insurance company takes ownership over your right to claim compensation from the criminal.
The insurance company hires a private investigator to help identify, collect evidence against and, if appropriate, arrest the criminal.
We now have to distinguish several cases. The easiest (and most common) is when the criminal is also insured. In that case, the two insurance companies negotiate and reach agreement regarding both guilt and level of compensation. IF they cannot agree, they go to a mutually-acceptable arbitration firm, and subsequently abide by its decision. The terms of the agreement between the criminal and his insurance company may well stipulate that if found guilty of a voluntary crime (as opposed to causing damage by accident), the criminal would have to repay his insurance company. The company would have the right to garnish his wages and, in extreme cases, restrict him to a secure facility.
The second case is that the criminal isn't insured, but agrees with the victim's insurance company over an arbitration court. The court renders a decision that is subsequently enforced against the criminal.
The third, rarest and most complicated case involves a criminal who refuses to cooperate. In that case, the insurance company may go to a special court, present its evidence, and seek a one-sided judgement against the criminal. Naturally, that will only happen after the criminal has been awarded ample opportunity to participate in the selection of a mutually-acceptable arbitrator.
The accused criminal may well seek his own arbitration firm, and if the two firms reach contradictory conclusions, they would agree on a third firm to "break the tie".
There is much more to tell about this model, but I will address only one question here (you are welcome to ask more), namely, why would criminals wish to carry insurance in the first place?
Keep in mind that in a libertarian anarchy, all developed land areas are privately owned. Very few private landlords wish to allow criminals to enter their territory. In most cases, it is too difficult for the landlord to determine whether a given person is a potential criminal or not. The simplest solution is to insist that only people carrying valid criminal insurance are allowed in.
Thus a residential neighbourhood, a commercial district, a school or an industrial area may only allow people carrying a valid criminal insurance. Those not carrying insurance would find themselves effectively excluded from civilised society.
In fact, the prospect of such exclusion may well act as a most effective deterrent against criminality.
Your second question had to do with national defence.
Again, there is no single answer. Members of a libertarian anarchy are likely to be much better armed than people living under government rule today. They will also fiercely resist a foreign occupying force. A foreign force wouldn't have the convenient option of taking over the government of the occupied territory; they would have to fight for every house, every mile, every person.
The main goals of a foreign invading army aren't likely to be population centres so much as high value facilities, mainly banks (which store gold and other precious commodities) and industrial facilities (including mining, oil fields, etc.).
The owners of such high value targets in areas at risk of foreign occupation would have every incentive to purchase insurance and/or directly defend their assets. Thus private armies would be hired either directly by high-valued target owners or indirectly by their insurers.
Thus national defence would be comprised of both a self-help component (locally-organised militias) and a commercial, for-profit effort (paid by at-risk property owners).
I hope this gives you an initial flavour of how an anarchy can be both stable and viable.
Free men are not equal and equal men are not free.
Government is not the solution. Government is the problem.
- By Godstud
- By wat0n