- 29 Oct 2023 01:31
#15293206
Here is a quote from an article regarding deterrence theory and how interests also plays a part in deterrence. This also reminds me of Game Theory in which in both economic bargaining, negotiating and in the case of deterrence between nations, making threat credible in the eyes of your adversary is important too. You have to make a threat that is actually credible. They touch on the concept of credible threats in this article below.
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articl ... index.html
Michael Rühle of NATO Review wrote:Deterrence is making a comeback. Perceived by many as a mere relic of the Cold War, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has hastened its resurrection. However, the debate over the past months as to how best to deter Russia reveals that 20 years of neglect have taken their toll. Much of what was once considered basic knowledge on deterrence appears to have evaporated. What, then, is deterrence? What can it achieve – and what can it not?
Deterrence is the threat of force in order to discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action. This can be achieved through the threat of retaliation (deterrence by punishment) or by denying the opponent’s war aims (deterrence by denial). This simple definition often leads to the conclusion that all it takes to deter is to put enough force on display. As long as both sides act “rationally”, i.e. according to a cost-benefit calculus, and if none of them is suicidal, their military potentials will keep each other in check.
If only it were so easy. History abounds with examples of deterrence failing despite a balance of forces, and even cases in which the weaker side attacked the stronger. In some cases, the weaker side banked on the element of surprise. The military leadership of Imperial Japan, for example, was fully aware of US military superiority. But if a surprise attack on the Pearl Harbor naval base would destroy a major part of the US Pacific Fleet while paralysing Washington politically, Japan might stand a chance of prevailing. In 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked the militarily superior Israel – not because they hoped to win, but because they wanted to re-establish the political clout they had lost after Israel had defeated them in the 1967 Six-Day-War. Israel had not seen the attack coming: why would two militarily inferior countries even think of attacking an opponent that was certain to emerge victorious? This self-assuredness led Israel to ignore the many warning signals about a pending attack. As a result, the rapidly advancing armies of Egypt and Syria were initially much more successful than expected. Military superiority had not ensured deterrence.
Another important example for the pitfalls of deterrence is provided by the 1982 Falklands War. Argentina, which contests the United Kingdom’s authority over the islands in the South Atlantic, knew only too well about the superiority of the British armed forces. However, over the course of several decades the UK had gradually been reducing its military protection for the islands. Thus, while London kept emphasising that the Falklands were British, the military Junta in Buenos Aires became convinced that such statements were mere lip service. When the Junta faced a domestic crisis that threatened its rule, it tried to generate support by stirring patriotic feelings and occupied the islands. Deterrence had failed because the United Kingdom had ignored an important factor. Striking a tough pose while at the same time reducing the means to make good on it undermines one of deterrence’s most important ingredients: credibility. The story did not end there, however. Much to Argentina’s surprise, the British Navy sailed to the South Atlantic and re-conquered the islands. General Galtieri, the Chief of Argentina’s military Junta, later admitted that he never believed that a European country would be ready to pay such a high price for a few insignificant islands so far away. Argentina, too, had miscalculated.
But could Galtieri and his fellow countrymen not have guessed that a proud nation like the United Kingdom would not stand idly by as part of her overseas territory was being occupied by another power? Should one not have known that remaining passive would have spelled the end for any British government? The answer: yes, in normal times Argentina may well have pondered such scenarios. However, in a crisis humans tend to think along a different kind of logic. Indeed, many studies about human behaviour demonstrate that people who fear to lose something valuable are ready to take greater risks than those who hope to make a gain. In the context of the Falklands War, this means that for the Junta, which was under siege politically, occupying the “Malvinas” was not about a gain, but rather about avoiding losing power. This made them take risks they otherwise would not have dared to take. Rationality – a precondition for a stable deterrence system – had evaporated.
Looking at Russian domestic politics today, the lessons of 1982 are worth reconsidering: stirring nationalism in order to generate political support may lead one to military adventurism which can be self-defeating.
All these cases demonstrate that deterrence is not just about military balances, but also about interests. If the opponent’s interest in achieving a certain objective is higher than one’s own, deterrence may fail. A classic example is the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. When it became clear that Washington was ready to defend its core security interests, the Soviet Union withdrew the missiles it had started to deploy in Cuba. Another example is the Vietnam War. Although the United States was militarily far superior, it ultimately had to withdraw because the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong were willing to make much greater sacrifices to achieve their goals than the US was willing to make in support of South Vietnam. This asymmetric set of interests not only makes deterrence fail, it also makes big powers lose small wars.
But what about nuclear deterrence? Should the fear of the enormous destructive power of such weapons not be enough to virtually guarantee deterrence? The answer to this question is the same as to the “conventional” examples cited above: even in the nuclear domain, deterrence depends on the interests that one seeks to protect. If a nation’s existence is at stake, the use of nuclear weapons is credible. Accordingly, deterrence between nuclear weapons states is considered to be relatively “stable”. By contrast, extending one’s national nuclear deterrence to allies is much more complicated. As British Defence Minister Denis Healey put it in the 1960s, one only needed five per cent credibility to deter the Russians, but 95 per cent to reassure the Europeans. Despite this “Healey Theorem”, however, extended nuclear deterrence has become a central pillar of international order. This is not only the case for NATO, but also for the Asia-Pacific region, where Japan, South Korea and Australia are under the US “nuclear umbrella”.
It is moot to speculate whether the United States would indeed be willing to risk nuclear escalation in order to protect an Ally. What counts is the political signal that Washington views the security of its Allies as a fundamental national security interest. However, such a message will only be convincing if the US is militarily present in those regions that is claims to defend. This ensures that in a conflict Washington will be involved from the start. Without such a presence, neither Allies nor opponents would perceive such a nuclear commitment as credible.
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articl ... index.html
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