[Igor Antunov]

ISLAMABAD: China’s acquisition of a strategic port in Pakistan is the latest addition to its drive to secure energy and maritime routes and gives it a potential naval base in the Arabian Sea, unsettling India.

The Pakistani cabinet on January 30 approved the transfer of Gwadar port, a commercial failure cut off from the national road network, from Singapore’s PSA International to the state-owned China Overseas Port Holdings Limited.

The Pakistanis pitched the deal as an energy and trade corridor that would connect China to the Arabian Sea and Strait of Hormuz, a gateway for a third of the world’s traded oil, overland through an expanded Karakoram Highway.

Experts say it would slash thousands of kilometers off the distance oil and gas imports from Africa and the Middle East have to be transported to reach China, making Gwadar a potentially vital link in its supply chain.

China paid about 75 percent of the initial $250 million used to build the port, but in 2007 PSA International won a 40-year lease with then-ruler Pervez Musharraf who was reportedly unwilling to upset Washington by giving it to the Chinese.

Although it may take up to a year for the deal to be signed, Gwadar would be the most westerly in a string of Chinese-funded ports encircling its big regional rival, India, which was quick to express concern over the impending transfer.

In Nepal, China is building a $14 million “dry port” at Larcha, near the Tibet border, along with five other ports and is upgrading transport links with an eye to the huge Indian market.

In Bangladesh, China is interested in building a $5-billion deep-sea port at Sonadia island in the Bay of Bengal, according to the shipping ministry.

Beijing is also a key backer of a port and energy pipeline in Myanmar that will transport gas pumped offshore and oil shipped from Africa and the Middle East to China’s Yunnan province, due to be finished by the end of May.

The ports were dubbed China’s “string of pearls”, or potential naval bases similar to those of the United States, in a 2004 report for the Pentagon.

But some analysts now pour cold water on suggestions that Beijing is scouting for naval bases in the Indian Ocean.

Andrew Small, an expert on China-Pakistan relations, believes that most of Beijing’s concerns can be resolved through cooperation, as seen in anti-piracy exercises in the Gulf of Aden that last year included drills with the US.

“Plenty of Indian naval strategists are highly skeptical of the likelihood of many of the locations... actually being used as military facilities by China,” Small said.

But Small believes that Gwadar is the mostly likely port to be developed by China for use by the Pakistan Navy, and potentially their own.

When asked about Gwadar, Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said Beijing supports “jointly undertaken matters which are conducive to Chinese-Pakistani friendship and to the development and prosperity of Pakistan.”

Other Pakistani experts suggest that Islamabad is more likely to give the Chinese navy access to its existing naval bases of Karachi or Qasim.

But Fazul-ul-Rehman, former director of the China Studies Center at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad, dismisses the prospect of China going to war in the Indian Ocean and calls Indian concern “propaganda”.

He says China has become more cautious about big investment projects in Pakistan due to security concerns. Taliban, sectarian and separatist violence blight Baluchistan, the southwestern province around Gwadar.

As a result, Rehman says there is a long way to go on China-Pakistan economic cooperation and emphasises that Gwadar will be a long-term project with Beijing looking for future alternatives to shipping routes for its oil and gas imports.

http://www.manilatimes.net/~manilati/in ... n-pakistan


Drastic shortcut for trade with the Middle East by the looks of it, and a way to station naval assets closer to the region.

[Political Interest]

This is an example of further Chinese strategic expansion. It will be interesting to watch to what extent this continues over the years. This is also significant for several reasons. Most obvious among them is that it shows China is extending its influence throughout Asia and if a naval base is built it will allow them to project power further. In addition a base so near the Middle East would mean China could further influence affairs in that region. Let us consider the fact that the Mediterranean countries are the West's door to the Middle East, a base in Pakistan could serve this purpose for China. Moreover this is especially significant considering the ties between China and Iran. It also suggests that Pakistan is possibly moving further into the Chinese and out of the American camp. Considering relations between Iran and Pakistan have improved one wonders if a Tehran-Islamabad-Beijing axis will be created. If Iraq and Afghanistan fall under further Iranian influence then these two countries could possibly also be influenced by China.

[Sithsaber]

Isn't the taliban firmly against Iran?

[Political Interest]

Isn't the taliban firmly against Iran?

Yes but there is some discussion about the fact that they may be cooperating, however it is not known for certain. This may complicate issues.

[Sithsaber]

Is this Saddam loves Al Qaeda bullshit or has the al quds force been using kabul as a training ground against americans?

[Travesty]

I doubt that the Taliban (which is mostly in Pakistan fighting Pakistani authorities) would be a significant factor in Pakistan-Iranian relations. The Taliban is a pawn not a palyer.

[Political Interest]

Is this Saddam loves Al Qaeda bullshit or has the al quds force been using kabul as a training ground against americans?

No, it is not. We should not dismiss any possibility.

[Sithsaber]

Nor should we be easily swayed by logical fallacies (see Iraq)

[fuser]

China had been trying to get those ports for some time now and from what I have read they will be an outpost to look after Chinese investments in east Africa. No need to raise any alarms here.

[Far-Right Sage]

The Quds Force hasn't been using Kabul as the Taliban has no current weight in Kabul and Karzai's position toward the Iranians has been neutral since his installation, but it is fair to say that only ideology would prevent cooperation between Iran and Afghanistan in the event that Karzai is killed and a Taliban state returns to power after NATO's withdrawal. The Taliban was executing Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif at the height of the Afghan Civil War, but the Taliban was also receiving American financial assistance as recently as the late 90's, so it is safe to say that nothing remains static in international relations.

More importantly, more strategic Iranian and Pakistani cooperation on matters such as who to support in Afghanistan with a Chinese blessing would be extremely troublesome for India, and herald the imminent decline of Indian influence in Afghanistan which already will begin to wane the moment Western ground forces pull out of Afghan soil and Karzai becomes another Najibullah in waiting.