[Vlerchan]

"In terms of the impact of immigration to economy-wide wage levels, Statistics Canada estimates that for every 10% increase in the population from immigration, wages in Canada are now reduced by 4% on average (with the greatest impact to more skilled workers, such as workers with post-graduate degrees whose wages are reduced by 7%)."

The paper is examining the short-run consequences of immigration. Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2011) approach the question using the same empirical design as applied to Israel and find that the consequences for workers dissipated across the medium- and long-run. I would suggest that this was a result of firms returning to the equilibrium capital-labor ratio. I would be cautious about relying too heavily on the approach used in those studies, though. They seem to only take into account the consequences for wages as a result of competition with immigrants within the same education-experience cell. If immigrants from one education-experience cell compliment another, that goes unrecognized.

This is especially problematic when you realize that incumbents tend to re-specialise when immigrants enter the labor market. Peri and Sparber (2011) find that in the United States, when high-skill immigrants enter the market, high-skill incumbents re-skill in more communication-intensive tasks, and Foged and Peri (2016) find that in Denmark, low-skill workers re-skilled into less manually-intensive occupations. In both cases, incumbents earned higher incomes as a result.

What's more, high-skill immigration seems to - at a pure economic level - improve the living standards of basically every other group through lower prices, increased output, etc. so I'm not sure what the specific issue is here, approaching it from the 'save-the-poor' approach being taken: Your paper fails to demonstrate, in and of itself, that the welfare of incumbents falls.

[...] indigenous population [...]

I always find this to be such a curious turn of phrase to describe modern native communities.

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What is your opinion on Free Trade and Interventionism as a foreign policy strategy.
If you agree with the former, but not the latter, then you are a Libertarian [Conservative].
If you agree with the former and agree with the latter, then you are a neo-Libertarian [Conservative].
If you disagree with the former, and disagree with the latter, then you are a Paleoconservative.
If you disagree with the former, but not with the latter, then you are a probably closest to what guides Trump.

[Fennec]

@mikema63,

Oh man, diversity is such a good thing for America.

http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/cama ... -final.pdf

[Fennec]

The paper is examining the short-run consequences of immigration. Cohen-Goldner and Paserman (2011) approach the question using the same empirical design as applied to Israel and find that the consequences for workers dissipated across the medium- and long-run. I would suggest that this was a result of firms returning to the equilibrium capital-labor ratio. I would be cautious about relying too heavily on the approach used in those studies, though. They seem to only take into account the consequences for wages as a result of competition with immigrants within the same education-experience cell. If immigrants from one education-experience cell compliment another, that goes unrecognized.

This is especially problematic when you realize that incumbents tend to re-specialise when immigrants enter the labor market. Peri and Sparber (2011) find that in the United States, when high-skill immigrants enter the market, high-skill incumbents re-skill in more communication-intensive tasks, and Foged and Peri (2016) find that in Denmark, low-skill workers re-skilled into less manually-intensive occupations. In both cases, incumbents earned higher incomes as a result.

What's more, high-skill immigration seems to - at a pure economic level - improve the living standards of basically every other group through lower prices, increased output, etc. so I'm not sure what the specific issue is here, approaching it from the 'save-the-poor' approach being taken: Your paper fails to demonstrate, in and of itself, that the welfare of incumbents falls.


I always find this to be such a curious turn of phrase to describe modern native communities.

---

What is your opinion on Free Trade and Interventionism as a foreign policy strategy.
If you agree with the former, but not the latter, then you are a Libertarian [Conservative].
If you agree with the former and agree with the latter, then you are a neo-Libertarian [Conservative].
If you disagree with the former, and disagree with the latter, then you are a Paleoconservative.
If you disagree with the former, but not with the latter, then you are a probably closest to what guides Trump.

I care about culture and homogeneity. I'll gladly pay $200 more for a smartphone. I'll gladly pay more for goods and services in general as opposed to dealing with the consequences of "diversity".

But since we're on the topic of economics, there are other economic variables I've taken into account from years ago:

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-c ... -1.1366906

Two studies here detailing the fiscal burden of immigration in Canada -

1.) Fraser Institute - $20 billion per year.
2.) SFU - $2 billion per year.

What's the difference between the two studies? The Fraser Institute is more reliable.

-The Fraser study picked 1987 as a date of analysis. Metropolis British Columbia picked 1970 as a date of analysis.
-What is the relevance of a base year? The Fraser study picked 1987 because that's the year Canada's immigration system was being revamped. By picking 1987 the Fraser study is demarcating a difference between a pre and post 1987 immigration system. This effectually compares two different immigration systems to make arguments for what worked and what did not and to suggest how we can fix it. The Metropolis study dates back to 1970 and lumps everything into a single immigration system. By doing so, all the costs of the current immigration system can be masked or ameliorated by previous cohorts of immigrants who brought value to the nation instead of mostly absorbing the benefits. Essentially, MBC (SFU) did not like the results of the argument so they changed the parameters until they satisfied their position. The 1970's immigration system was more selective , had smaller intake levels which was influenced by the nation's economic prospects. Today anyone from anywhere regardless of the economy may enter.

In 2012 24 Billion Left Canada.

https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2014 ... to_it.html

I can list more studies detailing the economic issues, but this post would then turn into one giant TDLR. And as I said, I care less about economic reasons and more about not being relegated to a minority status - which will, without a doubt happen in my lifetime in Canada (Vancouver, Toronto)

[Vlerchan]

I care about culture and homogeneity. I'll gladly pay $200 more for a smartphone. I'll gladly pay more for goods and services in general as opposed to dealing with the consequences of "diversity".

Your concern for the poor working-class didn't last long, did it.

What's the difference between the two studies? The Fraser Institute is more reliable.

The paper rather explicitly connects these outcomes to inefficiencies in the Canadian immigration system itself. It's also unfortunate that it doesn't distinguish between the costs of non-refugee immigrants and immigrants, otherwise. Though, the quantitative assessments in all these papers are terrible, in general; they're built more on a reflection of economic first principals than rigorous quantitative analysis: I can accept that the direction of the fiscal consequences of immigrants, in Canada, is probably in the red, though I am more than skeptical of the amount cited.

Nevertheless, to return to the first point, I don't disagree that the immigration system can in Canada could be better established: Your argument rests on it currently being poorly established and not on the inherent characteristics of mass-migration.

And as I said, I care less about economic reasons and more about not being relegated to a minority status - which will, without a doubt happen in my lifetime in Canada (Vancouver, Toronto).

Sure. I'm not disputing that some people may feel uncomfortable about their brown neighbors.

I am also not disputing, on a less trivial note, that diversity may pose adverse consequences for social capital - or neighborhood-level trust. Though, Putnam's argument was that this persisted in the short-run but across the long-run the impact was ambiguous and required further study. If I recall correctly, Putnam wrote a follow-up paper which addressed the manner in which his research was being falsely directed to make claims about long-run impacts.

Furthermore, it is worth noting that Putnam (2007, pp. 152) reports that, 1. an increase in the percentage owning their homes at a neighborhood level, and 2. an increase in the percentage of those with bachelors degrees at a neighborhood level, both had a larger adverse affect on social capital than an increase in the number of non-white immigrants. So, let's not pretend that, conditional on their being benefits to an activities - i.e. higher levels of college-completion, higher levels of home-ownership*, we are not willing to accept losses in our stock of short-run social capital for their exchange.

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* In this case, the more recent evidence that immigration induces wage gains, the more shaky evidence that it can positively affect the efficiency of R&D activities, etc. Since there's a concentration on Putnam here his proposal was,

Since the long-run benefits of immigration and diversity are often felt at the national level (scientific creativity, fiscal dividends, and so forth), whereas the short-run costs (fragile communities, educational and health costs, for example) are often concentrated at the local level, there is a strong case for national aid to affected localities.

(ibid, pp. 164)

His actual argument was that we were failing to harness our stock of high-skill immigrants as efficiently as we possibly could, and not as seems to be commonly suggested that we should restrict the inflows of immigrants into our countries. His own suggestion follows the typically highlighted suggestion when it comes to dealing with the losers from trade - i.e. subsidizing them through transfers from the winners. I agree, you can construct that argument from his findings, though lacking a prejudices against immigrants, it would seem worthwhile to explore potential avenues for reform, otherwise. That is something your argument has consistently lacked.