I want to try to clarify some things
The quote from Albert
This whole thing that consent can be withdrawn during sex is nothing but nonsense.
is plainly false in terms that people do change their minds and can for what ever reason go from wanting sex to not wanting it.
But I think one could already see that it would be ridiculous to believe people don't change their minds that could have already predicted that Albert was going to be talking about a situation in which someone changes their mind but doesn't communicate it and whether this is considered rape or not.
So I'll summarize that a man having sex with such an uncommunicative woman isn't going to be convicted of rape and its difficult to even imagine without further details why it would even be conceived as rape or even experienced as rape.
Because it seems odd that a woman just out of no where changes her mind and if she does change her mind then one would expect her to communicate it as women aren't just silent for no reason unless we consider there to be some sort of coercion or force that reasonably prevents her.
And if she chose to be silent without coercion, it likely to even be experienced as rape to the woman.
With vague language of her 'not wanting it', is probably in terms of her being okay with having sex but perhaps finding it unpleasant and tolerating it. Like a woman who perhaps doesn't give feedback to a partner who is doing a shit job (bad sex), which women is quite different to being raped even if unpleasant.
There is a onus on the woman to communicate when there is reasonable belief that consensual sex is being engaged with otherwise it would indeed result in the ridiculous conclusion that rape has occurred in a hypothetical example of a woman that without any motive changes her mind on wanting to have sex at all and is without anything to reasonable compel her silence doesn't communicate the change in her want to her partner.
Silence is only significant to consent in regards to what we consider sufficient conditions for a woman to meaningfully consent to something.
So that we might consider something rape for the severity of coerciveness whilst something else isn't.
The difference between a woman who sleeps with someone for fear of violence versus someone who sleeps with their boyfriend because they're afraid they'll be insulted/yelled at.https://kb.osu.edu/bitstream/handle/1811/72856/OSJCL_V2N1_333.pdf
The controlling issue in such cases, therefore, is not a factual question as to whether the women really want to have sex when they acquiesce under the pressure of circumstances-because they both do and do notbut a normative question as to whether in choosing sexual intercourse for themselves, they do so with the freedom the statute at hand regards as sufficient to leave the decision to them. Once one answers the latter question, one also knows what kinds of resistance they are and are not required to mount
To illustrate, recall Stella who felt forced to go along with her boyfriend's desire for sexual intercourse rather than be cursed. Did Stella really want to have sexual intercourse with her boyfriend? She did and she did not. She did not want to have sexual intercourse with her boyfriend when she was pushing his hands away from her underwear, because at that moment, she preferred physical resistance to sexual intercourse. Nor did she want it at the very moment of sexual intercourse, because she would not have gone along with him then if she had not been afraid of being cursed. Yet she also did want it at the very moment of sexual intercourse, because at that moment she preferred sexual intercourse to the alternative of being cursed. The legally-interesting question in Stella's case is not whether she actually consented to sexual intercourse in the context of feeling coerced-because, given that she decided to submit, she clearly did-but whether she prescriptively consented. The answer to the latter question has nothing to do with what Stella was thinking or what she expressed herself to be thinking. It has to do with the kinds of freedom the jurisdiction at hand believes women ought to possess for purposes of their sexual integrity.
And this is what relates to people calling prostitution rape in that they would emphasize the financial coercion involved in the circumstances for many prostitutes that undermines the sort of freedom thought necessary for minimum standard of sexual acts not to be criminal.
It's not that everyone who has sex for money is necessarily raped but the conditions that is predominant among those who do in actuality have sex for money who are desperate and lacking self direction in their own lives and are instead directed by the desperation of their circumstances.
The difficulty there of course is that we live in capitalist economy the world over where such financial coercion is normative to provide a 'service', to do a 'job' and not ultimately wrong by the standards of the economy no matter how much it offends any human and moral sensibility.
Where having sex for money becomes abstracted of its particularly and is seen like any other kind of work for money (ie abstract labor
And as far as I know affirmative consent
hasn't become the norm to rape/sexual assault cases, although might be garnering favor in the oddity that is Colleges adjudicating criminal matters in the US